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remember years ago, Joe, sitting with you at the coffee shop in Hingham right after I 
finished my comps. You encouraged me to get my first chapter to you by Christmas. Six 
or seven Christmases have passed since then, but now you have all my chapters (and 
more) – before Christmas. 
Third, I want to thank my other committee members who walked with me on this 
journey. You advised me, read and commented on my work, offered encouragement and 
friendship, and most of all, stuck with me. David, you are a gentleman and a scholar. You 
warned me about the difficulty of finding documents. You were right. I replayed that 
warning over in my head countless times, as I hovered over boxes of dusty documents in 
archives. Without your peerless Cold War critique, this dissertation would not be as 
historically accurate as it is. Andy, at my Proposal defense, you warned me to “go narrow 
and go deep.” You will never know how many times those words and your voice rolled 
around in my head as I researched, wrote, edited, and narrowed again and again. Still, as I 
submit this to you, I know of places where it should be cut some more and, yes, 
strengthened in other places. Thank you for your warning, but more for your support. 
Many times when I stopped by your office, you asked me to give you a “SIT REP”. Well 
here it is – done! Nancy, thank you for coming on board and giving yourself to this 
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my defense. Nancy, you taught my very first class at BU – Sociology of Religion. Since 
then, we have enjoyed many conversations and times together. I am sincerely indebted to 
you. Harvey, I am grieved that you can’t read this now. Your eyes have dimmed, but your 
mind and heart are still bright and vibrant. I look forward to dropping by your house and 
reading these words to you. As I explain in the Preface, this whole project began in your 
class at Harvard Divinity School. You inspired me, challenged me, and befriended me. 
You agreed to be on my committee and to accept a “temporary appointment to BU” to 
participate in my Proposal defense. I remember that made you very proud, which pleased 
me. Since then we have talked and you have shared valuable insights, like your story of 
walking back and forth through Checkpoint Charlie in Berlin during the tense days of the 
early Cold War. Harvey, my life is so much richer from the times I spent with you in and 
out of the classroom – memories I will always cherish. 
Third, there are many people at BU and Harvard that walked with me along the 
way, making the journey more meaningful and enjoyable. Thank you to each one of you 
for your contribution to my life – Bill Grimes, Joe Nye, Fr. Bryan Hehir, Monica Duffy 
Toft, Dana Robert, Adil Najam, Mary Elizabeth Moore, Jeremy Menchik, Min Ye, Cathy 
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many years. Without you, we never would have made it to Hingham or survived in 
Boston. We owe you a lot! Now there is time for hiking and boating without the sword of 
Damocles hanging over my head. 
Most of all, I want to express my thanks to my family, without whom none of this 
would have been possible. Mom and Dad, I wish you were here to read this document. 
You kept wondering when it was going to be finished. I’m sorry it took so long. I miss 
you both very much and know that you are beaming with pride as you look down on me – 
“that’s my boy!” On the day of my defense, I will be thinking of you knowing you are 
watching. 
To my kids – Lindsey and Edward, Ashley and Matt, and Hayley and Felipe – I 
appreciate your words of encouragement, your texts and emojis, your interest in my 
writing, your concern for my health, and your prayers. But more than all that, I love who 
you are – all of you – and the meaning that you give to my life each and every day. To 
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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation examines the U.S. government’s covert use of religion during 
the Cold War. The research investigates, “How and why did the U.S. government 
instrumentalize and operationalize religion in the Cold War as a part of its covert 
intelligence operations?” The inquiry utilizes an historical methodology interweaving the 
academic disciplines of history, religious studies, and international relations. Archival 
research from sixteen government, national security, university, religious and private 
archives, as well as personal interviews, provides the foundation for the narrative. 
Prior to this dissertation, no published work has attempted to present a 
comprehensive examination of covert operations and religion during the Cold War. 
Snippets and stories appear in the literature of the Cold War, as well as the memoirs of 
intelligence operatives. Studies on religion and missionary activity during the Cold War 
era reveal the involvement of religious leaders in clandestine activities. However, no 




This dissertation begins with an overview of religion and spying leading up to 
World War II and the creation of the US Office of Strategic Services (OSS), where the 
US government first employed religion as a covert tool. At war’s end, former OSS agents 
entered the newly formed Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), bringing with them the 
expertise and networks necessary to operationalize religion in clandestine activities. CIA 
officials like Allen Dulles, Kermit Roosevelt, Miles Copeland, William Eddy and James 
Jesus Angleton did not hesitate to use religion as a transactional tool. In addition, 
American clergymen, missionaries, and evangelist Billy Graham covertly collaborated 
with the CIA. U.S. presidents, the National Security Council, the CIA and other 
intelligence agencies were actively involved in formulating policies that weaponized 
religion. 
The term “blowback” refers to the “unintended consequences” of covert 
operations. The term was first used by the CIA in its official history of Operation 
TPAJAX – the 1953 Iran coup d’état overthrowing Mossadegh – where religion was used 
by the CIA. During the Cold War, religion in covert operations produced for the US 








The journey of Blowback of the Gods began with “The Search for a Moslem Billy 
Graham.” I was taking a course at Harvard Divinity School with eminent theologian, 
Harvey Cox. His course – “Islam through Western Christian Eyes” – explored how 
western Christianity shaped and many times skewed the historical narrative about Islam.1 
One of the assigned readings for the course was Michael Oren’s book, Power, Faith and 
Fantasy: America in the Middle East 1776 to the Present. Buried deep in the latter half of 
the book is a section on the Cold War and the actions of President Harry Truman toward 
the Arab world. A seemingly immaterial sentence in the middle of a paragraph snared me 
with a eureka moment: “[Truman] consequently assigned Kermit Roosevelt and other 
CIA agents to identify an Egyptian nationalist figure, a ‘Moslem Billy Graham,’ who 
could restore order in the country and enroll it in a NATO-like Middle East Defense 
Organization (MEDO).”2 
This was the first time that I had ever heard of “The Search for a Moslem Billy 
Graham” – an alluring amalgamation of Islam, Billy Graham, and CIA covert operations 
during the Cold War. This claim that in Egypt in the 1950s there was a CIA operation 
with this name intrigued me, particularly given my religious background and experiences 
                                                 
1 Harvard Divinity School, Class #2544, Spring 2009. 
2 Michael B. Oren, Power, Faith, and Fantasy: America in the Middle East 1776 to the Present (New 
York: W.W. Norton, 2007), 508. See Appendix 2 for more information on Michael Oren and the 
book. Oren cites several sources for his statement, see p. 685 note 2. It is doubtful that President 
Truman ordered the “Search for a Moslem Billy Graham” as Oren implies in his statement. Multiple 
sources ascribe a different provenance for this CIA operation, discussed in Chapter 5 of this book. 
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with the Billy Graham organization. Immediately, I dug deep into Oren’s claim, cross-
referenced his citations, and read various accounts about the “Moslem Billy Graham” 
operation. I soon discovered that the story, as widely quoted, originated in the captivating 
tales of CIA agent Miles Copeland. However, in reading various authors, I discovered 
holes and contradictions in the yarn spun by Copeland. 3 
My inquisitiveness deepened to the point that I was inspired to write a research 
paper on the subject for Professor Cox’s class. “The Search for a Moslem Billy Graham” 
sounded like it came straight out of a spy novel: a CIA covert operation in Egypt in the 
early Cold War, two competing religions – Islam and Christianity, an Egyptian nationalist 
leader and an American televangelist, and a power struggle for dominance in the Middle 
East. Throughout my graduate studies, I returned to the story repeatedly, searching 
broadly and deeply for information and answers. When the time came to choose a topic 
for my dissertation, the choice to me was obvious, and the journey of Blowback of the 
Gods began. 
My examination of historical sources soon revealed that the “Moslem Billy 
Graham” was not the only CIA covert operation involving religious themes, elements or 
actors. There was the story of Robert Mandelstam and “Occultism in High Places,” which 
purportedly played a role in the coup d’état that overthrew Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana in 
1966. There was the revelation that three generations of American missionaries from the 
same family in northern Thailand and Laos were on the CIA payroll for decades and 
                                                 
3 See “Appendix 3: Excursus on Miles Copeland’s Reliability as a Source” for a detailed discussion of 
the reliability of Copeland’s books, articles and stories as primary source material. 
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integral to the CIA-backed heroin operations in the region. There was the story of the 
1975 US Senate’s Frank Church Committee investigation into missionaries used as 
covert operatives by the CIA, a subsequent directive from CIA director George H. W. 
Bush ordering a halt to the practice, and the reality that the process continued under 
several subsequent CIA directors. When the CIA sought to end some of the missionaries’ 
contracts, the ecclesiastics threatened to sue the CIA to get their money.4 
The story of religion and CIA covert operations in the Cold War is not singular. It 
is an overlooked slice of the larger religion and Cold War history, a sub-discipline of 
Cold War Studies only recently gaining credence. Cambridge University Professor of 
History Andrew Preston states, “Long mired in obscurity, the role of religion in the Cold 
War is now an important aspect of international history.”5 A comprehensive review of the 
literature in the field reveals a legitimate lacuna for the religion and covert operations 
story.6 Moreover, conversations with distinguished scholars of the Cold War and the CIA 
–  John Prados (National Security Archives), Mark Kramer (Harvard University Cold 
War Studies Program), Burton Gerber (Georgetown University), Loch K. Johnson 
(University of Georgia), William Inboden (University of Texas at Austin), Diane Kirby 
(University of Ulster), Sarah-Jane Corke (Dalhousie University), Hugh Wilford 
(California State University, Long Beach), and Michael Warner (former CIA Historian) – 
                                                 
4 Chapters 2, 3 & 5 provide the details of these examples. 
5 Andrew Preston, “The Religious Cold War,” in Religion and the Cold War, ed. Phillip E. 
Muehlenbeck (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 2012), xi. See Appendix 2 for more detail on 
this point. 
6 See Appendix 2: Literature Review. 
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confirmed that the story is real, but substantially unexplored. Many of these scholars 
encountered stories of CIA covert activities and religion during research for their own 
books on the Cold War and expressed “regret” that they did not have time to follow the 
clues to their conclusion. 7 
 In the course of my own investigation into CIA covert activities, I quickly came 
across the term ‘blowback.’ It is a word and concept coined in intelligence circles to 
convey the reality of the “unintended consequences” of covert operations.8 Based on the 
imagery of 19th century muzzle-loaded arms, ‘blowback’ is the “escape backward of 
burned gunpowder after a shot.”9 In one word, intelligence services captured the surprise, 
the failure, and the damage of covert operations gone wrong. In looking for instances of 
operations involving religion during my research, I ran across numerous examples of 
“unintended consequences.” Why? Was it the nature and power of religion? Was it the 
ignorance of CIA agents operationalizing a metaphysical tool? Was it the zeal and 
passion of religiously observant government officials and CIA operatives to be 
instruments of God in the Cold War clash between god-fearing Americans and godless 
Communists? Whatever the origin, a number of covert operations utilizing religion 
produced ‘blowback.’ Thus, in a moment of epiphany, the title of this project was born – 
Blowback of the Gods.  
                                                 
7 See Appendix 2 for further detail on these scholars and this point. 
8 See Appendix 1: Excursus on the Provenance of ‘Blowback’ for a detailed discussion of the origins 
of the word. It comes from the British Intelligence Services and not the CIA as is popularly believed.  




The structure of this dissertation is as an historical book for publication. The 
content and chapters of this document meet all the requirements of a BU PhD 
dissertation. However, my concern in the writing was “telling the story,” not merely 
proving what I learned in my research – advice given to me by an editor at Oxford 
University Press. The story rests on solid, academic, primary-source research. It contains 
all the structural and analytic elements expected in a serious scholarly work. To 
accomplish this dual purpose, I have used this Preface and the Appendices to provide and 
expound in detail on the more traditional elements and questions of a PhD dissertation. 
Blowback of the Gods is a deep-dive into the waters of religion and covert 
operations. In researching and writing this book, I sought to avoid the rocks of ancillary 
subjects, as well as the siren song of expediency. This book is not a comprehensive 
history on the subject; there are elements and people in the story that invite further 
inquiry and covert operations yet-to-be discovered.10 
The labyrinthine process for obtaining historical documents and information for 
this project significantly lengthened the timeline of its completion. First, the official CIA 
FOIA process for requesting declassification of documents takes a minimum of 1½ to 2 
years; sometimes the process, with appeals, can take upwards of 3 years, often with 
negligible or even zero results. This maddening reality for all researchers of US 
government intelligence activities. Documentary evidence is hard to acquire. The CIA 
                                                 
10 I hope that this book will raise issues and questions that will spur researchers in years to come to 
continue the investigation of the issue of the CIA’s use of religion in clandestine activities, 
particularly with the declassification and discovery of more documents. 
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credits the delay in fulfilling FOIA requests to limited personnel and resources. However, 
more than one historian speculates that the delays are a sub-rosa scheme to discourage 
and dissuade historians from pursuing CIA documents. The second factor affecting the 
length of the research phase of this project was the accessibility of the CIA’s CREST 
files at the National Archives in College Park, Maryland. As of January 2017, the CREST 
files were, for the first time, made accessible online; however, for the greater part of this 
project I could only access these files in person, in a dedicated room, from a dedicated 
computer, at NARA II.11 Third, primary source materials declassified under the “25-Year 
Program Archive” of the US government were best available in collections at Presidential 
Libraries and papers housed in academic and private archives, spread around the country. 
They took time to visit. In the end, I visited and accessed files from sixteen different 
libraries and archives. As well, I conducted personal interviews.12  
“Appendix 2: Literature Review” contains an examination of the sources and 
documents used in my research. The materials cover four germane areas: (1) those 
dealing broadly with religion and the Cold War; (2) those investigating the CIA and 
covert operations; (3) the personal memoirs and histories of relevant CIA operatives, 
                                                 
11 For more details on the difficulties with the CIA FOIA process and the CREST archives, see 
Appendix 2. 
12 See Appendix 2 for details on finding primary source documents for this book. Regarding the 25-
Year Program Archive: “The automatic declassification provisions of Executive Order 13526 
(formerly EO 12958, as amended) require the declassification of nonexempt historically valuable 
records 25 years or older. . . . The requirement to automatically declassify records 25 years or older 
"rolls" forward one year at a time.” “CREST: 25-Year Program Archive,” CIA Online Library, 
accessed September 25, 2017, https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/collection/crest-25-year-
program-archive. “Freedom of Information Act Electronic Reading Room,” CIA Online Library, 
accessed September 25, 2017, https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/. See also Appendix 2 for 
more detail on this point. 
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government officials and religious leaders; and (4) relevant archival materials and 
government documents. This extensive literature review not only opens the window to 
my research sources and processes, it seeks to answer some of the logical questions and 
objections that might arise about the evidence. 
Questions for Investigation 
The central research question that drove my investigation throughout this project 
is the following: “How and, more importantly, why did the U.S. government 
instrumentalize and operationalize religion in the Cold War as a part of its covert 
intelligence operations?” Based on my education in religion, history, political science and 
international affairs, I had several hypotheses regarding why the US government might 
have acted in this way: 
1. The use of religion was a natural offshoot of the broader American religious 
milieu of the 1940s, 50s, and 60s. 
2. The use of religion was a domestic political mechanism to powerfully frame 
the Cold War narrative and America’s life-and-death political struggle with 
the USSR in terms of good versus evil, god-fearing America versus godless 
Communists. 
3. The use of religion was a strategic policy decision at the highest levels of the 
US government deemed necessary to counteract the USSR co-opting religion 
for its own ends.  
4. The use of religion was a functional, transactional, instrumental effort by the 
CIA to exploit one of many cultural tools available in regions that had a 
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dominant religious culture. (The determinative factor in this case is the 
religious nature of the target country.) 
5. The use of religion was a functional, transactional, instrumental effort by the 
CIA to utilize religion as one of the cultural tools available in its own toolbox 
of tricks for psychological and covert operations. (The determinative factor in 
this case is the toolbox available to the CIA for a particular operation, not the 
religious nature of the target country.) 
6. The use of religion reflected the personal religious convictions of US 
government leaders, which, intentionally or unintentionally, filtered into 
public policy decisions and actions. 
7. The use of religion reflected the personal religious beliefs and practices of 
CIA agents, which therefore influenced their choice of operational 
methodologies. 
8. The use of religion was a necessary political ingredient in the post-colonial 
50s and 60s. Some countries emerging from colonialism chose religious actors 
to lead them. Other countries saw status quo leaders opposed by religiously 
influenced rebel groups in the struggle for independence. 
9. The use of religion was a natural patriotic response by American religious 
actors who sought to be loyal to their country and to neutralize the growing 
anti-religious influence and persecutions of communist governments. 
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10. The use of religion in the Cold War was the natural byproduct of the 
engagement of religious actors and communities during WWII by Hitler, 
Stalin, and the OSS. 
11. Americans learned how to use religion in covert operations from the British, 
whose exploitation of religious, cultural and ethnic disparities in the colonial 
era by “divide-and-conquer” methodologies is well known. 
12. Some combination of the above. 
13. Some unknown X factor. 
Crucial questions drove my research into these hypotheses: Did the US 
government and its agencies, in fact, intentionally instrumentalize religion during the 
Cold War and seek to use it as a tool of covert operations in executing US foreign policy? 
If so, where did these initiatives originate – in the White House, the State Department, the 
CIA, or with individual operatives? Were they officially sanctioned operations, rogue 
efforts by quasi-independent agents or targets of opportunity by religiously persuaded 
actors? 
Did the religious covert operations reflect the official policy of the US 
government in fighting the Cold War? Were they a reaction and response to the conduct 
of other governments and their intelligence services, particularly the USSR? Were they 
an effort to counteract and exploit the anti-religious nature of communist doctrine? Or 
were they simply functional and cultural mechanisms employed to engage peoples and 
societies that were by nature highly religious? Were the US operations theologically 
motivated and executed, or were they strictly non-sectarian and transactional in nature? 
 
 xxii 
Did the CIA employ experts on religion in shaping their religious covert 
operations in the same way that they employ experts in science, mathematics, electronics, 
chemistry and psychology? Or did the CIA choose to operationalize something as volatile 
as religion without expert guidance? Did the post-WWII religious milieu of the United 
States influence the decisions of top government officials to engage in religiously imbued 
operations? Did the personal religious convictions of senior US government officials and 
CIA operatives motivate or influence their decisions to engage in covert operations? Did 
American Christian beliefs form the basis for these covert operations or did they involve 
other religious traditions? 
Were American religious leaders and institutions complicit in these covert 
activities? Did they participate willingly or by governmental coercion? What drove the 
participation of religious leaders, clergy and missionaries in CIA covert operations, their 
religious convictions, American patriotism, anti-Communism, or a desire for adventure?  
Because of their involvement with the CIA, did these religious leaders and 
organizations suffer blowback? Did the US government, in general, and the CIA, in 
particular, sustain blowback? Does blowback for these covert operations involving 
religion continue to influence US foreign policy today? Were there lessons learned about 
the power of religion that are applicable to US foreign policy and intelligence operations 
in the present and in the future? 
Unfortunately, my research for this project did not completely answer all the 
questions. The lack of answers on certain points is has several origins – the permanently 
classified nature of some materials from the CIA’s clandestine services, the 
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unsatisfactory outcomes of the FOIA process, or the fact that key operatives did not write 
books or leave papers shedding light on their activities and motivations before they died. 
While I was able to access and assemble enough documentary evidence to weave the 
religion and covert operations story, in some cases, because of limited data, I can only 
advance qualified conclusions based on the best information available. However, in most 
cases, I am able to offer sound arguments and consequential conclusions based on 
credible documentation. 
Approach and Scope 
In my search for answers, I started reading the basic historical literature on 
religion and the Cold War, as well as on covert operations during the Cold War. Along 
the way, I discovered tantalizing snippets of information and provocative pieces of the 
religion and covert operations story; however, I soon ascertained that no single 
publication offered an examination of the intersection of religion, covert operations, the 
CIA and the Cold War in a systematic, comprehensive manner. I then contacted several 
authors and scholars who had touched on elements of this story to seek their insights and 
advice. They confirmed that from their own research, religion and covert operations in 
the Cold War was indeed an untold story. I then moved to uncover documentary evidence 
from government, academic, and private archives. Finally, I sought out family members 
of individuals in my story to see if they possessed private papers to supplement the 
materials that I had already located. 
Along the way, I realized that pieces of the story existed, but no one had 
assembled them into a singular narrative. Like sea pearls left spilled and forgotten on the 
 
 xxiv
ground, my job would be to pick up the asymmetric orbs, carefully thread them together, 
and create a pleasing pearl necklace. Or, perhaps, like a beautiful tapestry, my job would 
be to weave together from the back side the disparate threads and textures that, once 
turned over, reveal a multi-hued piece of art that tells a timeless story. Thus, throughout 
this research project, my job has been that of scholar, researcher, and academic 
attempting to explain a “metaphysical riddle, wrapped in a mystery, inside the enigma of 
the clandestine world.”13 
This research project fits squarely within the academic disciplines of history, 
religious studies and international relations – not theology or church dogma. My 
approach is nonsectarian and non-doctrinaire. While inquisitive, I strive to be 
dispassionate, allowing the evidence to lead where it may. I make every effort to abrogate 
my personal religious biases, while at the same time recognizing that it is my religious 
education and background that provides some of the tools necessary to recognize 
elements of the story that others might overlook. It is the interdisciplinary nature of this 
project, I believe, that has possibly discouraged some scholars from pursuing it. 
My methodological approach is historical, because I believe that history is the 
best way to understand the “interconnections” and “interdependency” of the variables 
present in this inquiry. “Historians believe in contingent, not categorical, causation.” 14  
                                                 
13 With sincerest apologies to Winston Churchill for this liberal modification of his famous quote from 
a BBC broadcast on 1 October 1939, two weeks after Russia and Germany simultaneously attacked 
Poland. See Winston S. Churchill, ed., Never Give In! The Best of Winston Churchill’s Speeches (New 
York: Hyperion, 2003), 199. 
14 John Lewis Gaddis, The Landscape of History: How Historians Map the Past (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2002), 53, 64. 
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As a result, they see time and events from an elongated, inter-connected, web-like 
perspective.  
Distinguished Cold War historian, John Lewis Gaddis, contrasts how historians 
and political scientists deal with a diversity of variables: 
The single most frequently asked question [by political scientists is]: “How can 
we tease out the independent variable?” . . . The larger problem, though, [is] that 
historians don’t think in terms of independent and dependent variables. We 
assume the interdependency of variables as we trace their interconnections 
through time. Sorting them into separate categories just isn’t very useful to us. 
Gaddis punctuates his point, “How, apart from God if he or she exists, can there ever be 
such a thing as in independent variable? Aren’t all variables dependent on other 
variables?”15 The multiplicity and interdependency of the variables present in this 
research project and the interdisciplinary nature of the subject matter mandates a non-
linear, non-regression, historical approach. 
Throughout the narrative, I apply the term ‘religion’ in a broad and inclusive 
manner. When using the word ‘religion’ I generally mean traditional, institutionalized 
world religions. The CIA enlisted formal, institutionalized religions in its covert 
operations – the Roman Catholic Church, Islamic and Buddhist organizations, Christian 
clergy and missionaries. However, my use of ‘religion’ also encompasses less formal, 
non-traditional expressions of belief, spirituality and metaphysical practice. In some 
cases, the religious expressions utilized by the CIA in covert operations and examined in 
this research are of this type.   
                                                 
15 Ibid., 53-54. 
 
 xxvi
This dissertation has six chapters. Chapter ONE is “A Brief History of Religion 
and Spying” because the idea of utilizing religion for covert operations is not new. It is as 
old as religion and war themselves. Chapter TWO tells the story of the official revelation 
of the US government’s use of clergy and missionaries as CIA covert operatives. Five 
government investigations were held between 1966 and 1996, in which the White House 
and Congress confirmed that the CIA used not only religious leaders, but also academics 
and journalists. This revelation caused immediate blowback from the media and the 
public. Chapter THREE is entitled “Missionaries in Covert Operations” and explores the 
stories of clandestine activities by American missionaries revealed in archival and 
declassified documents. Chapter FOUR explores the relationship between legendary 
evangelist “Billy Graham and the CIA.” It digs deep into the story of the CIA’s funding 
of Billy Graham’s early crusades in South America. Chapter FIVE explores how CIA 
officials and agents used religious ideas, methods and tools to carry out covert operations. 
This chapter explores the policies, people, and CIA operations in the early Cold War that 
utilized religion for clandestine purposes. Finally, Chapter SIX shares my “Observations 
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A BRIEF HISTORY OF RELIGION AND SPYING 
On a crisp November morning in 1959, President Dwight D. Eisenhower and CIA 
Director Allen W. Dulles gathered with 5,000 invited guests under a clear blue sky on a 
picturesque parcel of land in Langley, Virginia to lay the cornerstone for the new 
headquarters of the CIA. Even before the passage of the National Security Act of 1947, 
which created the CIA, there had been calls for a permanent home for the US intelligence 
operations incorporated into the Central Intelligence Group, the precursor to the CIA and 
successor to the wartime OSS. In August 1955, Congress passed legislation, signed by 
President Eisenhower, allocating $46 million to build a CIA headquarters building.1  
From early in his tenure as Director of Central Intelligence, Allen Dulles was 
consumed with building a CIA “campus” that would consolidate the disparate offices of 
the intelligence service dispersed between ten different buildings around Washington, 
DC. Dulles included himself “in every detail of the planning” and building project – from 
the selection of the site, to the lobbying of Congress for money, to the choosing of the 
                                                 
1 The date of the cornerstone ceremony was November 3, 1959. “The CIA Campus: The Story of the 
Original Headquarters Building,” CIA Online Library, last modified April 13, 2013, accessed October 
17, 2017, https://www.cia.gov/news-information/featured-story-archive/2008-featured-story-
archive/original-headquarters-building.html. “CIA Observes 50th Anniversary of Original 
Headquarters Building Cornerstone Laying,” last modified April 30, 2013, accessed October 17, 2017, 
https://www.cia.gov/news-information/featured-story-archive/ohb-50th-anniversary.html. 
“Concentration of C.I.A.’s headquarters operations in few buildings” for better security was a key 
recommendation (C:17) in the Doolittle Committee’s Report on the Covert Activities of the Central 





architects from his own personal network, to the layout and design of the offices, to every 
minute detail of the cornerstone dedication ceremony that November morning.2 
One particular detail of the planned CIA headquarters building so obsessed Allen 
Dulles that he included it in his speech that November morning and later engraved it in 
marble in the entrance foyer opposite the sacred stars of the Memorial Wall and the Book 
of Honor. In his speech at the ceremony, Dulles suggested that a “guiding motto . . .  be 
inscribed on the face of this building.”3 The motto? A Bible verse. A very personal verse 
for Allen Dulles. It became The Agency’s official motto and part of its official credo – 
“And Ye shall know the truth and the truth shall make you free” (John 8:32).4 
Nine months earlier, Dulles discussed this verse with Eisenhower’s Secretary of 
Agriculture, Ezra Taft Benson, in an exchange of personal letters. At that time, Benson 
served as one of the members of the Quorum of the Twelve Apostles of the Church of 
                                                 
2 Ibid. Peter Grose, Gentleman Spy: The Life of Allen Dulles (Amherst, MA: The University of 
Massachusetts Press, 1994), 417-18, 467-68. 
3 Allen W. Dulles, “Remarks by Allen W. Dulles Director of Central Intelligence at the Cornerstone 
Ceremony Central Intelligence Agency Headquarters Building, 11:30 A.M., November 3, 1959,” 
accessed October 17, 2017. CIA-RDP62S00545A000100100020-3, CREST, NARA II. 
4 “Headquarters Photo Tour: Bible Quote Carving,” About CIA, May 22, 2107, accessed October 17, 
2017, https://www.cia.gov/about-cia/headquarters-tour/headquarters-photo-tour/index.html. The 
adoption of an official CIA credo and mission statement, including the Bible verse, occurred in 1984 
at the time of the groundbreaking ceremony for the Headquarters Building Expansion with President 
Ronald Reagan, Vice-president George H.W. Bush, and DCI William Casey. Declassified CIA 
documents reveal some of the discussion surrounding the adoption of the credo, mission statement, 
and motto. There does not appear to be any debate or questioning about the inclusion of the Bible 
verse. See “Groundbreaking for the Central Intelligence Agency Headquarters Building Expansion by 
the President of the United States,” accessed October 17, 2017. CIA-RDP90-00552R000505390092-0, 
CREST, NARA II. “CIA Credo,” accessed October 17, 2017. CIA-RDP88B00443R001500050075-8, 
CREST, NARA II. George W. Owens to Associate Deputy Director of Administration, “Comments on 
Proposed CIA Mission Statement,” accessed October 17, 2017. CIA-RDP92G00017R000800230001-
4, CREST, NARA II. William Casey to Barry Goldwater, “Letter on CIA Mission and Goals,” 




Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints (Mormon Church). Later, Benson became the 13th 
President of the LDS Church. In his letter, Dulles congratulates Benson on a recent article 
in Parade magazine in which Benson stated that his favorite Bible verse was “Ye Shall 
Know the Truth and the Truth Shall Make You Free.” Dulles quips that he had recently 
quoted the same verse as a favorite of his to a different publication at about the same 
time. Dulles goes on to speak of the verse in relationship to the construction of the new 
headquarters building: 
Furthermore, as you know we are now in process of starting the construction 
of the new headquarters for C.I.A. out near Langley, Virginia. It has always been 
my purpose to use this quotation prominently as an inscription on the building. It 
seems to me particularly appropriate for the work that I am doing.  
In his brief reply, Benson affirms Dulles’ intention: “I do hope the new building will 
carry the quotation.” 5 
Greater insight into Dulles’ interest in this verse comes from another cornerstone 
ceremony, this one three years earlier on July 1, 1956 at the Georgetown Presbyterian 
Church. The church ceremony commemorated the re-laying of the church cornerstone – 
originally laid by President James Monroe in 1821 – and a re-dedication of “this church 
to a new era of service.” In his speech, Dulles refers to his “long heritage of Presbyterian 
affiliations, associations, and upbringing.” He reveals that before he decided on a career 
in public service, “I had planned to go into the ministry.” At the end of his short speech, 
Dulles reflected on the deeper meaning of John 8:32 for himself: 
There is one passage in the Bible that I turn to often in the Gospel of St. John, 
where Christ says, “Ye shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free.” I 
                                                 
5 Allen Dulles to Ezra Taft Benson, “Exchange of Letters, February 1959,” accessed October 16, 




believe that resounding word will go around the world, will eventually prevail 
against all that tyrants can do, and that it, as some translations of this passage 
state, will set you free; and you means everyone who is under tyranny today. As I 
have the great honor and privilege with you and for you today to lay the 
cornerstone, I rededicate this church to this task.6 
For Allen Dulles, the Bible verse in the foyer of the new CIA headquarters building 
represented the power of knowledge and truth to overcome the forces of tyranny and 
oppression. By revealing “the truth” in world affairs, the CIA produced freedom for the 
oppressed all around the world. For Dulles, this was his passion, his mission and, from 
his faith perspective, his god-ordained calling. 
Not everyone shared Dulles’ high-minded view of the CIA motto. Thomas F. 
Troy, a CIA scholar, highlighted objections to Dulles’ Bible verse in his August 1985 bi-
monthly newsletter, Foreign Intelligence Literary Scene. In an editorial, Troy recounted 
stories of critics of the CIA’s biblical motto deeming it hypocrisy and a lie.7 Others 
suggest “ye shall know the truth” is oxymoronic since The Agency’s modus operandi is 
spying, lying, deception and stealing secrets. Official CIA historian, Mark Lowenthal, 
contends that the Bible verse in the entrance to the CIA headquarters “is a nice sentiment, 
but it overstates and misrepresents what is going on in that building or any other 
intelligence agency.” Lowenthal declares decisively, “Intelligence is not about the truth. 
                                                 
6 Allen W. Dulles, “Address Hon. Allen Welsh Dulles Cornerstone Laying Georgetown Presbyterian 
Church Washington, D.C., July 1, 1956,” accessed October 16, 2017. CIA-RDP70-
00058R000100250062-5, CREST, NARA II. 
7 Thomas F. Troy, “Christ and the Truth at CIA,” accessed October 17, 2017. CIA-RDP90-




If something were known to be true, states would not need intelligence agencies to collect 
the information or analyze it.” 8 
The Washington Star captured the irony of the Bible verse in a news story the day 
after the 1959 cornerstone ceremony. The Star article cited the Bible verse used by 
Dulles. It also noted that placed inside the cornerstone time capsule was, among other 
things, “microfilm copies of newspapers that came out the same day” as the ceremony. 
The front pages of those newspapers, the Star observed, were filled with the scandalous 
news of Columbia University professor Charles Van Doren’s sworn confession before 
Congress that the television game show Twenty One was rigged and that his audience-
captivating winning streak was a lie used to pump up television ratings for NBC. The 
Star’s headline highlighted the paradox – “Van Doren Story in Cornerstone Near Holy 
Writ.” 9 Interestingly, in all the discussions and criticisms of Dulles’ Bible verse, inside 
and outside the CIA, no one questioned the First Amendment implications of engraving a 
verse from the New Testament on the wall of the CIA headquarters building or 
designating it as the CIA’s official motto.10 
                                                 
8 Mark M. Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy, 4th ed. (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 
2009), 6-7. 
9 Washington Star, “Van Doren Story in Cornerstone Near Holy Writ,” accessed October 16, 2017. 
CIA-RDP78-04506A000100030067-1, CREST, NARA II. Twenty One was not the only TV game 
show caught up in the 1950s game show scandals investigated by the Federal Communications 
Commission and the U.S. Congress. Also involved were The $64,000 Question, Dotto, Tic-Tac-
Dough, and The $64,000 Challenge. 
10 A declassified Deputies Meeting Memo dated 20 October 1958 noted that “the Director wanted the 
bible quotation . . . in a prominent place on the new building” and that directives were given to the 
appropriate people “to insure that this was included in the specifications at this time.” See “Diary 
Notes: At the Deputies Meeting,” accessed October 16, 2017. CIA-RDP76-00183R000300020133-4, 




Allen Dulles’ Bible verse on the entrance wall of the CIA headquarters building is 
emblematic of the real and complicated relationship between the CIA, covert operations 
and religion. The carving of the biblical text into stone at the height of the early Cold War 
at the behest of one of America’s greatest Cold Warriors further highlights the thesis of 
this book: That the US government instrumentalized and operationalized religion as a 
tool of covert operations during the Cold War.  
Nevertheless, this realist-metaphysical partnership did not originate with the Cold 
War. It did not arise ex nihilo in 1945.  
It is a story as old as religion and war. It is a story of saints and spies, of devotion 
and betrayal. It is the story of this book.  
Religion, spies and the ancients 
In the Spring and Autumn period of ancient China, when Lao-tse and Confucius 
were transforming Chinese culture, society and politics with their ideas, an obscure 
warrior-philosopher arose to articulate a military theory, one which would influence, 
even to the present day, scholars and strategists of warfare. Sun Tzu, “a strikingly serious 
fellow, dressed in monkish gray,” came from a family who “for generations had made 
their living as military advisers.” Sun Tzu, the military adviser to the King of Wu, 
authored the classic treatise: The Art of War. This volume of military theory and its 




strategists until 1772 – the year that a Jesuit priest, Father Jean Joseph Marie Amiot, 
translated it into French.11  
The Art of War is comprised of thirteen brief chapters dealing with fundamental 
strategic, operational and tactical principles of warfare. The final chapter – “The Use of 
Spies” – addresses the question of espionage. Allen Dulles considered Sun Tzu’s 
commentary in this chapter to be the “first remarkable analysis [in history] of the ways of 
espionage” and the “first written recommendations regarding an organized intelligence 
service.”12 Sun Tzu states that “to strike and conquer” in warfare, the wise sovereign and 
the good general needs “foreknowledge.” Lionel Giles, in his translator’s commentary on 
Sun Tzu’s text defines foreknowledge as “knowledge of the enemy’s dispositions, and 
what he means to do.”13 Sun Tzu’s foreknowledge is what we would call secrets, covert 
information, or actionable intelligence. 
In a striking follow-up statement, Sun Tzu declares, “Now this foreknowledge 
cannot be elicited from spirits; it cannot be obtained inductively from experience, nor by 
any deductive calculation. Knowledge of the enemy can only be obtained from other 
                                                 
11 Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. Lionel Giles, ed. Dallas Galvin (New York: Barnes & Noble 
Classics, 2004), xi, xv, xxv-xxvi. The Spring and Autumn period was from the 8th–5th centuries BCE. 
The Warring States period followed, running from the 5th–3rd centuries BCE. Lao-tse was a Chinese 
philosopher and the founder of Taoism. Taoism and other Chinese religions consider him divine. 
Confucius was a Chinese moral, social and political philosopher. He was the founder Confucianism. 
Father Amiot’s original translation was entitled Les Treize Articles de Sun-tse and is deemed by many 
contemporary scholars significantly flawed. The first English translation of The Art of War by Captain 
E.F. Calthrop appeared in Tokyo in1905 under the title Sonshi (the Japanese form of Sun Tzu). British 
scholar Lionel Giles published the first authoritative English translation, with notes, in 1910. 
12 Allen W. Dulles, The Craft of Intelligence (Guilford, CT: Lyons Press, 2016), 4-5. Dulles uses the 
translation of Sun Tzu’s book by General Samuel B. Griffith for Oxford University Press in 1963. In 
it, Chapter 13 is entitled “Employment of Secret Agents.” 




men.” Sun Tzu, before anything else, rules out spiritual practices as a basis for 
knowledge and action in espionage. Knowledge must come from people, spies on the 
ground, human intelligence. The Chinese master, Chang Yü, interprets Sun Tzu’s 
statement about spiritual practices as meaning “prayers or sacrifices” – religious rituals. 
The Chinese master, Mei Yao-ch’ên, summarizes Sun Tzu’s full comment: “Knowledge 
of the spirit-world is to be obtained by divination; information in the natural science may 
be sought by inductive reasoning; the laws of the universe can be verified by 
mathematical calculation: but the dispositions of an enemy are ascertainable through 
spies and spies alone.” 14 Sun Tzu’s approach to espionage is temporal, not mystical. 
Sun Tzu proceeds to identify five categories of spies – local spies, inward spies, 
converted spies, doomed spies, and surviving spies – that fundamentally correspond, as 
Allen Dulles notes, to the basic types of agents that the CIA utilizes today.15 In 
concluding his theory of spying and of warfare in general, the Chinese warrior-sage 
unambiguously asserts, “Spies are the most important element in war, because on them 
depends an army’s ability to move.” The Chinese master, Chia Lin, makes it plain: “An 
army without spies is like a man without ears or eyes.” 
                                                 
14 Ibid., 201-202. 
15 Ibid., 202-206. Dulles (2016), 4-5. The five categories of spies are as follows: “Local spies” are 
native residents of an enemy region. “Inward spies” are inside officials in enemy territory. “Converted 
spies” are double agents – an enemy agent who is captured, turned, and sent back to spy for his 
captors. “Doomed spies” are expendable agents sent to leak false information and if caught, they face 
execution. “Surviving spies” are penetration agents who infiltrate the enemy, get information and 




Sun Tzu’s strategic concepts of spying and warfare continue to be regarded as 
shrewd over two and a half millennia later. The Art of War continues to be a standard 
textbook in military and intelligence academies around the world. Strategic military 
planning consistently incorporates its principles. What is noteworthy is Sun Tzu’s 
proximate positioning of spiritual practices and religious rituals in his discussion of 
foreknowledge. It is the first point of clarification he raises. It indicates, even from the 
ancient days of warfare, the close association between spying and religion.  
Half a world away and only a few decades later, Herodotus, the great Greek 
historian, recorded stories of religion and spying during the Graeco-Persian wars. 
Herodotus was born in Halicarnassus situated on the southwest corner of Asia Minor on 
the border between the Greek and Persian empires.16 In this “cultural and linguistic 
crossroads,” Herodotus grew up with an immense curiosity about diverse cultures, the 
legends and stories he heard, and the events that shaped the world he lived in, particularly 
the wars. He was not just curious. He wanted facts. He wanted to learn and record the 
truth, as best it could be determined, about what happened before and during his lifetime. 
He developed an investigative methodology that became the quintessential research 
model for historians even to the present day: investigate and see things for oneself; visit 
and research the locales where events took place; interview and question the best sources 
available; critically report “conflicting information given from different points of view;” 
and arrange the collected information into a captivating story. His sweeping tome – The 
                                                 




Histories – is notable because it is the “first continuous prose narrative extant in Western 
literature.” So consequential is Herodotus’ work that, centuries later, Cicero gave him the 
title “The Father of History.”17 
The Histories is a compilation of nine books written during Herodotus’ lifetime of 
travels and sojourns in the Persian, Greek, and Egyptian empires. Besides recording 
stories about cultures, traditions, geography, daily life, politics and wars, he offers an 
“extended and comprehensive description” of the “religious traditions and practices” of 
the places where he lived and travelled.18 Herodotus provides accounts of “praying and 
sacrificing, making and fulfilling vows to the gods, consulting oracles, interpreting omens 
and dreams, believing in miracles, pondering pieties and impieties, creating new cults, 
sanctuaries, and festivals, and making dozens of dedications to their gods and heroes – all 
in direct relation to known historical events.”19 Most significantly, Herodotus’ 
examination of religion goes beyond cursory descriptions to explore and analyze the 
“divine or supernatural strands in the causation or the prefiguring of the events 
narrated.”20 
                                                 
17 Herodotus, The Histories, trans. Walter Blanco, ed. Walter Blanco and Jennifer Tolbert Roberts, 
Norton Critical ed. (New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 1992), xi-xiii, 318-22, 369-70. See J.A.S. 
Evans, “Father of History or Father of Lies: The Reputation of Herodotus” in The Histories, 368-377, 
for a discussion on the reliability of Herodotus’ historiography. Evans asserts, Herodotus’ “reputation 
as a liar was well established within a couple of generations of his death” (p. 369). 
18 John Gould, “Herodotus and religion,” in Herodotus: Volume 2: Herodotus and the World, ed. 
Rosaria Vignolo Munson, 1st ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 183. 
19 Jon D. Mikalson, Herodotus and Religion in the Persian Wars, 2nd ed. (Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina Press, 2012), 5.  




There are three primary reasons why religion figures so prominently in 
Herodotus’ history. First, religious beliefs and practices were widespread in the societies 
of antiquity. Second, in the fifth century BCE, one of the best sources of information was 
priests. They were educated. They could read. They ranked among the social elites and, 
as a result, had access to the privileged information of the ruling classes. Further, the 
priests maintained extensive relationships and communications between temples reaching 
to the edges of the known world. Thus, priests operated some of the earliest intelligence 
gathering networks.21 The third reason that Herodotus wrote so much about religion was 
that “religion . . . was important in Herodotus’ perception of things” – important to the 
people and civilizations he described and important within his own belief system. 22 
Early in Book I of The Histories, Herodotus tells the story of the war between the 
Lydians and the Milesians. In the twelfth year of the war, a temple of Athena in Miletus 
accidentally burned to the ground because of the hostilities. Soon after, King Alyattes II 
of Lydia became sick with a protracted illness. The king decided to consult the famous 
Oracle at Delphi regarding how to restore his health. The Pythian priestess at Delphi told 
the messengers of the king to rebuild the Temple of Athena, which would require a 
cessation of the fighting. When the Delphic message reached King Alyattes II, he decided 
to pursue a temporary peace with the Milesians in order to rebuild the temple. He 
                                                 
21 Dulles (2016), 1-2, 4. Herodotus (Blanco), 75-107. 
22 Gould, 183. See Herodotus (Blanco), 89, 107 for Herodotus’ affirmations of his own beliefs. 
However, some skeptical scholars dispute that religion was important to Herodotus. These scholars 
argue that Herodotus was merely a dispassionate reporter of the religious practices his research 
revealed. See Donald Lateiner, “Five Systems of Explanation” in Herodotus, The Histories, 415-22. 




dispatched his ambassador to offer a provisional truce. However, before the ambassador 
arrived, Thrasybulus, the tyrant ruler of Miletus, obtained “reliable advance intelligence 
and knew everything Alyattes intended to do.” Thrasybulus decided to trust his spies’ 
report and concocted a scheme to trick Alyattes into making a permanent peace beneficial 
to both sides. The deception worked. Alyattes and Thrasybulus made peace and 
committed to be “friends and allies with each other.” Then, “Alyattes built two temples to 
Athena in Assesus instead of one, and he recovered from his illness.”23 
In Book III, Herodotus relates the story of the invasion of Ethiopia by Emperor 
Cambyses II of the Persian Empire, son of Cyrus the Great. Before the invasion, 
Cambyses decided to send several spies into Ethiopia “under the pretence of carrying 
presents to the king, but in reality to take note of all they saw” and bring back a report. 
The spies spoke the Ethiopian language and cloaked themselves as friendly emissaries 
from Cambyses. However, Hereon, the Ethiopian king, discovered their true identities. 
Instead of killing them – the normal fate for exposed spies – King Hereon interrogated 
them to obtain information about Cambyses and the Persian people. He then showed the 
spies the strength of the Ethiopian weapons, people, and their customs. Upon their 
release, the spies returned to give a full report to Cambyses. Instead of the report 
discouraging Cambyses from mounting an invasion, the Persian ruler erupted in rage and 
ordered his army to immediately “march against the Ethiopians without having made any 
provision for the sustenance of his army.” The tragic result was that the army starved in 
                                                 
23 Herodotus (Blanco), 8-11. See also, Herodotus, The History of Herodotus, trans. George Rawlinson, 




the Ethiopian desert and in desperation turned to cannibalism to survive. Finally, 
Cambyses retreated after losing “vast numbers of soldiers.” “And so ended the expedition 
against Ethiopia.”24 
In Book VI of The Histories, Herodotus chronicles the first Persian invasion of 
Greece in 490 BCE at the Battle of Marathon. The story of the political maneuvering by 
the Greeks to form a military alliance prior to the invasion is replete with descriptions of 
religious apparitions, dreams, and observances. The Athenian herald to Sparta, 
Philippides, had a vision of the god Pan demanding the people’s worship. “The Athenians 
believed this story” and built a temple for Pan at the Acropolis. Likewise, the people of 
Sparta refused to join the Athenian coalition against the Persians because they were in the 
middle of celebrating a festival in honor of Apollo. Similarly, the Plataeans sent 
ambassadors to the Athenians to tell them that they would join the military alliance, but 
the Athenians were in the middle of “sacrificing to the Twelve Gods.” So the “Plataean 
ambassadors sat as supplicants at the altar and offered their fealty to Athens.” Finally, the 
two great armies – the Athenian-Plataean alliance and the Persians – faced-off on the 
plain of Marathon. In this critical moment, the Athenian army turned to the gods for a 
sign to know when to attack: “After they had taken up their positions, they kept cutting 
the throats of sacrificial animals until the omens looked good; then the Athenians were 
                                                 





unleashed, and they furiously charged the barbarians.”25 Notably, in all the vignettes 
about the Battle of Marathon, Herodotus does not refer to spies, only the gods. 
In Book VII of The Histories, Herodotus describes the second invasion of the 
Greek mainland in 480 BCE by the Persians under the leadership of Xerxes the Great. As 
the news of an imminent incursion spread, the Athenians “were eager to consult the 
oracle, and so they sent ambassadors to Delphi.” When the emissaries returned, disputes 
broke out between the Greeks over the meaning of the prophecies received from the 
oracle. In the end, however, they trusted the gods and ordered preparations for war and a 
great naval battle foretold by the oracle. The leaders of Greece met in a general council to 
determine how best to defend themselves from the approaching Persians. “The first thing 
they did” after “patching up their feuds was to send three spies into Asia” to obtain 
intelligence about Xerxes’ army. Quickly, the spies “were discovered, interrogated under 
torture by the commanding officers of the infantry, and then led away to their deaths.” 
Xerxes heard about the death sentences, severely rebuked his officers for their actions, 
and ordered that the spies appear before him. “As soon as he found out what their mission 
was, Xerxes ordered the bodyguards to take them on a guided tour of his whole infantry 
and cavalry and, when they had had their fill of sightseeing, to send them off unharmed to 
wherever they wanted to go.” Xerxes followed a similar strategy to that of King Hereon 
of Ethiopia. “If the spies returned . . . and the Greeks heard about his army, Xerxes 
believed that they would give up this freedom of theirs and that he would achieve his 
                                                 




objective without having to mount a campaign against them.” However, upon hearing the 
report of the spies, the Greeks did not capitulate and Xerxes proceeded with his invasion 
plans. In this vignette, the Greeks utilized both religion and spies to gather intelligence in 
preparation for the battle.26 
Book VII of The Histories continues with its description of the Persian invasion 
of Greece. After crossing from Asia to Europe at the Hellespont, Xerxes’ great army 
marched from north to south en route to Athens, Corinth and Sparta. Before reaching 
these population centers, the massive Persian army had to navigate a narrow, strategic 
mountain pass at Thermopylae. In the face of the advancing Persians, many Greeks 
panicked and fled. However, King Leonidas of Sparta stood firm in his defense of the 
pass with approximately 5,200 Greek warriors against an overwhelming force of 
2,641,610 Persians.27 Before arriving at Thermopylae, “Xerxes sent out a mounted spy to 
see how many Greeks there were and what they were doing.” The spy moved stealthily 
around the fringes of the Greek camp, “noted their numbers,” observed their preparations 
for battle, and “trotted back unmolested.” Upon hearing his spy’s report, Xerxes was 
incredulous that “so few men could do battle with his army” and refused to believe the 
intelligence report.28 
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After two days of savage battle, an amazed Xerxes was “at a loss as to how to 
deal with this situation.” Then a local resident, a traitor, offered to show Xerxes a hidden 
goat path across the mountain, which would allow the Persian army to flank and surround 
the Greeks. As contingents of the Persian army made their way along the goat path, they 
were surprised to encounter a thousand heavily armed Phocian soldiers “stationed there to 
guard the trail and defend their own homeland.” After a quick skirmish, the Persians 
outflanked the Phocians and proceeded down the mountain to encircle Leonidas’ 
remaining warriors.29 
At this point in the story, Herodotus introduces several divine revelations to 
provide context to what ensued. “Megistias the seer had examined the sacrificial animals 
and told the Greeks at Thermopylae that they would die at dawn.” In addition, Herodotus 
relates that “the Spartans had consulted the Delphic oracle as soon as the war broke out,” 
and the Pythian priestess prophesied that the Spartans would be “uprooted by the 
barbarians or their king would die.” Realizing that he was probably facing death on the 
third day of the intrepid defense of the pass, King Leonidas sent his only son home and 
ordered a strategic retreat of the bulk of his forces, so that they might live to fight another 
day. Leonidas remained with 300 Spartan warriors along with additional Greek soldiers 
to fight to the death in a rear guard action. “The Greeks fought the barbarians with all the 
strength they had, fought recklessly out of their minds.” In a curious aside, Herodotus 
states that on the morning of the final battle, “Xerxes poured out drink offerings at 
                                                 




sunrise.”30 Both sides called on the gods – one lived and the other died. Both sides used 
spies – one was victorious, the other defeated. Religion and spies both played pivotal 
roles in the epic story of the Persian invasion of Greece and the Battle of Thermopylae. 
Why retell these ancient stories? Why start with Sun Tzu and Herodotus when 
examining CIA covert activities during the Cold War? First, CIA and US intelligence 
training materials from the Cold War era frequently begin with the history of Sun Tzu 
and Herodotus. It seems logical to start where these intelligence histories start, to 
understand the foundations they laid. 31 Second, when Allen Dulles published his Cold 
War classic, The Craft of Intelligence, in 1963 on the “fundamentals of intelligence 
gathering for a free world,” he anchored his narrative in the bedrock of these two men 
and their ancient stories. Third, these stories illustrate that religion and spying in warfare 
existed from the earliest days. Allen Dulles considered the stories of Sun Tzu and 
Herodotus “the earliest recorded instances of ‘intelligence-gathering.’”32 However, the 
tale of religion and spying moves beyond Sun Tzu and Herodotus to encompass all the 
Abrahamic religions – Judaism, Christianity, and Islam – and Asian religions as well. 
Religion, spies and world religions  
Seven centuries before Sun Tzu and Herodotus, ancient Judaism integrated 
religion and spying to an extent unparalleled in antiquity. The Torah records that in the 
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thirteenth century BCE, Pharaoh of Egypt, under divine duress, released the children of 
Israel from slavery. The prophet Moses led the exodus of the Israelites out of Egypt, 
confronting Pharaoh with God’s words to “let my people go.” After crossing the Red Sea, 
receiving God’s law at Mt. Sinai, and trekking across the Sinai desert, the children of 
Israel stood at the threshold of the land promised to their ancestor Abraham.33  
At that moment, “The Lord spoke to Moses saying, ‘Send out for yourself men so 
that they may spy out the land of Canaan, which I am going to give to the sons of Israel; 
you shall send a man from each of their fathers’ tribes, every one a leader among them.’ 
So Moses sent them from the wilderness of Paran at the command of the Lord, all of 
them men who were heads of the sons of Israel.”34 Twelve men went to “spy out” the 
land, to collect intelligence on the flora, geography, people, and military fortifications of 
the land, and to bring back a report to Moses.35  
Surveying a strange land before entering was a standard scouting procedure. It 
was necessary to scrutinize the productivity of the land to determine whether it could 
sustain the children of Israel.36 It was crucial to choose the best route to enter the land. It 
was essential to determine the military strengths and weaknesses of the people and the 
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land. What was unusual and different about the mission of the twelve spies was that it did 
not originate with Moses – God commanded it. 
The twelve spies traveled throughout the Promised Land for 40 days and nights, 
and returned with a report praising the bounty and beauty of the land. They also reported, 
“The people who live in the land are strong, and the cities are fortified and very large.” 
Most daunting to the spies was that they “saw the descendants of Anak there . . . a part of 
the Nephilim,” a race of giants who made the spies feel like “grasshoppers” before them. 
As a result, ten of the twelve spies recommended that the Israelites not go into the land 
God had promised them out of fear of the Anakin annihilating them. However, two spies, 
Joshua and Caleb, brought a minority report: “By all means go up and take possession of 
it, for we will surely overcome it.” They were confident that God would give them 
victory over the inhabitants of the land. Nevertheless, the children of Israel chose to 
believe the majority report of the ten spies and refused to enter the Promised Land.37 
Because of the fearfulness of the people and their refusal to trust God, the Torah 
tells us that God condemned them to wander in the wilderness for 40 years, one year for 
every day that they “spied out the land, forty days.” In addition, each of the ten spies that 
brought back a “bad report” and “made all the congregation grumble” were not allowed 
to enter the Promised Land and died in the wilderness. Only Joshua and Caleb “remained 
alive out of those men who went to spy out the land” and entered into the Promised 
Land.38  
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Allen Dulles knew well the story of Moses and the twelve spies from his 
Presbyterian upbringing. Reflecting on the account in The Craft of Intelligence, he 
offered an analysis with the keen eye of a master spy: 
In this particular intelligence mission, there is more than meets the eye at first 
reading. To begin with, if one wanted a fair and impartial view of the nature of the 
land of Canaan and its people, one would not send political leaders on an 
intelligence mission. One would send technicians, and surely not twelve, but two 
or three. Furthermore, Moses and Aaron did not need information about the land 
of Canaan, as they trusted the Lord. The real purpose of this mission was, in fact, 
not to find out what sort of a land it was: it was to find out what sort of people – 
how strong and trustworthy – were these leaders of the various tribes of Israel. 
When only two met the test in the eyes of the Lord, the rest and their peoples were 
condemned to wander in the desert until a new and stronger generation arose to 
take over.39 
The exodus story celebrates spying because it explains why the children of Israel 
wandered in the Negev wilderness for forty years. It explains the leadership of Joshua 
and Caleb as successors to Moses. And it sets a pattern that was repeatedly followed by 
the tribes of Israel as they explored and conquered the Promised Land. The Nevi’im – the 
Jewish books of the Prophets – tell stories of Joshua sending spies to Ai, of the house of 
Joseph spying out Bethel before entering, and the sons of Dan sending five spies to 
search out the hill country of Ephraim.40 The most notable story from this period is 
Joshua sending two men to spy out the land east of the Jordan and the ancient city of 
Jericho before mounting an attack. The two spies found refuge in the brothel “of a harlot 
whose name was Rahab.” When the king of Jericho heard spies were in his city hiding in 
Rahab’s house, he sent soldiers to seize them. Nevertheless, Rahab hid the spies “in the 
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stalks of flax” on her rooftop until she could safely help them escape through a window 
in her house over the wall of the city. Joshua repaid Rahab’s generosity and kindness to 
the spies. When Israel conquered and torched Jericho, Joshua spared Rahab, her family, 
and all that she owned. Possibly, Joshua remembered the danger and anxiety of his own 
experience of being a spy and needing a place of refuge. Afterward, Rahab and her 
family joined the Israelites and lived among them the rest of her days. In the Christian 
New Testament, the Apostle Matthew records that Rahab, the harlot, was an ancestor of 
Jesus Christ, further validating her actions in assisting Joshua’s spies.41 
In the Torah and the Nevi’im, there are other stories of spies. For example, in 
Genesis, Joseph, one of the twelve sons of the patriarch Jacob – whom God later renames 
Israel – was maliciously sold into slavery in Egypt by his jealous brothers. In Egypt, 
Joseph rose to be the second most powerful political leader in the country, second only to 
Pharaoh himself. Years later, when a famine engulfed Egypt and Canaan, Joseph’s 
brothers travelled down to Egypt to buy grain to take back to their families in Canaan. 
Because of the need to ration food, all transactions involving Egypt’s grain required the 
approval of Joseph. When Joseph met his brothers, they did not recognize him, but he 
immediately recognized them. Joseph repeatedly accused his brothers of being “spies” 
sent to assess the weaknesses of the land of Egypt. This accusation by Joseph was a ruse 
to extract a measure of revenge on his brothers and to force a reunion with his younger 
brother, Benjamin, and his father, Jacob. The story of Joseph and his brothers is central to 
                                                 




the Genesis narrative. It spans five chapters of the text and explains how the children of 
Israel came to be in the land of Egypt.42  
Later in the Nevi’im and in the Ketuvim –the Jewish Writings – David sends out 
spies to track the movements of his nemesis, King Saul. Subsequently, when David 
becomes king, he sends some of his officials on a diplomatic mission to the Ammonites, 
but they accuse David’s men of carrying out a covert spying mission.43 David’s son, 
Absalom, rebelled against his father and initiated a conspiracy to remove David from the 
throne of Israel. Like his father, when he needed to mount a covert operation, “Absalom 
sent spies throughout the tribes of Israel.” Eventually, the coup d’etat failed when 
David’s soldiers slew Absalom.44  
These stories of Israel’s spying and intelligence gathering are a part of the fabric 
and psyche of the nation of Israel. God commanded Moses to uses spies to establish and 
preserve the nation of Israel. Thirty-two centuries later, in 1948, David Ben-Gurion 
understood that to re-establish the modern Jewish state, Israel “would have to develop the 
finest secret services in the world.” Ben-Gurion sought out the “princes” of the Jewish 
people – utilizing the Hebrew translation of the selection of the twelve spies by Moses 
found in Numbers 13:1-2, “Send thou men that they may spy out the land of Canaan . . . 
every one a prince among them.”45 This image is so powerful to Israelis that the first 
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complete history of Israel’s intelligence services, written by Dan Raviv and Yossi 
Melman, is entitled Every Spy a Prince. Ben-Gurion chose “princes” for his fledgling 
intelligence services and made “stringent demands” upon them: “that they be motivated 
by patriotism, not personal gain; that they represent the best aspects of Israeli society, not 
the worst; that they obey the unique tenet of self-restraint, which Israel’s army calls 
‘purity of arms’ . . . and that they remember that they are defending a democracy.”46 
The Jewish scriptures never question the integration of spying and religion; rather, 
it is celebrated. Even though spying and covert operations employ methods – lying, 
deceit, trickery, law breaking – that violate the ethical norms of Judaism, spying is central 
to the Jewish founding traditions and to Israel’s national survival. The most distinctive 
contribution of the Jewish religion’s use of spying and covert operations is that God not 
only sanctions it, he commands it. Not to spy would be to disobey God. This 
sanctification by the Almighty transforms a surreptitious and, at times, morally 
questionable activity into a holy calling. 
Christianity incorporates the sacred Jewish writings of the Torah, Nivi’im, and 
Ketuvim into the Old Testament. In addition, Christians include a second collection of 
sacred writings called the New Testament into their Holy Bible. The New Testament 
writings cover the history of Jesus Christ, the establishment and spread of the Christian 
church in the first century BCE, and related writings. Christians, in general, accept all the 
writings of the Old Testament as historically accurate and authoritative. Therefore, 
                                                 
46 Dan Raviv and Yossi Melman, Every Spy a Prince: The Complete History of Israel’s Intelligence 




Christians, in addition to Jews, consider all of the Old Testament accounts that deal with 
religion and spying as valid and vital. Christians also believe that the Bible is “the word 
of God” and thus carries the moral and ethical imprimatur of God, even with inherent 
ethical conflicts. 
In the New Testament, the word for spy or spying occurs only three times. The 
first occurrence is in the story of Jesus’ final week leading up to his crucifixion. “The 
scribes and chief priests” were angry with Jesus and sought a means of having him 
arrested. “So they watched Him, and sent spies who pretended to be righteous, in order 
that they might catch Him in some statement.”47 The word for spies here in the original 
Greek means “hired to lie in wait.”48 Given the context, there is no implied approval of 
spying for Christians because, in this passage, spying was the act of Jewish religious 
leaders against Jesus. The second New Testament passage that speaks of spying is in 
Paul’s letter to the Galatians. Paul recounts for the Galatian church the events 
surrounding the first Christian Council at Jerusalem where Paul’s critics and accusers 
sought to discredit him before the council of the Twelve Apostles. Paul states in his 
defense, “It was because of the false brethren secretly brought in, who had sneaked in to 
spy out our liberty which we have in Christ Jesus.”49 The verse’s use of the verb for “spy 
out” relates to the theological debate at the heart of the Jerusalem Council, as well as the 
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nature and character of the “false brethren” seeking to discredit Paul.50 Neither of these 
two passages relate spying to military or intelligence operations. 
However, in the book of Hebrews, the writer presents a list of the great heroes and 
heroines of the Christian faith – who “gained approval through their faith” – such as 
Noah, Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, Moses, David, Samuel, and others who were persecuted 
and martyred for their fidelity to God.51 Included in this list of champions of the faith is 
Rahab of Jericho, who hid the two spies sent by Moses: “By faith Rahab the harlot did 
not perish along with those who were disobedient, after she had welcomed the spies in 
peace.”52 Moreover, in the New Testament, the author of the Epistle of James celebrates 
Rahab as an example good works and faith. The Apostle Matthew includes her in his 
genealogy of Jesus Christ.53 This repeated inclusion and celebration by the New 
Testament writers of Rahab’s actions in saving the two spies of Jericho legitimizes 
spying as compatible with Christian beliefs, a fact made more apparent by the covert 
actions of Christian religious leaders in the early modern era and following. 
The sacred writings of Islam reiterate numerous stories found in both the Jewish 
and Christian scriptures, including stories of religion and spying. Muhammad, the 
founder of Islam, was a warrior-prophet who led his people militarily, politically, and 
spiritually. Stories of religion and spying are as intrinsic to the founding narrative of 
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Islam as they are to Judaism. Military historian Richard Gabriel details Muhammad’s 
military prowess: 
Muhammad was truly a great general. In the space of a single decade he 
fought eight major battles, led eighteen raids, and planned thirty-eight other 
military operations where others were in command but operating under his orders 
and strategic direction. He was wounded twice, suffered defeats, and twice had 
his positions overrun by superior forces before rallying his troops to victory. But 
Muhammad was more than a great field general and tactician. He was a military 
theorist, organizational reformer, strategic thinker, operational level combat 
commander, political and military leader, heroic soldier, revolutionary, and 
inventor of the theory of insurgency and history’s first successful practitioner.54 
Further, Gabriel asserts that Muhammad was “a master of intelligence in war” and that 
“his intelligence service eventually came to rival that of Rome and Persia.”55 
In comparing the Qur’an with the Torah, Surah 12 recounts the life of the 
patriarch Joseph echoing the Genesis account.56 However, in the Qur’an account, Joseph 
does not accuse his brothers of being “spies.” He calls them “thieves” and accuses them 
of making “mischief” in Egypt, an important difference from the Torah account.57 
Similarly, Surah 5 describes the story of Moses and the twelve spies. However, the 
Qur’an does not refer to Moses’ twelve covert emissaries as “spies” as they are in the 
Torah account, but rather simply as “men.”58 These disparities between the Qur’an and 
Torah accounts do not indicate a reluctance in the Islamic texts to speak of spying. The 
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Qur’an, Hadith, and Sira are replete with stories of spies in the course of military and 
political actions by Muhammad and his followers.59 
The Battle of Badr on 15 March 624 CE was the first battle between the Muslim 
followers of Muhammad and his Meccan opponents. It was a critical, decisive early battle 
that established Muhammad’s reputation as a great military leader and commanded the 
respect of Muhammad’s Quraish opponents from Mecca.60 Twice a year, a great camel 
caravan brimming with expensive trading goods set out from Mecca across the Arabian 
Peninsula destined for the large commercial centers of Iraq and Syria. The merchants of 
Mecca consolidated their resources to create the caravans and, since the expeditions 
generated most of their annual income, they guarded them with a small army of 
professional soldiers. Muhammad obtained advance intelligence about the makeup, 
schedule and route of the caravans. One of his uncles, Abbas, was an important banker in 
Mecca and covertly served as Muhammad’s spy – an “agent-in-place” – in Mecca for 
many years. Abbas regularly sent intelligence reports to the Prophet about the situation in 
Mecca including information about the Meccan caravan, which set out in the fall of 623 
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CE, scheduled to return in the spring of 624. On the return trip, Muhammad planned to 
ambush the caravan.61  
In addition to the intelligence that Muhammad received from his uncle Abbas, he 
also sent out a team of spies to shadow the caravan, monitor its progress, and ride ahead 
to warn Muhammad when it was returning to the region of Medina. The leader of the 
Meccan caravan, Abu Sufyan, became aware of Muhammad’s spies while the caravan 
was in Damascus leading him to increase security measures and to be on guard for a 
possible ambush on the return trip. 
Located on the main caravan route between Medina and Mecca was the large 
village of Badr with substantial wells for watering travelers and their animals. 
“Muhammad had every reasonable expectation that Abu Sufyan’s caravan would stop 
there.”62 However, to be sure, Muhammad sent two spies to Badr to gather intelligence 
from the locals watering at the wells. Upon returning to Muhammad’s camp, the two 
spies reported that the size of Abu Sufyan’s caravan troops were about 1,000 men while 
Muhammad only had 314 men. Abu Sufyan also went to the Badr water wells after 
Muhammad’s spies had left to gather intelligence. Both generals vigorously sought 
information on their adversary in advance of the battle. 63 
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Muhammad and his Muslim soldiers won the Battle of Badr not only with 
strategic intelligence, but also with superior military tactics seldom utilized by the 
disparate Arab tribes. Muhammad reconnoitered the plain of Badr and chose a strong 
defensive position for his Muslim troops facing west, forcing the attacking Meccans to 
launch their daybreak assault facing east directly into the blinding morning sunrise. 
Muhammad arrayed his troops in ranks and units under a unified system of command 
whereby the general gave orders to the field commanders who obeyed regardless of their 
own personal or tactical inclinations. “Muhammad was transforming Arab warfare from 
war as sport, clan revenge, or individual glory into an instrument for the achievement of 
political goals.” Muhammad also “introduced the Western practice of removed 
command,” whereby he positioned himself on a low hill above and behind his troops in 
order to direct the battle. Before Muhammad, removed command was unknown in Arab 
warfare where commonly the tribal chief led the charge of the troops. 64 
Finally, Muhammad weaponized religious belief and zeal when he “incited” his 
soldiers declaring, “By God in whose hand is the soul of Muhammad, no man will be 
slain this day fighting against them with steadfast courage advancing not retreating but 
God will cause him to enter Paradise.”65 The Qur’an records that Muhammad promised 
his soldiers that Allah would send down “three thousand angels” to reinforce the 
outnumbered Muslims and that “five thousand swooping angels” would defend the 
Muslims “if the enemy should suddenly attack you.” Ibn Ishaq reports multiple stories of 
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surviving Muslim soldiers describing celestial angels fighting on the battlefield with the 
Muslim forces.66 In the end, Muslims ascribe the surprising victory at the Battle of Badr 
to Allah’s divine favor and intervention, even though intelligence gathering and military 
tactics played critical roles in the triumph.67 
Emboldened by the victory at Badr, Muhammad continued to conduct raids 
against the Meccan caravans and various Bedouin tribes. It seems that Muhammad’s 
uncle Abbas regularly supplied intelligence about the caravans leaving Mecca giving 
“Muhammad sufficient time to assemble a force and position it where it could ambush 
the caravan.” 68 In al-Bukhari’s Hadith, he tells of an expedition of 1,400 Muslims led by 
Muhammad travelling to Mecca. Concerned about the plans of the Quraish warriors to 
oppose the Muslims militarily, Muhammad sent a spy ahead to collect information about 
the plans of the Quraish. The spy reported that the Quraish completely blocked the road 
to Mecca with other tribes gathering to oppose Muhammad.69 Later, during the Battle of 
Uhud, Muhammad used spies for multiple types of covert action.70 Again, before the 
Battle of Hunyan, he sent out spies to appraise the strength and intentions of the Hawazin 
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tribe. When the report came back, Muhammad sought to confirm the intelligence by 
sending out an additional spy to “go among them and stay with them” to learn all about 
them and “bring him back the news.”71 The Battle of Hunyan was a decisive victory for 
the Muslims and it is one of the few battles of Muhammad mentioned by name in the 
Qur’an. In addition, it was also a victory won with the help of “invisible forces” sent 
down from Allah.72 
Muhammad, as a general, intuitively understood Sun Tzu’s famous dictum, “All 
warfare is based on deception.”73 Muhammad repeatedly asserted to his followers, “War 
is deceit.”74 From spying, to espionage, to disguising troop movements, to misdirection, 
to spreading false information, to surprise attacks – techniques largely unused by the 
chivalrous, honor-driven Arab tribes – Muhammad knew that strategic deception was 
crucial to victory on the battlefield, even if it created ethical conflicts. The Qur’an even 
speaks of Allah being involved in perpetrating schemes and deception.75 To deal with the 
ethical dilemmas effectuated by deception in warfare, Muhammad established norms and 
boundaries for Muslims who were involved in spying. 
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First, spying is permitted and lawful in warfare as a part of Qur’an’s exhortation 
to Muslims to “take every precaution for yourselves.”76 Second, Muslims are not to spy 
on other Muslims for reasons of jealously, suspicion, or a desire to know a fellow 
Muslim’s weaknesses or faults. It is a sin. Muslims spying on Muslims violates privacy 
and sows discord among the Muslim faithful.77 Third, Muslims are not to join with 
unbelievers and enemies of Islam to spy on Muslims. Providing material assistance to the 
Infidel against fellow Muslims brings judgement on the offender.78 Fourth, when Infidels 
are caught spying on Muslims they are to be executed.79 
Muhammad and his Muslim warriors were as resolute in their use of spying, 
espionage and intelligence gathering as were Moses and the Israelites. The Islamic sacred 
texts, though, provide more exhaustive insights into Muhammad’s strategic and tactical 
of spying – commercial spies, agents-in-place, battlefield scouts, combat patrols, 
interrogating prisoners, and reconnaissance missions to gain the upper hand in war.80 
Muhammad, like Moses, justified the inherent ethical conflicts of covert operations with 
appeals to God’s authority and religious norms. Further, Muhammad saw all forms of 
deception in war as legitimized by the just cause to which Allah had called him, thus 
producing a just war destined to achieve a righteous end. 
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Buddhism emerged in the 6th century BCE on the Gangetic Plain of India during a 
time of constant war and conflict perpetrated by changes to the “old Aryan social, 
economic and religious order . . . that had existed for more than a thousand years.”81 
Larger states or political realms made war against smaller tribal kingdoms or “republics” 
like the Sakyas into which Siddhartha Gautama – who became the Buddha, “the 
enlightened one” – was born (563-483 BCE).82 The traditional story of Gautama’s family 
and his upbringing reads like a “fairy tale,” according to distinguished professor of 
religion Stephen Prothero. Siddhartha was the privileged prince of the king and queen of 
the Sakya tribe. He lived in a beautiful home and surroundings, and wallowed in the 
luxury, opportunities, and training that his high social status offered. According to the 
traditional legend, Siddhartha suffered a “crisis of conscience” as a young man and began 
to question the affluence of his life compared to the suffering, sickness and death around 
him. In a moment of awakening, at twenty-nine, Siddhartha forsook all he possessed – 
home, parents, wife, child and belongings – and turned to a life of asceticism, wandering 
the countryside seeking after enlightenment, which he found six years later sitting under a 
Bodhi Tree.83 
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Contemporary scholarship increasingly paints a different picture of Buddha’s 
provenance. Buddha’s father was more likely a warrior chief of the Sakya tribe and 
personally commanded an army of 100,000 men in battle. From a young age, Buddha 
learned to be a soldier and at age six, he entered formal military training, which lasted 
until he was sixteen. His “curriculum included courses in logic, politics and economics,” 
as well as instruction with all the Aryan weapons of warfare – clubs, daggers, swords, 
spears, javelin, battle-axe, bow and arrow, as well as the chariot, warhorse and war 
elephant. At age eleven, the Buddhist texts affirm that he went through a formal initiation 
into the warrior class, the Kshatriya, as a full member and soldier for life. It is “all but 
certain that Buddha experienced the trial of war as a soldier in the Sakya army.” As a 
soldier, he lived a life of hardship, discipline, bravery, and obedience, rather than an 
existence of princely luxury and privilege as portrayed in the traditional mythos. Indeed, 
the teachings of the warrior class regarded luxury “as a sin.”84   
India and Buddhism produced no great chroniclers of war like Herodotus or 
Thucydides, so much of “Buddha’s war experience can only be inferred from limited 
evidence.”85 Therefore, in the accepted histories and sacred texts, there is no discussion 
of spies or spying as is found in the other ancient military histories and religious writings. 
However, one can reasonably infer, given the pervasiveness of war in India during 
Buddha’s lifetime, his rigorous military training as a member of the warrior caste, and his 
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active participation in military engagements, that Siddhartha knew the basics of spying, 
intelligence gathering and covert operations. 
If one accepts this alternative narrative, then what caused Buddha to carry out the 
“Great Departure” and leave his family, clan and tradition?86 Why did he turn his back on 
his training and his life in the warrior caste? Why did he reject his position in the Sakya 
army and abandon his father, the commanding general? What caused him at age twenty-
nine to become a pacifist and develop an abhorrence for war? Why did he teach that 
being a soldier violated Buddhism’s fundamental ethical norms and was morally 
illegitimate? 
Richard Gabriel, an eminent historian of warfare at both American and Canadian 
war colleges, advances a novel and compelling argument. He contends that Siddhartha 
Gautama suffered from battle shock, combat fatigue or another form of Post-Traumatic 
Stress Disorder (PTSD). Gabriel examines the struggles of Buddha’s life immediately 
after the Great Departure and compares it to the symptomatology of the psychological 
and physical breakdown caused by even brief exposure to violent military action. 
Buddha’s abandonment of his family fits the classic pattern of victims of PTSD 
“disrupting the traditional social ties to which they are most closely bound.” His aimless 
wandering is “characteristic of PTSD sufferers, often leading to homelessness.” “He 
remained silent for long periods, often falling into deep trances and extreme 
disorientation, what psychiatrists would today call fugue states.” PTSD may even explain 
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Buddha’s embracing of a spiritual life in that “soldiers recovering from severe trauma 
often turn to some form of religiosity as a part of their redemption from suffering and 
return to normal life.” After six years of wandering, a young girl who brought Buddha a 
bowl of milk and rice drew him back into normal living. He rejected his life of asceticism 
and self-inflicted suffering, embraced what he called the Middle Path, and became a 
travelling teacher.87  
The Buddhist texts cleave closely to the traditional narrative of Buddha’s 
background and upbringing. They say almost nothing about his life as a soldier and his 
experiences on the battlefield. However, even though Buddha’s teachings condemn 
warfare and forbid soldiers from becoming monks, some of his teachings found in the 
Pali Canon praise the military and its disciplined life encouraging Buddhist monks to 
emulate a spartan regimen in their daily lives. “Many of the positive references to 
military life and discipline come from the Jataka,” one of the “main sources from which 
the Buddhist laity receive instruction.”88 Furthermore, some of Buddha’s followers, like 
the Sohei in feudal Japan, were warrior-monks who used military methods to advance 
Buddhism.  
Like other world religions, Buddhism’s embrace of a militaristic tradition 
challenges its ethical norms, its call for universal love, and its compassion for the poor, 
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suffering, and dispossessed. Finally, although there is no clear mention of spying in 
warfare in Buddhism, the praise of war and warriors creates a correlation between 
Buddhism and intelligence activities that, though tenuous, is still plausible.89   
Religion, spies and the early modern era 
The early modern era was a time of religious upheaval, sectarian strife and 
political revolution throughout Europe, spilling over into the New World. 90 Government-
sponsored intelligence activities institutionalized religion and spying in ways previously 
unknown. The foreign and domestic intelligence needs of the evolving European nation-
states necessitated an increasing number of spies serving more professional, complex 
intelligence services. Thus, the early modern era is pivotal to understanding the historical 
conjunction between religion and spying. 
According to Allen Dulles, Sir Francis Walsingham (1532-1590 CE), serving 
during the reign of Elizabeth I, established England’s “first full-fledged professional 
intelligence service” and earned the moniker “the father of British intelligence.” 
Although records exist of intelligence activities throughout English history, particularly 
during the reign of Henry VII and the Cromwell era, Walsingham created the first 
independent institution staffed by professionals dedicated to foreign and domestic 
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spying.91 Dulles claims, “There is hardly a technique of espionage which cannot be found 
in [Walsingham’s] practice of the craft.”92 
Francis Walsingham was born during the watershed years of the English 
Reformation when Henry VIII declared himself the supreme head of the Church of 
England. As Protestants, the Walsingham family embraced King Henry’s religious 
reformation and benefited politically from relationships within the royal Court. Young 
Francis grew up connected and at ease with court life. After an education at King’s 
College, Cambridge, Francis joined English Protestants in exile in Padua, Italy during the 
reign of Queen Mary, who sought to snuff out the English Reformation and re-
Catholicize England. When Elizabeth I ascended to the throne, restoring the supremacy 
of the Church of England, Walsingham returned home along with other exiles and soon 
entered Parliament. In 1571, the Queen appointed him the English Ambassador to the 
French Court of Charles IX during the midst of the French wars of religion between 
Catholics and French Protestant Huguenots.93  
The English embassy in France was located in Walsingham’s home in the 
Huguenot district of Paris. On St. Bartholomew’s Day 1572, Walsingham witnessed the 
gruesome massacre of tens of thousands of Huguenots across Paris. The violence was a 
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deliberate effort by Charles IX to eradicate the political and patrician leadership of the 
Huguenots gathered in Paris for a special religious observance. At the risk of his own life 
and that of his family, Walsingham sheltered some of his fellow Protestants against the 
marauding Catholics. The savagery that Walsingham witnessed that St. Bartholomew’s 
Day sealed his antipathy against Catholics, shaping his policies and political activities 
once he returned to England to assume the role of Elizabeth’s principal secretary and 
chief of security.94  
Driven by his hatred of Catholics and an equal passion to protect his Queen, 
Walsingham employed classic espionage techniques to thwart three separate efforts to 
assassinate Elizabeth. Walsingham enlisted Cambridge-educated linguists and 
cryptographers to decode secret messages between the Catholic French and Spanish 
courts and Mary Queen of Scots. Invisible inks hid messages in regular letters and state-
of-the-art ciphers disguised other messages.95 Professor Nigel Smart of the University of 
Bristol studied the cryptograms decoded by Walsingham’s chief assistant, Thomas 
Phelipps and asserts, “The work that Phelipps was doing along with the other 
codebreakers at the time, is equivalent to the work that say Turing was doing at Bletchley 
Park in the Second World War. It is essentially the kind of cutting edge research and 
level of expertise in cryptanalysis that is currently being done by GCHQ in the United 
Kingdom or NSA in America.”96  
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Walsingham operated a vast network of espionage agents across Europe, 
penetrating all the important royal courts of the Continent, including the Vatican. He 
coerced captured spies to work as double agents for his secret service, and devised 
schemes of chicanery and plots of murder. “His crowning achievement was the 
employment of a spy on the staff of the Admiral in command of the Spanish Armada. 
Thus he was able to obtain the most detailed information regarding the state of readiness 
of the Armada, its ships, equipment, forces, and stores.”97 One of Walsingham’s many 
men in Madrid, Anthony Standen, obtained a full copy of the secret report detailing 
Philip II of Spain’s complete plans to invade England and provided it to Walsingham and 
Elizabeth I only days after Philip had approved it. Thus, the British Navy had ample 
warning of the arrival of the Spanish Armada. With Walsingham’s intelligence gathering, 
Elizabeth’s forces were able to defeat the Spanish invasion and with it the Catholic 
nation’s objective of overthrowing Elizabeth, destroying Protestantism in England, and 
placing Catholic Mary Stuart on the throne.98 
Walsingham’s skill at infiltrating and suborning Catholic clergy further ensured 
the success of his espionage activities. Torture and the misery of prison persuaded some 
Jesuits and priests, arrested for illegally celebrating mass or propagating the Catholic 
faith, to serve the English crown. Walsingham offered others a release from prison and 
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money if they would work as one of his secret agents in the Catholic royal courts and 
communities of Europe. Robert Beale, Elizabeth’s Clerk of the Privy Council, 
commented on Walsingham’s payments, “With money he corrupted priests, Jesuits and 
traitors to betray the practices against the realm.”99 Two of Walsingham’s most famous 
Catholic double agents who “worked for money” were Thomas Rogers, whose nom de 
guerre was Nicholas Berden, and George Gilbert. Berden made his way to Rome and 
reported to Walsingham in “despatches [sic] every few days” the interactions of the 
Vatican and the Catholic underground with Mary Queen of Scots. Gilbert Gifford, a 
Catholic deacon, was ‘turned’ by Walsingham in 1585 and placed in Mary Stuart’s inner 
circle as a trusted courier of her secret messages to her Catholic co-conspirators. It was 
one of these messages, passed from Gifford to Walsingham, which revealed Mary’s 
direct order to Anthony Babbington and John Ballard to assassinate her cousin Elizabeth 
I. This act of treason led directly to Mary’s trial and execution in 1587.100 
Allen Dulles, with his sensitivity to religion, observes that “religious affiliations” 
played “a major role” in Walsingham’s spy story.101 Indeed, religion was both the cause 
and the means for Walsingham’s spying. The sixteenth century was a time of social, 
religious, political and economic upheaval across Europe; a time of religious reformation 
and counter-reformation; a time of sectarian strife and war; a time when kings and queens 
ofttimes took sides not based on their ‘best interests’, but on their religious convictions. 
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Religion was thus at the heart of the conflict between Elizabeth I and Mary Queen of 
Scots, and the raison d'être for England’s first intelligence service. But religion was more 
than the reason for the creation of Walsingham’s spy network; it was the means by which 
he accomplished many of his operations. From infiltrating religious communities and 
institutions to stealing and deciphering secret messages from the Pope to luring religious 
leaders to operate as double agents, Walsingham had no compunction about manipulating 
religion or religious leaders to serve his clandestine ends. This convergence of religion 
and spying in the espionage of Sir Francis Walsingham foreshadows the manipulation of 
religion during the Cold War by the CIA. 
The only rival to Walsingham’s achievements in espionage until the nineteenth 
century, according to Allen Dulles, was Cardinal Richelieu of France (1585-1642 CE).102 
Hailing from a noble family in service to King Henry III of France, Richelieu became the 
Bishop of Luçon at twenty-one years of age by dispensation of the Pope. After 
impressing the Queen Mother and Regent, Marie de’ Medici, at the meeting of the 
Estates-General in 1614, Richelieu was named a secretary of state.103 This followed with 
Richelieu’s elevation to Cardinal of the Catholic Church in 1622 and Chief Minister to 
Louis XIII in 1624. Besides being a churchman and chief counselor to the king from 
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1624 to 1642, Richelieu was also a general, admiral, promoter of commerce, patron of 
literature and the arts, and a “ruler of Europe.”104 
When Cardinal Richelieu rose to political power, France “existed only as a 
geographical entity with an unstable eastern boundary.” Feudal, regional and religious 
loyalties dominated France with different systems of law in the north versus south and no 
unified culture or language. Richelieu distinguished himself in Court with his drive to 
forge a single, strong national government, to make Louis XIII the absolute master of the 
realm, and to establish France as the preeminent power in Europe. To accomplish this 
mission, Richelieu was “a man of unswerving purpose, knowing no scruples in advancing 
his country’s interests, and possessing in the highest degree the qualities of a statesman – 
prophetic vision, unfailing sagacity, and an iron will.”105 However, three major obstacles 
stood in Richelieu’s way: the Protestant Huguenots whose political and economic power 
had expanded since the Edict of Nantes; the nobility who were unwilling to surrender the 
dominance they enjoyed in the feudal system; and foreign powers, which “long encircled 
and threatened France,” particularly the Habsburg States, Austria and Spain, and the Holy 
Roman Empire.106 In addition, the ironfisted Cardinal had many enemies who sought to 
destroy him, including Court rivals and the Queen Mother. To fight the unremitting 
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battles, Richelieu enlarged and strengthened the army, created a navy, and fashioned the 
foremost spy operation in Europe. 
Richelieu created a “spider’s web” of spies and intelligence gathering across 
Europe to keep himself informed of the plans and actions of his adversaries.107 Echoing 
Sun Tzu, Richelieu valued “foresight” as the most important essential of “good 
government,” thus necessitating an espionage operation: 
Nothing is more necessary in governing a state than foresight, since by its use 
one can easily prevent many evils which can be corrected only with great 
difficulty if allowed to transpire. Just as a doctor who knows how to prevent 
illness is more esteemed than the one who works cures, so too should ministers of 
state always remind both themselves and their masters that it is more important to 
anticipate the future than to dwell upon the present, since with enemies of the 
state, as with diseases, it is better to advance to the attack than to wait and drive 
them out after they have invaded.108 
In addition to collecting information, Richelieu’s spy network “spread lies, false 
intelligence and used active measures to influence events all over Europe to keep 
France’s enemies fighting each other and weaken them.”109 Richelieu’s spies were 
everywhere. Every branch of the French government had agents loyal to Richelieu. Some 
of his adversaries’ most trusted advisors were on Richelieu’s payroll. “Ladies of rank and 
gentlemen of fashion, who in public declaimed against Richelieu’s tyranny, sent secret 
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reports for his information.”110 Moreover, like Walsingham, Richelieu employed skilled 
linguists and code-breakers to decipher secret messages intercepted by his spies. 
Richelieu spied on the Queen Mother, who turned against the Cardinal after 
initially supporting him, siding with the nobility in their efforts to stop Richelieu’s 
economic reforms. Richelieu suborned the Queen Mother’s physician to report not only 
on her health, but also on the private matters she shared with the doctor. Further, a priest, 
who was a confidant of the Queen Mother, reported to Richelieu all that he learned, even 
in the sacred confines of the confessional. Similarly, Richelieu spied on Louis XIII’s 
wife, Queen Anne of Austria, daughter of Philip III of Spain, by means of one of her 
ladies who disclosed “the inmost feelings and secret councils of the Queen.” Richelieu 
schemed to remove one of Louis XIII’s female confidants, Louise de Lafayette, by 
enlisting a priest who heard Lafayette’s confessions. The priest reported to Richelieu 
what the young lady disclosed about her relationship with the king and her own inner 
feelings. At Richelieu’s behest, the priest wrote letters to Lafayette manipulating her to 
end her relationship with the king and commit herself to a convent, which she did. 
Another female friend of the king had her every action reported to Richelieu by a spy 
code-named “le bon ange” – the good angel. When Louis XIII tired of women, Richelieu 
supplied the king with young men to satisfy his sexual desires. The Marquis of Cinq-
Mars quickly became the king’s favorite. However, Cinq-Mars was discovered by 
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Richelieu’s agents to be secretly plotting with Spain against his own lover, resulting in 
Cinq-Mars’ beheading at Richelieu’s order.111 
Cardinal Richelieu’s most valued and effective agent was a red-haired, unkempt 
Capuchin friar, Father Joseph (Francois le Clerc du Tremblay).112 Joseph served as a 
political mediator for the Queen Mother, covertly reporting to Richelieu her plans. Thus, 
Joseph was able to give Richelieu advance notice of “The Day of Dupes,” a plot by the 
Queen Mother to force her son to dismiss Cardinal Richelieu from office. The ploy failed 
thanks to Father Joseph’s forewarning and Richelieu’s quick intervention. Subsequently, 
a trip to Rome to attend the general meeting of the Capuchin order served as cover for 
Father Joseph to inform Richelieu of political developments at the Vatican. Other times, 
under the guise of a travelling friar, Joseph journeyed to the Habsburg Courts of Austria 
and Spain to report their strategic plans. Father Joseph’s austere appearance as a 
wandering Capuchin friar provided a perfect guise for Richelieu’s deceptions, yet 
sometimes Joseph represented Richelieu in foreign courts in an official capacity.113 
Unlike Walsingham, religion was not the primary motivation for Cardinal 
Richelieu’s spying. He was an observant Catholic who longed to see France committed to 
the Roman Catholic Church. His Catholic zeal was one of the prime catalysts for the 
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military defeat and subjugation of the Protestant Huguenots at La Rochelle.114 Yet as 
Chief Minister, his first priority and supreme loyalty was to France and the absolutist rule 
of King Louis XIII. Richelieu willingly compromised his religious oaths and betrayed his 
Catholic coreligionists whenever it served French national interests, as when he 
positioned France on the side of the Protestant anti-Habsburg coalition against the 
Catholic alliance in the Thirty Years War.115 
Although religion was seldom the cause for Richelieu’s spying, he had no qualms 
about using clerics, religious orders, and Vatican officials as the means to accomplish his 
subversive schemes. Father Joseph is the most obvious example of Richelieu’s coopting 
clergy for clandestine operations. Yet the most egregious example involves Richelieu, a 
Cardinal, repeatedly ordering priests to violate the sacred Seal of the Confessional to 
convey penitent’s secrets and sins to Richelieu for profane political purposes. Richelieu 
had “no scruples,” religious or otherwise, when advancing the interests of France and 
King Louis XIII.116 Although a Prince of the Church, Richelieu’s actions, particularly in 
the domain of espionage, reveal him as a ruthless, remorseless prince of the state. 
In the seventeenth century, as a result of the European wars of religion and the 
harsh persecution of ecclesiastical dissent, many religious groups fled to the New World 
where they could enjoy freedom from royal tyranny, new economic opportunities and, 
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most importantly, religious freedom. In America, religious communities were able to 
establish their lives according to their beliefs. They had the opportunity to grow and 
expand in spite of the fact that the European system of state-supported churches still 
dominated parts of the New World. Colonial America was religiously pluralistic with 
Anglicans, Quakers, Catholics, Congregationalists, Presbyterians, Puritans, Reformed, 
Baptists, Methodists, Lutherans, Moravians, Mennonites, Anabaptists, Huguenots, Jews 
and even a few Muslims. By the eighteenth century, one cause began to unite the 
disparate, discordant religious groups – a revolutionary war with Britain. 
According to Cambridge University historian, Andrew Preston, “Religion was 
central to the outbreak and course of the Revolutionary War. It was not quite a religious 
war, though a religious war raged within it as colonists drew battle lines with a cross as 
well as a sword.”117 The preachers and itinerant evangelists of the First Great Awakening, 
like George Whitfield and Jonathan Edwards, spread the seeds of revolution. They 
proclaimed with fiery oratory the need for personal redemption, social change, and a new 
beginning. Individuals had a free will, the evangelists declared, and by choosing God, 
one could experience a new life and freedom. As Preston observes, “American religion 
helped nurture new ways of thinking about established authority and its relationship to 
individual liberty.” The ministers declared that there was no true authority other than God 
– not kings, not governments, not institutions. On the American frontier, with its 
individualistic, independent spirit, Whitfield’s message that “our help comes from God” 
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not government was embraced with enthusiasm. Inevitably, these messages fed the 
churning discontent with King George III of England and his oppressive Acts of military 
control, social restriction and taxation. Moreover, the religious separatists and dissenters 
that populated America were predisposed to reject Britain’s authority because of the 
persecution they had previously suffered.118 
The flames of political discontent were increasingly fanned by religious words 
and images understood by most colonists.119 When the Stamp Act of 1765 was imposed, 
levying a direct tax on printed materials including newspapers, magazines, legal 
documents and even playing cards, Americans revolted declaring the British promoters of 
the tax to be “the monstrous beasts of the book of Revelation.” Any colonist accepting a 
piece of paper with the royal stamp would be receiving “the mark of the beast,” a 
powerful reference to the Antichrist. 120 When Patrick Henry made his famous “Give me 
liberty, or give me death!” speech on March 23, 1775, it employed the “emotional style 
and simple language” of a revival sermon and resounded with Christian themes: 
He affirmed that “we shall not fight our battles alone. There is a just God who 
presides over the destinies of nations, and who will raise up friends to fight our 
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battles for us.” And to the question, “Is life so dear, or peace so sweet, as to be 
purchased at the price of chains and slavery?” the answer came, “Forbid it, 
Almighty God!” 
Moreover, Henry labeled the struggle against the oppression of Britain a “holy cause of 
liberty.” 121 In an effort to assure God’s favor, the newly constituted Continental 
Congress, in 1774 and 1775 proclaimed “days of prayer and fasting” for the colonies 
“calling on all Americans to confess and repent of their sins.” John Adams declared in a 
revolutionary tract, “Let the pulpit resound with the doctrines and sentiments of religious 
liberty.”122 Thus, American religion and the drive for independence intertwined. Each 
encouraged the other. Each supported the other. And, as a result, American clergymen 
became not-so-clandestine provocateurs of the Revolutionary War. 
American clergy not only advocated revolution and mobilized popular opinion, 
some were actively involved in the patriots’ clandestine operations.123 In Boston, 
Reverend Charles Chauncy of the prestigious First Congregational Church played a role 
in helping the semi-clandestine Sons of Liberty become established. As well, Reverend 
Samuel Cooper, whose Brattle Street Church included revolutionaries John Hancock, 
Samuel Adams, Joseph Warren and John Adams, was involved with the Sons of Liberty. 
George Whitefield, likewise, supported and corresponded with Samuel Adams about 
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resistance activities.124 Divided loyalties split the Anglican. Many steadfastly stood by 
their oath of fidelity to King George III as head of the Church of England, while others 
became sympathetic to the injustices suffered by the colonists. Reverend John Vardill 
was an Anglican clergyman who had served as the assistant rector of Trinity Church in 
New York. While posted in England, British intelligence recruited him to run a network 
of spies targeting Benjamin Franklin, Silas Deane and other members of the American 
diplomatic mission in Paris. Besides collecting valuable intelligence on the Americans, 
one of the spies was able to steal secret correspondence between the American diplomats 
and the Continental Congress. The British and French used their experienced, 
professional espionage services to spy on the Americans in Paris, London, and in the 
Colonies. As with Walsingham and Richelieu, they were not hesitant about employing 
clergy as spies.125 For the Americans, spying was largely informal. Intelligence against 
the British was “carried out by countless private citizens, tradesmen, booksellers, 
tavernkeepers and the like, who had daily contact with British officers, befriended them, 
listened to their conversations, masquerading as Tories in order to gain their 
confidence.”126 Therefore, it is possible – even probable – that like Reverend Vardill, 
many patriotic American clergymen gathered intelligence from their parishioners and 
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passed it on to revolutionary leaders. In addition, although few stories exist of specific 
clergy-led clandestine networks, it is credible that colonial clergymen organized and ran 
spy networks to support the Patriots’ cause. 
According to Allen Dulles, George Washington “was an outstandingly gifted 
intelligence chief. He himself directed the entire intelligence effort of the American 
forces, even to taking a hand personally in its more important operations.” Within two 
weeks of taking command of the Continental Army, Washington began to establish his 
own intelligence capabilities. He created spy rings – Merserau, Clark, Culper – and 
appointed trusted aides as intelligence case officers, like Elias Dayton, John Jay, and 
Benjamin Tallmadge. There are no clear examples of clergy being used by Washington as 
intelligence operatives, although it is possible that a few of the Continental Army’s 117 
chaplains, appointed and financed by Washington, may have had limited involvement in 
clandestine activities. Some colonial pastors chose to become actively involved as 
soldiers in the Continental Army, like Pastor Peter Muhlenberg of Woodstock, Virginia. 
One Sunday in 1776, he stood in the pulpit of his church and preached on Ecclesiastes 3, 
“To everything there is a season . . . a time of war, and a time of peace.” At the end of the 
sermon, he threw off his clerical robe to reveal the uniform of a Virginia militia officer. 
Muhlenberg had accepted an appointment as a colonel in the Virginia regiment. As a 
result, three hundred men in his congregation followed him into the militia that day.127 
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Washington’s most effective spy ring – the Culper Ring – operated out of 
Setauket, Long Island and the south shore of Connecticut; it had responsibility for 
intelligence operations in New York City, Connecticut and Long Island. The Ring’s 
leaders were Abraham Woodhull (Samuel Culper, Sr.), Robert Townsend (Samuel 
Culper, Jr.), Caleb Brewster and Anna Strong. Washington’s intelligence case officer, 
Captain Benjamin Tallmadge, recruited and oversaw the Culper Ring. Woodhull, 
Brewster, and Tallmadge were “stout Presbyterians” like most of the people of Setauket, 
while Townsend was a Quaker. Brewster and Tallmadge had a special connection as both 
grew up in Setauket where Brewster’s father, Reverend Nathaniel Brewster, pastored the 
hamlet’s Presbyterian Church. When he retired, Reverend Benjamin Tallmadge, Captain 
Tallmadge’s father, assumed the pulpit. In early 1777, a prominent Loyalist officer, 
Colonel Richard Hewlett, commandeered the church and turned it into a fortified 
headquarters for British troops. He desecrated the interior and destroyed the adjoining 
graveyard. Tallmadge and Brewster were infuriated at this act of defilement to their 
fathers’ church and conducted a revenge raid against Colonel Hewlett on August 14, 
1777. Although religion was not a driving force in the clandestine activities of the Culper 
Ring, it did undergird the beliefs of the leaders and influenced some of their espionage 
operations.128 
                                                 




Religion, spies and World War II 
On February 24, 1920 in Munich, Germany, the National Socialist German 
Workers’ Party (NSDAP) announced its inaugural political program – “The Twenty Five 
Points” – penned by Adolf Hitler and Anton Drexler. Two of the core guiding principles 
dealt with religion and led ultimately to the genocide of the Jews and persecution of 
religious communities. Point Four states, “Only Nationals (Volksgenossen) can be 
Citizens of the State. Only persons of German blood can be Nationals, regardless of 
religious affiliation. No Jew can therefore be a German National.” The subsequent six 
principles define the rights of citizens and the discriminations against non-citizens. The 
Nazi political creed speaks of Jews as an ethnic group and a religious group. This 
becomes more apparent in Point Twenty-Five of the NSDAP manifesto: 
We demand freedom for all religious denominations, provided that they do not 
endanger the existence of the State or offend the concepts of decency and 
morality of the Germanic race.  
The Party as such stands for positive Christianity, without associating itself 
with any particular denomination. It fights against the Jewish-materialistic spirit 
within and around us, and is convinced that a permanent revival of our nation can 
be achieved only from within, on the basis of: Public Interest before Private 
Interest.129 
However, Jews were not the only religious groups targeted by the Nazis. 
Jehovah’s Witnesses did not “accept the authority of the state.” As a result, large numbers 
suffered arrest, imprisonment, and execution. Protestant Christians – Lutherans, United 
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Church, Reformed, Baptists and others – formed a significant portion of Hitler’s 1932 
electoral base. They embraced Hitler’s strong nationalism, his promise of “positive 
Christianity,” his Aryan image of Jesus, and his anti-Semitism. Many Protestant pastors 
believed that Christianity would thrive under Nazism and that Hitler would restore 
Germany to its earlier Christian greatness. However, after becoming Chancellor, Hitler’s 
scheme to co-opt and suppress the Protestant churches became obvious. On April 7, 
1933, the Aryan Clause, restricting government and church employment to those of 
“Aryan” stock, took effect. On April 30, Hitler appointed Ludwig Müller as Reich’s 
Bishop over all the Protestant churches. Soon thereafter, a series of steps sealed Nazi 
control of the Protestant churches. All Protestant denominations were forced to merge 
into one national Reich Church controlled by Müller. All pastors were required to take an 
oath of loyalty to Hitler. All members of Jewish descent were expelled from churches, 
even those who had converted to Christianity or were pastors. The Old Testament was 
removed from the German Bible because it was Jewish. Sections of the New Testament 
were also considered Jewish and cut out. Parts of the Protestant worship liturgy, like 
hymns, baptism, and communion, were adjusted to be more German and less “Israelite.” 
Theological concepts like “grace” were expunged for being “un-German.”130 
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These changes to Protestant church life in 1933 generated great consternation 
within Christian communities over whether it was better to capitulate or revolt. The first 
and most influential person to speak out in support of the Jews and against the Aryan 
Clause was theologian and pastor, Dietrich Bonhoeffer. In April 1933, a couple of weeks 
after the Aryan Clause came into effect, Bonhoeffer challenged Protestant pastors to 
reject the Clause and the Nazi religious program in an essay entitled, “The Church and 
the Jewish Question.” Soon thereafter, Martin Niemöller organized the Pastor’s 
Emergency League (PEL) in opposition to the Aryan Clause and the Reich Church. The 
PEL evolved into the larger movement of the Confessing Church, which upheld the 
orthodox tenants of Protestant Christianity, divorcing itself from the Nazis and the 
Reich’s Bishop Müller. The Confessing Church appointed their own bishops and pastors, 
and held their own, sometimes secret, church services. They created their own 
underground seminary at Finkenwalde to train new clergy. However, the Gestapo soon 
shut down Confessing congregations, arrested pastors and leaders, and shuttered the 
seminary after only two years.131 
By the mid-1930s, the rejection of Nazi religious policies by Confessing Church 
leaders turned to active resistance. Pastors like Heinrich Grüber and Martin Niemöller 
became active in smuggling Jews out of the country. Others joined resistance plots 
against Hitler. In 1938, Dietrich Bonhoeffer joined a small but growing cabal led by 
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General Ludwig Beck, Admiral Wilhelm Canaris, General Hans Oster, and eventually 
Colonel Claus von Stauffenberg. At first, plans against Hitler involved efforts to persuade 
the generals to overthrow the Führer; soon, plots turned to the assassination of Hitler. A 
year after joining the resistance, Bonhoeffer’s brother-in-law, Hans von Dohnanyi, 
arranged for the pastor to join Abwer – German military intelligence – as a civilian spy. 
Abwer was a hotbed of resistance activity, led by Admiral Canaris and assisted by 
Dohnanyi and Oster. These leaders were sympathetic to Bonhoeffer’s work with the 
Confessing Church and sought to help him. They believed that Bonhoeffer, with his vast 
church connections in Germany and abroad, could contribute to the conspiracy against 
Hitler. In return, Abwer provided Bonhoeffer with needed protections from the Gestapo 
and from the military draft. Abwer also offered Bonhoeffer, under the guise of official 
business, the ability to travel and continue his pastoral work. Bonhoeffer’s arrangement 
with Abwer made him not merely a spy, but a double agent. After several years of 
surveillance, the Gestapo arrested Bonhoeffer and Dohnanyi on April 5, 1943. They were 
imprisoned until April 9, 1945 when they were executed along with other key figures of 
the resistance, including Canaris and Oster.132  
German clergymen operated as spies for Abwer in the United States, too. As chief 
of Abwer Admiral Canaris launched “Operation Pastorius” in June 1942 to land eight 
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Nazi saboteurs in America to attack key economic targets across the country. It was the 
most significant intrusion of Nazi saboteurs on American soil during World War II. The 
plot failed when one of the agents, George Dasch, got cold feet and turned himself in to 
the FBI. A handkerchief found on one of the saboteurs had secret writing identifying their 
contact in the United States, Rev. Carl Krepper of the United Lutheran Church in 
Rahway, New Jersey. Krepper was a Nazi deep-cover agent placed in the United States 
seven years earlier to assist Nazi spies if they ran into trouble. Krepper reported to Abwer 
on Nazi operations in America through letters to his wife.133  
On February 1, 1933, Adolf Hitler gave his first speech to the German nation in 
his new capacity as Reich Chancellor. The radio address – “Proclamation of the 
Government to the German Nation” – promised to “regard it as [our] first and foremost 
duty to revive in the nation the spirit of unity and cooperation.” Hitler said that one of the 
“basic principles on which our nation has been built up” is to “regard Christianity as the 
foundation of our national morality, and the family as the basis of national life.” At the 
end of the speech, Hitler closed with a call for God’s help: “May God Almighty give our 
work His blessing, strengthen our purpose and endow us with wisdom and the trust of 
our people, for we are fighting not for ourselves but for Germany!” On March 23, 1933, 
the day before the passage of the Enabling Act giving the Führer dictatorial powers, 
                                                 
133 “Ex-Pastor Seized as Nazi Spy Aide,” New York Times (hereinafter NYT), December 20, 1944. 
“Secret Printing on Saboteur’s Handkerchief Restored at Krepper Spy Trial in Jersey,” NYT, February 
15, 1945. Jerry Carino, “Local pastor unravels Jersey Nazi spy mystery,” December 7, 2015, accessed 
February 18, 2018, https://www.app.com/story/news/local/ocean-county/2015/12/07/local-pastor-
unravels-jersey-nazi-spy-mystery/76660808/. See also, J. Francis Watson, The Nazi Spy Pastor: Carl 




Hitler addressed the Reichstag with a lengthy speech outlining his new government’s 
plans for the renewal of Germany. Half-way through the speech, he spoke about the 
“revival of religious life” in the nation: 
The National Government regards the two Christian confessions as the 
weightiest factors for the maintenance of our nationality. They will respect the 
agreements concluded between them and the Federal states. 
Their rights are not to be infringed. . . . It will be the Government’s care to 
maintain honest cooperation between Church and State; the struggle against 
materialistic views and for a real national community is just as much in the 
interest of the German nation as in that of the welfare of our Christian faith. 
Later in the speech, Hitler spoke expectantly, though deceptively, of his hopes for a 
positive relationship between the Catholic Church and his new government:  
In the same way, the Government of the Reich, who regard Christianity as the 
unshakeable foundation of the morals and moral code of the nation, attach the 
greatest value to friendly relations with the Holy See, and are endeavouring to 
develop them. 134  
As Hitler spoke about the Catholic Church, negotiations for a joint treaty were 
already underway between Reich Vice Chancellor Franz von Papen and Vatican 
Secretary of State Eugenio Pacelli, later Pope Pius XII. The Vatican was concerned about 
protecting the 23 million Catholics in the country, which represented 35% of the German 
population. Early on, “Adolf Hitler recognized . . . the potential for Catholic resistance to 
National Socialism.” 135 On July 20, 1933, the Holy See signed a Concordat with 
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Germany. The treaty granted privileges and protections to Catholic churches, schools, 
religious orders and the clergy. In exchange, German bishops were required to swear an 
“oath of loyalty” to the German Reich. Catholic clergy could not be members of or 
involved with any political party. The Catholic Church’s parliamentary party, trade 
unions, professional associations, news outlets, and youth organizations were required to 
withdraw from all social and political activity; either the government or the Vatican 
forced them to dissolve or merge their activities into Nazi-controlled organizations. News 
of the Concordat negotiations provided Hitler with much needed support from Catholics 
in the March 1933 federal elections; in the Reichstag, the support of the Catholic Centre 
Party was crucial to the passage of the Enabling Act. Moreover, nonintervention by the 
Catholic Church was advantageous to Hitler in resolving the “Jewish question.”136  
For the Nazis, according to historian David Alvarez, “the concordat was little 
more than a propaganda device to legitimize their regime . . . They had no intention of 
abiding by the agreement, and when the time came to smash the Church, they would not 
be deterred by a legal document.”137 In the mid-1930s, the New York Times ran repeated 
stories detailing the persecution of clergy and religious groups in Germany. Oppression 
and violent actions, particularly against Catholics, were on the rise. Roving bands of 
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Brownshirts physically attacked priests and legally charged them with crimes at 
“immorality trials.” The Brownshirts fabricated charges of “perverted and immoral” 
lifestyles against priests, friars, monks and nuns. The Nazis fired Catholic teachers as 
Catholic schools closed or merged under duress with Nazi-controlled “community 
schools.” The Nazis censored Catholic newspapers, then banned them altogether. They 
shuttered seminaries. They forbade Catholic Youth organizations. And “thousands of 
Catholic civil servants . . . were threatened with disciplinary measures or dismissal unless 
their children were enrolled in Hitler Youth or German Girls League.” The attacks on 
Catholics were so abhorrent that Christian and Jewish leaders in the United States 
launched a campaign to support German Catholics and to protest “Hitlerite tyranny,” 
stating in their declaration, “Nazism is apparently seeking the destruction of all spiritual 
freedom and the uprooting of all religious tradition.” This accusation by US clerics was 
validated in 1941 when Nazi Deputy Führer Martin Bormann declared to Heinrich 
Himmler that the “influence of the Church must be entirely eliminated.”138 
Pope Pius XI, alarmed at the mushrooming maltreatment of the German Catholic 
Church, published an encyclical – Mit brennender Sorge (With Burning Anxiety) – on 
Palm Sunday 1937 and read in all the Catholic churches in Germany. The Pope’s letter 
condemned the Nazi government’s violations of the Concordat and its hostile treatment 
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of the Church in Germany. It denounced Nazi ideology and the glorification of race and 
state. However, it did not condemn Nazism or Hitler by name. Upon hearing the news of 
the encyclical, Hitler was furious. The Nazi attacks on German Catholics intensified and 
expanded.139 
Long before Hitler became Reich Chancellor, the Vatican relied on its internal 
intelligence services to provide information to the Pope and the Roman Curia on religious 
and political developments in Germany. The Pope needed to understand what was 
happening, especially with Hitler’s secret plans. The Pope bore a heavy and sacred 
responsibility to protect Catholic citizens, properties and interests in Germany. The most 
trustworthy source of information for the Pope was his own espionage service.  
While scholars debate the origins and structure of the Vatican’s intelligence 
operations, no one disputes its existence or effectiveness. Simon Wiesenthal, the 
legendary hunter of Nazi war criminals, declared, “the best and most effective espionage 
service I know in the world belongs to the Vatican.”140 Some scholars date its founding to 
the sixteenth century during the Vatican plots to overthrow Queen Elizabeth I and replace 
her with Mary Queen of Scots. Other scholars argue there has never been an official 
establishment of a Vatican spy service. Organizationally, some say that there is an 
external branch of the Vatican intelligence service collecting and analyzing information, 
overseeing coded communications, and running covert operations; while, at the same 
time, there is an internal counter-espionage arm guarding against spies within the 
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Vatican. Other scholars assert that the Vatican intelligence operations have always been 
informal or ad hoc, operating through the normal communication channels between the 
bishops and Rome, or as a diplomatic office within the Secretary of State’s department, 
or as the secret domain of religious orders like the Jesuits. Whatever position one takes, 
scholars agree that before and during World War II the Vatican’s intelligence services 
were highly engaged in countering Nazi violence against the Church, while guarding 
against German infiltration and spying within the Vatican.141 
Chief among the Vatican intelligence operatives in this era was a Jesuit priest, 
Father Robert Leiber. He was Eugenio Pacelli’s private secretary and most trusted 
personal advisor from the early 1920s until Pius XII’s death in 1958. As such, he saw or 
spoke with Pacelli two or three times every day, more than any other priest. He read 
nearly everything that crossed the Pope’s desk and was Pacelli’s confidant and advisor on 
the Vatican’s deepest secrets. During the time that Pacelli was Cardinal Secretary of State 
and then Pope, Leiber served as the primary contact for numerous Church intelligence 
operatives, spies, and double agents. Many believe that during these years, Leiber was the 
chief of the Vatican intelligence service, even though he was “never a Vatican official,” 
never “kept an office in the Vatican,” and “did not appear in [the Vatican] directory.” In 
every respect, he was “an unofficial official” – the perfect cover for the Pope’s espionage 
chief.142 
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One of Father Leiber’s notable spy contacts was a German Abwer double agent, 
Josef Müller, a respected Munich lawyer, devout Catholic and fervent anti-Nazi. Müller 
was a member of the secret resistance group within Abwer headed by Admiral Canaris, 
who sent Müller to Rome to establish a secure channel of communications with Pope 
Pius XII. Canaris sought to enlist the Pope’s help in brokering assurances from the 
British that if the German resistance was able to overthrow Hitler, the Allies would work 
sympathetically with the resistance to install a new government in Germany. Müller’s 
point of contact in Rome was Father Leiber, who then carried Müller’s messages to the 
Pope. Throughout his repeated trips between Berlin and Rome, Müller’s allegiance to the 
Catholic Church never wavered. Later, “to demonstrate the conspirators’ good faith,” 
Müller rushed to Rome “to inform Pius XII that Hitler was preparing to launch a military 
campaign against France” by way of Belgium, Holland and Luxembourg. Upon receiving 
this news via Leiber, Pius XII quickly alerted the governments of the target nations 
through Catholic diplomatic channels. Unfortunately, the governments of France and the 
Lowlands greeted the invasion news with skepticism upon learning that it came from an 
Abwer double agent.143 
There were notable Vatican spies, some of whom operated solely in Germany, 
some that moved freely between Germany and Rome, and others that operated in Eastern 
Europe. Monsignor Ludwig Kaas was “the exiled former leader of the defunct German 
Centre Party” and a long-time associate of Pacelli. He worked in Rome with Leiber and 
                                                 




Müller collecting and disseminating intelligence for Pius XII.  Niccolo Estorzi served the 
Vatican espionage service as a courier and messenger, travelling freely between 
European countries. He was also the operational leader of the Tisserant Plan to re-
evangelize atheist Russia by moving behind the invading Nazi Army to restore 
Catholicism in conquered territories.144 
At the same time, the Nazi regime worked vigorously to infiltrate the Vatican and 
compromise its intelligence networks. The effort was overseen by the brutal and ruthless 
Reinhard Heydrich, head of the Nazi party’s intelligence service, the SD 
(Sicherheitsdienst), and later the RSHA (Reichssicherheitshauptamt or Reich Main 
Security Administration), which included the SD, Gestapo and combined police services. 
Heydrich issued the so-called “Heydrich Directive” that “all the Reich’s espionage and 
security forces . . . double their efforts to penetrate Vatican security.” Albert Hartl, a 
renegade former Catholic priest, headed this effort because of his extensive knowledge 
and contacts within the German Catholic Church. He in turn recruited disgruntled priests, 
monks and theological professors, as well as low-level employees of Catholic 
institutions. Hartl had mixed success in placing agents inside the German Catholic 
Church. For example, the SD was completely caught off-guard by Pope Pius XI’s 
encyclical, Mit brennender Sorge, on Palm Sunday 1937, but Hartl was able to secure 
regular copies of the confidential minutes of the German bishops’ meetings. The failure 
of the SD to place its own agents inside the Vatican was a setback. Hartl had to rely upon 
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the Italian government’s mid-level clandestine network inside the Holy See for 
information.145 
The Soviet Union was also involved in efforts to crack the Vatican’s intelligence 
network. In fact, the Russians and the Holy See had been spying on each other since 
before the 1917 Revolution. The espionage game between the two powers became more 
intense and purposeful in the 1920s when Lenin’s purge of Catholic leaders and seizure 
of Catholic properties dismayed the Vatican. In 1922, the communist secret police – the 
Cheka – placed their first agent inside Russian Catholic circles. The spy was an 
“especially pious” young man who “professed his intention of becoming a Catholic 
monk.” In 1924, there were approximately two hundred Catholic priests in Russia. By 
1936, that number was down to fifty. By the next year, there were only ten, and in 1938, 
there were two. When Germany invaded Russia in 1941, “only two of about 1,200 
Catholic churches remained active.” The Vatican devised a covert plan to revive the 
Catholic Church in Russia. The Vatican sent a French Jesuit, Father Michel d’Herbigny, 
on a series of clandestine trips to the Soviet Union in order to secretly ordain new bishops 
and establish an administrative framework for the Russian Catholic Church. The Soviet 
secret police monitored Father d’Herbigny’s movements and dismantled much of the 
ecclesiastical hierarchy that he established. The secret police arrested and imprisoned his 
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contacts, but a small portion remained. To counter the Vatican’s covert operations in 
Russia, the Soviet intelligence service compromised d’Herbigny’s protégé and most 
promising recruit in Rome – Father Alexander Deubner – using a communist seductress, 
Clara Zetkin. Deubner was able to steal an important secret report on Russia from the 
Pope’s desk and pass it on to the Russians. He stole other Vatican files, as well, and 
passed them to his Soviet handlers. The Vatican discovered and banished Deubner, but 
Moscow was able to place another agent inside the Vatican’s Commission for Russia, 
Monsignor Eduard Prettner-Cippico. He photographed key documents and passed on the 
prints to Soviet intelligence. Later, the Vatican dismissed him too for “illegal financial 
dealings.”146 
Before and during World War II, religion was more than an object of spying for 
the Soviet Union. First, religion was antithetical to the revolutionary principles of 
Marxism-Leninism. On Easter Sunday 1923, the Soviets executed Monsignor Konstantin 
Budkiewicz in Moscow’s Lubyanka Prison. His crime? Resisting religious persecution, 
thus “committing a counterrevolutionary act.” Second, religious organizations were a 
threat to the institutional establishment of the communist system in Russia. In 1917, 
eighty percent (118 million) of the total Russian population of 148 million were Russian 
Orthodox adherents. There were roughly 5 million Catholics and a lesser number of 
Protestants at the time. To control the country, the Soviets had to eradicate the authority 
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and influence of religion. From 1917 to 1930, 42,800 Russian Orthodox clergymen, 
monks and nuns died or were executed in Soviet labor camps and prisons. During Stalin’s 
“Great Purge” from 1936-38, 100,000 Orthodox clergy and lay leaders were executed. 
Among Catholics, 1,000 clergymen were executed by 1932 and 19,812 priests and nuns 
were imprisoned. Third, religion was a tool for Soviet propaganda to undergird the war 
against the Nazis. When Germany invaded Russia during Operation Barbarossa, the 
Nazis used radio broadcasts and leaflets to denounce the Soviet anti-religious campaigns 
of the past decades proclaiming that Germany had come to restore “religious freedom” to 
Russia. Striking back, the Soviet government used previously silenced Russian Orthodox 
clerics to denounce the Nazi extermination of the Jews and persecutions of Christians. 
Orthodox clerics made passionate, emotion-filled appeals to historic Russian patriotism, 
declaring that the struggle against the Wehrmacht was a “holy war” against Hitler – “the 
Antichrist” and a “servant of Satan.”147 
During 1941, the Soviet leadership had legitimate concerns about priests and their 
congregations in Nazi-conquered Soviet territories defecting to the enemy, particularly in 
the Western borderlands, the Baltic States and the Ukraine. The concern was not just with 
Christians; it also involved Muslims in the Caucasus region and Tatars in Crimea, many 
of whom openly supported the Nazis. With the outcome of the war still in the balance, the 
Soviet government sought to regain support from religious communities by easing 
restrictions on them. “Soviet atheistic journals ceased publication” within a few days of 
                                                 




the German invasion. The Soviets shuttered “anti-God museums.” Closed churches 
reopened and resumed worship services. “Heavy taxes” previously levied against 
churches were lifted. Religious groups could solicit charitable funds for the first time 
since 1918, which surprisingly ended up buying equipment for a tank unit and an aerial 
squadron. In addition, religious groups were encouraged to raise funds from their co-
religionists in “free countries” because in addition to providing much-needed foreign 
funds, it encouraged Western support of the Soviet war effort. The most extraordinary 
propaganda event during this time was the sudden decision by the Soviet government to 
allow the open celebration of Easter 1942. Moreover, in addition to religious rites, 
“Soviet authorities also released extra rations of sugar and flour for the baking of 
traditional Orthodox Easter cakes.” The primary reason for authorizing Easter 
celebrations was to “sway foreign public opinion.” The Kremlin released pictures of 
Easter services in Moscow churches for “publication abroad – not for publication at 
home. The domestic press remained silent about the Easter services.” By 1943, the tide of 
war began to favor the Allies and Soviet restrictions on religion returned.148 
Even before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, President Franklin D. Roosevelt 
recognized the need for an American civilian intelligence agency, as he quietly laid the 
groundwork for America’s eventual entry into the war. In July 1941, Roosevelt appointed 
a Columbia Law School= classmate and friend, William J. “Wild Bill” Donovan, as the 
Coordinator of Information for a new intelligence agency. Donovan, a gregarious Irish 
                                                 




Catholic, modeled his espionage operation on Britain’s Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) 
and Special Operations Executive (SOE), which he had researched on information-
gathering tours during 1940-41 under the tutelage of Britain’s spymaster, William 
Stephenson. In the COI’s early days, Donovan ran into roadblocks and resentments from 
the US Army and Navy intelligence services, as well as the FBI’s fiercely protective J. 
Edgar Hoover, who labelled the new covert bureau “Roosevelt’s folly.” The attack on 
Pearl Harbor changed everything. In July 1942, President Roosevelt created an expanded 
Office of Strategic Services (OSS), giving Donovan “millions in unvouchered funds,” 
and a “license to wage secret war around the globe.” At its peak, the OSS had 
approximately 12,000 employees.149 
The OSS operated under the aegis of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), with the 
agency’s original purpose being the support of US military objectives. Donovan’s agents 
worked behind enemy lines to collect intelligence, spread propaganda, organize 
resistance groups, conduct subversion and prepare for military operations. The OSS 
played significant roles in Operation TORCH in North Africa, the invasion of Sicily and 
Italy, and Operation OVERLORD in France. The OSS also carried out important 
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operations in Eastern Europe, particularly the Balkans, and in Burma, Thailand and 
China.150 
Donovan held the rank of Major General, yet he preferred to operate his secret 
force with a freewheeling, informal style. However, when Donovan built his staff, he 
imitated the British, preferring men of social standing with elite school ties. The belief 
was that elite pedigrees would forge comradery and mutual trust. Many of the senior 
leaders of the OSS came from Ivy League schools and had experience on Wall Street or 
as top-tier lawyers. “Donovan recruited so many sons and daughters of families in the 
Social Register that O.S.S., it was said, stood for ‘Oh So Social’.” One of Donovan’s 
ablest spies was Allen Dulles, a New York lawyer and businessman. Donovan recruited 
Dulles into the OSS and in future years Dulles proclaimed Wild Bill “the father of 
modern United States intelligence.” Dulles headed the OSS’s European operations out of 
offices in Bern, Switzerland. He had a broad opinion on the kind of people needed to 
construct a covert network for work behind enemy lines.151  
Dulles’ network in Europe included high-ranking officers in the German military, 
European aristocrats, academics, journalists, and athletes, as well as retired businessmen, 
housewives, stage and screen actors, and prostitutes. Dulles intuitively understood that 
when working behind enemy lines, the OSS needed people who were “at home” in the 
areas of operation – people who knew the customs, the languages and dialects, and had 
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on-the-ground contacts. It was helpful if a US citizen was available who fit the OSS agent 
profile. However, it was preferable to use an indigenous resident who was an accepted 
member of the community and wanted to help the Allied cause. Motivations for agents 
working with the OSS varied: for some, it was a personal grievance; for others, it was 
money; for some, it was political; and for others, it was ideological – even religious.152 
As with wartime espionage operations throughout history, an effective resource 
for intelligence gathering is religious leaders and their networks. Donovan and Dulles 
made ample use of priests, nuns, monks and other religious personnel in carrying out 
OSS operations. One agent was a French village monk “with his shaven head, long brown 
robe, and dirty tassels,” but with a “strong desire” to help the Americans. He had one 
weakness. He confessed to his OSS handlers, “I cannot  . . . tell any lies. Anything, but 
not lie.” Later, a German soldier stopped the monk and asked what he was doing.  He 
answered, “The American soldiers sent me.” When the German asked “Why?” the friar 
honestly replied, “Because . . . I am an American spy.” The monk’s rectitude resulted in 
his arrest and confinement at Dachau, where later the American Army liberated him and 
returned him to the OSS.153 In Northern Thailand, Lucy Starling was a sixty-year-old 
Presbyterian missionary who had spent thirty years doing educational and evangelistic 
work. When the OSS moved into the area, Lucy volunteered to serve. In Northern Burma, 
two priests were members of the OSS Detachment 101 supporting Merrill’s Marauders in 
jungle penetration operations. The two men were “fighting priests” who believed in the 
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“Church Militant.” The clerics had been missionaries for many years to the Kachin tribe 
in the China-Burma-India triangle. The priests served Merrill’s soldiers “as interpreters, 
not only of the language, but of the Kachin customs, and as guides, philosophers, and 
friends to the woefully inexperienced Americans.” The priests’ contributions were 
“invaluable.”154 John Birch went to China as a missionary right before the start of World 
War II. In 1942, wanting to enlist in the US army, he happened one night upon Lt. Col. 
Jimmy Doolittle and a group of survivors from the raid over Tokyo. Birch led them to 
safety and, upon Doolittle’s recommendation, joined up with Gen. Claire Chennault’s 
famous Flying Tigers where he worked with military intelligence and later transferred to 
the OSS. However, John Birch became famous after the war when he was murdered – a 
result of his own “incautious, impetuous actions” – by Chinese communist guerillas. 
Birch’s far-right politics and anti-communist convictions made him a cult hero for 1950s 
Cold Warriors who named a new conservative political organization after him – the John 
Birch Society.155 
Besides missionaries, the children of missionaries were treasured assets. Born and 
raised in foreign countries, speaking languages with native fluency, “missionary kids” fit 
the OSS agent profile even better, in many cases, than their parents.  One intelligence 
historian notes that thirty-seven of the OSS’s “best agents were missionaries’ daughters.” 
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One of them was Rosamond Frame who married fellow OSS officer Thibaut de Saint 
Phalle, introduced by OSS co-worker Julia Child. Rose was a “missionary’s daughter” 
who spoke nine different Mandarin dialects fluently. “By switching dialects within a 
conversation, she was able to tell whether someone was . . . truthful about exactly where 
they had been born and raised.” Rose became one of General Donovan’s “most trusted 
operatives” in China, “supervising networks of Chinese who engaged in sabotage behind 
Japanese lines.”156  
A missionary son who ended up working for the OSS was William A. Eddy, often 
called “the American Lawrence of Arabia.” Eddy was born to Presbyterian missionary 
parents in Lebanon and “grew up speaking colloquial Arabic on the streets of Sidon.” He 
served in the US Marines during World War I; he was wounded in action. After the war, 
Bill Eddy worked for a number of years alongside “a preponderance of missionary sons” 
who staffed the State Department’s Arab section. Eddy then chaired the English 
Department of American University in Cairo. On the eve of World War II, he re-enlisted 
in the Marines and received a posting in Tangier, Morocco. Eddy was fluent in three 
different Arabic dialects as well as French and German. He had a deep religious 
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understanding of Islam, as well extensive personal contacts with Arab leaders throughout 
the Middle East. Donovan quickly scooped up Eddy because the OSS “desperately 
needed Middle Eastern expertise.” Eddy was the OSS’s lead agent in North Africa 
throughout the war. He ran the network of agents who made covert, propaganda and 
logistical preparations for the Anglo-American troop landings across North Africa during 
Operation TORCH. Subsequently, Eddy went to Saudi Arabia where he cemented the 
US’s vital strategic relationship with King Ibn Saud. Eddy used his Arabic skills and his 
“ability to recite chapters of the Koran by heart” to win the confidence of the Saudi king. 
A few years later, after the war, the Saudi king “told Eddy he trusted him like one of his 
own sons.” In February 1945, on Franklin Roosevelt’s return from the Yalta Conference, 
Eddy helped organize the historic three-day meeting between Roosevelt and Ibn Saud 
aboard the USS Quincy anchored in the Suez Canal. The missionary son served as the 
sole official translator for the two leaders during the meeting. In the famous official 
photograph of the meeting, it is Bill Eddy in his Marine Colonel’s uniform kneeling 
beside the two leaders – a smiling, engaged Ibn Saud, an ailing Franklin Roosevelt, and 
the trusted translator for both men during the critical conversation.157 
In contrast to the Nazis and Soviets, the fledgling US intelligence service was 
slow to direct resources at the Vatican. The OSS did not significantly dispatch agents into 
the field until the fall of 1942; at that time, their first priority was the support of military 
                                                 
157 Hollinger, 117-127. Hugh Wilford, America’s Great Game: The CIA’s Secret Arabists and the 
Shaping of the Modern Middle East (New York: Basic Books, 2013), 22-25, 60-63. For more on Eddy 
see R. Harris Smith, OSS: The Secret History of America’s First Central Intelligence Agency 




operations, particularly in North Africa. Although the OSS had an “Italian section,” the 
agency did not have meaningful contacts or capabilities inside Italy or the Vatican during 
1942 and early 1943. During this time, the information that the OSS collected came 
principally through indirect sources – “press and radio reports, interviews with political 
exiles and travelers, and gossip from the diplomatic cocktail party circuit.” Early on, 
Washington had one reliable contact inside Vatican City, Harold Tittmann, a disabled 
American war veteran who worked as a diplomatic assistant to US presidential envoy, 
Myron Taylor. As Franklin Roosevelt’s “personal representative” to the Holy See, Taylor 
only had access to “a handful of officials” in the Vatican. However, Tittmann was able to 
quietly collect information on papal intrigues and smuggle it out to Allen Dulles in 
Switzerland via diplomatic pouch.158 
The situation dramatically improved after the Allies liberated Rome in June 1944. 
The OSS quickly established an intelligence station in Rome and targeted diplomats, 
particularly the German and Japanese missions to the Holy See. “In the fall of 1944 OSS 
Rome began to receive intelligence from two apparently well-placed sources inside the 
Vatican.” Code-named VESSEL and DUSTY, they offered copies of highly sensitive 
papal documents in exchange for money. “The material illuminated the darkest recesses 
of papal diplomacy and administration.” Washington deemed the material so valuable 
that it circulated “at the highest levels of the American government, including the White 
House.” It even influenced policy discussions in Washington during the last year of the 
                                                 




war. However, doubts arose when VESSEL reported a covert meeting between Myron 
Taylor and Ken Harada, the Japanese ambassador to the Holy See, which never occurred. 
A counterintelligence investigation revealed that the OSS was the victim of an 
imaginative and skillful counterfeiter, Virgilio Scattolini, who sought to become rich by 
supplying false documents to the Americans, as well as other countries. Scattolini was the 
single source for both VESSEL and DUSTY materials. He was so shrewd and 
convincing, and his OSS handlers so gullible, that Scattolini successfully continued to 
sell his material to the American intelligence service months after the war ended. Even 
James Jesus Angleton, the OSS counterintelligence chief in Rome, continued to believe 
in VESSEL and DUSTY until early 1946.159 
In spite of the Scattolini hoax, the OSS was able to place other effective agents 
within the Holy See. Father Felix Morlion was a Dominican priest and journalist who 
founded the Catholic International Press (CIP); he affiliated with the Center of 
Information Pro Deo, an organization with well-established contacts in Germany, 
Holland and Belgium. On the run from Hitler, Morlion established a Pro Deo office in 
Lisbon and eventually New York City, where he teamed up with a well-known journalist, 
Anna Brady. Morlion and Brady became OSS agents and receiving funds from Donovan. 
Morlion then relocated to the Eternal City “as the CIP’s resident correspondent.” He used 
his press credentials to penetrate business, social, intellectual and clerical circles in 
Rome. Morlion produced a steady stream of intelligence from his contacts, which he 
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forwarded to Anna Brady in New York who passed it on to the OSS. But by early 1945, 
some within the OSS began to have second thoughts about the value of Morlion’s reports 
and his influence dwindled. Martin Quigley was another OSS agent stationed in Rome 
under the cover of being a “marketing representative for the American film industry.” 
Quigley was able to operate smoothly in Vatican business and ecclesiastical circles, 
connecting even with Pope Pius XII’s confidential assistant and spymaster, Father Robert 
Leiber. Quigly generated intelligence reports on the pope’s health, the politics of various 
cardinals, the activities of diplomats to the Holy See, and the Vatican’s opinions about 
the Soviet Union. Toward the end of the war, Bill Donovan met personally with Quigley 
and ordered him to be alert for possible peace moves by Tokyo, because Donovan felt 
that if such an offer came it would likely come through the Vatican.160 
In July 1944, only one month after the Allied liberation of Rome, Pope Pius XII 
held a private audience with General William Donovan, where the Pope decorated the 
OSS chief as a “Knight Grand Cross of the First Class of the Order of Saint Sylvester.” 
This knighthood is conferred by the Supreme Pontiff on Catholic laypersons who “by feat 
of arms, or writings, or outstanding deeds, have spread the Faith, and have safeguarded 
and championed the Church.” In light of the nature and timing of the ceremony, and the 
fact that OSS intelligence operations in Rome were still in their early stages, it is 
plausible that Donovan’s personal connections within the Church and his efforts on 
behalf of the Catholic Church predated the OSS involvement with the Vatican. Donovan 
                                                 




biographer, Anthony Cave Brown, details covert actions by Wild Bill during World War 
I and, in particular, an important meeting he had with Cardinal Mercier of Louvain, 
Belgium in 1916. As a result, Brown poses a question, “Is it possible WJD [William J. 
Donovan] had become a spy for Christ? Certainly from now on WJD became 
increasingly close to the Catholic hierarchs of the United States.” Other writers speculate 
that Donovan made valuable contacts within the Catholic Church leadership and the 
Vatican intelligence service during his 1940-41 tours of Europe under the guidance of 
William Stephenson. Whatever the story, the awarding of a knighthood to Bill Donovan 
shows that in 1944 Pope Pius XII highly valued what Donovan and his OSS agents were 
doing on the Church’s behalf.161 
 The Foundation 
As World War II entered its final months, a debate stirred in Washington over the 
future peacetime role of a civilian intelligence agency. General Donovan submitted a 
four-page memorandum to President Roosevelt on November 18, 1944 outlining a 
proposal for “the organization of an intelligence service for the post-war period.” 
Donovan recommended the formation of a new “central intelligence service” under the 
jurisdiction of the Executive Branch reporting directly to the President instead of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff. The new agency would “collect and coordinate the intelligence 
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material required by the Executive Branch in planning and carrying out national policy 
and strategy.” Built on the “keel” of the OSS, Donovan urged the President to act quickly 
to retain the OSS’s “trained and specialized personnel needed for the task.” Donovan pled 
with Roosevelt, “This talent should not be dispersed.”162  
One week before Roosevelt died, he replied to Donovan’s memo instructing him 
to call together “the chiefs of foreign intelligence and internal security units in the various 
Executive agencies so that a consensus of opinion can be secured.” A consensus did not 
come quickly or easily. Government departments threw up roadblocks. Multiple studies 
proposed divergent solutions. However, the critical factor was that Donovan’s friend and 
ally, President Franklin D. Roosevelt, died on April 12, 1945 and the new President, 
Harry S. Truman, had different ideas about how best to protect national security. The 
debate continued until the Cold War was well underway. Truman signed The National 
Security Act of 1947 on July 26 creating the Central Intelligence Agency, over a year 
after Winston Churchill delivered his famous warning that “an iron curtain has descended 
across the Continent.”163 
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As the Cold War began, clandestine activities accelerated on both sides of the 
Western-Soviet divide. Former World War II allies were now adversaries. Espionage 
services that had once cooperated to defeat the Axis powers now targeted each other. 
Quickly, American and Russian spymasters fell back on the methods and networks they 
used during World War II; the ones with which they were most familiar and comfortable 
– including religious leaders and organizations. Religious groups took sides during the 
superpower standoff often based on nationalistic or political considerations, not 
theological ones.  
Was the Cold War a religious war? Increasingly historians of the Cold War are 
examining and debating this question. University of Texas historian, William Inboden, 
argues in his classic work, Religion and American Foreign Policy, 1945-1960, “The Cold 
War was a religious war. Religion helped define the nature of the conflict, delineate the 
different sides, and determine the outcome.” Likewise, Andrew Preston, Cambridge 
University professor of history and international relations, argues that the Cold War was a 
“religious” war because “matters of faith permeated the conflict” and “often came to 
define the struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union and between West 
and East.”164  
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Whether or not the Cold War was a “religious war”, it was not a “holy war” in the 
classic sense. Perhaps, it is more accurate to call the Cold War a “religiously influenced” 
war. Nonetheless, whatever position one takes on the metaphysical dimensions of the 
Cold War, the decades-long conflict followed the pattern of history – from Sun Tzu and 
Herodotus to Moses and Mohammad; from Walsingham and Richelieu to Stalin and 
Donovan.  
Religion and spying played a consequential role.  
But the realization of this fact in America would not become public knowledge 
for thirty years, until the 1975-76 Frank Church Committee hearings. Rumors swirled 
from the mid-60s about the CIA using clergy and missionaries as spies. News stories 
occasionally popped up in the secular and religious media. However, a letter from then-
CIA director William Colby to the Church Committee on October 21, 1975 disclosed that  
the CIA was using religious leaders and workers (along with academics and journalists) 
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THE REVELATION OF COLD WAR RELIGION AND SPYING 
Three days before Christmas in 1974, a bombshell New York Times front-page 
story alleged that “massive, illegal domestic intelligence operations” by the CIA “directly 
violating its charter” occurred “during the Nixon Administration” and dated back to the 
1950s. Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist Seymour Hersh wrote the article based on secret 
information that he received first-hand from CIA director William Colby. Hersh’s story 
targeted former CIA director, Richard Helms, and CIA chief of counterintelligence 
operations, James Jesus Angleton. The story of CIA malfeasance came only six months 
after the US Senate Watergate Committee completed its final report and four months 
after President Nixon resigned.1 
The public outcry precipitated by Hersh’s original and follow-up stories about 
CIA misbehavior led directly to official investigations by the President and Congress. 
The three primary investigations into the intelligence abuses were President Gerald 
Ford’s Commission on CIA Activities within the United States (Rockefeller 
Commission), the US House Select Committee on Intelligence (Pike Committee), and the 
US Senate Select Committee to Study Government Operations with Respect to 
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Intelligence Activities (Church Committee). These three committees investigated 
separate yet overlapping dimensions of the CIA controversy, including questions 
surrounding the covert use of clergy and missionaries in clandestine operations. The three 
committees exercised varying degrees of rigor and scrutiny concerning the religion 
question, and their final reports reflected differing degrees of transparency about religion 
and covert operations in their conclusions and recommendations.2  
A decade before these three committees did their work, President Lyndon Johnson 
appointed the three-person Committee on Central Intelligence Agency Support to Private 
Organizations (Katzenbach Committee) to investigate questionable CIA funding of 
domestic organizations, including religious institutions, revealed in a March 1967 
Ramparts magazine exposé. Then thirty years later, in 1996, the US Senate Select 
Committee on Intelligence held special hearings on the “CIA’s Use of Journalists and 
Clergy in Intelligence Operations.” These five distinct investigations spanning thirty 
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years indicate that from the earliest days of the Cold War, questions and controversy 
persisted about the CIA’s use of religious groups and personnel in espionage operations.3  
These official hearings and the media coverage that swirled around them made 
one fact clear: The CIA utilized and, in some cases, paid American religious personnel to 
carry out covert operations throughout the Cold War. This is an indisputable fact verified 
by the official reports of these investigative bodies, by the now-partially declassified 
documents these inquests uncovered, and by the sworn testimony of CIA and US 
government officials. Moreover, religious institutions, clerics and missionaries of this era, 
some of whom worked directly with the CIA, have provided corroboration of a covert 
relationship between church and state for espionage purposes during the Cold War.  
The Church Committee and Hard Evidence 
Of the three 1975-76 committees investigating intelligence abuses, the Church 
Committee was the most influential and consequential. It was made up of a “hall of 
fame” committee, and a chair, Senator Frank Church (D-ID), who announced his 
Presidential candidacy while the committee was still active. The Church Committee met 
longer (15 months) and investigated more material than did the Rockefeller Commission 
or the Pike Committee. It had a larger and more experienced investigative staff. It was 
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more public and sensational with its discoveries, for example the CIA secret dart gun 
prominently displayed for the television audience by Senators Frank Church and Barry 
Goldwater. The Church Committee held more televised public hearings and produced a 
lengthier and more detailed final report, which became available more quickly to the 
public. According to a Brookings Institution study of US government investigations 
between 1945 and 2012, the Church Committee is “a model high-impact investigation.” 
“The investigation not only met all of the attributes of the good investigation, [it] 
generated durable results. It did good and well.”4  
Portions of the Church Committee hearings were nationally televised and offered 
the American public, for the first time, “an opportunity to learn about the secret 
operations conducted for decades by U.S. intelligence agencies.” Congress had never 
before conducted formal hearings into the activities of the US intelligence services, much 
less broadcast them on television. Previously, only a handful of senior senators – labelled 
“blind and toothless watchdogs” by critics – occasionally learned bits and pieces about 
covert activities. According to testimony by CIA director Colby, senators in charge of 
CIA oversight often said, “we don’t know and frankly we don’t want to know.” DCI 
Helms confessed years later, “Senators and congressmen [were] not wild to know about 
some of the types of things that go on. Sometimes they would just say, ‘Look, forget it 
and don’t bother to tell us.’ At other times, ‘All right now we’ve heard about it, let’s go 
on to something else.’” Senator Mike Mansfield repeatedly but unsuccessfully pushed for 
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more rigorous intelligence oversight from 1955 onwards. Ironically, in 1975, Mansfield 
was the prime architect, as Senate Majority Leader, of the structure, membership and 
mandate of the Church Committee.5 
The Church Committee “identified a wide range of intelligence abuses by federal 
agencies, including the CIA, FBI, Internal Revenue Service, and National Security 
Agency.” According to Loch Johnson, former special assistant to Senator Church during 
the hearings, “The Church committee discovered that the New York Times articles had 
only scratched the surface of abuses by the intelligence agencies.” During its 
investigations, the Church Committee received a copy of the CIA’s highly secret and 
closely held “Family Jewels” report, detailing the most egregious and controversial of the 
CIA’s misdeeds.6 The portion of the Church Committee’s investigation that focused on 
foreign intelligence operations uncovered details about the CIA’s Bay of Pigs failure, 
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assassination plots, biological agents program, drug experimentation programs, and the 
CIA’s use of journalists, academics, clergy and missionaries in intelligence and 
espionage operations.7 
A resolution of the Senate created the Church Committee on January 27, 1975   
and it issued its final report on April 29, 1976. The committee was chaired by Frank 
Church (D-ID) with John Tower (R-TX) serving as vice-chair. Distinguished members 
included Howard Baker (R-TN), Barry Goldwater (R-AZ), Charles “Mac” Mathias (R-
MD), Walter Mondale (D-MN), Walter “Dee” Huddleston (D-KY) and Philip Hart (D-
MI).8 Most of the 126 full committee meetings, 40 subcommittee hearings and 800 
interviews of witnesses occurred in closed sessions because of the classified nature of the 
subject matter, as well as the need to protect intelligence sources and methods.9 The final 
committee report of six volumes, along with eight supplementary volumes of materials, 
proposed ninety-six legislative and regulatory reforms designed “to place intelligence 
activities within the constitutional scheme for controlling government power.” 
Subsequently, in May 1976, the Senate adopted Resolution 400 establishing permanent 
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oversight of the US intelligence services through the Senate Select Committee on 
Intelligence. Moreover, in 1978, Congress passed the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Act (FISA), which created the super-secret FISA Court to hear requests and authorize 
warrants for wiretaps, data collection and surveillance against foreign spies and, more 
recently, terrorists within the United States.10 
The first volume of the Church Committee’s Final Report deals with “Foreign 
and Military Intelligence” issues, with section ten discussing the CIA’s clandestine 
operations involving “academic institutions, the media, and religious institutions.” The 
secret involvement of the CIA with these three groups “had their origins in the early Cold 
War period when most Americans perceived a real threat of a communist imperium and 
were prepared to assist their government to counter that threat.” The CIA and the Church 
Committee recognized the influence that these “private institutions” had on shaping the 
beliefs of the public and policymakers, and questioned whether it was prudent to “forego 
the clandestine use of our universities, our media, and our religious groups in competing 
with our adversaries.” However, covert relationships between the CIA and these groups 
raised complex ethical questions that required “careful evaluation, given the critical role 
these institutions play in maintaining the freedom of our society.” For example, 
Are the independence and integrity of American institutions in any way 
endangered by clandestine relationships with the Central Intelligence Agency? 
Should clandestine use of institutions or individuals within those institutions be 
permitted? If not, should there be explicit guidelines laid down to regulate 
Government clandestine support or operational use of such institutions or 
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individuals? Should such guidelines be in the form of executive directives or by 
statue?11 
Later, the report raised the question of whether it was acceptable for journalists, 
academics, or clerics to volunteer for clandestine operations even if their parent 
organization had formally rejected official involvement with the CIA.  
The use of journalists by the Agency had long been “among the most productive 
means of intelligence-gathering employed by the CIA,” as detailed by renowned 
journalist Carl Bernstein in a 25,000-word cover story for Rolling Stone on October 20, 
1977. The media’s entanglement with the CIA involved some of the United States’ most 
respected news organizations, including the New York Times, CBS, NBC, ABC, TIME, 
Newsweek, the Associated Press, United Press International, Reuters, and Hearst 
Newspapers.12 Likewise, the CIA had long utilized covert relationships with universities 
and academics to gather information, facilitate international contacts, spread propaganda, 
and provide cover for clandestine operatives. But the CIA’s cozy and, at times, financial 
relationship with the academy was exposed in a 1967 Ramparts magazine exposé on the 
CIA’s covert funding of the National Student Association (NSA) and other academic 
institutions. To quiet the “public and congressional uproar” over the Ramparts story, 
President Johnson established the Katzenbach Committee, chaired by Under Secretary of 
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State Nicholas Katzenbach, to investigate the “covert funding of institutions.” The 
committee limited its investigation to the funding issue. However, the committee 
broadened its impact by moving beyond the question of CIA involvement with 
institutions to focus “particular attention on the covert use of individuals,” including 
clerics and missionaries.13 
The section of the Church Committee Final Report dealing with US religious 
groups is the sparsest of the three institutional groups investigated, although the 
committee acknowledged that religious groups were “among the most important of our 
society’s institutions.” Likewise, the books, articles, and retrospective discussions on the 
Church Committee’s work published over the last forty years, have also given the least 
attention to the involvement of religious organizations and clergy in CIA covert 
operations. Religious groups were deemed by the Church Committee as “a special case” 
because “virtually all religions are inherently supra-national.” Using religious groups “for 
national purposes,” the report states, “both violates their nature and undermines their 
bonds with kindred groups around the world.”14 However, the supra-national nature of 
religious groups with their international networks was one of the prime factors that made 
them attractive to the CIA for covert operations. 
The Church Committee’s investigation of the covert use of religious groups was 
limited in several ways. First, the investigation “focused exclusively on the use of U.S. 
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religious organizations.”15 This stipulation means that there was no examination of 
religious institutions working with the CIA headquartered outside the United States or 
identified as non-American. It means that the committee did not look at clandestine 
operations conducted by foreign clerics or missionaries recruited as CIA operatives. It 
also means that the investigation did not look into CIA covert operations that targeted or 
mobilized foreign religious communities. Second, the Final Report describes the small 
sample size of files examined by the committee regarding the CIA’s relationship with 
religious groups and the media, files conveniently selected and pre-screened by the 
Agency: 
As for the media and relationships with religious groups, the Committee inspected 
precis or summaries of all operational relationships since 1951 and then selected 
over 20 cases for closer inspection. The documents from these some 20 files were 
selected and screened by the Agency and, by mutual agreement, names of 
individuals and institutions were removed. 
Therefore, the Committee has far from the full picture of the nature and extent of 
these relationships and the domestic impact of foreign clandestine operations. 
Nevertheless, it has enough to outline the dimensions of the problem and to 
underscore its serious nature.16 
These investigative limitations on the Church Committee’s inquiry into CIA covert 
operations with religious groups, although adopted “by mutual agreement,” corroborate 
the Final Report’s candid confession that the committee had “far from the full picture” of 
the CIA’s involvement with clergy and missionaries. Third, it means that the Final 
Report’s meager two-page account of the “Covert Use of U.S. Religious Groups,” was 
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heavily dependent on two pieces of evidence – a letter from DCI William Colby and a 
one-page statement from DCI George H.W. Bush. 
The October 21, 1975 letter from then-CIA director Colby to the Church 
Committee “stated that the CIA used religious groups with great caution” and that “their 
use required special approval” as outlined in CIA guidelines adopted in the wake of the 
Katzenbach Committee’s 1967 report. Subsequently, a February 11, 1976 statement of 
policy from newly appointed DCI George H.W. Bush claimed that as of that date the 
“CIA has no secret paid or contractual relationship with any American clergyman or 
missionary. This practice will be continued as a matter of policy.” However, the CIA had 
previously reported to the Church Committee that as of August 1975 it had four active 
covert relationships with clergy.17  
Further, the Final Report states, “The CIA has informed the Committee of a total 
of 14 covert arrangements which involved direct operational use of 21 individuals.” In 
this section of the report, however, no time frame is specified for the operational use of 
these 21 individuals. The only reference to time is the earlier statement that the 
committee only examined files dating back to 1951. However, in the concluding 
“Findings and Recommendations” section of the Final Report, it states regarding 
religious personnel, “The CIA informed the Committee that only 21 individuals have 
ever participated in either covert action projects or the clandestine collection of 
intelligence” [italics added].18 Clearly, there are inconsistencies and limitations in the 
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Final Report regarding the covert use of religious personnel. Moreover, statements made 
by CIA directors, witnesses in a 1996 Senate Select Committee on Intelligence hearing, 
and history itself contradicts the Final Report’s claims as to the limited use of clergy and 
missionaries.19 
The “DCI Statement of Policy” issued by George H.W. Bush on February 11, 
1976 was the basis for much of the Church Committee’s conclusions regarding the use of 
religious personnel. However, it contained an important exception at the end: 
Genuine concern has recently been expressed about CIA relations with newsmen 
and churchmen. The Agency does not believe there has been any impropriety on 
its part in the limited use made of persons connected in some way with American 
media, church and missionary organizations. Nonetheless, CIA recognizes the 
special status afforded these institutions under our Constitution and in order to  
avoid any appearance of improper use by the Agency, the DCI has decided on a 
revised policy to govern Agency relations with these groups: 
--  Effective immediately, CIA will not enter into any paid or contractual 
relationship with any full-time or part-time news correspondent accredited by 
any U.S. news service, newspaper, periodical, radio, television network or 
station. 
--  As soon as feasible, the Agency will bring existing relationships with 
individuals in these groups into conformity with this new policy. 
--  CIA has no secret paid or contractual relationship with any American 
clergyman or missionary. This practice will be continued as a matter of policy. 
CIA recognizes that members of these groups may wish to provide information to 
the CIA on matters of foreign intelligence of interest to the U.S. Government. The 
CIA will continue to welcome information volunteered by such individuals.20  
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DCI Bush repeatedly referenced this policy statement in letters and communications with 
religious leaders during the late spring and summer of 1976. Bush argued that no 
impropriety had taken place in the past, nor would it in the future. Further, he continued 
to state his conviction that “any American citizen has the right to volunteer information to 
his government” and that the “CIA will continue to welcome information provided by 
individuals.” This exception allowing for the voluntary involvement of clergy or 
missionaries with the CIA created a contingency that thereafter complicated the issue of 
religious personnel working with the CIA.21 
Not all the members of the Church Committee agreed with the recommendations 
of the Final Report, including the restriction on the CIA’s involvement with religious 
personnel. Senator Barry Goldwater, the conservative lion of the Senate, stated that he 
“refused to sign the final report of the Select Committee on Intelligence Activities in the 
belief that it will cause severe embarrassment, if not grave harm, to the Nation’s foreign 
policy.”22 Instead, Goldwater submitted a 17-page minority opinion in which he detailed 
specific objections to numerous conclusions and recommendations of the majority. 
Goldwater’s differences of opinion included the issue of the CIA using academics, 
journalists and clerics: 
While I believe that any institution or organization has the right to take positions 
on domestic or foreign policy issues, I also believe each individual American has 
the right to cooperate with his government in its lawful pursuits. I submit this 
right should apply to academics, clergymen, businessmen, union members, 
newsmen, etc. The more groups we exclude from assisting the intelligence 
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community, the poorer our intelligence will be. Surely, our values have been 
turned upside down, when cooperating with the CIA is viewed as unseemly or 
degrading.23  
Committee vice-chair, John Tower, also refused to sign the Final Report. He affirmed in 
his individual statement that he concurred with Goldwater: “I specifically endorse . . . the 
right of every American, including academics, clergymen, businessmen, and others, to 
cooperate with his government in its lawful pursuits.” In addition, Tower stated that 
Howard Baker was in agreement with himself and Goldwater in this opinion; however, 
Baker’s individual statement does not specifically articulate this point.24 Goldwater, 
Tower, and Baker were not alone in their opposition to restrictions on the CIA’s use of 
clergy and missionaries. 
As the Church Committee hearings accelerated in the summer of 1975, stories 
circulated in the media about the CIA’s use of clergy and missionaries in covert 
operations. The Washington Star printed a story (August 5, 1975) about a Belgian Jesuit 
priest receiving “$5 million in under-the-table CIA money” during the Kennedy 
Administration to support anti-communist efforts in Latin America. A Chicago Tribune 
story (August 2, 1975) described CIA connections to missionaries in Bolivia, Vietnam, 
and India. And in a Washington Star story (August 13, 1975) about the covert use of 
missionaries, the writer opined: “The CIA holds nothing sacred, including the sacred. It 
has to meddle in everything.” Additional stories about covert operations and religious 
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groups ran in the Washington Post, TIME, and the National Catholic Reporter.25 Senator 
Mark Hatfield (R-OR), a devout evangelical, “warmly and derisively called ‘St. Mark’ by 
his colleagues,” was alarmed at the “regular practice over the years to use missionaries, 
clergy, and members of religious organizations for intelligence activities.” Hatfield 
argued on the floor of the Senate that “this practice tarnishes the image of the United 
States in foreign countries, prostitutes the church, and violates the first amendment’s 
separation of church and state.” Unless he could receive a commitment from the CIA or 
the President to stop this practice, Hatfield declared that it was his intention to introduce 
legislation to forbid it.26 
On August 26, 1975, Hatfield wrote a letter to CIA director Colby asking the DCI 
to make a public announcement that “in the future the CIA will totally separate itself 
from organized religion.” In reply, Colby said to Hatfield that the CIA had used 
missionaries and clergy in the past and intended to continue to do so in the future. Colby 
stated unequivocally, “I believe that it would be neither necessary nor appropriate to bar 
any connections between CIA and the clergy and the churches.” This was a consistent 
and strongly held opinion by William Colby. In his March 15, 1988 retrospective 
interview with the CIA Oral History project, Colby responded with obvious emotion 
when directly questioned about this point: “They were useful agents and then this crazy 
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business got loose – you can’t use journalists, you can’t use academics, you can’t use 
missionaries, you can’t use something else, you can’t use this, you can’t use that. There’s 
nobody left. So, that’s a totally false issue.” Former DCI Richard Helms voiced a similar 
point of view in the same Oral History interview. Helms stated unequivocally that he was 
in favor of using academics, newspapermen and clergy. “In World War II, in the OSS, we 
had priests, academics by the score, lawyers, anybody that you could find, doing 
espionage for the United States,” Helms recalled, “and nobody thought twice about it.” 
Helms continued, “I see no reason why Americans shouldn’t serve their country in one 
capacity or another, if they’re personally willing to do it.” Colby and Helms agreed on 
this point, although they differed on other matters.27 
After Colby’s unsatisfactory response to Hatfield’s request, the senator then wrote 
to President Gerald Ford on September 19, 1975 asking him to prohibit the CIA’s use of 
religious personnel in covert operations by means of an Executive Order. In a written 
reply from White House counsel Philip Buchenon on behalf of President Ford sided with 
the CIA director and his Republican colleagues on the Church Committee: “The 
President does not feel it would be wise at present to prohibit the CIA from having any 
connection with the clergy. Clergymen throughout the world are often valuable sources 
of intelligence and many clergymen, motivated solely by patriotism, voluntarily and 
wittingly aid the government by providing information of intelligence value.” 
Experiencing a rebuff from the DCI and the President, Hatfield introduced his promised 
                                                 




legislation – Senate Bill 2784 – on December 15, 1975, which became a source of 
contention for the CIA during 1976. 28 
The day before President Ford’s reply to Senator Hatfield, the White House 
announced a major shake-up in President Ford’s cabinet – sometimes referred to as the 
“Halloween Massacre” – which included the firing of CIA director Colby and the 
nomination of George H.W. Bush as the new DCI. After Bush was established in 
Langley, Senator Hatfield began to correspond with the new DCI “in hopes of reaching a 
satisfactory solution” to the problem of the CIA using religious personnel for intelligence 
activities. The new director of the CIA brought a new attitude towards Hatfield and his 
concerns. In correspondence with Hatfield, Bush admitted that the CIA had indeed 
worked with clergy and missionaries through the years. But in light of the increasing 
public and congressional concerns, Bush had issued “a new regulation restricting agency 
contacts with the clergy, missionaries, and members of religious organizations,” referring 
to his February 11, 1976 policy memo. Bush reiterated in his communication with 
Hatfield that the CIA will continue to welcome information individually volunteered by 
American clergymen or missionaries “each as his own conscience dictates.” In light of 
Bush’s written commitment not to use American clergy or missionaries in CIA 
operations, Senator Hatfield withdrew his legislation on May 25, 1976.29 
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Parallel Investigations and the Debate 
After Seymour Hersh’s sensational December 22, 1974 front-page story about the 
Agency, President Ford established his own blue-ribbon investigative panel – the 
Commission on CIA Activities within the United States (Rockefeller Commission) – 
which ran parallel to the Church and Pike Committee hearings. The Rockefeller 
Commission came into existence on January 4, 1975 by Executive Order 11828 with 
Vice President Nelson Rockefeller as chair, and reporting directly to the President. The 
Commission completed its work in five months, faster than either the Senate or House 
special committees, primarily because all of the Rockefeller meetings were executive 
sessions, closed to all but the committee members. The respected members of the 
Rockefeller Commission were from the private sector – business, education, banking, 
trade unions, and former military – although some had previous government experience. 
The group notably included future US President Ronald Reagan, listed in the 
commission’s official report as a “political commentator, former President of the Screen 
Actors’ Guild, and former Governor of California.” The Rockefeller Commission 
received three tasks from President Ford:  
(1) Ascertain and evaluate any facts relating to activities conducted within the 
United States by the Central Intelligence Agency which give rise to questions 
of compliance with the provisions of 50 U.S.C. 403 [CIA Act of 1949];  
(2) Determine whether existing safeguards are adequate to prevent any activities 
which violate the provisions of 50 U.S.C. 403;  
(3) Make such recommendations to the President and the Director of Central 
Intelligence as the Commission deems appropriate.30 
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Unlike the congressional committees, the Rockefeller Commission did not 
specifically look into the CIA’s covert use of clergy and missionaries. The Commission’s 
Report to the President makes no direct mention of religious institutions or individuals as 
it relates to espionage. However, as later investigations by Congress and journalists 
revealed, religious groups and individuals were involved in the use of “proprietary 
companies” or “devised facilities” – front organizations or companies that provided 
“nonofficial cover” bona fides for clandestine agents – which the Rockefeller 
Commission did examine. The commission concluded that the “CIA’s cover 
arrangements are essential” to the CIA’s foreign intelligence mission, even though 
proprietary companies and devised groups often have “substantial domestic aspects.” 
Based on its investigations, however, the Commission concluded that there were “no 
instances” of the domestic elements of CIA cover operations constituting “any violations 
of the law.” In fact, the Commission praised the controls on cover arrangements instituted 
by the CIA to guarantee compliance with the law.31  
One other area that the Rockefeller Commission investigated that involved, but 
did not specifically identify religious groups and personnel, was the area of domestic 
spying on groups and individuals that held anti-war, pro-civil rights or politically radical 
viewpoints. Broadly grouped under the operational cryptonym MHCHAOS (Operation 
CHAOS), President Lyndon Johnson commissioned the CIA covert operation in the 
summer of 1967 and it continued until 1974 under President Richard Nixon. The two 
                                                 




Presidents were convinced that American domestic dissent received funds and support 
from abroad. From its beginnings, CHAOS was the responsibility of CIA director 
Richard Helms who observed, “LBJ simply could not believe that American youth would 
on their own be moved to riot in protest against U.S. foreign policy.” Johnson, related 
Helms, was certain that “foreign communists” were behind “this intolerable interference 
in our domestic affairs.” Among the religious groups and personnel targeted by CHAOS 
were Catholics, Jews, Protestants, Muslims, pacifists, Ramparts magazine, Clergy and 
Laymen Concerned about Vietnam, and even Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. The Rockefeller 
Commission guardedly acknowledged in its Report to the President “some domestic 
activities of Operation CHAOS unlawfully exceeded the CIA’s statutory authority.”32 
Alongside the Rockefeller Commission and the Church Committee, the House of 
Representatives constituted its own committee to investigate the CIA’s misdeeds. On 
January 16, 1975, the House created the Select Committee on Intelligence, chaired by 
Lucien Nedzi (D-MI), chair of the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Intelligence. 
Nedzi had strong liberal credentials and, as chair of the subcommittee, conducted a 
“thorough investigation of the CIA’s role in Watergate.” Nedzi tried to get the select 
committee to focus on the “Family Jewels” abuses. Then on June 5, 1975 the New York 
Times reported that Nedzi had been briefed more than a year earlier, in 1973, about CIA 
“assassination plans and domestic law violations.” However, Nedzi had not notified any 
of his colleagues about the CIA disclosures. Nedzi’s fellow Democrats were furious and 
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forced Nedzi to resign from the committee on June 12, 1975. Six months had passed, but 
the House Select Committee on Intelligence accomplished little of substance. After 
several days of wrangling by the full House of Representatives, a new select committee 
was constituted with Otis Pike (D-NY) as chair. This new House Select Committee on 
Intelligence was called the Pike Committee.33 
From the early days of the Pike Committee’s investigation, an adversarial 
relationship developed between Otis Pike, the CIA, and the White House. Pike 
considered the CIA a “rogue elephant” that was out of control and needed to be 
restrained. He believed that his committee had the authority to request whatever files it 
wanted from the CIA and to declassify them according to its own standards, rather than 
those imposed by the CIA or White House. The CIA staff considered the Pike 
Committee’s requests for documents “silly” and “the deadlines impossible to meet.” In 
addition, the Pike Committee had a young staff with little experience with Congress or 
the intelligence community. Pike’s young staff zealots were “absolutely convinced” that 
the CIA was “the devil incarnate.” They came into meetings with the CIA staff “loaded 
for bear,” which caused relationships to deteriorate even further. DCI Colby developed a 
deep-seated disdain for Pike and repeatedly called the committee chair a “jackass.” 
Colby’s antipathy towards Pike did not wane. Twelve years later, during Colby’s CIA 
Oral History interview, when the subject of Pike was raised, Colby blurted out, “that 
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jackass, Pike.” Similarly, Colby considered the inexperienced Pike Committee staffers “a 
ragtag, immature and publicity-seeking group.” 34 
The frustration and personal animus experienced during the Pike Committee 
hearings showed up in its final report. An entire section of the report detailed the 
“virtually nonexistent” cooperation between the three entities and the “foot dragging, 
stonewalling, and deception” by the White House and the Agency on committee requests 
for information about the CIA’s budget and about specific covert operations. The 
hostility reached its nadir when the White House, CIA, and Republican committee 
members vigorously opposed the release of the final report. President Ford wrote to Pike 
that he had determined that the release of the report “would be detrimental to national 
security.” The House voted not to release the report until it “has been certified by the 
President as not containing information which would adversely affect the intelligence 
activities of the CIA.” This did not happen. Soon afterwards, large sections of the report 
leaked to The Village Voice and later to the New York Times, which printed them. In light 
of the conflicts, controversy and suppressed final report, the Pike Committee’s work did 
not enjoy the public support or have the legislative impact achieved by the Church 
Committee.35 
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In spite of its shortcomings, the Pike Committee did not hesitate to confront head-
on the controversial policy of using clerics, academics, and journalists for covert 
operations. Representative Ronald Dellums (D-CA), the left-leaning former Mayor of 
Oakland, led the charge in the Pike Committee to block the CIA from using religious 
personnel in any capacity. Even before the House Select Committee on Intelligence held 
its first meeting under Lucien Nedzi, Dellums declared, “I think this committee ought to 
come down hard and clear on the side of stopping any intelligence agency in this country 
from utilizing, corrupting, and prostituting the media, the church, and our educational 
system.”36 Consistent with this declaration, Dellums repeatedly raised concerns in the 
committee about the CIA’s use of clergy; he argued passionately and persistently against 
any use of religious personnel. Dellums’ arguments were the catalyst for a vigorous 
debate within the Pike Committee about the ethics, constitutionality, and prudence of 
using preachers, priests, missionaries, nuns, or any kind of religious worker in clandestine 
operations.37 
Ronald Dellums was concerned about the enormous power – “and I emphasize 
enormous,” he said to the committee – that the different intelligence agencies possessed 
to “compromise,” “corrupt,” “pervert” and “destroy” the press, clergy and academics. He 
cited the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, with its promise of separation of 
church and state, freedom of conscience, and freedom of the press, as the basis of his 
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argument. Dellums was convinced that not only was “corruption” a possibility, but a 
reality: “We have, in fact, corrupted members of the clergy.” He proposed that it was the 
constitutional responsibility of Congress to “prohibit members of the clergy from being 
corrupted by our intelligence community.” He did not explain how this prohibition could 
be enacted or enforced. Fellow Democratic committee member, Philip H. Hayes (D-IN), 
rebutted Dellums’ curious line of reasoning with an equally peculiar argument. Hayes 
countered that it was unconstitutional “to exclude a particular classification of persons 
from employment” with the U.S. government. He further contended that protecting 
clergy, academics and journalists from corruption is “impossible for the Government to 
undertake, and certainly it is impossible for us to undertake.” Chair Otis Pike sided with 
Dellums in the committee’s debate over the wording of a policy statement on the use of 
clergy, academics or journalists in clandestine operations. Pike spoke forcefully, “I think 
it is wrong to use the clergy” as cover for the CIA. However, Pike demurred that he was 
more comfortable with a policy that was limited to only American religious personnel, 
setting aside the thorny question of whether restrictions should apply to the CIA working 
with foreign religious organizations and personnel.38  
The question of whether restrictions should be limited to US religious institutions 
and personnel arose more than once during the Pike Committee hearings. At one point, 
several committee members got into a robust debate with Dellums and Pike over whether 
their policy proposal applied only to US citizens. Dellums stated clearly that he was only 
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referring to American clergy and missionaries, “I am only attempting to cover what the 
Constitution covers.” Then a committee member questioned whether the Catholic Church 
was a US institution? Chair Pike responded curtly, “No. I think you have a real problem 
here no matter how you slice it.” Deftly avoiding the more controversial question of CIA 
involvement with foreign operatives, the committee agreed on a policy recommendation 
that placed restrictions only on CIA involvement with “American citizens and 
institutions.” Yet, some committee members rejected this compromise because it would 
unnecessarily “limit the intelligence-gathering effectiveness of our country.” It was for 
this reason that Representative Robert Kasten (R-WI) continued his support for the use of 
religious personnel in covert operations without restrictions.39 
The Pike Committee, for all its internal and external problems, conducted a wide-
ranging debate over whether American intelligence agencies should use clergy and 
missionaries in clandestine operations. The committee members raised a number of 
important questions: Was the use of religious organizations and personnel by the CIA 
consistent with the principle of separation of church and state, as specified in the First 
Amendment? Was it ethical and moral, and in keeping with the norms of American 
society? Did the use of clergy corrupt or compromise them? Did it discriminate against 
religious personnel who were willing to work with the CIA as either paid employees or 
volunteers? Did prohibiting clerics from being involved in CIA activities unduly diminish 
the United States’ intelligence-gathering capabilities? These were good questions, which 
                                                 




were, and continue to be, foundational to the debate over the use of religious institutions 
and personnel in espionage activities. Yet none of the three committees that examined 
CIA abuses in 1975-76 significantly addressed the ethics and advisability of engaging 
foreign religious institutions and personnel in covert operations. 
The Ramparts Controversy, Katzenbach Committee and the Money Trail 
Ramparts magazine was founded in 1962 as a glossy, New Left-leaning Catholic 
journal devoted to aesthetic, literary and religious commentary.40 By 1964, the journal 
increasingly published political stories on the Vietnam War, civil rights and the CIA. 
Then in 1966-67, ten years before the Church Committee, a series of exposés on the 
covert activities of the CIA forever secured Ramparts a place in American publishing 
history and stirred up a hornet’s nest of controversy for the CIA and the White House. 
The exposés garnered national attention for the niche journal and boosted its circulation 
from 50,000 to 250,000. The exposés also led to the appointment of a presidential 
investigative committee, the Katzenbach Committee, whose recommendations changed 
the way the CIA worked with private voluntary organizations, including religious ones.41 
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Ramparts played a central role in what Director of Central Intelligence, Richard 
Helms, labeled “one of my darkest days as DCI.” It was February 13, 1967. Helms spent 
an “exhausting day” visiting atomic energy-related plants and laboratories in Nevada and 
New Mexico. That evening, as he stood at the door of his hotel room, an anxious aide 
rushed to hand him an envelope with an urgent message from President Lyndon Johnson: 
“Return to Washington immediately.” After hastily arranging a private plane, Helms flew 
overnight directly back to Washington and drove forthwith to the CIA headquarters, still 
totally in the dark as to what “pending crisis or flap might have prompted LBJ’s urgent 
demand.” Helms spent several hours sitting at his desk waiting for a return call from the 
White House. Finally, the President called and told Helms that he wanted to make sure 
the DCI was at his desk when the February 14 New York Times hit the newsstands.42 
The Times carried a front-page story headlined, “A Student Group Concedes It 
Took Funds From C.I.A.” The story lede stated, “The National Student Association, the 
largest college student organization in the country, conceded today that it received funds 
from the Central Intelligence Agency from the early nineteen-fifties until last year.” The 
story was a pre-emptive strike by the National Student Association in consultation and 
agreement with the CIA to counteract a full-page advertisement running simultaneously 
in the same issue of the Times. The advertisement was from a “little known, left-leaning, 
monthly journal, Ramparts.” The Ramparts advertisement ran on page thirty-one of the 
newspaper. In bold print with sensational language, it made a gripping promise: 
                                                 




In its March issue, Ramparts magazine will document how the CIA has infiltrated 
and subverted the world of American student leaders, over the past fifteen years. 
It has used students to spy; it has used students to pressure international student 
organizations into taking Cold War positions; and it has interfered, in a most 
shocking manner, in the internal workings of the nation’s largest and oldest 
student organization. . . . The story in the March Ramparts also presents an 
amazing account of how the CIA bends so-called independent foundations to its 
clandestine financial purposes, using them as conduits for espionage money. 
Names are named and dollar amounts cited. . . . When you read this extraordinary 
article, you will feel that the CIA owes the youth of this country an apology. 
At the bottom of the advertisement was a sign-up strip for a subscription to Ramparts “to 
be sure [you] get the March issue of Ramparts.”43  
The day after the incendiary Ramparts story and advertisement ran, the New York 
Times reported that President Johnson ordered the CIA to close immediately all covert 
programs of funding to student groups and private organizations. However, a State 
Department telegram sent that day states that the White House denied Johnson took this 
action.44 That same day, the President appointed the three-person Katzenbach Committee 
composed of Under Secretary of State Nicholas Katzenbach (chair), Secretary of Health, 
Education, and Welfare John W. Gardner, and Director of Central Intelligence Richard 
Helms. The mandate of the committee was “to review relationships between government 
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agencies, notably the Central Intelligence Agency, and educational and voluntary 
organizations which operate abroad.” After a month and a half of meetings, the 
Katzenbach Committee presented a brief report, with the classified notes and appendices 
withheld, which recommended that no agency of the federal government “shall provide 
any covert financial assistance or support, direct or indirect, to any of the nation’s 
educational or private voluntary organizations.” President Johnson immediately accepted 
the committee’s recommendations and directed that “all agencies of the government . . . 
implement it fully.” The committee stated that in reaching its conclusions, it had 
“interviewed dozens of individuals in and out of government,” reviewed “thousands of 
pages of reports,” and reviewed, in particular, “the relationship between CIA and each 
relevant organization.”45   
Even as the Katzenbach Committee ramped up its investigation, the media 
engaged in a reporting frenzy. Daily front-page stories ran in the New York Times, as well 
as stories in the Washington Post, Washington Star, TIME magazine and across the wire 
services, revealing the scope and complexity of the CIA covert funding scheme. Dummy 
front groups comingled with legitimate American foundations to provide conduits and 
cover for CIA operations using secret funds. The CIA money passed through four layers 
of financial accounting to disguise its origins and ultimate purposes. Multiple news 
stories, published even before the promised Ramparts story hit the newsstands, also 
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named names and revealed dollar amounts. A New York Times story on February 17, 
1967 identified five organizations “receiving funds from foundations identified as 
conduits for Central Intelligence Agency money.” One of the organizations, the 
American Friends of the Middle East, had strong religious and CIA connections. 
Subsequent news stories revealed other groups and foundations with religious 
connections. The impact of the media disclosures was shattering to many of the private 
organizations, according to historian Hugh Wilford, forcing some to answer difficult 
questions from their constituencies and others to collapse entirely because the CIA was 
their sole source of funding. 46 
Ramparts released its much-anticipated exposé in early March 1967. The first half 
of the ten thousand-word article outlined the history, structure and scope of the 
clandestine CIA funding scheme. The second half of the article featured an on-the-record 
interview with Phil Sherburne, president of the National Student Association for 1965-66, 
and Michael Wood, NSA fund-raising chief. Sherburne and Wood described in detail the 
NSA’s relationship with “Covert Action Division No. Five of the CIA’s Plans Division,” 
some of whose personnel were former NSA officers. Sherburne and Wood explained to 
Ramparts how the CIA funneled money through front foundations to help student groups 
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support the US government’s anti-communist efforts. As promised, the Ramparts story 
identified the CIA-backed foundations and detailed dollar amounts.47  
The CIA’s funding of the NSA and other student groups endeavored to counter 
Soviet-connected student groups that wielded significant influence at international 
student conferences, like the 1946 and 1950 World Student Congresses in Prague and the 
1962 Helsinki World Youth Festival, “where lavishly financed Communist groups stole 
the show.” At these international conferences, communist student organizations 
“outmaneuvered, outshouted and outfinanced” the Americans. The CIA also sought to 
counter-balance the communist groups’ efforts to impress and engage “delegates from the 
underdeveloped, uncommitted nations of Africa, Asia and Latin America.” Additionally, 
the CIA was eager to support American students travelling to student conferences in 
Eastern Europe and Russia in order to use them to collect human intelligence on 
conditions and activities behind the Iron Curtain. In a number of cases, the CIA used the 
students as unwitting operatives. Marcus Raskin, the director of the Institute for Policy 
Studies in Washington, DC, wrote in a companion piece to the Ramparts article: “The 
CIA made patsies out of thousands of young Americans who went abroad to conferences 
or who studied under NSA auspices, but who unknowingly were being paid for, and were 
used by the CIA as contacts, covers and mail drops.”48  
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It was Michael Wood, the NSA’s chief of development and fundraising, who 
broke the vow of silence about the CIA funding operation. His decision to tell the secret 
story “was the most agonizing of my life,” and in so doing, he betrayed the trust of his 
“close friend,” NSA president Phil Sherburne, who first entrusted Wood with the CIA 
secret. When Ramparts reporters started fact-checking Wood’s story, they discovered an 
intriguing linkage between the NSA’s funders and those identified a couple of years 
earlier by a maverick Congressman. In 1964, Wright Patman (D-TX), chair of the House 
Committee on Banking and Currency, “had accidentally stumbled across eight CIA 
funding pass-throughs while conducting an investigation into foundation tax loopholes.” 
In a public meeting of the House Small Business subcommittee, Patman revealed that the 
J.M. Kaplan Fund of New York City had a special arrangement with the CIA to pass-
through funds donated to it by eight other CIA dummy foundations. In the subcommittee 
meeting, Wright Patman publicly identified what became known as the “Patman Eight’” 
The Ramparts reporters discovered in their research that some of the foundations in the 
“Patman Eight” were funding the NSA. The CIA linkage claimed by Wood and 
Sherburne was real.49 
Leading newspapers and newsmagazines of the day were instrumental in 
revealing the depth and breadth of the CIA funding operation. Occasionally, news stories 
used graphics to illustrate the CIA’s pass-through system for disguising funds destined 
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for clandestine operations. A Washington Post story on February 26, 1967 provided one 
of the most effective graphics for explaining the CIA funding operation: 
  Figure 1. Graphic Source. Richard Harwood, “O What a Tangled Web the CIA Wove: Cost Likely to Rise High 




The Post graphic illustrates how the CIA money was distributed.50 First, 
foundations, trusts and charitable funds controlled by families or individuals who worked 
closely with the CIA received money. Some of these foundations were dummy 
foundations or ‘mail drops’ created by the CIA and managed by its operatives. For 
example, the San Jacinto Fund of Houston was a “desk-drawer operation” because it had 
neither a listed phone number nor an office address. It operated out of the offices of an 
accountant. Sometimes the CIA passed funds first to the dummy foundation and then to 
the legitimate foundation; sometimes the CIA gave money first to a legitimate foundation 
who passed it through to a dummy foundation; and other times the CIA passed funds 
directly through the dummy foundation. Using dummy foundations allowed the 
legitimate foundations to hide the source of their income on their required 990-A forms 
for the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). Some of the legitimate foundations simply failed 
to list their source of funds on their IRS 990-A forms – an intentional oversight that went 
unquestioned.51 
The second step in the funding scheme was that the money, most times, passed to 
legitimate, public foundations and organizations, which gave the illicit payments the 
patina of legitimacy. Not surprisingly, some of the records of the legitimate tax-exempt 
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foundations, which were required by the IRS to be publicly available, “were strangely 
missing from the files of district offices.” Third, the money passed to organizations and 
groups that served as CIA front organizations. The CIA created some of these front 
groups, while others were legitimate American institutions that worked freely with the 
CIA. Fourth and finally, the money arrived in different regions of the world to support 
different groups and individuals carrying out clandestine CIA operations. This multi-
layered approach laundered the money and made it legitimate. According to the Post 
article, this complex process ended up involving “most of the major private institutions of 
American life.”52 
The Post story reported that the funding operation started “in the late 1940s and 
early 1950s” when the CIA initiated a “vast program” to “influence the political and 
ideological posture of private groups throughout the world, including many within the 
United States.” The amount of money involved was a “tightly held secret” and even the 
President of the United States “had no inkling of the answer.” At the time of the Post 
story, news outlets had traced about $15 million to various transactions, but the total 
amount of CIA funds involved was “in the hundreds of millions.”53 
A number of the legitimate foundations knowingly and willingly served as CIA 
funding conduits. The Brown Foundation of Houston, established by the founders of the 
construction giant Brown & Root, were close friends and financial allies of Lyndon 
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Johnson. As reported in The Nation magazine in December 1967, they donated to the 
Vernon Fund, a CIA dummy foundation, and to the American Friends of the Middle East, 
a CIA front organization. The Hobby Foundation of Houston also had close personal and 
political ties to Lyndon Johnson.54 It was established by former Governor of Texas, 
William P. Hobby, and his wife, Oveta Culp Hobby, the first Director of the Women’s 
Army Corps in WWII, the first Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare under 
President Eisenhower and, for many years, the chair of the family foundation. The Hobby 
Foundation actively involved the scion of the family, William Hobby, Jr., who was the 
Executive Editor of the Houston Post and the longest serving Lt. Governor in Texas 
history.55 Bill Hobby, as he is known, worked for Navy Intelligence during WWII and 
later continued a relationship with the Agency. His wife, Diana, was a CIA employee for 
two years. In a February 1967 interview with the New York Times, Bill Hobby was 
candid and forthright about the Hobby Foundation’s relationship with the CIA. He said 
that the foundation “had been for many years a conduit for the transfer of funds for the 
Central Intelligence Agency to various organizations here and abroad.” The transfer of 
funds involved “several projects” and “we are glad to have done it and proud to have 
been of service to the Federal Government.” Hobby verified the accuracy of the structure 
of the CIA pass-through scheme as illustrated in the Washington Post graphic. He 
                                                 
54 The Texas-based foundations included the Brown Foundation, Hobby Foundation San Jacinto Fund, 
Marshall Foundation, M.D. Anderson Foundation, Hoblitzelle Foundation, and Jones-O’Donnell 
Foundation. 
55 Bill Hobby was Lt. Governor of Texas for eighteen years under three Democratic governors: Dolph 




confirmed that the source of the funds that the Hobby Foundation received was from 
“many of the foundations previously mentioned as C.I.A. ‘fronts.’” In a March 1967 
interview with Newsweek, Bill Hobby explained how the process worked: “‘We were told 
that . . . we would receive certain funds from the CIA. Then we’d receive a letter, say 
from Organization XYZ, asking for funds. We granted the funds.’ No questions asked. 
‘We believed that [the CIA] knew what they were doing.’” In a column written twenty-
four years later, Hobby provided additional details about his relationship with the Agency 
and again expressed pride in his work with the CIA.56 
American Friends of the Middle East and Other CIA Fronts 
One of the CIA front organizations to which the Brown and Hobby Foundations 
provided channeled funds was the American Friends of the Middle East (AFME), a 
“Committee to Increase Understanding of Common Spiritual Values” in the Middle East. 
Dorothy Thompson, a celebrated newspaper columnist and news commentator for NBC 
radio, who TIME magazine named in 1939 as the second most influential woman in 
America after Eleanor Roosevelt, started the AFME. Thompson had taken a two-month 
tour of the Middle East in the winter of 1950 to gain “more than [a] superficial 
knowledge of the area.” In March 1951, CIA operative Elmer Berger, former head of the 
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American Council of Judaism, and Kermit “Kim” Roosevelt, the CIA’s Near East 
Division chief, approached Thompson to discuss the situation in the Middle East. They 
encouraged Thompson to set up a citizen group to promote the “spiritual and cultural 
bonds between the civilizations of the Middle East and our own,” as a bulwark against 
the spread of Communism. With the approval and support of Allen Dulles, the CIA 
Deputy Director of Plans (covert operations) and a personal friend of Thompson, the CIA 
covertly supplied funds and office space to help the AFME get off the ground.57 
On June 22, 1951, Thompson and a group of eminent Americans held a news 
conference in New York City to announce the “formation of a movement called 
‘American Friends of the Middle East.’” Five days later, in a full-page advertisement in 
the New York Times, the AFME articulated its purposes with statements loaded with 
religious and spiritual language, as illustrated by its opening words: 
Our civilization was cradled in the Middle East. From the Ancient Near East came 
today’s great religions – the Religions of the Book. But the West has gone far 
toward forsaking its heritage and forgetting the place of origin of its faith.  
Now that both religion and science are threatened by narrow and aggressive 
materialism, the American people need to know more about the contributions 
made to both by the peoples of the Middle East.  
The ad spoke of Soviet atheism and materialism, and said that communism “denies all 
spiritual values. . . . In the areas under its control, Soviet Communism undertakes to 
uproot and wipe out all religions by campaigns of extreme violence.” Emphasizing that 
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the Middle East is home to 200 million Muslims and 7 million Jews and Christians, the 
AFME ad decried the efforts of “Communist godlessness” to cloak itself in “spiritual 
concepts.” In response to the communist threat, “Americans and the peoples of the 
Middle East must strengthen their bonds of culture and religion, of literature and 
education, so as to stand united against the danger which threatens to engulf us all.”58 
American Friends of the Middle East funded numerous religious projects. One 
project in 1952 paid for three travelling fellowships for American seniors at recognized 
theological seminaries who wrote the most “original” and “informative” essay on “The 
Impact of Islam on Christianity.” The winners of the essay contest received a four to five 
week all-expense-paid tour of the Holy Land, which the AFME hoped “would promote 
better understanding and goodwill between the people of the United States and the 
Middle East.”59 The AFME sponsored another project in 1952 called Operation Magic 
Carpet. In cooperation with the US Air Force, the AFME assisted 3,763 Muslim pilgrims 
on their way to Mecca for the Hajj. The pilgrims’ transportation fell through and they 
became stranded in Beirut, Lebanon with no way to travel the 800 miles to Mecca in time 
for the Id Al Adha Feast of the Sacrifice. As the pilgrims boarded the Air Force planes, 
they found in their seats two-pound sacks of halal food with a note written in Arabic: 
“American Friends of the Middle East presents you this lunch packet and wishes you a 
successful journey and a safe return to your homes.” Cornelius Van H. Engert, then 
secretary-treasurer of the AFME called the operation “one of the most dramatic and 
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hopeful actions America has taken in the Middle East since the war.”60 Another AFME 
project provided financial aid for Arab and Muslim students to attend over 100 American 
colleges and universities in the United States. This project came under severe criticism 
from American Jewish organizations because its purposes were viewed as being more 
anti-Zionist than anti-Communist.61 
Indeed, one of the continual criticisms hurled at the AFME was that it was anti-
Zionist and pro-Arab, that its covert purpose was to undermine the US relationship with 
the struggling new State of Israel and enhance the US relationship with the Arab States. 
The criticism, although vigorously denied by Dorothy Thompson and other AFME 
leaders, seemed to have a measure of substance. Of the twenty-two “Charter Members” 
of AFME listed in its inaugural New York Times advertisement, none was Jewish or 
Muslim. Most were Protestant Christians with five Christian clergymen a part of the 
group. Of the eight professors in the group, all were Middle East experts with Arab or 
Muslim sympathies. Several members of the AFME founding leadership were journalists 
and three individuals had US Foreign Service and intelligence backgrounds, including 
William “Bill” Eddy who was FDR’s translator and the OSS North Africa chief.62 One of 
the future leaders of the AFME was Dr. Edward Elson, senior minister of the National 
Presbyterian Church in Washington, DC, whose membership included President Dwight 
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D. Eisenhower, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, and FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover. 
In 1956, on the heels of the Suez Crisis, Dr. Elson travelled across the Middle East in his 
official role as chair of AFME, but more significantly as the unofficial yet recognized 
personal ambassador and envoy for President Eisenhower to whom Elson wrote regular 
reports of his conversations with Middle East political leaders. On that trip, Elson carried 
a personal letter from Eisenhower to King Saud of Saudi Arabia, and thereby became the 
first American clergyman to visit the kingdom publicly.63 
What did the AFME, a private American citizens group striving to build better 
relationships with the Middle East, provide to the CIA? What was the purpose and 
advantage to the CIA in covertly funding and working with this religious-cultural-
educational group? Historian Hugh Wilford argues that the “AFME field offices in the 
Middle East provided CIA officers with nonembassy cover to carry out their espionage 
and covert action duties,” like CIA officer, Eugene Burns, who operated under AFME 
cover in Baghdad. These “deep cover” intelligence officers offered the CIA a covert 
“back channel” for Middle Easterners to cooperate with and provide intelligence to the 
US government. Second, the AFME was a voluntary cultural association from which 
Middle Easterners were more likely to accept an invitation to visit the United States than 
a government agency. The State Department saw the AFME as a credible private 
organization that could sponsor exchange visits with Middle Eastern individuals and 
groups who were skittish about identifying in any way with the US government. Finally, 
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the existence of the AFME, led by prominent and influential Americans, demonstrated 
that goodwill existed in the United States for Arabs. This offered hope for a balanced 
American foreign policy in the Middle East, in spite of the fact that since Truman’s 
official recognition of the State of Israel, US foreign policy had leaned in a more pro-
Israel, pro-Zionist direction. The CIA managed and oversaw the AFME cover operation 
by assigning a case officer, Mather Eliot and later Lorraine Norton, as Dorothy 
Thompson’s personal secretary. As well, the CIA used its relationships with members of 
the AFME board of directors to influence the direction and decisions of the 
organization.64 
Besides the AFME, the CIA funded other front organizations involved in religious 
activities. In the 1960s, the Baird Foundation of Buffalo, New York and the Paderweski 
Foundation of New York City funneled several hundred thousand dollars to the Union of 
Bishops of the Orthodox Church Outside Russia. This provided valuable links to a 
religious diaspora connected to co-religionists behind the Iron Curtain. Likewise, the 
Baird Foundation and the Hobby Foundation channeled funds to Christian church groups 
and Christian newspapers in Germany, particularly in Berlin.65 The Jones-O’Donnell 
Foundation of Dallas and the Marshall Foundation of Houston served as CIA conduits for 
a religious-educational organization called Christianform, which was dedicated to “the 
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defeat of atheistic communism.” This non-descript charity was started by a retired US Air 
Force Major, Nicholas T. Nonnenmacher, who also served on the “subversive activities 
committee” of the American Legion. In 1959, the organization reported income of 
$3,100; however, by 1961 its revenues had mysteriously soared to $250,000. The new 
money poured in from the CIA through front foundations. Christanform was the “father” 
of the Cuban Freedom Committee and involved in multiple CIA efforts to topple Castro. 
Nonnenmacher also sought in 1957 to get the student bodies of 360 colleges and 
universities to join in a mass demonstration to “pay tribute to the students who fought in 
the Hungarian revolution.”66  
The charity’s most public and audacious action occurred during two visits of 
USSR Premier Khrushchev to the United States. From September 15-27, 1959, 
Khrushchev toured America and held meetings – at the beginning and end of his tour – in 
Washington, DC with President Eisenhower. The Soviet premier’s tour occurred at the 
same time as Khrushchev’s sweeping anti-religious campaign, which lasted from 1959 to 
1964. Also, in the fall of 1960, Khrushchev attended the United Nations General 
Assembly in New York City. It was at this gathering that Premier Khrushchev famously 
pounded his shoe on the delegate desk to protest a speech.67 Whether in Washington, DC 
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or New York City, when Khrushchev was in town, Christianform hired a skywriting 
airplane to paint a giant cross in the sky above the city center along with the Greek letters 
Alpha and Omega, which represented “the Christian belief in a Supreme Deity.” 
Christianform told the press that the skywriting symbols were the organization’s effort to 
tell the Soviet premier, “Americans put their trust in God to cause the eventual overthrow 
or dissolution of communism.”68  
Foundations and front organizations were involved in numerous other operations 
with religious groups. The National Student Association included in its membership 
several prominent religious student groups: the World Student Christian Federation, 
National Intercollegiate Christian Council, Student Christian Movement, National 
Catholic Welfare Council Youth Wing, Catholic Action, Catholic International Student 
Movement, American Jewish Committee, Algerian Union of Muslim Students, and other 
regional religious student bodies.69 A number of the students in these religious 
communities reported contacts by the CIA and some even worked clandestinely with the 
Agency in various parts of the world. A student group called Frontier Internship in 
Mission (FIM), a Christian version of the Peace Corps that operated from 1961-1974, 
reported frequent encounters with CIA operatives in Africa, Latin American, and Asia.70 
In addition, the CIA’s elaborate web of front organizations, funding conduits, foundations 
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and covert activities swept up literary publications, like Encounter and The New Leader, 
cultural organizations, like the Congress for Cultural Freedom, and Hollywood, all of 
whom used religion as a Cold War weapon in one way or another. “God was 
everywhere.”71 
The Ramparts story and the relentless press investigations opened a Pandora’s 
Box of controversy for the CIA and the White House. Conservative newsmagazine, 
Human Events, ran stories, promoted by the White House and State Department, 
characterizing Ramparts as an ultra-left rag whose reporting could not be trusted. Rumors 
circulated of Ramparts receiving funds from the KGB, an alleged connection promoted 
by the CIA, which for months observed and analyzed Ramparts and its staff in depth. 
CIA counter-intelligence chief, James Angleton, wrote regular, comprehensive reports to 
the CIA Deputy Director of Plans, copied to the Director of the FBI, detailing Ramparts’ 
monthly activities and the underlying “themes” in its published stories. Angleton noted 
that of the ten principal topics “prominent” in Ramparts between 1964 and 1967, nine of 
the ten “are also themes used consistently in the Soviet and Bloc propaganda campaign 
against the U.S.” The inference was clear, although not explicitly stated – Ramparts was 
influenced, if not directed, by the Soviet propaganda machine. However, an internal CIA 
memo partially declassified several years later states that the Ramparts–KGB connection 
was not true.72 
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To manage the Ramparts controversy, on February 15, 1967, the day after the 
story first appeared in the New York Times, President Johnson created the Katzenbach 
Committee to examine the accusations against the CIA and develop recommendations. 
Internally though, as government documents later revealed, the purpose of the committee 
was more political than structural. Acting on recommendations from the State 
Department regarding the “CIA-NSA Flap,” the White House ordered that effective 
immediately “all public statements would be made by Katzenbach.” This allowed the 
White House to stonewall media inquiries and, hopefully, quash the story. The State 
Department memo to the White House proposed, “We will volunteer nothing. We will 
not respond to newspaper allegations. We will not respond to statements made by 
individual members of such groups.” The referral of all questions to Katzenbach was an 
effort to “deflect any questions on the grounds that it is impossible to answer them 
sensibly until the study is complete.” This was in spite of the fact that, as newspapers 
reported, the CIA–NSA–private organization funding operation existed in the Truman, 
Eisenhower, and Kennedy Administrations. And, in the Johnson Administration, even 
though the President’s staff denied he had any knowledge of the scheme, Attorney 
General Robert Kennedy briefed the press on “background” and “not for attribution” 
about the CIA operation. As well, Johnson had evidently known about the CIA financial 
arrangement since 1955, as a member of a Senate CIA watchdog subcommittee “during a 
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time that the agency’s dealing with the private groups [was] being formed and 
expanded.”73 
The political purpose of the Katzenbach Committee is reinforced by the fact that a 
mere eight days after the creation of the three-person committee, Nicholas Katzenbach 
presented President Johnson with a “preliminary finding” that “praised the CIA’s support 
of the private groups.” It declared that the Agency’s actions were in keeping “with 
national policies established by the National Security Council in 1952 through 1954.”74 
The Washington Post observed, “In releasing the Katzenbach report, Mr. Johnson 
appeared to be shifting the position of his Administration toward one of strong support 
for the beleaguered CIA.” With the release of the full and final report one month later, the 
committee made two recommendations: First, “It should be the policy of the United 
States Government that no federal agency shall provide any covert financial assistance or 
support, direct or indirect, to any of the nation’s education or private voluntary 
organizations.” Second, that the government should create a “public-private mechanism 
to provide public funds openly for overseas activities,” similar to the British Council. 
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Johnson, in a brief response statement, immediately accepted the first recommendation 
and directed “all agencies of the government to implement it fully.” However, he pledged 
only to give the second recommendation “serious consideration” and promised to create 
another “special committee” made up of members of “the Executive, the Congress, and 
the private community” to study the issue. In reality, as the Church and Pike Committees 
made clear a decade later, little changed.75  
Moreover, a CIA memo for internal distribution accompanying the Katzenbach 
final report, made two prescient observations that affected future clandestine CIA 
operations. First, the CIA memo observed that the Johnson policy on funding only 
applied to “American-based educational or private voluntary organizations,” thus 
providing a loophole for engaging foreign clergy, missionaries, and religious 
communities. Second, “the new ground rules” permitted “the utilization of American 
individuals as agents or donors” as long as “the organizations with which they are 
associated do not become involved.” The CIA employed both of these loopholes in 
subsequent years to facilitate and legitimize their use of clergy and missionaries in 
clandestine activities.76 
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Thirty Years On and Exception Waivers 
In 1996, the Cold War was over. Thirty years had passed since the Ramparts 
controversy and the Katzenbach Committee. Twenty years had passed since Seymour 
Hersh’s front-page New York Times story sparked the Church and Pike Committees. Yet 
the question of journalists and clergy working for the CIA persisted in the media and with 
Congress. Now a new war was sparking concern – the so-called war on terror – and the 
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, under Arlen Specter (R-PA) as chair, held a 
special hearing on July 17, 1996 to examine anew the stubborn issue of journalists and 
clergy as spies.77 
Three weeks before the hearing, on June 25, 1996, a truck bomb exploded at the 
Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia killing 19 U.S. Air Force personnel who were a part of 
Operation Southern Watch, the southern Iraq no-fly zone maintained following the 1991 
Gulf War. Originally thought to be an al-Qaeda attack, in 2006 the US District Court in 
Washington, DC “concluded that Iran was responsible.” It was not until August 2015 that 
the mastermind of the attack, Ahmed al-Mughassil, “a senior leader of an Iranian-backed 
Saudi militant group” was arrested in Beirut, living under the protection of Hezbollah. 
The Khobar Towers bombing came on the heels of the November 1995 double-bombing 
of an American-run military training center in the Saudi capital of Riyadh.78  
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Furthermore, in January 1996, the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) released 
an Independent Task Force Report – “Making Intelligence Smarter” – chaired by Richard 
N. Haas. The Task Force was made up of eminent Americans from government, 
academia, business, media and the military. The report made recommendations on 
“measures to improve the intelligence product, suggestions for internal reorganization, 
and steps to build or rebuild relationships with important external constituencies.” One of 
the recommendations of the Task Force was that “legal and policy constraints” which 
circumscribe clandestine operations be reviewed and, that “at a minimum,” a “fresh look 
be taken at limits on the use of non-official covers.” Among the groups mentioned in the 
discussion of clandestine operations was the media.79 News organizations responded 
quickly to the CFR proposal. The New York Times Editorial Board, in a piece entitled 
“No Press Card for Spies,” criticized the CFR suggestion that journalists should once 
again be used as spies or that media organizations could provide non-official cover for 
CIA agents: 
The prohibition on paying accredited journalists for intelligence work should be 
absolute. The same applies to issuing bogus press credentials to a cover agent. 
Such a firewall is essential . . . using reporters as agents offends and confounds 
the principles of American democracy.80 
Similarly, a Washington Post story referenced the CFR report and its proposed review of 
“legal and policy restraints” against the CIA’s use of clergy and journalists. The Post 
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reported that a “controversial loophole” existed allowing the CIA to use journalists, 
clergy and missionaries in “extraordinary circumstances.” Roberta Cohen, a member of 
CFR, responded to the New York Times editorial in a letter to the editor. She raised the 
issue of clergy working for the CIA as spies with non-official cover. In her letter, Ms. 
Cohen states that Richard Haas singled out clergy as “potential candidates for C.I.A. 
cover.” She rebuked the Times because “you say nothing in their defense.” She goes on to 
claim that a number of members of CFR were “deeply disturbed” by the Task Force 
report, and that “our concern [is] not just for its impact on journalists.”81 The importance 
of the CFR report and the subsequent media response is that Senator Specter cited both as 
the reason for his calling the special hearing of the Senate Select Committee on 
Intelligence on July 17, 1996.82 
The special hearing had three parts. The first part was a presentation by Director 
of Central Intelligence John Deutch; the second section dealt with using journalists as 
spies; and the third part involved a four-person panel of religious leaders discussing the 
dangers of using clergy and missionaries in intelligence operations. Senators on the 
committee expressed discomfort with any “public discussion of U.S. intelligence sources 
and methods.” Moreover, committee members expressed a general reluctance to prohibit 
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completely the use of journalists and clergy “if lives are at risk or a vital national interest 
is at risk.” Senator Bob Kerrey (D-NE), vice-chair of the committee, said that he did not 
see a reason “why any profession should be completely and permanently excluded from 
the possibility of working with CIA or DIA.” Kerrey felt that the determining factors 
should be the situation and the willingness of the individual. Senator John Glenn (D-OH) 
concurred with Kerrey saying, “just to have a policy that says we will under no 
circumstances, no how, no way, even think of talking to the clergy or those associated 
with religious groups overseas or journalists, I think that would be a wrong policy . . . 
because we are into a tough time for human intelligence.”83 
The formal portion of the hearing began with an opening statement by DCI 
Deutch. He started by reiterating that it had been CIA policy for twenty years – since the 
Church Committee – not to use American clergy, American journalists or Peace Corps 
volunteers for intelligence operations. He affirmed that this was his strong belief and 
personal preference based on the need for an independent, free press, and the principle of 
separation of church and state. However, Deutch cautioned, he was unwilling to prohibit 
unconditionally the use of clergy and journalists in some exceptional circumstances, such 
as when the lives of American hostages were at stake or a terrorist group was trying to 
use a weapon of mass destruction. He asserted that his predecessors for the last 19 years 
had also refused to make this prohibition. Deutch then referenced a new, classified 
policy, which he had issued, that “set out several specific tests that must be satisfied” 
                                                 




before the CIA Director or Deputy Director would be authorized to issue an exception 
waiver allowing for the use of clergy, journalists or Peace Corps volunteers. Deutch 
claimed that in his fourteen months as DCI he had never issued such an exception waiver. 
In response to the DCI’s claim, Senator Specter stressed that exceptions were “very, very 
unusual” and an “extraordinary circumstance,” and therefore should not be in the public 
record. Evidently, the senator from Pennsylvania was unaware that Admiral Stansfield 
Turner, DCI sixteen years earlier, publicly admitted before a Senate committee that on 
three occasions he agreed to waive the CIA rule against contracting with missionaries. 
Turner testified that sometimes there are “unique circumstances” and a “situation of the 
highest urgency and national importance” where clergymen are “the only means 
available.” 84  
Deutch’s testimony and the opening comments by some of the senators on the 
committee made clear that the government wanted to preserve the exception waiver for 
clergy, missionaries, journalists and Peace Corps volunteers. However, the four religious 
leaders invited to appear before the committee argued for the opposite – a complete, 
irrevocable ban on the CIA use of clergy and missionaries. 
The panel of religious leaders included Dr. Don Argue, president of the National 
Association of Evangelicals (NAE), representing 42,500 congregations nationwide from 
49 different denominations; Dr. John Orme, executive director of the International 
Foreign Mission Association; Sister Claudette LaVediere, president of the Maryknoll 
                                                 




Sisters, who work with the poor in over 30 countries; and Dr. Rodney Page, deputy 
general secretary of the Church World Service and Witness Unit of the National Council 
of Churches, representing 33 Protestant denominations composed of approximately 45 
million people. The religious leaders argued that the CIA’s use of clergy, missionaries, 
and aid workers endangered lives – American and foreign. Moreover, the CIA policy 
“undermines the trust of all workers,” raises suspicions, and has resulted in some 
religious workers “being taken into captivity as hostages” in the Middle East and 
Southeast Asia, and others being murdered in the Burma-Thai border region.85  
Dr. Argue cited the 1977 policy adopted in the wake of the Church Committee 
hearings that prohibited any intelligence relationship “with any U.S. clergy or missionary, 
whether ordained or not, who is sent out by a mission or church organization to preach, 
teach, heal, or proselytize.” Then in 1996, DCI Deutch stated that the ban would be 
waived in cases of “unique and special threats to national security.” Argue called the new 
waiver policy “unethical and immoral.” He insisted that the “CIA close any loophole that 
allows for intelligence gathering, collaboration with clergy, missionaries, and aid 
workers.” Further, Argue said, “we insist that the CIA clarify and publish its policy for 
the protection of U.S. citizens serving in ministry abroad.”86  
In his presentation, Argue referred to a letter written by Senator Mark Hatfield 
(D-OR) to DCI Deutch on February 28, 1996, criticizing the director for abrogating the 
agreement that Hatfield made with DCI George Bush in 1976 instituting the ban on the 
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CIA using clergy and missionaries. Hatfield said that his agreement with Bush to 
withdraw his pending legislation at the time rested on the implementation of the ban. 
Now, Deutch was nullifying that agreement. Hatfield echoed his concern and opposition 
from two decades earlier: 
The suspicion created by CIA involvement with even one overseas member of 
U.S.-based religious organizations puts the welfare of all missionaries in 
jeopardy. Therefore, allowing the waiver of this policy is tantamount to declaring 
no policy at all. 
I again have to reiterate my strong opposition to this practice under any 
circumstance.87 
The other religious leaders on the panel concurred with Dr. Arugue’s opposition 
to Deutch’s waiver policy, joining in the call for a total ban on the use of clergy and 
missionaries by US intelligence agencies. Dr. Orme said that the policy was “particularly 
problematic in Islamic countries,” where terrorism and hostage taking were concerns. 
Orme, like Argue, insisted that the “CIA publicly close any loophole” allowing for the 
use of missionaries and overseas workers, “in order to protect the ministry, safety, and 
lives of its personnel and their families.” Sister Claudette LaVerdiere said that the waiver 
policy puts missionaries and “the people with whom we work at great risk,” and seriously 
undermines and jeopardizes “our whole ministry.” LaVerdiere joined with her colleagues 
in calling for a “complete ban on loopholes.” Dr. Page joined in denouncing the waiver 
policy. He argued that the mere “existence of this waiver authority places religious 
workers in jeopardy.” He stated that the “public perception that a few U.S. missionaries 
might be gathering information secretly for the Government undermines the trust of all 
                                                 




workers.” In his comments, Dr. Page raised the issue of the CFR Task Force Report and 
credited it with, at least partially, creating the turmoil over the exception waiver. 
Coincidently, the CFR Task Force, in formulating its report, consulted with DCI Deutch, 
along with former DCIs Helms, Gates, Webster and Woosley, and future DCIs Tennet 
and Hayden. 88 
During the question and answer portion of the religious leaders’ presentation, it 
became clear that the senators did not want to abolish the exception policy and sought 
some form of limited accommodation that would allow the waiver policy to remain. 
Senator Specter offered the compromise that only the President of the United States could 
grant an exception waiver. Dr. Orme rejected this proposal, persisting in his call for an 
“absolute prohibition.” Senator Charles Robb (D-VA) stated that his sympathies lay with 
establishing a permanent exclusion on the use of clergy and missionaries. However, as 
one who “understands the need for different assets” for the intelligence community, Robb 
believed “that there should be clear exceptions” to any exclusion policy. Therefore, he 
was for keeping the current waiver policy in place.89 
Facts and Questions 
After three decades of investigations and revelations about the CIA’s use of 
clergy and missionaries in intelligence operations, two things remained – facts and 
questions. 
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The fact was that the long-standing rumor within religious communities and 
among intelligence operatives was true – the CIA, DIA and other intelligence bodies 
within the US government used clergy, missionaries and religious workers as intelligence 
gatherers and clandestine operatives during the Cold War. The White House, Congress 
and the CIA confirmed this fact. Classified and declassified documents shared with the 
White House and members of Congress during five government investigations from 1966 
to 1996 verified this fact. Sworn testimony before Congress provided by multiple 
Directors of Central Intelligence, numerous CIA leaders and operatives, multiple 
religious leaders, clergy and missionaries, and news reporters confirmed the truth of the 
long circulated rumors. A second indisputable fact is that the CIA covertly funded 
religiously connected operations through a complex network of legitimate and dummy 
foundations, front organizations, and clandestine cut-outs. A third fact is that although the 
parties involved agreed that it was necessary for the US government to have far-reaching, 
effective intelligence capabilities, there was strong disagreement on how necessary it was 
for clergy, journalists, academics, and Peace Corps volunteers to be involved in 
espionage.  
The value of this three-decade-long discovery process was that it revealed the 
scope of the controversy. It revealed the key questions and points of debate at the core of 
the CIA-religious community relationship. It exposed the points of disagreement and 
refusal to compromise. And it made evident the tension and delicate balance between the 




Yet questions remained. How and where did these operations involving clergy 
and missionaries actually take place? Did they only involve American religious workers? 
The CIA, when talking about its work with clergy and missionaries, almost exclusively 
used this national descriptor. What about foreign clergy, missionaries and religious 
workers? Were there other types of CIA covert operations that utilized religious ideas, 
tools or methods, but not religious personnel? 
The answer begins with a missionary working on the CIA payroll when DCI 









MISSIONARIES IN COVERT OPERATIONS 
Subsequent to Director of Central Intelligence George Bush’s declaration that the 
“CIA has no secret paid or contractual relationship with any American clergyman or 
missionary,” an ordained, Southern Baptist missionary to Indonesia, who had been under 
contract with the CIA, threatened a lawsuit.1 In partially declassified CIA documents, his 
name remains blacked-out; but the fact that he and other missionaries worked for the CIA 
during the Cold War is clear. 
The unnamed Southern Baptist missionary worked for a branch of the CIA known 
as the Joint Publications Research Service (JPRS). The JPRS formed a part of the Foreign 
Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), created in 1941 to monitor all German, Italian, 
and Japanese public radio broadcasts. The JPRS evolved from the US Army’s Military 
Documents Center in WWII, which translated all captured enemy materials. In 1947, by 
directive of the National Security Council, the FBIS and JPRS transferred into the CIA’s 
Office of Operations in the Directorate of Intelligence. The FBIS was assigned to 
“monitor foreign radio, television, press wire service news and commentary 
transmissions to meet the information needs of all U.S. departments and agencies,” 
particularly information originating from communist sources. Likewise, the JPRS was 
responsible for the translation into English of all foreign language publications and 
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documents needed by the CIA and other departments of the US government during the 
Cold War.2 
A year after Bush issued his policy memo about journalists, clergy and 
missionaries, the JPRS finally got around to notifying its staff about the implementation 
of the new policy.3 On February 23, 1977, the JPRS sent out a form letter to all its 
employees informing them that “consistent with the policy of the CIA” the JPRS could 
not have “any paid or contractual relationship” with American journalists, news 
correspondents, clergymen or missionaries. Therefore, “in compliance with this policy, 
we will be required to terminate our contract with anyone who falls within the categories 
cited above.” As is evident from the declassified JPRS communications, the department 
was not in a rush to comply with the CIA policy on clergy and missionaries, of which 
there were several.4 The pushback to the JPRS termination announcement was swift and 
forceful. 
In a memo to the CIA’s Office of General Counsel, dated March 22, 1977, the 
Director of the FBIS asked for advice on how to handle the threat of litigation from the 
Southern Baptist missionary who “does piecework translations in Indonesian from 
unclassified foreign press sources.” The missionary had been under contract to the CIA 
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for seven years. The clergyman seemed desperate for the money, even though his 
earnings from the CIA the previous year totaled only $973.5 This income total and the 
missionary’s urgency to receive it is not surprising. In a 1975 letter to then-DCI Colby, 
an unnamed writer complains about the “pathetically low” rate that the CIA paid its 
translators and accused the CIA of “taking advantage of its translators.” Later, in a 1977 
letter to DCI Stansfield Turner, the president of the American Translators Association 
(ATA) expressed similar concerns and affirmed, “Many members of the ATA depend 
upon JPRS contracts for all or most of their income.” In the various communications 
back-and-forth between the CIA and its translators, concern about money fills much of 
the discussion.6 
Once the unidentified Southern Baptist missionary received notice that the CIA 
was going to terminate his contract, he quickly phoned his regular JPRS contact to 
express his dismay. He followed up the phone call with a letter putting his concerns into 
writing. The JPRS reviewed his case and determined that the Bush policy required the 
termination of his contract. The CIA informed the missionary by letter of their decision. 
The missionary responded immediately with another letter challenging the termination 
action and raising the “possibility of litigation.” In the memo, the Director of the FBIS 
told the CIA General Counsel that two other missionary contractors had expressed similar 
views in their communications with the JPRS and “we anticipate more such reactions.” 
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The Director of the FBIS solicited the General Counsel’s “earliest advice” on how to 
handle the threat of litigation from the Southern Baptist missionary, and any other cases 
that might arise in the future.7  
The Agency’s legal conundrum grew more complicated when Royal L. Tinsley, 
Jr., president of the ATA, threatened to have the members of the association “write to 
their representatives in the House and Senate, requesting congressional action to redress 
what we see as unjustifiable restrictions on their right to earn a living working for the 
JPRS.” Tinsley requested that the CIA review the Bush policy and make an 
accommodation for the JPRS. On July 18, 1977, Director of Central Intelligence 
Stansfield Turner responded to the ATA president stating that the CIA had conducted a 
review of the policy and that “members of the clergy” would not be prohibited from 
“providing unclassified translation services” for the CIA. Turner went on to confirm that 
he had decided not to prohibit “overt relations with missionaries or members of the clergy 
on matters which are unrelated to their religious status, such as the providing of 
unclassified translations services.” Turner provided no clarification as to what qualified 
as “matters unrelated to their religious status.” However, Tinsley was pleased and 
pronounced the decision “wise and just.”8 
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Stansfield Turner’s response to the controversy with the ATA and the threat of the 
missionary lawsuit against the CIA provides a glimpse into a deeper discrepancy 
regarding the use of clergy and missionaries by the CIA. Turner took over the CIA on 
March 9, 1977, two months after Bush’s departure and only two weeks after the JPRS 
staff letter ignited the lawsuit controversy. President Carter, a Navy man, charged Turner, 
another Navy man, with bringing reform and renewal to the Agency. 
In the fall of 1977, DCI Turner gave a speech on several occasions entitled 
“Secrecy and Morality in Intelligence” dealing with the issue of ethics in the CIA’s 
operations. Turner gave the speech at DePauw University and Wabash College in 
Indiana, at St. John’s Forum in Washington, DC, and at North Shore Unitarian Church in 
Chicago. In the course of his talk, he raised the subject of the CIA’s funding of 
academics, journalists, clergy and missionaries. As regards the CIA’s relationship with 
religious personnel, Turner was blunt and explicit: “No secret, paid or unpaid, contractual 
relationships permitted. None exist.” This statement, given at least four times, followed 
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and contradicted his letter to the ATA about making an accommodation for clergy and 
missionaries. 9 
More inconsistent, though, was his March 1980 testimony before the House 
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence in which he called prohibitions against 
intelligence cooperation with religious, media or academic organizations an “unwarranted 
limitation of flexibility.” Turner asserted to the House committee, “There can arise 
unique circumstances in which intelligence relationships with members of these 
institutions are not only warranted, but may be the only means available for 
accomplishing important intelligence objectives.”10  
In two different speeches – one before the national conference of Presidents of 
State Bar Associations and the other before the San Francisco Press Club – Turner 
repeated the same argument that there should be flexibility and exceptions for the CIA to 
use clergy, missionaries, journalists and academics. Turner spoke skeptically to these 
audiences about the “many rules and regulations recently applied to intelligence 
activities” that complicate the execution of clandestine operations. To illustrate his point, 
he gave the example of an American missionary who was living and ministering in a 
country “under siege” and in the midst of a “rebellion.” The CIA did not have assets on 
the ground and was “having considerable difficulty keeping track of what was 
happening.” In the midst of the hostilities, the missionary made ham radio transmissions 
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about what was going on inside the country. Unknown to the missionary, the CIA was 
tracking and listening to his broadcasts to gather intelligence on how the CIA might 
respond to the emergency. However, this action created an internal crisis for the CIA, 
raising questions about whether covertly eavesdropping on the missionary’s broadcasts 
broke regulations. Did the interception of this American missionary’s signal violate the 
CIA policy against using missionaries? Did the action qualify as “illegal electronic 
surveillance of an American citizen?” Could the CIA use this missionary’s information 
for their covert operations? While the “rebellion” was still underway, the CIA referred 
their legal quandary to the US Attorney General for an opinion and debated the questions 
internally among their own legal staff. The Attorney General reached a decision, which 
DCI Turner approved – a decision that he described in his two speeches: 
As long as the missionary stuck to the CB and normal ham radio bands, it was 
alright. But if he tried to disguise his broadcast as well he might because he was 
in danger because of his transmissions, that would indicate his desire for privacy 
and we would have to cease listening – and cease learning what was going on and 
whether he was still safe.11 
During his four-year tenure as Director of Central Intelligence, Turner oscillated in his 
statements about whether or not the CIA could use clergy and missionaries for 
intelligence activities. However, the DCI was less hesitant when it came to using clergy 
and missionaries for overseas operations where the CIA lacked sufficient resources on the 
ground.  
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William Casey, a protégé of WWII OSS chief Bill Donovan and a former OSS 
agent himself, followed Stansfield Turner in 1981 as Ronald Reagan’s Director of 
Central Intelligence. Casey was a Jesuit-educated, devout Catholic, “who would go to 
astonishing lengths not to miss mass.”12 Casey was a member of the secretive Catholic 
chivalric society, the Sovereign Military Order of Malta (SMOM), as was former DCI 
John McCone. As a “Knight of Malta,” Casey had the privilege of joining with other 
knights, like Reagan Secretary of State Alexander Haig, in the annual St. John’s Day 
parade through the streets of Rome. They “dressed in scarlet uniforms and black capes, 
brandishing swords and waving flags emblazoned with the eight-pointed Maltese cross” 
and swearing allegiance to the “defense of the Holy Mother Church.”13  
Founded in Jerusalem in 1050 CE, the Knights of Malta ranks as “the world’s 
oldest surviving order of chivalry.” The Order of Malta, of which the Knights are a part, 
is a “sovereign subject of international law,” has permanent observer status at the United 
Nations, has diplomatic relations with “over 100 states and the European Union,” and 
enjoys legal extraterritoriality on its two properties in the heart of Rome, making the 
Order of Malta the world’s smallest sovereign state. The mission of the Order of Malta 
and its Knights is providing aide to the poor and relief to victims of war and disaster. 
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However, one of the most important benefits to being a Knight of Malta was access to the 
Catholic world’s social, political, governmental and business elites.14 
In the mid-1980s, DCI William Casey used his connection with the Knights of 
Malta and other religious groups to funnel millions of dollars in illegal, covert aid to the 
Nicaraguan Contras after Congress passed the Boland Amendment outlawing the use of 
any US government funds for support of the anti-Sandinista rebels. Casey covertly 
continued his illegal operation using the church-going Lt. Col. Oliver North, assigned to 
the National Security Council, to create a ‘private’ back channel to the Contras. One of 
Casey’s schemes to continue funding the Contras involved secretly selling military 
armaments to Iran using Israel as a cutout. This illegal operation became the centerpiece 
of the 1987 congressional Iran-Contra hearings.15  
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A secondary Casey funding and supply scheme involved religious organizations. 
It received less attention at the congressional hearings, but generated significant coverage 
in the media. Pat Robertson’s Christian Broadcasting Network (CBN) raised millions of 
dollars from its TV viewers to aid so-called “refugees” in Central America through a 
charitable campaign called “Operation Blessing.” The CBN donations then went into 
Oliver North-controlled private charities called the Nicaraguan Refugee Fund and the 
Nicaraguan Freedom Fund to provide food, medical aid, and munitions to the 
Nicaraguan Contras. In addition to Pat Robertson, fundamentalist Baptist Jerry Falwell 
channeled funds to the Contras through his “Liberty Foundation.” Christian entertainer 
and movie star Pat Boone joined in raising funds and political support for the anti-
Sandinista rebels and his old friend, President Ronald Reagan. When the CBN-funded 
supplies arrived in Honduras, where the rebel bases were located and from which the CIA 
ran its secret war, the Knights of Malta oversaw the distribution network for getting the 
supplies to the Contras. A March 15, 1985 United Press International story describes 
how the CBN and Knights of Malta rented two transport planes to airlift 80,000 pounds 
of materials from Miami to Honduras to be distributed to Nicaraguan “refugees” – the 
Contras.16  
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DCI Casey took these actions knowing they were contrary to public statements he 
made a few years earlier in support of the CIA’s policy forbidding the use of religious 
leaders and organizations. On June 8, 1982, DCI Casey met at CIA headquarters with 
Southern Baptist Convention Foreign Mission Board President Keith Parks and Executive 
Vice President Bill O’Brien to discuss Southern Baptists’ concerns about the CIA’s use 
of clergy and missionaries in CIA operations. At the time, the Southern Baptist 
Convention (SBC) was the largest Protestant denomination in the United States and had 
one of the largest and most far-reaching mission operations in the world.  At the meeting, 
Casey told the Baptist leaders that he “personally ha[d] strong objections to any 
utilization of missionaries by the CIA” and that as DCI he “had not and would not use 
missionaries” as agents. Parks repeated Casey’s statements in letters to Vice-President 
George Bush and Senator Mark Hatfield, also copied to Casey. As well, the secular and 
religious press widely covered the Parks meeting with Casey, prominently featuring 
Casey’s statements. Casey knew he was publicly ‘on the record’ with his support of the 
CIA policy regarding not using clergy or missionaries.17 
Like Stansfield Turner before him, William Casey gave conflicting messages 
about the CIA’s position on the use of clergy and missionaries for covert operations. 
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Publicly, Casey pledged support for the decade-old Bush prohibition against the CIA 
having any “secret paid or contractual relationship with any American clergyman or 
missionary.” Privately, however, Casey did not hesitate to use his personal connections 
with religious leaders and organizations to fund and supply the CIA’s secret war in 
Nicaragua. Perhaps Casey justified his clandestine cooperation with Pat Robertson, Jerry 
Falwell, and the Knights of Malta by classifying them “volunteers,” thus fitting them into 
the exception clause created by George Bush and Gerald Ford. Perhaps Casey did not use 
actual missionaries for the Contra supply operation; however, Robertson and Falwell 
were both ordained clergymen. Perhaps he simply ignored the Bush policy and did what 
he thought necessary to do his job as Director of Central Intelligence. Whatever Casey or 
Turner’s rationale for their contradictory approaches, ultimately they joined with DCIs 
Colby, Helms, and Deutch in actively using religious personnel and organizations in 
espionage operations. It seems, considering the broad sweep of CIA history, DCI 
approval for the use of clergy and missionaries in CIA clandestine activities was, in 
reality, the norm not the exception. The communications and testimonies of missionaries 
in the field bolsters this argument.  
Missionary Leaders Confirm CIA Involvement 
A more precise picture of the CIA’s use of missionaries and clergy emerges from 
the archival papers of mission organizations deposited in the Billy Graham Center 
Archives at Wheaton College in suburban Chicago.18 The papers reveal a trail of 
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discussion, debate and concern by mission leaders over the CIA’s involvement with their 
organizations and staff members over a period of decades. The first-hand testimonies 
confirm the reality and nature of the CIA’s engagement with American missionaries.19 
Missionary records indicate only sporadic expressions of concern over CIA 
involvement with missionaries during the late-1940s, 1950s and 1960s. It was a time of 
war – the Chinese civil war, the Korean War, the Vietnam War – all involving a 
communist threat. It was a time for Americans to “rally ‘round the flag” and support their 
government; many American missionaries considered it their patriotic duty to assist the 
CIA in defending the United States. It was the era of Joe McCarthy and the Red Scare. 
Religious organizations strongly supported the Cold War narrative, advanced by 
Presidents Truman and Eisenhower, as well as McCarthy, of god-fearing Americans 
versus godless Soviets.20 The threat of subjugation by “atheistic communism” meshed 
with many missionaries’ theology and preaching, that is until some missionaries became 
convinced that American support for Third World dictators, despots, unfettered 
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capitalism, and the plundering of natural resources was not an acceptable life for the 
people they came to serve.  
The Church Committee disclosures of CIA misdeeds stirred missionary concerns 
about intelligence activity in their midst. However, it was Senator Mark Hatfield’s efforts 
on the floor of the US Senate and his reading into the Congressional Record the private 
communications between himself, DCI Colby, President Ford, and DCI Bush, which 
provoked mission leaders into action. The US Roman Catholic Conference, the National 
Council of Churches (NCC), and the Evangelical Fellowship of Mission Agencies 
(EFMA) made public statements challenging the CIA’s involvement with missionaries. 
More importantly, investigative news stories about religion and spying in secular 
publications like TIME, The Washington Post, The New York Times, and the Chicago 
Tribune, as well as trusted religious publications like the National Catholic Reporter, The 
Christian Century, Eternity and Christianity Today influenced the opinions of religious 
Americans. 
A timeline of key events better illustrates the acceleration of communications 
about CIA involvement with mission organizations. Archival documents validate the 
timeline (dates for key religious organization events appear in bold): 
1. 1963 June 12 – EFMA letter to mission organizations explains steps for 
cooperating with the CIA.21 
2. 1975 January 27 – Senate Church Committee begins work. 
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3. 1975 August 1 – National Catholic Reporter publishes dramatic story – “CIA 
Funded, Manipulated Missionaries” – disclosing specific examples of CIA 
involvement with missionaries.22 
4. 1975 August 2-13 – Multiple stories appear in leading US secular newspapers 
detailing CIA activities with missionaries and clergy.23 
5. 1975 August 26 – Senator Hatfield sends a letter to DCI Colby asking the CIA 
to adopt a policy forbidding the use of missionaries, similar to the policy 
prohibiting the use of Peace Corp volunteers and Fulbright scholars. 
6. 1975 September 13 – Colby replies to Hatfield refusing to change CIA policy 
and actions towards missionaries. 
7. 1975 September 19 – Hatfield writes a letter to President Ford asking him to 
issue an Executive Order for CIA to stop using missionaries.24 
8. 1975 October 10 – Christianity Today prints major story – “Conversing with 
the CIA” – describing missionary activities with CIA.25 
9. 1975 October 29 – EFMA sends request to mission organizations asking 
them to send copies of their policies on involvement with the CIA and other 
intelligence agencies.26 
10. 1975 October 31 through 1977 June 21 – Mission organizations reply to 
EFMA request for policies and include stories of CIA involvement with 
missionaries on the field.27 
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11. 1975 November 4 – President Ford’s “Halloween Massacre.” DCI William 
Colby fired. George H.W. Bush nominated as new DCI. 
12. 1975 November 5 – President Ford (via White House Counsel Philip W. 
Buchen) refuses to issue Executive Order prohibiting CIA engagement with 
clergy and missionaries.  
13. 1975 December 1 – The U.S. Catholic Mission Council in Washington, DC 
issues a formal statement denouncing the CIA use of missionaries and calling 
for legislation.28 
14. 1975 December 15 – Hatfield gives a speech on the floor of the Senate 
expressing displeasure with the refusal of the DCI and President to rescind the 
CIA policy on religious engagement. Hatfield introduces legislation (S-2784) 
to prohibit all federal intelligence agencies from working with clergy and 
missionaries. Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield joins as co-sponsor of 
Hatfield’s bill and speaks in support on the Senate floor.29 
15. 1975 December 19 – National Council of Churches publishes a formal 
statement opposing CIA contact with American missionaries and foreign 
clergy.30 
16. 1976 January 30 – Hatfield writes DCI Bush asking him to reverse Colby’s 
policy on clergy and missionaries. 
17. 1976 February 11 – Bush issues a “Statement of Policy” forbidding the CIA to 
use clergy or missionaries, but allowing voluntary cooperation.31 
18. 1976 March 15 – Christianity and Crisis publishes editorial – “Render Unto 
Caesar: Missionaries and the CIA” – on the split loyalties of Christians to 
government.32 
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19. 1976 March 17 – Hatfield writes Bush asking the DCI to clarify the meaning 
and scope of the “Statement of Policy.” 
20. 1976 April 1 – Eternity magazine publishes major story on “Missionaries and 
the CIA.”33 
21. 1976 April 8 – Bush and Hatfield meet in person to discuss the need for more 
detailed CIA regulations on CIA contact with clergy and missionaries. 
22. 1976 April 29 – Senate Church Committee issues final report. 
23. 1976 May 14 – Bush writes President Ford with attached copy of new CIA 
regulations on clergy and missionaries, as part of broader changes to CIA 
policy mandated by Executive Order 11905: United States Foreign 
Intelligence Activities (February 18, 1976).34 
24. 1976 May 25 – Hatfield announces on the Senate floor the new CIA 
regulations on clergy and missionaries and reads it into the Congressional 
Record, thereby making it public. 
25. 1976 May 25 – Hatfield announces that because of the new CIA regulations 
on clergy and missionaries, he will withdraw his legislation (S-2784).35 
26. 1976 June 16 – Hatfield writes a letter to religious and missionary 
organizations saying that he has done all he can on the issue of CIA 
involvement with clergy and missionaries. He now hands the issue to the 
religious organizations to follow-up: “The individual churches and their 
missionaries must still bear a major responsibility in being sure that the 
church’s mission is not compromised.”36 
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27. 1976 August 18 – The Christian Century publishes an editorial on CIA 
activity with clergy and missionaries – “Wolf in Shepherd’s Frock.”37 
In the early Cold War years, many American mission organizations willingly 
cooperated with the CIA and other US intelligence agencies. The issue discussed among 
mission agency heads was not whether they should cooperate with the CIA, but how best 
to work with the CIA. In the summer of 1963, in the shadow of the Cuban Missile Crisis 
and with US military involvement in Vietnam accelerating, Clyde W. Taylor, Executive 
Secretary of the Evangelical Foreign Mission Association, sent a memorandum to all 
EFMA member missions in which he spelled out explicitly how missionaries could best 
cooperate with the CIA. Taylor’s memo reveals the mindset of many American mission 
agencies towards collaboration with the CIA. The memo, reproduced here in its entirety, 
shows how comfortable some mission agencies were with the CIA: 
June 12, 1963 
To: EFMA member missions 
Re: Interviews of CIA agents with missionaries 
This memorandum is prompted by various requests for advice as to what 
cooperation our mission boards (particularly our missionaries home on furlough) 
should give to requests from representatives of the Central Intelligence Agency. 
In particular we have had some complaints about a few CIA agents who operate 
with considerable high pressure when seeking information. 
With this in mind we asked for an interview with one of the top liaison men of the 
CIA here in Washington and requested that he spell out for us what they expect 
from missionaries. 
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The following are his comments and our suggestions: 
1. CIA agents are not to expect highly secret information. They expect 
current observations of the missionary that anyone who knows the culture 
of the people would note and see. They are particularly interested in the 
conclusions of the missionary. 
2. They want details regarding local and national events, particularly the grass 
roots opinion of the people out there. Political developments, economic trends 
– all of this is valuable to our government as background material. This is not 
secret material. 
3. The interviewed missionary can always refuse to comment on a given matter, 
or if uninformed, he can simply say “I don’t know.”  
4. CIA always respects matters of personal confidence. They do not expect 
missionaries to break confidence with those who may have imparted 
information to them. 
5. Information, even with the Intelligence Bureau itself, is not quoted by name of 
the informer (except on very rare occasions) and this would be regarded as 
restricted information. 
6. Agents of the CIA frequently like to use tape recorders, not in order to be able 
to prove that the missionary said a certain thing but in order to get an accurate 
picture. If the missionary does not agree to use of a tape recorder he does not 
have to permit it. 
Other comments: 
1. Missionaries interviewed by the CIA are not giving “intelligence reports” to 
their government. They are simply reporting. 
2. If missionaries are ever asked by a foreign government agent whether they 
have talked with the United States Intelligence, the reply should be that they 
have talked all over about the country (its progress, problems, ambitions) but 
that they never gave secret information to anyone – they didn’t have any to 
give. 
3. The main thing is that missions and missionaries are not obligated to give any 







In any case where Communism is involved the American citizen will always be 
considered a spy, or an agent of the CIA, and an enemy, regardless of whether he 
ever talks to his government or not.38 
Twelve years after Taylor’s EFMA memo, a different mood prevailed in the United 
States regarding secret government activities. It was after the assassinations of President 
John F. Kennedy, Martin Luther King, Jr., and Robert Kennedy, after the end of the 
Vietnam War, after Watergate, after the Pentagon Papers, after the resignation of 
President Richard Nixon, and with the Church Committee actively investigating the 
misdeeds of the CIA. Americans – secular and religious – had a more cynical, jaundiced 
view of the CIA. 
In the summer of 1975, Senator Mark Hatfield led the efforts in Congress to 
prohibit, or at least severely limit, the CIA’s use of clergy and missionaries. Hatfield 
embraced this struggle out of his own deep faith and active engagement with American 
religious leaders, particularly evangelicals. Hatfield was a moderate Baptist and different 
kind of evangelical. He vocally opposed the war in Vietnam; he was a lifelong pacifist; 
he worked to cut back military spending; and he was a critic of the nascent religious 
right. Some conservative evangelicals sought to expunge “liberals” like Hatfield from 
Congress, and Bill Bright, president of Campus Crusade for Christ, promised “to pray the 
wrath of God on Mark Hatfield.” But Hatfield earned the trust of many evangelicals, 
liberal Protestants, Catholics and even secularists. It was politically beneficial to have a 
                                                 





Protestant spearhead the CIA-missionary debate in Congress, as well as the negotiations 
with the CIA and the White House, because in the mid-1970s there were 42,000 
American missionaries serving abroad; of these, 35,000 were Protestant (serving in 600 
mission agencies) and 7,000 were Catholic.39 
During the 1975-76 controversy over the CIA’s use of clergy and missionaries, 
conservative Protestant voices were not the only ones heard on the subject. On December 
1, 1975, the US Catholic Mission Council in Washington, DC issued a formal statement 
in response to the “recent allegations of both overt and covert CIA use of U.S. foreign 
missionaries.” The council declared that “the nature of missionary activity today calls for 
as complete an identification as possible with the local Church where it exists,” and any 
missionary, “especially a North American national, must strive to remain free of all 
suspect relations with his or her country of origin.” Therefore, the Catholic Mission 
Council deemed it “necessary to repudiate U.S. Governmental involvement with overseas 
missionaries for intelligence purposes.” The group felt that their position was particularly 
critical “when the CIA is under public investigation for its alleged unethical involvement 
in the internal affairs of foreign countries.”40 
A couple of weeks later, the Executive Committee of the US National Council of 
Churches, in response to Senator Hatfield’s release of letters from DCI Colby and 
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President Ford, issued a formal statement calling for CIA involvement with “American 
missionaries and foreign clergy . . . for any purpose whatsoever” to “stop immediately.” 
The Executive Committee directed the whole staff of the NCC “to refrain from all 
contacts with C.I.A. or other U.S. government intelligence agency representatives.” 
Further, the NCC called on all member denominations and mission boards to develop 
“clear policies” that repudiated any contact between the CIA and American missionaries. 
Finally, the NCC stated its clear support for “the current efforts of Senators Mark 
Hatfield and Mike Mansfield, and other members of Congress, to enact legislation” to 
prohibit the CIA from all contact with American and foreign religious personnel.41 
The statements of Protestant and Catholic mission organizations on the CIA were 
provoked not only by Hatfield’s crusading in Congress, but also by remarkable stories of 
CIA involvement with missionaries and clergy reported in the secular and religious press. 
A story in the Washington Star on July 23, 1975, citing CIA sources, told of a Belgian 
Jesuit priest, Rev. Roger Vekemans, who in 1963 received $10 million in “under-the-
table” CIA and USAID funds “to support anti-Communist labor unions throughout Latin 
America and back the presidential campaign of Edwardo Frei in Chile,” against Marxist 
Salvadore Allende. The arrangement was sealed in a secret meeting at the White House 
with President John F. Kennedy, Attorney General Robert Kennedy, CIA Director John 
McCone and Peace Corps Director R. Sargent Shriver. When contacted about the story, 
former chief of CIA Latin American operations, David A. Phillips, admitted, “This does 
                                                 





not surprise or shock me. . . . On the contrary, any information gathering organization 
would be derelict if it did not take advantage of the in depth [sic] expertise of American 
clerics working in the area.” The story goes on to report that a Protestant missionary in 
Bolivia “routinely passed on to the U.S. Embassy, and thus presumably to the CIA 
station, the names of Bolivians he thought were Communists.” The Star also interviewed 
Dr. Eugene Stockwell, assistant general secretary of the National Council of Churches for 
the story. He said that he had “personal knowledge of two cases in which missionaries 
provided intelligence” to the CIA.42 
Two days later, on July 25, the Washington Post ran a story reporting that a 
Catholic bishop whose diocese was outside of Saigon “was on the agency’s payroll as 
recently as 1971.” The bishop’s CIA case officer would fly into Saigon for secret 
meetings with the cleric. In rebuttal, a Vatican source “stoutly maintained that no bishop 
would ever knowingly take CIA money.” The Post also reported on another Protestant 
missionary in Bolivia who provided regular intelligence reports to the CIA “as a patriotic 
duty and not for pay.” According to the story, the missionary was “knowledgeable about 
the Communist Party and had all sorts of information about unions and farmers’ 
cooperatives.”43 
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Primary sources for the Washington Star and Washington Post stories, as well as 
two stories distributed by the National Catholic News Service, were John Marks and 
Victor Marchetti. A year earlier, Marks and Marchetti published a controversial book, 
The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence, which had a measure of influence on the 
establishment of the Church and Pike Committees. The CIA tied up the publication of the 
book in legal proceedings for over a year seeking to censor 339 passages. Marks and 
Marchetti fought back and eventually published their book with only 168 sections 
redacted. The sanitized portions of the book appear as empty white spaces with the word 
“Deleted” stamped across the white space.  The sections challenged by the CIA but still 
published appear in bold typeface. Before writing the book, John Marks was a State 
Department staff assistant to the Intelligence Director, and Victor Marchetti was a CIA 
Soviet military analyst and later executive assistant to the Deputy Director. After leaving 
the State Department, Marks became director of a research project on the CIA at the 
Center for National Security Studies, while Marchetti became an author. Both were 
outspoken critics of the CIA. They sought out the news media and religious organizations 
to tell their story. TIME magazine identified Marks and Marchetti as the source for many 
of the stories circulating in the press about the CIA and missionaries. 44 
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A lengthy news story in the National Catholic Reporter (NCR) on August 1, 
1975, written by Richard Raske, leaned heavily on Marks as a source, as well as Philip 
Agee, a former CIA Latin American case officer who had just published his memoir, 
Inside the Company: CIA Diary. In the NCR story, both Marks and Agee agreed that 
“voluntary CIA-church connections should be exposed and that churches should be held 
accountable.” Marks and Agee gave additional examples of the CIA manipulating clergy 
and missionaries: the CIA sought to covertly fund a priest in India through a labor 
organization, but the priest refused the funds “on pragmatic rather than moral grounds” 
when he found out it was CIA money; a group of nuns in Columbia “unknowingly 
collected important census information for the CIA;” and the CIA manipulated the 
Catholic Church in Ecuador to destabilize two civilian governments that refused to sever 
relations with Cuba, resulting in chaos and military rule. The NCR story also quoted a 
Marks interview with a twenty-year veteran of American intelligence. “I’ve used 
Buddhist monks, Catholic priests and even a Catholic bishop,” the CIA agent confessed. 
“Hell, I’d use anybody if it was to the furtherance of any objective,” the agent declared, 
undoubtedly reflecting a prevailing sentiment of many CIA agents in the 1950s and 
1960s.45 
In October 1975, Christianity Today (CT), the Billy Graham-founded evangelical 
flagship newsmagazine, ran a lengthy story on CIA involvement with missionaries, 
particularly Protestant ones. It described how missionaries were routinely “debriefed” by 
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CIA agents when they returned home on furlough regarding conditions and developments 
in the areas where they lived and ministered. A veteran Christian and Missionary 
Alliance (CMA) missionary, William Carlsen, returned home from the troubled tribal 
areas of northern Thailand to receive a call from the CIA asking for an appointment. An 
agency representative came to Carlsen’s home in Sharon, Pennsylvania and debriefed 
him for eight hours. Carlsen did not mind the lengthy interview. He said that he “counts it 
a privilege to share information with responsible services of the government when they 
seek us out.” CMA executives interviewed by CT stated that many of their missionaries 
in Southeast Asia “were solicited by military, State Department and CIA officials during 
the 1960s and early 1970s.” Similarly, a representative for Overseas Crusades told CT 
that at one time, the CIA debriefed virtually all of its personnel when they returned 
home.46  
The Christianity Today story repeated a number of the examples reported in the 
Washington Star, Washington Post, and National Catholic Reporter articles. However, 
CT revealed additional stories, purportedly coming from Marks, about a Catholic Relief 
Service Officer in South Vietnam who was in fact a military intelligence officer. Marks 
also alleged that CIA agents were posing as missionaries for cover, although he did not 
provide details. CIA sources interviewed by CT for the story claimed that “95 per cent” 
of the intelligence provided by missionaries was “about people,” but that most of the 
information the missionaries collected was “useless . . . because they don’t know what to 
                                                 




look for.” The CIA tried coaching some missionaries while they were home on furlough 
on “what to look for upon their return to South Vietnam.”47  
Some missionaries in southeast Asia refused to cooperate with intelligence 
authorities, says the ex-CIA officer, but most did cooperate, and some offered 
helpful information. (Missionaries recalled in interviews that some of their 
colleagues spent much time with military intelligence officers.) An example cited 
by the source involves Montagnard ministers in South Viet Nam who worked in 
Communist-controlled areas. Missionaries gleaned information from these 
workers and relayed it to intelligence authorities. 
In such situations, says one mission official, missionaries are not motivated by 
patriotism but by concern over what a Communist victory would mean: the end of 
their work, possibly the deaths of close friends among national workers, the 
curtailment of Gospel outreach. These zealous missionaries don’t see themselves 
as spying for America but defending the Lord’s work, says the official.48 
The CT story cited unnamed authorities who estimated that “between 10 and 25 per cent 
of America’s 35,000 Protestant and 7,000 Catholic foreign missionaries have given 
information to intelligence authorities.” This totals between 4,200 to 10,500 missionaries 
cooperating with US intelligence agencies, a significant difference from the repeated CIA 
claims that cases involving missionaries “are rare.” 49 
Many of the news stories raised the issue of missionaries’ motivation for 
becoming involved in clandestine activities. For some, it was clearly a matter of 
patriotism and a sense of duty to serve their home country. For others, it was a desire to 
see communism defeated, so that the mission fields where they invested their lives would 
know political and religious freedom. For some, it was a commitment to follow the 
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direction of the religious organization of which they were a part. For example, many 
Catholic priests in Latin America were a part of a $25 million Vatican program to create 
an anti-communist network of labor, cultural and social reform initiatives. For others, it 
was about money. One missionary told of a CIA agent approaching him, requesting 
information that “could have easily been secured elsewhere. But here I was being offered 
substantial money that could be used for the missionary project I was involved in, so I 
provided the information and took the money.” For a few, like William Carlsen, the 
CMA missionary debriefed by the CIA for eight hours, their view about cooperating with 
the CIA reflected a “so-what attitude.” “We already have a stigma,” Carlsen said. “We’re 
white and from America, and the Communists think we’re spies anyway, so we might as 
well cooperate if our help is needed.” Unfortunately, there were some cases where CIA 
agents threatened missionaries to coerce cooperation – threats of refusal to renew visas or 
threats of arrest for cooperating with foreign governments.50 
After Christianity Today published the story on the CIA and missionaries in 
October 1975, Wade T. Coggins, Executive Secretary of the Evangelical Foreign 
Missions Association, sent a memo to all its member missions asking them to “share” 
with the EFMA copies of their policies in three critical areas: (1) “policies relating to 
paying ransom to kidnappers and other terrorists;” (2) “policies relating to giving 
information to the CIA;” (3) “evacuation plans.” In addition, Coggins requested “your 
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comments about the Biblical and ethical issues of these matters.” Coggins’ memo 
prompted a flurry of letters back-and-forth between mission agency heads and the EFMA 
about CIA involvement with missionaries. The letters mentioned the influence and 
pressure of outside events: the Church Committee hearings, the statements by Senator 
Hatfield in Congress, the statements by DCI Colby and President Ford supporting the 
CIA’s use of missionaries, concerns about the CIA expressed by board members and 
major donors, and news stories in the secular and religious press, in the US and 
internationally, about the CIA and missionaries.51  
Some missions groups, like The Navigators, said that they had no awareness of 
CIA contacts with missionaries and that their organization had no policy regarding CIA 
interaction with missionaries. The General Baptist Foreign Mission Board did not clarify 
whether the CIA approached their missionaries, but they stated that they had “not 
developed policies” related to the CIA. The Board of World Missions of the Baptist 
General Conference wrote that they had “no firm policy” on giving information to the 
CIA and furthermore, their board had not even discussed it.52  
However, most of the mission groups responded to Coggins’ request stating that 
they were aware of CIA involvement with missionaries and that they opposed the US 
government’s intrusion into their sacred and humanitarian operations. Opposition 
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expressed by mission leaders ranged from mild to severe. Policy statements on the 
subject spanned the gamut from short and informal to lengthy and officially sanctioned 
by boards of trustees. For example, the policy offered by the Latin America Mission was 
brief but definitive: “It is the policy of the Latin America Mission, Inc. of the U.S.A. that 
its personnel not be involved in intelligence gathering for any branch of government, of 
their own or any other country, since such activities are incompatible with the nature and 
purpose of the missionary task.” Likewise, the policy statement of the Missionary Board 
of the Brethren Church declared, “our missionaries should in NO way furnish 
information concerning the country in which they are a guest for purposes of intelligence 
or giving of any information that might be used as intelligence either on [the] field or at 
home.” The Church of the Nazarene Department of World Missions sent Coggins their 
policy statement: “Missionaries in the employ of the General Board shall not take part in 
nor publicly express themselves concerning the politics of the countries in which they are 
laboring. They shall not serve either as voluntary or paid informants to provide political 
information to any government or its agents, including that of the nation of which they 
are a citizen.” 53  
W. Stanley Mooneyham, president of World Vision, one of the world’s largest 
Christian humanitarian aid organizations, reacted angrily to President Ford’s endorsement 
of the CIA using clergy and missionaries, as well as the unfolding disclosures of “links 
                                                 
53 “Latin America Mission Letter to Wade Coggins,” March 26, 1976, BGCA–EFMA/TCIA. 
“Missionary Board of the Brethren Church to Wade Coggins,” August 8, 1977, BGCA–EFMA/TCIA. 





between the CIA and Christian missionaries.” In an “Open Letter to President Ford,” 
Mooneyham did not mince words:  
While the CIA may have devised this as a positive strategy to help our country, 
from my point of view it is a diabolical and destructive practice primarily 
benefiting Satan and his efforts to thwart the spread of the Gospel. What more 
effective way could this be done than by discrediting and neutralizing any 
spiritual influence by the largest missionary force in the world? (You may not be 
aware that North America provides 70 percent of all Protestant foreign 
missionaries in the world and well over half of all global missionary giving.) 
Anything which renders this spiritual force ineffective must be counted as a 
victory for the Church’s enemy.54 
The National Council of Churches board recommended that each of its individual 
thirty-one member church bodies “issue policy statements repudiating ‘intentional 
contacts’ between their personnel abroad and United States Government intelligence 
agencies.” Dr. Eugene Stockwell, the NCC associate general secretary for overseas 
ministries added, “Church bodies overseas have the right to expect that the relationships 
of United States religious personnel to those churches will be solely at the service of 
common worldwide Christian mission and will not be used in any way for the purpose of 
one government.” The United Methodist Church Board of Global Ministries said it would 
remove missionaries found to be “intentionally engaged” in intelligence work. 
“Missionaries of the United Methodist Church are servants of Jesus Christ and under the 
separation of church and state are not agents of any government,” the board statement 
said.55 
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The Mission Aviation Fellowship (MAF), which serves mission agencies by 
flying personnel in and out of remote areas, said that they had been “aware of the abuses 
of the CIA since long before the present investigation” and that “six years ago our Board 
took action to forbid our people to cooperate in any way with the CIA.” However, the 
MAF letter did not offer a sample of their policy. A separate communication bulletin 
from the MAF to its missionaries was more direct stating that members of the MAF were 
“forbidden to even talk” with the CIA or other US intelligence agencies.56  
In contrast, the Missionary Church Department of Overseas Missions offered a 
confusing policy statement. On the one hand, their department “absolutely forbids any 
and all covert activities by its overseas personnel, such as acting as an informant.” 
However, the Missionary Church acknowledged, “More and more missionaries [are] 
being approached by agents of various U.S. government agencies to inform on either U.S. 
citizens as well as on citizens of other countries where they are resident.” Then in a 
statement directed to their missionaries they said, “It is neither the privilege or intention 
of the Overseas Department to suggest who your friends should be,” so the department 
“trust[s] that each of you will use good judgement in your relationships so that there will 
be no cause for suspicion on the part of government or basis for terrorist retaliation.” 
While on the one hand, the Missionary Church “absolutely forbids” interaction with 
intelligence agencies, on the other hand, it seems to leave room for individual 
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cooperation with the CIA, perhaps in keeping with the voluntary exception clause created 
by DCI George Bush.57 
Some mission agencies, like the Conservative Baptist Foreign Mission Society, 
adopted policies for their missionaries and staffs at board of trustees meetings that were 
formally structured with “Whereas” statements followed by “Be It Resolved” 
declarations. The Christian Missionary Alliance, Overseas Crusades, and Mexican 
Mission Ministries, adopted a variation of a simpler statement: 
Missionaries on furlough or overseas are not permitted to act as a source for 
intelligence gathering agents of the country in which they served or their country 
since such actions could identify them in the country in which they serve as 
intelligence gathering agents rather than ministers of the gospel.58 
Some mission agencies freely acknowledged working with the CIA. Grace 
Mission out of Grand Rapids, Michigan, stated in their letter to Wade Coggins that “we 
have given information to the CIA in the past but no request has been received now for 
about five years.”59 They did not say one way or another whether they would cooperate 
again, if requested to do so by the CIA. The General Council of the Assemblies of God 
provided specific details about their system of cooperation with the CIA:  
Until now we have cooperated by sharing cultural information with CIA 
representatives who have requested it. Usually this has been a once-a-year affair 
in connection with our School of Missions and their representative has talked 
privately to a few of our missionaries of his selection on each occasion [sic]. We 
do not have a new policy, but the unspoken policy is that we will cease this 
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practice and no longer continue it. Until now we have done so simply as a matter 
of cooperating with the Government of the United States and with the assurance 
of both complete privacy and the fact that only cultural information was sought.60 
The Mennonite Central Committee, a Christian humanitarian aid and refugee agency, 
acknowledged that they “had some experience” with approaches from the CIA. Their 
denominational officials “expressed concern” about this arrangement and were pushing 
for the development of guidelines. However, they felt that this would be difficult to 
enforce because “a lot of intelligence is gathered informally even though no official 
contract or approach is involved.” Moreover, informal interactions with the CIA created 
complications, as pointed out by a supporter of Latin America Missions USA in a letter to 
the mission agency head: “The only thing I would be opposed to is having an [sic] LAM 
worker systematically providing information to the CIA, thus making him or her an 
‘agent,’ even if only an informal one.”61 
Southern Baptists Challenge CIA Policy on Missionaries 
The Southern Baptist Convention, the largest Protestant denomination in the 
United States, had a mission force in 1981 of 3,100 missionaries in 95 countries, 
according to SBC Foreign Mission Board (FMB) president, Keith Parks. Records show 
that the SBC actively engaged with the issue of foreign political involvement and CIA 
use of missionaries from 1974 through 1988. FMB president Baker James Cauthen and 
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then Keith Parks wrote multiple letters to Presidents Ford and Carter, DCIs Bush, Casey 
and Webster, and members of Congress, most notably Senator Hatfield. Parks held 
personal meetings with DCIs Casey (June 8, 1982) and Webster (November 9, 1988) to 
discuss SBC concerns about CIA involvement with overseas religious organizations and 
personnel. At that time, the SBC actively supported the multi-denominational Baptist 
advocacy group, the Baptist Joint Committee on Public Affairs, in their efforts to stop the 
CIA use of missionaries. As well, the SBC was one of six sponsors (along with the 
National Council of Churches, the US Catholic Conference, the Synagogue Council of 
America, the National Association of Evangelicals and the Lutheran Council in the 
U.S.A.) of a major 1981 conference in Washington, DC on “Government Intervention in 
Religious Affairs.” The conference brought together “representatives of more than 90% 
of the adherents of organized religion in the United States.” The program sought to 
address “seventeen actions by state and federal agencies which have caused concern by 
the sponsoring bodies,” including the CIA use of clergy and missionaries in clandestine 
operations.62 
 During the 1975-76 debate over the CIA use of missionaries, the SBC Foreign 
Mission Board stated that its missionaries “go to their fields to share the gospel of Christ 
and minister to human need. They do not involve themselves in political affairs.” The 
FMB adopted a formal statement on February 10, 1976 that said, “Missionaries are to 
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maintain carefully their role of spiritual ministry, refraining from any relationship with 
intelligence operations of any nation (including the United States) or with political 
movements in the nations where they serve. They are to avoid anything that might make 
unclear their purpose of Christian witness and service and thus jeopardize their witness 
for Christ.” Much of the FMB’s action to address the CIA-missionary issue was driven 
by a steady stream of letters from SBC member churches and individuals who expressed 
“no small amount of consternation” over the media reports of missionaries being 
involved in spying for the CIA. Pastor David Bell from South Carolina expressed a 
sentiment broadly held by many SBC members: “I am relatively confident that such 
people were not appointees from our Mission Board.” Senior leaders of the FMB publicly 
affirmed to the SBC constituency that FMB missionaries were not involved with the CIA. 
Moreover, FMB president Keith Parks, a long-time missionary in Southeast Asia in the 
50s, 60s and 70s, told this author, “I never knew any missionary personally who was 
affiliated with the CIA.”63 Unfortunately, the SBC like many other Protestant and 
Catholic mission agencies did have personnel involved overtly and covertly with the 
CIA. 
The Church Committee disclosures and the congressional crusade of Senator 
Hatfield Efforts principally propelled the SBC and other mission agencies in the mid-
1970s to stop CIA engagement with clergy and missionaries. After 1978, unease by the 
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mission agencies abated as the new CIA regulations came into force and religious bodies 
instituted their own policies and enforcement structures. Then in 1980, concerns flared 
anew as President Jimmy Carter, an evangelical himself, made a statement in his State of 
the Union address that raised alarms for mission boards and religious organizations. In 
his speech to Congress and the nation, Carter announced: 
We also need clear and quick passage of a new charter to define the legal 
authority and accountability of our intelligence agencies. We will guarantee that 
abuses do not recur, but we must tighten our controls on sensitive intelligence 
information, and we need to remove unwarranted restraints on America’s ability 
to collect intelligence.64 
Carter’s proposal to loosen “unwarranted restraints” on the CIA drew a flurry of 
responses from religious leaders. In a joint letter to the President, a coalition of 36 
religious groups urged Carter to “resist any effort to undercut current restraints on CIA 
operations and to take concrete steps to bring all U.S. intelligence agencies under the 
strict rule of law.” The religious coalition included the SBC, the American Friends 
Service Committee, the Maryknoll Fathers and Brothers, the Unitarian Universalist 
Association, the United Church of Christ, the United Presbyterians, as well as the 
American Civil Liberties Union. On February 15, 1980, the National Council of 
Churches Executive Committee published a resolution calling for Congress to “include in 
the charters of all U.S. intelligence gathering and law enforcement agencies explicit 
prohibitions” against the use of clergy, missionaries, or religious organizations in three 
ways: 
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Recruiting or employing missionaries, members of the clergy or church workers – 
American or foreign – as informants or agents in any capacity at home or abroad; 
Impersonating clergy or church workers; 
Establishing proprietaries purporting to be church, church agencies or religious 
organizations.65 
Less than a year later, on December 4, 1981, President Ronald Reagan signed 
Executive Order (EO) 12333 loosening restrictions on the intelligence community, but 
providing no protections for clergy and missionaries. In fact, Reagan’s executive order 
revoked Executive Order 12036, signed by President Jimmy Carter, which did provide 
some limited, though not explicit, prohibitions against contracting with clergy and 
missionaries. Four days after the signing of EO 12333, the Foreign Mission Board of the 
SBC met and passed a resolution instructing FMB President Parks to contact “appropriate 
government officials urging that legislation be passed prohibiting CIA agents from 
posing as missionaries, or from using a mission operation as a front, or from gathering 
intelligence through existing missionaries.” Parks immediately contacted Senator 
Hatfield asking him to introduce once again legislation prohibiting US intelligence 
agencies from working with clergy or missionaries. Hatfield wrote Parks back saying that 
“internal regulations and executive orders” now have been put into place addressing these 
concerns. Hatfield said, “I believe it would be counter productive for me to publicly 
assert, through the introduction of a bill, that the present controls are ineffective, and that 
statutory prohibitions are required. This would only exacerbate suspicion of our 
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missionaries.” Promising to “periodically monitor compliance with internal CIA 
regulations,” Hatfield suggested that no further action be taken “at this time.”66  
However, Hatfield did arrange for Parks and FMB Vice-President Bill O’Brien to 
meet personally with DCI William Casey at the CIA on June 8, 1982. Parks requested the 
meeting because of FMB concerns over “persistent rumors of contact” by CIA agents 
with missionaries, including ones affiliated with the SBC. In one case, it involved the 
CIA using a mission organization as a “front.” In the meeting, Parks “denounced” the 
Reagan executive order for not forbidding the use of clergy and missionaries. In 
response, Casey “strongly affirmed the [FMB] board’s position that to involve 
missionaries in intelligence activities violates the First Amendment to the Constitution.” 
Casey went on to promise that if anyone presents “hard evidence that missionaries are 
being used as agents or that agents are posing as missionaries the agency would take 
action.” The Baptist Press reported Parks as saying that Casey was “very strong that the 
executive order by former president Jimmy Carter prohibiting use of missionaries as CIA 
agents” was sufficient to provide needed protections. However, in an interview with the 
author, Parks said that Casey believed Reagan’s executive order was what forbade the use 
of clergy and missionaries. Likewise, in an oral history given at Baylor University, Parks 
implied that Casey’s statement was in reference to Reagan’s executive order. Was the 
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DCI confused that Reagan’s EO 12333 rescinded Carter’s EO 12036 protections for 
clergy and missionaries? Was Casey’s obfuscation intentional, given his covert 
operations background and his later working with religious groups during the Nicaraguan 
Contra affair? According to Parks, Casey’s speaking manner may have contributed to the 
confusion, “He was the hardest man to understand, he was so hard, just mum mum 
mum.” Either way, Casey suggested that the executive order was sufficient to address 
FMB concerns. Parks replied, “Well, you know, we’d – I’d rather have a law.” Casey was 
not even willing to consider legislation. In the end, the meeting between Parks and Casey 
allowed an airing of concerns, but little changed.67  
In 1988, with the assistance of Stan Hastey of the Baptist Joint Committee on 
Public Affairs, Senator David L. Boren (D-OK), chair of the Senate Select Committee on 
Intelligence (SSCI), and sympathetic SSCI staffers, Parks once again travelled to CIA 
headquarters, this time to meet with the new Director of Central Intelligence, Judge 
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William Webster. According to Parks, the issue of the CIA using clergy and missionaries 
for spying was back in the news and the FMB was once again concerned about the impact 
that public reports would have on SBC missionaries. Like the previous meeting with 
Casey, Parks asked Webster not to use missionaries for any CIA operations.68  
The meeting took place on November 9, 1988 and involved Parks, Webster, and 
CIA General Counsel Russell Bruemmer. At the meeting, the DCI assured the FMB 
president that the CIA was abiding by the current policy on the use of clergy and 
missionaries in intelligence operations. In a follow-up letter from Bruemmer to Parks, the 
General Counsel outlined the points covered by the DCI in the meeting: 
As Director Webster told you, the CIA does not permit its agents or employees to 
represent themselves as clergy or missionaries in order to provide cover for 
clandestine intelligence activities. The CIA also does not permit U.S. clergy or 
missionaries to be used as agents for intelligence collection purposes. These 
policies may only be waived by the Director in extraordinary circumstances. As 
noted by Director Webster, the CIA does permit U.S. clergy or missionaries to 
provide information on a voluntary basis. Moreover, the CIA enters into “open” 
relationships with U.S. clergy or missionaries – that is an overt relationship 
acknowledged to senior officials within the organization – to provide services 
such as translation or lecturing at Agency training courses. 
As we discussed, Congress acts in an oversight role to ensure compliance with 
these regulations. If CIA changes its regulations, it notifies the two Congressional 
Intelligence Committees. In addition, CIA annually provides Congress with a 
summary of our compliance with these regulations.69 
In subsequent communications between Parks, Webster, and Bruemmer, the CIA General 
Counsel revealed that the CIA’s policy on “Relations with Clergy and Missionaries” was 
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unclassified and he offered to send a copy to Parks. On December 14, 1988, Bruemmer 
mailed Parks “the section from our regulations that prohibits the use of missionaries for 
covert CIA activities.” It was a single page attached to Bruemmer’s letter. The policy 
statement was a more formal rendering of the basic points Bruemmer listed in his 
November 9 letter to Parks.70 
Through the mid-to-later years of the Cold War, the CIA’s policy on using clergy 
and missionaries in covert operations evolved from informal, non-written viewpoints that 
vacillated with changing Presidents and DCIs to a formal, written policy incorporated 
into the CIA’s policy manual and overseen by Congress. However, the policy statement 
still had holes – big ones – that allowed the CIA to carry out religiously based covert 
operations around the world during the Cold War. For example, the written policy did not 
completely forbid CIA agents and employees from using religion as a cover for 
espionage operations. It did not forbid CIA agents from setting up religious front 
organizations. The policy specified that it applied only to United States religious 
personnel and organizations. The policy did not forbid engaging, paying, contracting, or 
collaborating with foreign (non-US) religious personnel and organizations. The policy 
did not forbid paying money to foreign intelligence agencies to act as proxies for the US 
in working with religious people or groups. The policy stood as an ‘internal regulation’ of 
US intelligence agencies and could be changed at any time by the director of that agency. 
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The director or deputy director of an intelligence agency had the authority to create 
exceptions to the policy. Unpaid relationships with clergy or missionaries were allowed 
on a voluntary and witting basis; however, the policy did not define what constituted 
voluntary cooperation. For example, if a missionary regularly cooperated with the CIA 
and volunteered information, were they not de facto an agent?  In addition, according to 
the policy, CIA agents could still approach US religious personnel and seek their 
voluntary cooperation if, “in the determination of the DDO, such individuals might 
possess important foreign intelligence information or be in a position to assist the 
Agency.”71 
Most crucially, the 1988 CIA written policy on “Relations with Clergy and 
Missionaries” did not have the force of law. The CIA and the White House continually 
rebuffed efforts by Hatfield, Mansfield, and religious leaders, for more than a decade, to 
pass legislation that would govern the CIA’s involvement with religious leaders and 
organizations. Even if legislation was enacted, in some situations, like with Director of 
Central Intelligence William Casey, it would not have mattered. The DCIs did what they 
thought best for the CIA and the US government, whether it was legal or not. Finally, in 
spite of denials and equivocations to the contrary by different DCIs, the actions of the 
CIA on mission fields in South America and Southeast Asia tell a different story. 
                                                 




The CIA and Missionary Operations in South America 
In the late 1950s and early 1960s, American attention and anti-communist efforts 
increasingly fixated on Latin America. For decades, Central and South America served as 
little more than a provincial supplier of coffee, fruit, rubber, wood, ore, oil and other raw 
materials to American capitalists and consumers. Moreover, Latin America was destitute. 
In 1961, per capita income was $200 annually. Adult illiteracy stood at 70%. Fifty-five 
out of one hundred children died before they reached the age of five. Social and military 
elites controlled the land, the businesses, the economy and the governments. Democracy 
was nonexistent.72 
Then revolution came. Fidel Castro transformed the Batista-corrupted, US-
supported pleasure playground of Cuba into the western hemisphere’s first and only 
communist state. Subsequently, Castro with the help of Che Guevara exported his 
revolutionary ideology to the cities and jungles of Latin America. The US fought against 
Castro with the failed Bay of Pigs invasion, assassination attempts, and a military 
showdown during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis.  
Most significantly, though, President Kennedy countered with the introduction of 
his “Alliance for Progress” – a Latin America-focused plan, patterned after the Truman 
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Doctrine, Marshall Plan, and even Kennedy’s own domestic “New Frontier.” Kennedy 
first introduced his Latin American vision in his Inaugural Address:  
To our sister republics south of our border, we offer a special pledge – to convert 
our words into good deeds – in a new alliance for progress – to assist free men 
and governments in casting off the chains of poverty. But this peaceful revolution 
of hope cannot become the prey of hostile powers. Let all our neighbors know 
that we shall join with them to oppose aggression or subversion anywhere in the 
Americas. And let every other power know that this Hemisphere intends to 
remain the master of its own house.73 
Kennedy had two targets for the billion-dollar Alliance for Progress. First, he sought to 
soothe domestic unrest and the appeal of Marxist ideology by alleviating the crushing 
poverty perpetuated by economic underdevelopment, social inequality, and illiteracy. 
Second, he endeavored to undergird the police and militaries of “our sister republics 
south of the border” with training and weapons, ostensibly for protection from Soviet- 
and Cuban-backed rebels.74  
At Kennedy’s official signing of the Alliance commitment at the Inter-American 
Economic and Social Conference at Punta del Este, Uruguay on August 5, 1961, the 
President promised, “to help build a better life for the people of the hemisphere, an effort 
to which I am devoting my personal attention.” Even though “the tasks before us are vast, 
the problems difficult, the challenges unparalleled,” Kennedy foresaw “a great release of 
the creative energies” to create “a new and better world” enabled by “the unlimited power 
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of free men guided by free governments.” To accomplish his sweeping aims, Kennedy 
said he needed the “participation of all our people – of workers and farmers, businessmen 
and intellectuals and, above all, of the young people of the Americas.” He failed to 
mention one group to whom the US government and CIA repeatedly turned for help – 
clergy and missionaries.75 
Catholic missionaries began Christianizing the Spanish and Portuguese colonial 
lands of South and Central America in the 16th century CE. Until the 20th century, 
Catholics were the dominant religious influence – guardians of the political, social and 
economic status quo, excepting some Jesuits who ventured into the rural and jungle areas 
to minister to the poor farmers and native tribesmen. In the decades after World War II, 
the religious landscape shifted. First, a number of Catholics embraced Liberation 
Theology, which challenged established Church and government authority, pressed 
progressive social reforms, worked for the eradication of educational and economic 
inequality, and showed a “preferential option for the poor.”76 Second, evangelicals, 
Pentecostals, and some fundamentalists, began to flood Latin America with missionaries 
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committed to doing good deeds, providing medical and educational services, sharing the 
gospel, and civilizing jungle tribes. Historian Joel Carpenter examines the post-WWII 
explosion of North American missionaries and observes, “After the Second World War, 
American religious, cultural, and technological products were being exported in ever-
increasing volume in the triumphal context of America’s rise to power.”77 In Latin 
America, the most far-reaching and influential of the evangelical mission groups was 
Wycliffe Bible Translators (WBT) and its sister mission agencies, the Summer Institute 
of Linguistics (SIL) and the Jungle Aviation and Radio Service (JAARS), all founded by 
Cameron “Uncle Cam” Townsend. Other groups like New Tribes Mission (NTM) and 
Missionary Aviation Fellowship (MAF) were also instrumental in missionizing Latin 
America.78 
Cameron Townsend, a Bible salesman from Orange County, California, worked 
during WWI among the tribes of Central America. As a result, in 1934, he established a 
language-training program in Sulphur Springs, Arkansas – the first Summer Institute of 
Linguistics – to train would-be missionaries how to translate the Bible into previously 
unrecorded, tribal languages and then use newly created Bible translations to evangelize 
native peoples. From its earliest days, Townsend’s organization had a dual identity. In 
North America, the Summer Institute of Linguistics went by the name Wycliffe Bible 
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Translators, particularly when SIL/WBT missionaries spoke to US church groups about 
their calling from God to translate the Bible into unknown languages and to evangelize 
“unreached peoples.” Overseas, notably in negotiations with foreign governments, the 
organization used the name Summer Institute of Linguistics, representing its mission as 
“scientific and cultural.” SIL secured contracts from foreign governments to locate 
uncharted people groups, live among them, learn and record their unknown languages, 
establish “literacy training” programs, and provide social and medical services. 
Townsend argued that their linguistic work helped preserve the “linguistic traditions of 
indigenous peoples” and protect the native dialects from assimilation and extinction by 
majority national languages. For foreign governments, the work of SIL promised a way 
to locate and map isolated tribal groups in order to integrate them into the culture of the 
nation. SIL also offered a transportation and communications system – first through SIL 
and then JAARS – to communicate and send government officials into previously 
unreachable jungle regions. Ultimately, SIL provided a way to “civilize” and “pacify” 
tribal groups that might prove to be a social or economic threat to governments. With 
foreign governments, SIL always emphasized its non-sectarian scientific approach and 
altruistic activities, while stating that its religious goals were secondary.79  
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The Summer Institute of Linguistics, JAARS, NTM and MAF came under 
suspicion in several countries for working with the CIA. To critics, the rumors seemed to 
have substance. Most missionaries were white North Americans. They lived in 
compounds that by the poverty-stricken standards of Latin America seemed luxurious. 
They had their own airplanes and airstrips allowing them to travel in-and-out of countries 
avoiding normal customs procedures – a charge leveled against NTM by the government 
of Venezuela as a reason for their expulsion from the country. The missionaries had their 
own advanced radio networks with highly trained technicians, allowing them to 
communicate across the continent and deep into the jungles. In 1970, JAARS provided 
radio support for the Columbian national police as they suppressed a revolt by the 
Guahibo Indian tribe with whom SIL had worked. The tribal revolt started when the 
Columbian government passed a land reform program – supported by the US government 
– allowing Columbians to settle on tribal lands. In 1981, the government of Panama 
expelled sixteen members of a SIL team “after police discovered radio transmitters, a 
teletype machine, and a telephone switchboard in the SIL headquarters, all unregistered.” 
In addition, the airplanes of JAARS and MAF shuttled police and soldiers to remote 
outposts. In the 1950s, MAF had a contract with the Ecuadorian government to carry 
“government officials and Army personnel” around the country. In the 1970s, JAARS 
had a contract with the Peruvian government to train mechanics and pilots for the 
Peruvian Army and provide air services to remote jungle military outposts. As well, SIL 
promised host governments that its missionaries would prepare detailed ethnic and 




artifacts for the government.”80 The preferential relationship that missionaries enjoyed 
with several Latin American governments further raised suspicions among the oppressed 
peoples that the missionaries were working for the CIA. Suspicions also had a basis in the 
history of missionary involvement in the commercial exploitation of Latin America. 
In the 1940s, multinational oil companies, like Standard Oil, Shell and Texaco, 
explored diverse and often remote regions of Latin America looking for oil. Royal Dutch 
Shell secured a 2,500 square mile oil concession from the government of Ecuador in an 
area of the upper Amazon, a region with several aboriginal tribes. In 1946, the Huaorani 
tribe, commonly called Aucas, killed a number of Shell workers exploring for oil on 
tribal lands along the Curaray River in eastern Ecuador. As a result, Shell abandoned its 
work camp – Shell Mera – along with its valuable airstrip. A few years later, a team of 
five couples, made up of SIL and MAF missionaries, occupied the camp and set up an 
Christian outreach to the Aucas. Led by Nate Saint, a MAF pilot, and his sister, Rachel, a 
SIL linguist, they used Nate’s plane to fly over the Auca villages, drop gifts and food, 
and pictures of the missionaries. Weeks of efforts to befriend the Aucas preceded a plan 
to meet them face-to-face. On January 2, 1956, the five men landed their plane for the 
first time on a sandy stretch of beach along the Curaray River. For six days, they called 
into the jungle inviting the Aucas to come out. Soon, two natives, a man and woman, 
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came out of the jungle and interacted by sign language with the missionaries. Then on 
January 8, 1956, a group of Aucas, agitated at the intruders on their land, attacked and 
killed all five missionaries, even as they had the Shell workers.81 
When the five men did not return, other MAF pilots searched for them by air. 
Once spotted, the pilots contacted the U.S. Caribbean Command at the Panama Canal, 
who immediately dispatched a helicopter and troops to retrieve the missionaries’ bodies. 
Henry Luce, publisher of TIME and Life magazines and a missionary kid himself, sent 
photographer-correspondent Cornell Capa to travel with the troops into the jungle of 
Ecuador to document the story for Life’s millions of readers. Subsequently, on January 
30, 1956, Life magazine carried a gripping ten-page story of the five “missionary 
martyrs” who laid down their lives for their faith. Capa captured dramatic pictures of the 
murder site as first discovered by the US soldiers showing bodies floating in the water 
and bodies run through with spears, along with evocative images of tearful widows 
holding their fatherless infants. The Life magazine photos and story captivated the nation 
and became a worldwide sensation. Vice President Richard Nixon and former president 
Harry Truman spoke about the deaths. The governments of Ecuador and Peru donated 
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new planes to help SIL reach other indigenous tribes. Elizabeth Elliott, whose husband 
Jim was one of the five killed, wrote a best-selling book about the martyrs’ story, 
Through Gates of Splendor. Rachel Saint, at Townsend’s urging, launched a whirlwind 
tour of twenty-seven American cities telling the murdered missionaries’ story. 
Accompanying Saint was Dayuma, one of the mysterious Auca women whom Rachel 
had reached and befriended. On June 5, 1957, Saint and Dayuma appeared before 30 
million viewers on Ralph Edwards’ television show, This is Your Life. Then on July 7, 
1957, Saint told her story to a packed Madison Square Garden during the first-ever Billy 
Graham Crusade in New York City, billed by the Graham organization as the “greatest 
single effort in the history of evangelism.”82 
Nonetheless, the full story of the missionary tragedy did not emerge for over a 
decade. Behind the missionaries’ sincere religious motives and actions, SIL had a private 
agreement with the government of Ecuador to “civilize” and “pacify” the Aucas so that 
they could be relocated to a different area of the Amazon. Moving the Aucas would 
enable Shell to resume exploration and drilling in eastern Ecuador, thus generating 
needed revenues for the Ecuadorian government. An investigative reporter for The San 
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Francisco Chronicle, Bill Wallace, revealed the backstory in a 1981 article in The 
Nation, “Onward Wycliffe Soldiers – Missionaries with a Mission:” 
In 1946, the hunter-gatherer Indians of the Auca tribe drove representatives of the 
Shell Oil Company out of the eastern jungles of Ecuador; in 1964 a plane from 
Wycliffe brought the first oil company geologist back into the remote wilderness, 
and the “Christianized” Auca tribesmen, under the direction of the Wycliffe 
missionaries who converted them, were used as an advance public relations party 
by the oil companies, moving hostile Aucas out of the path of the geological 
survey teams and assisting Ecuadorean officials in a massive campaign to relocate 
the tribes onto government reservations.83 
The American mission efforts in Latin America, particularly those of SIL/WBT 
and NTM, came under heavy criticism. In August 1953, Catholic bishops in Peru 
denounced SIL/WBT for its “active and tendentious campaign to convert the Indians of 
our Amazon to evangelical Protestantism [through] a vast proselytizing action, hiding its 
true intentions behind a series of disguises.” In Columbia, the Apostolic Vicar of the 
Caquetá region told Townsend that Columbia was a Catholic country; thus, he forbade 
Protestant missionaries to work with the Amazon Indians. Once SIL agreed to abide by 
the Concordat between the government of Columbia and the Vatican, and offering “help, 
favors, and even planes,” the Bishop relented and allowed SIL into the country. 
Additionally, anthropologists, many of them connected to American universities, were 
harsh in their criticism of SIL’s motives and methods. The academics said that the 
SIL/WBT work threatened the existence of the traditional cultures, values and religions 
of the Amazonian tribes. John Moore, chair of the anthropology department of the 
University of Oklahoma, with whom SIL had close ties, “said the institute’s zealous 
                                                 




evangelical work with the Cheyenne Indians – in the name of the university – hurt his 
own scientific work with the tribe.” Moore criticized the missionaries for being “linguists 
until the point where they get the trust of the Indian group, and then they begin to 
proselytize.” In 1976, Venezuelan university professors and members of the capital’s 
intellectual elite condemned New Tribes Mission when the Venezuelan military 
discovered two American engineers carrying out mineral prospecting while under the 
cover of being NTM missionaries. When arrested, the engineers carried identification 
cards verifying that they were employees of Westinghouse and General Dynamics, both 
US military contractors. Later, an investigation revealed that NTM had received funding 
from General Dynamics. Because of these criticisms, along with others, SIL/WBT and 
NTM lost contracts and suffered expulsion from Brazil, Panama, Mexico, Ecuador, 
Guatemala, Peru, Columbia and Venezuela.84 
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Another factor contributed to the expulsions – persistent claims of cooperation 
with the CIA. Some sources allege that there was a connection between Nate Saint, the 
MAF pilot killed during Operation Auca, and the CIA. The basis of this assertion is two 
passages from Gerard Colby and Charlotte Dennett’s book, Thy Will Be Done: The 
Conquest of the Amazon, about the Rockefeller family, American missionaries, and the 
CIA in Latin America. The book tells of an encounter between Nate Saint and General 
James Doolittle, the famous commander of the legendary WWII Doolittle Raid over 
Tokyo. Colby and Dennett based their account on a brief scene in a 1960 biography of 
Saint, which they correctly cite but do not accurately portray.  
While at the Shell Mera camp, the biography states that Saint enjoyed and drew 
pleasure from “surprise visits” from Americans. One day Saint was startled and delighted 
to find “Jimmy Doolittle” stop by the camp along with officials from the Shell Oil 
Company. At the time, Doolittle was a vice-president and director of Shell Oil. 
According to Saint, “[Doolittle] asked about the work of the mission and of our ‘little Air 
Force.’” Doolittle then related an account of Jake DeShazer, one of Doolittle’s Raiders 
who attacked Tokyo, but after the war became a “Free Methodist missionary” and 
returned to Japan. This is the extent of Saint’s recollection about the Doolittle encounter 
– one paragraph, no specific timeframe, no explanation of Doolittle’s comment about our 
“little Air Force.”85 
                                                 




However, Colby and Dennett take Saint’s account and set it in 1954 during the 
time that President Eisenhower commissioned General Doolittle to investigate and 
prepare a report on CIA covert operations. The authors state, “[Saint] met Shell director 
Jimmy Doolittle during the general’s secret fact-finding tour of CIA covert assets for 
President Eisenhower.” During this tour, Colby and Dennett report that Doolittle stopped 
over to inspect the MAF base at Shell Mera. The authors claim that upon meeting Saint, 
“with a twinkle in his eye” Doolittle asked, “How’s our little air force?” The inference is 
clear: Saint had a secret connection to Doolittle and CIA covert operations, and the CIA 
clandestinely operated MAF airplanes. However, the “Daily Log” of the Doolittle 
Committee’s activities found in Appendix B of the now declassified Doolittle Report 
clearly refutes Colby and Dennett’s account. The appendix specifies that Doolittle only 
took one trip abroad during the committee’s tenure – Frankfurt, Vienna, Athens, and 
Rome from September 13-18, 1954. According to the report, Doolittle made no trips to 
South America. CIA scholar-expert John Prados corroborates this assessment in his 
discussion of the Doolittle Report in Safe for Democracy: The Secret Wars of the CIA.86  
Thus, it is highly unlikely that Nate Saint was a CIA covert operative in Latin 
America. The encounter with General Doolittle revealed in the biography was at a 
different time, for different purposes, and had no covert implications. However, 
Doolittle’s report to Eisenhower did serve to support the expansion of CIA covert 
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operations globally, which in turn affected Latin America. On September 30, 1954, 
Doolittle presented his final report to the President calling for the use of ruthless methods 
and skilled people to defeat the communist threat: 
It is now clear that we are facing an implacable enemy whose avowed objective is 
world domination by whatever means and at whatever cost. There are no rules in 
such a game. Hitherto acceptable norms of human conduct do not apply. If the 
United States is to survive, long-standing American concepts of “fair play” must 
be reconsidered. We must develop effective espionage and counterespionage 
services and must learn to subvert, sabotage and destroy our enemies by more 
clever, more sophisticated and more effective methods than those used against us. 
It may become necessary that the American people be made acquainted with, 
understand and support this fundamentally repugnant philosophy.87 
A separate story told by Colby and Dennett about SIL-CIA connections has more 
substance and credibility. In 1961, Townsend was trying to gather support for the entry of 
SIL into Columbia. He wanted to “get the Kennedy White House further involved in 
SIL’s cause.” Townsend knew that to do that, he “would have to enlist SIL in the holy 
war against Castroism.” One of SIL’s officials, Robert Schneider, was friends with a CIA 
staff officer, William Kintner. Townsend and Schneider appealed to Kintner for CIA 
support arguing that the Columbian “Indians’ political allegiances were worrisome.” 
Because the Indians were often in isolated areas, Townsend claimed that they were 
“special targets of communism.” The proposed SIL project “would discourage 
communism by equipping the people to read and write and by supplying literature of the 
Free World.” Convinced of the importance of SIL’s work in fighting communism in 
Columbia, Kintner passed on the SIL proposal to Arthur Schlesinger at the White House, 
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who was able to secure the President’s endorsement in the weeks leading up to 
Kennedy’s trip to Bogota in December 1961 to promote the Alliance for Progress.88 
The tragic death of the five missionaries during Operation Auca, with its attendant 
international media coverage, was an unexpected boon for SIL/WBT. It provided 
desperately needed funds to support existing works and to expand into new areas. 
Donations poured into SIL/WBT. Rachel Saint’s twenty-seven city tour of America and 
her appearance at Billy Graham’s crusade at Madison Square Gardens generated 
significant publicity and funds. Perhaps the greatest benefit to emerge from the Auca 
murders was an open door to Vietnam and Southeast Asia.89 
Townsend had been looking for an opening to send SIL to “help out in the holy 
war in Vietnam.” He reached out to Philippine President Ramón Magsaysay, who wrote 
letters of introduction for SIL and its representative to Vietnamese President Ngô Diệm. 
At the end of January 1956, just after the news of the five missionary martyrs hit the 
headlines, Richard Pitman, SIL’s Southeast Asia representative, held his first “very 
friendly” meeting with Diệm. Within a year, an SIL team was in Saigon taking US 
Embassy-sponsored language classes. The team was also building a relationship with 
Colonel Edward Lansdale, who was advising the Vietnamese military and government on 
rural pacification campaigns, the integration of religious militias, and refugee programs. 
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Missionaries would prove to be a significant help to Lansdale and the CIA with these and 
other challenges during the Vietnam War era.90 
The CIA and Missionary Operations in Southeast Asia 
Southeast Asia was one of the most active regions for US missionary 
collaboration with the CIA, besides Latin America. Catholics came to the area in the 16th 
century and Protestants in the 19th century. With the advent of the Cold War and efforts 
to stop the spread of communism, missionary and clergy assistance in Southeast Asia was 
invaluable, particularly with the native tribespeople of Vietnam and the rugged Golden 
Triangle of northern Laos, Thailand and Burma. 
First the French and then the Americans sought to enlist the help of the 
Montagnards, the Nungs, and other tribespeople of Vietnam and Laos in the battle against 
the Communists. The French used Catholic missionaries and the Americans used 
conservative Protestant mission groups like SIL/WBT and the Christian and Missionary 
Alliance (CMA). The Montagnard tribespeople numbered almost 2 million and 
constituted 15 percent of the population of Vietnam and 50 percent of the population of 
Laos. US Army Green Berets trained Montagnards to fight the Viet Cong, supported by 
the CIA. SIL/WBT missionaries, who translated the oral dialects of the hill peoples into 
written languages, assisted the CIA and Green Berets; CMA missionaries built churches 
and created social structures in the villages; and the US Agency for International 
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Development (USAID) routed CIA funds to support the missionaries’ work as well as 
food and farming implements. Green Berets used the Montagnards to break up the 
infiltration routes of the North Vietnamese soldiers. “To boost morale, the Green Berets 
composed a marching song for the [Montagnards] . . . sung to the tune of ‘Onward 
Christian Soldiers.’”91  
In Laos, the CIA ran a “secret war” using Hmong tribesmen as their army. 
SIL/WBT missionaries pacified and educated the Hmongs. When the “secret war” in 
Laos ended, SIL/WBT missionaries helped the CIA evacuate 40,000 Hmong warriors 
into neighboring Thailand and from there to Bolivia. In Bolivia, the Hmong refugees 
resettled into SIL/WBT’s Tumi Chucua jungle base in the northeastern region of the 
country.92 SIL/WBT also worked with the Nung tribesmen, hill people who fled into 
South Vietnam in large numbers after the withdrawal of the French in 1954. According to 
Marks and Marchetti in The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence, “The Nungs were known to 
be extremely fierce fighters, and they became a favorite source of manpower for CIA 
operations in South Vietnam. In fact, casual observers could nearly always spot secret 
CIA installations in the Vietnamese provinces by the Nung guards out front.” The CIA 
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used the Nung fighters to observe and sabotage North Vietnamese Army and Viet Cong 
troop movements along jungle trails.93 
Catholics were an important religious community in Vietnam. Large numbers of 
rural Vietnamese converted to Catholicism during the French colonial period through the 
efforts of monks and priests. Some of the Catholic fathers became priest-warriors against 
the Communists, like Father Hoa who commanded a private army of 1,200 soldiers, 
many of them Nung tribesmen, to defend 18,000 people in his area against the 
Communists.94 After the defeat of the French at Dien Bien Phu in 1954, the Geneva 
Peace Accords provided for the voluntary resettlement of people from North Vietnam to 
the south and vice versa.95 The CIA spearheaded the resettlement effort, coordinated by 
the US Navy, called “Operation Passage to Freedom” (Navy name) and alternatively 
“Operation EXODUS” (CIA name). The Pentagon Papers, fully released June 13, 2011 
by the US National Archives, state that during Operation EXODUS “65% of North 
Vietnam’s Catholics moved to the South, more than 600,000 in all.” In addition, “2,000 
northern Protestants” evacuated to the south.96  
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The movement of Catholics to South Vietnam was more appealing with the 
ascendancy of Ngô Diệm as Prime Minister of the State of Vietnam in 1954 and as the 
first President of the Republic of Vietnam in 1955. Diệm and his family were devoutly 
Roman Catholic; his older brother, Ngô Thục, was Bishop of Vinh Long and eventually 
Archbishop of Hue. From 1950 to 1953, Diệm spent three years in exile in the United 
States, hosted by Francis Cardinal Spellman of New York City and lodged at the 
Maryknoll Seminary in Hawthorne, New York, just 15 miles north of Manhattan. Diệm 
met Cardinal Spellman through his older brother, Thuc. When Diệm returned to South 
Vietnam to assume political leadership, the large influx of Catholics through Operation 
EXODUS helped bolster the fledgling administration of Diệm, strengthened American 
public support for South Vietnam and, according to the CIA plan, would destabilize the 
North Vietnamese regime. The plan for Operation EXODUS came from CIA chief of 
operations in South Vietnam, Colonel Edward Lansdale.97 
During WWII, Lansdale served in Bill Donovan’s OSS assigned to Southeast 
Asia. After the war, Lansdale went to the Philippines, a largely Catholic country, where 
he served as military liaison to Ramón Magsaysay, Minister of National Defense, who 
later became President. Lansdale helped Magsaysay create a psychological warfare 
division within the Philippine Army, which targeted its efforts at the Hukbalahap 
Rebellion, popularly known as the Huks, a communist-sympathizing guerilla group in the 
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central highlands of Luzon.98 Lansdale ran a number of psywar operations designed to 
intimidate and defeat the Huks. Military historian, Max Boot, in his critically acclaimed 
book on Lansdale, The Road Not Taken: Edward Lansdale and the American Tragedy in 
Vietnam, recalls a psywar operation described by Lansdale in his papers housed at the 
Hoover Institution, which played upon the Philippine superstitions about ghosts, ghouls 
and vampires. Lansdale wrote that the Philippine army “planted stories among the town 
residents of an asuang [vampire] living on a hill where the Huks were based.” 
Two nights later, after giving the stories time to circulate among Huk 
sympathizers in the town and make their way up to the hill camp, the psywar 
squad set up an ambush along a trail used by the Huks. When a Huk patrol came 
along the trail, the ambushers silently snatched the last man of the patrol, their 
move unseen in the dark night. They punctured his neck with two holes, vampire-
fashion, held the body up by the heels, drained it of blood, and put the corpse 
back on the trail. When the Huks returned to look for the missing man and found 
their bloodless comrade, every member of the patrol believed that the asuang had 
got him and that one of them would be next if they remained on that hill. When 
daylight came, the whole Huk squadron moved out of the vicinity.99 
Lansdale’s background in counter-insurgency operations and psychological 
warfare served him well when he transferred to Vietnam in 1954 to head up the 
clandestine Saigon Military Mission. He was the chief US intelligence agent in Saigon. It 
was during this time that Lansdale helped initiate Operation EXODUS. According to the 
Pentagon Papers, Lansdale instigated a “black propaganda campaign of pamphlets and 
announcements, ostensibly Viet Minh in origin, aimed at discrediting the DRV 
[Democratic Republic of Vietnam], depreciating its currency and adding to popular fears 
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of its new powers.” One of the intended outcomes was “rampant rumors” among the 
populace, creating a willingness to leave.100 Dr. Tom Dooley, a Catholic US Navy doctor, 
became the public face of Operation Passage to Freedom; however, it was Lansdale’s 
psyops that helped Dooley recruit North Vietnamese, particularly Catholics, to join the 
exodus south.101  
Religion played a significant role in Lansdale’s upbringing. His parents were 
members of Mary Baker Eddy’s Church of Christ, Scientist. His upbringing in the church 
gave him a “sympathy for the underdog” and an “empathy for minorities.” As a youth, he 
drifted away from the church and as an adult came to describe himself as “not a religious 
person.”102 However, Lansdale displayed an unusual sensitivity to the religious and 
spiritual dimensions of covert operations. 
For example, in 1957 Lansdale transferred to Washington, DC where he became a 
part of military special operations planning team at the Pentagon. In November 1961, 
President Kennedy appointed Lansdale as Chief of Operations of the Special Group 
(Augmented) (SGA) to develop a covert plan to “help the people of Cuba overthrow the 
Communist regime from within Cuba and institute a new government with which the 
United States can live in peace.” On February 20, 1962, Lansdale presented his “total 
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plan” to “help Cubans recapture their freedom” to the President, Secretary of Defense, 
Secretary of State, DCI, and other members of the Special Group (Augmented). He 
created a six-phase plan spanning the timeframe of March to October 1962. The 
dimensions of his operational plan included political, economic, psychological, military, 
intelligence, sabotage, and basic action elements.103 Throughout the plan, one sees 
Lansdale’s frequent use of religious factors, which integrate more effectively into the 
political and ideological approach to counterinsurgency preferred by Lansdale versus the 
force of arms. 
In the Basic Action Plan, Lansdale echoes his Vietnam experience with religious 
communities by calling for “resistance teams” to be set up in “all population elements” 
including the “Church.” In the Political Support Plan of Lansdale’s document, he calls for 
enlisting the support of “United Nations members and U.N. organs” regarding the 
“plight” of religious groups in Cuba under the Communists. In addition, he also called for 
alerting “Latin American leaders, government and public” to the religious suffering of the 
Cuban people under Castro. Further, to sustain the support of the Cuban people for the 
overthrow of Castro, Lansdale planned to use “radio programs,” some of them broadcast 
from covert locations within the country and some offshore. The first type of radio 
programs listed in Lansdale’s plan are “religious programs.” In the Psychological Support 
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Plan, Lansdale’s first action was to “create an atmosphere of a ‘crusade’ for human 
liberty,” which would set a “deeply-moving tone and motivating force for the liberation 
of Cuba.” To accomplish this goal, Lansdale suggested making “maximum use of 
spiritual appeal” by having “Bishop Boja Masvidal who has a genuine Cuban 
revolutionary background” give a “prayer for Cuba.” In the Intelligence Support Plan, 
Lansdale raised the need to “exploit the intelligence possibilities of former residents of 
Cuba” including those from religious communities.104 Reading the full report of the Cuba 
Project reveals how comfortable Lansdale was incorporating religious elements into 
covert operations, which he viewed as particularly essential in countries with strong 
religious cultures. 
On November 1, 1963, Major General Lansdale officially retired from the US Air 
Force. The next day, Lansdale’s old friend, President Ngô Diệm of South Vietnam was 
assassinated along with his brother in a coup d’état. Then three weeks later on November 
22, 1963, Lee Harvey Oswald assassinated Lansdale’s benefactor, President John F. 
Kennedy, in Dallas. With a new President of the United States, there was a new attitude 
and approach towards the war in Vietnam. Soon Lansdale was back in Saigon as “special 
assistant” to the US Ambassador and director of CIA operations in Indochina.105 
In June 1968, Lansdale wrote a lengthy classified report to US Ambassador 
Ellsworth Bunker dealing with the subject of “Vietnamese Soothsayers.” Lansdale’s 
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report explored how the military, political and social elites of South Vietnam consulted 
mystics in making decisions and directing their personal affairs. From Lansdale’s 
perspective, what was important for the readers of his report to understand was not 
whether Americans believed in the reality and power of the soothsayers, but that the 
Vietnamese believed and ordered their lives accordingly.106 One soothsayer explained to 
Lansdale how the fortunes of the US Embassy changed when it moved from its old 
building to a new one because of its orientation to bodies of water. Another soothsayer 
suggested that the US military lost some of its “good luck” in 1962 by giving up its 
headquarters building at 606 Tran Hung Dao. The soothsayers’ mystical arts included 
“wizardry, prophecy, spiritualism, astrology, palmistry, phrenology, necromancy, 
geomancy, animistic taboos, and subtle mesmerism.” In a memo to the ambassador 
accompanying the report, Lansdale suggested that four specific soothsayers might have 
“clandestine operational” value for the CIA and US military in Vietnam. Lansdale’s 
report mirrored in a number of ways a famous 1964 report prepared by the Special 
Operations Research Office at American University – “Witchcraft, Sorcery, Magic and 
Other Psychological Phenomena and Their Implications on Military and Paramilitary 
Operations in the Congo” – with which Lansdale was likely familiar. 107  
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Lansdale’s report to Ambassador Bunker revealed that the soothsayers “included 
many of the Vietnamese leaders among their clientele.” One of the four mystics that 
Lansdale highlighted for possible CIA covert operations was “a person close to the 
President’s family – a member of the staff of Nguyen van Kieu, the President’s brother.” 
Lansdale sought to learn as much as possible about the soothsayers’ “methods of 
divination” and the origins of their beliefs. The soothsayers’ practices exhibited 
syncretism, incorporating elements of Christianity, Buddhism, Taoism, Confucianism, 
folk philosophy, as well as arcane spiritualism. Beyond their mystical practices, the 
soothsayers taught people “prayers, fasting, and good action can change events and even 
partly change your destiny.” Business for the soothsayers rose sharply after the 1968 Tet 
offensive, Lansdale reported, “as people became apprehensive about the future.” Because 
Lansdale believed that the four soothsayers he featured for Ambassador Bunker could be 
a help in the future, he provided the name, address, and phone number of his friend, Dr. 
Ho Quan “Manny” Phouc, who helped Lansdale research the soothsayers and knew how 
to reach each one personally.108 
In 1959, the CIA began its buildup of a secret army of Hmong tribesmen in the 
Golden Triangle. General Lansdale, from his position at the Pentagon, oversaw much of 
the planning of the secret, undeclared war in Laos. He envisioned the operation with the 
hill tribesmen in the Golden Triangle as an “early warning” system, a “trip-wire sort of 
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thing” to monitor the movements of the North Vietnamese, “sealing off the mountain 
infiltration routes from China and North Vietnam.” The Golden Triangle encompasses 
the northern mountainous regions of Laos, Thailand and Burma. During the US military 
involvement in the region in the 50s, 60s and 70s, it also involved a different triangle – 
the CIA, US missionaries and the opium trade. 109 
In 1967, the United Nations reported that the Golden Triangle produced 70% of 
the world’s supply of raw opium; producers traded and sold their valuable commodity 
into southern China, Vietnam, Europe and the United States. In the colonial era, before 
the French came, Chinese traders dominated the opium trade and shipped the pungent, 
banana-leaf-wrapped cubes of opium tar into China, Vietnam, and to Britain. Then the 
French took over after WWII until their withdrawal in1954. During this time, the French 
military managed and directly profited from the drug trade. French commandos shipped 
opium and refined heroin to Saigon via military transports. From Saigon, it travelled by 
freighter to the Port of Marseille and through the “French Connection” to the United 
States. When the CIA moved into the Golden Triangle in the 1950s to take over military 
operations, opium was a significant part of the lives, culture and economy of the people 
of the region.110 
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The CIA did nothing to stop or eradicate the opium trade; in fact, the Agency 
protected and facilitated the well-established industry. The CIA needed to raise an army 
to fight its “secret war” in Laos against the Communists. That was its priority, not 
stopping drugs, in spite of President Nixon’s “declaration of war” against the 
international heroin trade.111 In the Golden Triangle, the CIA selected one leader from 
every one of the hill tribes to serve as a commander and lead his troops into battle. The 
commander would recruit his fellow tribesmen as mercenary soldiers with the promise of 
a salary, food for their family, weapons and training, all courtesy of the CIA. The “CIA 
had only as much influence with each tribe as its surrogate commander did” and it was in 
the Agency’s best interest “to make these men local autocrats by concentrating military 
and economic power in their hands.” That meant that the CIA’s tribal military 
commanders became not only de facto warlords, but also, with the CIA’s assistance, 
extremely wealthy drug lords, for example Generals Vang Pao, Ouan Rattikone, and 
Phoumi Nosavan. The CIA used its private air service, Air America, which included 
fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters, to assist the Hmong commanders in transporting the 
opium to market. The aircraft would bring humanitarian supplies – rice, food, medical aid 
– into the Golden Triangle for the CIA mercenaries and then exfiltrate opium. In 1962, 
when the US and Soviet Union signed a Geneva Agreement to de-militarize Laos, the 
CIA simply withdrew its bases to adjacent areas of Thailand and then choppered back-
and-forth every day to direct guerilla activities. When DCI Richard Helms shut down the 
                                                 




Agency’s private airline on April 21, 1972, the CIA simply donated planes and choppers 
to the drug lord generals who continued to use them for the opium trade.112 
The Church Committee in 1975-76 looked into the allegations of CIA 
involvement with drug trafficking. The Church Committee Final Report cited a 1972 
CIA Inspector General’s investigation of the issue and concluded that there was “no 
evidence that the Agency, or any senior officer of the Agency, has ever sanctioned or 
supported drug trafficking as a matter of policy. Also, we have found not the slightest 
suspicion, much less evidence that any Agency officer, staff or contract has ever been 
involved in the drug business.” Ironically, after this categorical denial, the Church 
Committee report lists exceptions, minor cases, random infractions and causes for 
concern, which verified the CIA’s involvement in drug trafficking in Southeast Asia.113 
In 1972, Alfred McCoy exposed the truth about the CIA’s involvement with the drug 
trade in sworn testimony before Congress and in his impeccably researched, pioneering 
book, The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia. McCoy’s monograph, based on extensive 
interviews and archival resources, established unequivocally the CIA’s involvement in 
the opium trade, and yet his conclusion demonstrated surprising restraint: 
In most cases, the CIA’s role involved various forms of complicity, tolerance, or 
studied ignorance about the trade, not any direct culpability in the actual 
trafficking. With its vast budget, the CIA had no reason to handle heroin. Instead 
it was the agency’s tactics of indirect intervention through local allies, some of 
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them drug lords, that led to similarly indirect involvement in drug trafficking. The 
CIA did not handle heroin, but it did provide its drug-lord allies with transport, 
arms, and political protection. In sum, the CIA’s role in the Southeast Asia heroin 
trade involved indirect complicity rather than direct culpability.114 
Multiple historical sources confirm that the CIA was complicit in the Indochinese drug 
trade, but so were American missionaries. Most notable of these missionaries working 
with the CIA was the Young family. 
Rev. William Marcus Young, an American Baptist missionary serving under the 
Boston Mission Society, moved to Kentung in the Shan state of northeastern Burma in 
1892. He had great success in converting the Lahu and Wa hill tribespeople, who 
according to local legend, perhaps based on a prophecy by San Fo Zu, believed that one 
day a “white brother” would come with a “lost book” that would tell them about the true 
god. As a result, Young was revered by the Lahu and Wa peoples as a deity or prophet – 
the Jaw Maw, a man-god – and had great success in evangelizing the tribespeople in 
Burma and China.115 In 1901, Rev. Young’s son, Harold, was born. He grew up in the 
mountains of Burma and southern China, where he frequently accompanied his father on 
evangelism trips through the jungles from village to village for months on end. He too 
became a missionary and learned to speak six languages fluently. During WWII, Bill 
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Donovan’s OSS recruited Harold to assist the Allied cause against the Japanese, first in 
Burma and later in China. Harold organized, trained and commanded guerilla teams of 
Shan and Kachin warriors to perform hit-and-run attacks on the Japanese. As a jungle 
survival expert, Harold taught the warriors “how to find food and water, build shelters, 
hunt and trap game, and set up pitfalls and ambushes against enemies. Harold eventually 
compiled his [knowledge] into a field manual for the US Army.” After the British 
defeated the Japanese and resumed administration of Burma, they made Harold the 
Assistant Superintendent of the Northern Shan States. He commanded thousands of Lahu, 
Shan, Wa and Ghurka troops, responsible for guarding the Burma-China border. As well, 
Harold performed a judicial function where he “tried and convicted many influential 
warlords,” sentencing some to execution by a gunshot to the head.116 
After Burma gained its independence in 1948, after Mao’s Communists seized 
control of China in 1949, and after the Korean War started in 1950, the CIA, desperate to 
stop the spread of communism, set up a base of operations in northern Thailand. One of 
the CIA’s first and most important recruits was Harold Young. He was hired for his 
ethnographic, linguistic and jungle survival knowledge. One of his first assignments was 
to assist the CIA with rearming and reorganizing Chiang Kai-shek’s Kuomintang (KMT) 
troops who fled across the border into the Shan states of Burma after Mao seized power 
in China. In 1951, the CIA began airlifting weapons and food to the KMT troops so they 
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could carry out cross-border attacks and spark anti-communist uprisings in China. After 
three abortive invasions of western Yunnan province by the CIA-backed KMT troops, the 
Agency gave Harold the task of gathering intelligence and organizing operations in the 
Golden Triangle and southwestern China. Harold created tribal guerilla teams, made up 
primarily of Shan and Lahu Christians, to track and report on the communist force 
posture, troop movements, and armaments. Harold’s son, Gordon, ran the radio dispatch 
network since he was able to communicate fluently with all agents-in-the-field whether 
they spoke Lahu, Wa, Shan or Chinese. Harold and Gordon oversaw this CIA operation 
for six years. The Young home became the social center of the region for homesick 
Americans, many of them working for the CIA and USAID. As well, every good CIA spy 
needs a cover story. Harold decided that he would present himself, besides being a 
missionary, as an entomologist and naturalist. He amassed a sizable insect collection, 
some samples of which he sent to the American Museum of Natural History in 
Washington, DC.117 
Harold’s younger son, William, followed his father into the family business, not 
as a missionary, but as one of the CIA’s most effective and celebrated agents in the 
“secret war” in Laos. On his father’s recommendation, the CIA hired William in 1958 as 
a “tribal expert” and “interpreter-translator.” Young was fluent in five local languages 
plus his native English; moreover, he had an extensive, sophisticated knowledge of the 
geography and ethnography of the Golden Triangle. Because of his linguistic skills, 
                                                 




Young took the lead in building up a “pan-tribal army” which carried out operations in 
the mountains against the Pathet Lao and the infiltrating North Vietnamese. Even though 
the indigenous army had a “council” made up of two leaders from each tribe, in reality 
“Young controlled the money and made all the decisions.” He directed the construction 
of over twenty dirt landing strips for the CIA’s Air America aircraft to move troops and 
supplies. He directed Yao commando attacks on Pathet Lao villages and supervised Yao 
and Lahu intelligence teams. He served as the principle liaison between the CIA and 
Hmong army chief, General Vang Pao. William recruited and trained raiding parties to 
penetrate into China, as had his father. To support the cross-border operations, William 
created three China-targeted radio listening and transmission stations deep in Burma’s 
Shan states. He also built a training camp, which graduated “thirty-five agents every two 
months, and sent hundreds of teams deep into Yunnan.” Young’s employment with the 
CIA ended – in 1967 or 1968, depending on the source – over differences regarding the 
covert war in Laos and the overt war in Vietnam. Subsequently, Young ran several small 
business ventures, including serving as an adviser to the US Drug Enforcement 
Administration regarding the drug trade in the Golden Triangle. Young was found dead at 
home on April 1, 2011, with a bullet in his head, a revolver in one hand and a crucifix in 
the other. “Bill Young died as he once lived – violently,” a friend said. The Thai police 
said that it was an apparent suicide, but could there be a more diabolical explanation 
resulting from his work with the CIA and drug trade? The answer is a mystery.118 
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William Young’s attitude towards the opium trade in the Golden Triangle 
reflected his “sophisticated understanding of the hill tribes” and the lives and economic 
realities of hill tribe farmers. Young believed that “until a comprehensive crop 
substitution program was initiated . . .  nothing should be done to interfere with the opium 
traffic.” In a September 1971 interview with author Alfred McCoy, Young explained his 
views on the opium trade in the Golden Triangle: 
Every now and then one of the James Bond types would decide that the way to 
deal with the problem was to detonate or machine-gun the factories. But I always 
talked them out of it. As long as there is opium in Burma somebody will market 
it. This kind of thing would only hurt somebody and not really deal with the 
problem.119 
Young’s sympathies for the hill farmers and their opium-based, subsistence 
economy was shared by other CIA agents like Tony Poe, who ran CIA special operations 
in Tibet, northern India, and Indonesia, and Edgar “Pop” Buell, a CIA agent who 
originally came to the area with a mission organization, International Voluntary Services 
(IVS). Buell was a farmer from Indiana who volunteered with IVS, a Mennonite Church 
economic assistance program created in 1953, which served as the prototype for the US 
Peace Corps. Buell used his agricultural expertise to help the Hmong farmers improve 
their techniques for planting and cultivating opium. “If you’re gonna grow it, grow it 
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good,” Buell told the Hmong farmers, “but don’t let anybody smoke the stuff.” Buell’s 
techniques worked; opium production and international exports increased.120 
In 1961, IVS worked in the Central Highlands of Vietnam and signed a contract 
with CIA Saigon station chief, William Colby, to create special Montagnard commando 
teams for a village defense system. The idea for the project originated with IVS 
missionary David Nuttle, who became a CIA contract officer. Beginning in 1964, “the 
CIA funded extensive pacification programs” in Laos and turned again to IVS to execute 
its plans. Colby, by now the CIA’s Far East Division chief, twice visited the CIA 
operations in Laos in October 1965 and July 1966. In a follow-up report to DCI Helms, 
Colby wrote, “I found the situation in Laos exhilarating.”121 Another IVS missionary, 
Joseph Flipse, packed a pistol on his hip, unusual for a Mennonite, and worked closely 
with William Young in leading Yao commandos in attacks on Pathet Lao villages just 
east of the Thai border. Flipse’s non-pacifist tendencies surfaced after he retired from 
IVS and returned to the US. Author Alfred McCoy sought out Flipse for an interview 
during the writing of The Politics of Heroin. McCoy found Flipse running a “restored 
nineteenth-century flour mill on the banks of a stream in Readyville, Tennessee.” After 
an interview over a cup of coffee regarding the IVS work in the Golden Triangle, Flipse 
“finished the interview by threatening to kill me if I sourced any information to him.” 
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According to McCoy, it was the only death threat he received during his years of research 
on The Politics of Heroin.122 
In a most unusual way, the CIA verified its work with missionaries in the Golden 
Triangle with respect to the opium trade. In July 1972, in the run-up to the publication of 
The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia, Alfred McCoy wrote an abbreviated version of 
the story for Harper’s magazine entitled, “Flowers of Evil: The CIA and the heroin 
trade.”123 The story dropped like a bomb on the CIA and immediately prompted action by 
the Agency to prevent Harper & Row from publishing McCoy’s forthcoming book. 
When the respected publisher refused to stop the presses, letters flew back and forth 
between the CIA’s General Counsel, Lawrence Houston, and Harper & Row’s General 
Counsel, Brooks Thomas. The Agency denounced McCoy’s claims in the “Flowers of 
Evil” article and refuted, in advance, accusations they anticipated McCoy would allege in 
his book. Seymour Hersh of the New York Times got wind of the squabble and wrote a 
series of front-page stories about the publication controversy. The CIA then demanded – 
for national security reasons – to review the galley proofs of the book to see if it 
contained any classified or spurious material. Under great pressure and with great 
reluctance, Harper & Row and McCoy agreed to let the CIA review an advance copy for 
seven days. At the end of the review period, the CIA presented the publisher with an 
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eight-page critique of the book citing supposed factual errors and requesting the removal 
of certain passages. McCoy’s editor, Elisabeth Jakab, pronounced the CIA’s criticisms 
“pathetic,” while the Harper & Row General Counsel told the New York Times that the 
CIA’s objections “were pretty general and we found ourselves rather underwhelmed.” 
McCoy declared the CIA’s critique “very, very weak – pathetic almost.”124 
To fight back against the CIA’s infringement of their First Amendment rights and 
to assure publication of the book before the CIA could mount further legal challenges, 
Harper & Row accelerated publication of the book – unchanged. Further, to validate their 
journalistic integrity, Harper & Row released to the New York Review of Books the 
complete paper trail of communications between the publisher, the CIA and the author 
during the publication dispute. On September 21, 1972, the New York Review of Books 
published all the letters and documents under the title, “A Correspondence with the CIA.” 
Included in the article was the CIA’s full critique with its list of objections and requested 
changes. Harper & Row responded to every single objection made by the CIA. In 
reviewing all the documents and CIA objections – some significant and some miniscule – 
one startling fact stands out: The CIA did not raise a single objection to anything McCoy 
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said about the relationship between the CIA, missionaries and the opium trade. Nothing. 
It seems the CIA accepted that part of the story as factual and accurate.125 
A Matter of Perspective 
Opinions vary greatly on the use of missionaries by the CIA during the Cold War 
– the opinions of Presidents, DCIs, members of Congress, religious leaders and the 
missionaries themselves. Some supported the use of missionaries as a valuable tool for 
fighting godless communism in remote regions of the world. It was a time of war, so 
normal considerations should be set aside. The obligation of citizenship trumps all other 
concerns. By contrast, others felt that the collusion of missionaries with the CIA violated 
core religious principles, which the missionaries believed and taught, thus making them 
appear hypocrites. For some, it was a matter of pragmatism. In remote jungle regions, 
missionaries were the only westerners available who knew the geography, ethnography 
and linguistics of the area. The missionaries were not merely the only ones available; 
they were the best ones available. 
As the historical evidence establishes, some missionaries freely cooperated with 
the CIA, while others refused. The same held true for mission organizations – some 
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willingly and vocally collaborated with the CIA, while others vehemently opposed it. 
Some felt that several Presidents and DCIs did the right thing by allowing the CIA to use 
clergy and missionaries, while others supported the efforts of Senators Hatfield and 
Mansfield to pass legislation to forbid the CIA from working with clergy, missionaries, 
and religious groups – American or foreign. Whatever one’s point of view or basis of 
opinion, the issue of using missionaries for covert operations in remote regions of the 
world is complex and not easily reconciled. 
These pages are insufficient to narrate fully the story of the Cold War partnership 
between missionaries and the CIA. Absent, given the limitations of length, are the stories 
of missionaries working together with the CIA in the Middle East and Africa, with Asian 
Buddhists and the Dali Lama in Tibet. Nonetheless, one of the most fascinating cases of 
CIA collaboration with a religious leader involves a man whose message, ministry and 








BILLY GRAHAM AND THE CIA 
The first question of the press conference obviously made Billy Graham 
uncomfortable. It was ten o’clock in the morning on March 16, 1967 at the Holiday Inn in 
San Juan, Puerto Rico overlooking the azure Atlantic.1  
Billy Graham arrived at seven-thirty the night before to prepare for an 
evangelistic crusade set to begin at the Hiram Bithorn Stadium on Palm Sunday, March 
19, concluding a week later on Easter Sunday, March 26. In order to maximize publicity 
for the long-planned meetings, Rev. Graham held a press conference, as was his custom, 
a few days before the start of the crusade. However, this press conference was unlike any 
he had conducted since he first burst onto the public stage at his historic 1949 Los 
Angeles crusade. When invited to ask questions, reporter Robert Friedman bluntly asked 
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Graham if the US Central Intelligence Agency funded his South America crusades. 
Graham’s answer was the front-page headline in the San Juan Star.2 
The Graham team held the Thursday morning press conference in the Candlelight 
Room of the Holiday Inn. Gil Stricklin, the BGEA team member in charge of the media 
and public relations, oversaw the meeting. In attendance were key BGEA personnel 
including Cliff Barrows, Walter Smyth, Grady Wilson and Don Hustad. The press 
conference started out with a lighthearted welcome and introductions by Rev. Efraim 
Santiago, chair of the crusade. After highlighting the three main purposes of the 
evangelism campaign, Santiago made extended comments about the finances of the 
event. He remarked that “hundreds and hundreds of people” had already contributed “one 
dollar, five dollars” to undergird the crusade costs. The organizers hoped to collect 
$73,000 in advance of the meetings and $45,000 during the crusade to achieve the 
$118,000 budget. “The money is the only means to make possible the campaign,” 
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Santiago emphasized. During his ten minutes of introductory remarks, the crusade chair 
spoke about only two subjects – the three purposes of the event and money. At the ten-
minute mark in the press conference, Santiago turned the microphone over to Billy 
Graham. 
Graham started out reminiscing about being in San Juan in 1958, “We were in the 
old baseball stadium and it poured rain.” He affirmed that Catholics were welcome at his 
crusades, “Many priests and nuns come to all my crusades.” Graham then turned abruptly 
to the subject of finances – “I want to say another word about finances.” Graham 
emphasized that all the money collected was for “local expenses” and to support the local 
organization. “We will not receive one cent” of the money collected, Graham 
underscored, referring to the US-based organization.  
Then, apparently to highlight his frugality, Graham talked about why he was 
staying at the Holiday Inn. He said that he had a special card from the hotel chain that 
entitled him “to stay free at Holiday Inns, forever.” Graham boasted that it was a 
“lifetime” card with no expiration date. Graham’s focus on finances at the beginning of 
his remarks seemed overmuch considering Santiago’s extended explanation on the same 
subject. Perhaps Graham had a premonition about an upcoming question. 
Next, Graham turned to the issue of the Vietnam War. He recalled his recent visit 
with the troops “during the Christmas holidays.”3 In an effort to absolve himself of any 
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Tour. Sometimes, Graham did joint events with others and sometimes he did solo events. On 
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criticism, Graham said, “I have never taken sides as to the moral issue of whether 
America should or should not be there. It is the responsibility of the President, the 
Cabinet and Congress to decide. They are elected by the people to decide.” Then, in 
contradiction to previous public statements and actions, Graham pointedly asserted, “I do 
not take sides politically.”  
He expounded on the “sheer beauty of [Vietnam]” and compared it Puerto Rico. 
He said that he was “surprised at how relaxed people were in Saigon, just like San Juan,” 
a curious characterization and juxtaposition of cities. 
Continuing with the subject of Vietnam, Graham seemed to want to demonstrate 
to the gathered press his insider access to high-level information. “We are on the verge 
now of what might be some very encouraging developments in the Vietnam situation. In 
the next few weeks we are going to read some startling things about what is going to 
happen.” Graham urged prayers for President Johnson during his March 20-21, 1967 
summit meeting in Guam with Chairman Thieu and Prime Minister Ky of Vietnam. 
Graham’s cryptic reference to “startling things” may have been an allusion to the 
outcome of the Guam meetings or, perhaps, something else that President Johnson shared 
with the evangelist.4 Graham was close to Johnson and spoke regularly to the President 
on the phone, visited with him in the Oval Office and the White House private residence, 
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stayed overnight at the White House several times, flew with him on Air Force One and 
spoke to Cabinet Meetings at the invitation of the President. “Being with you is always a 
source of strength to me,” Johnson wrote to Graham. As well, Graham and his wife, 
Ruth, were frequent guests at the Johnson ranch on the banks of the Pedernales River in 
Central Texas.5 
As if to reinforce his earlier statement about not taking sides politically, Graham 
closed his extended comments by stressing the political neutrality of his campaign in 
Puerto Rico, “I’m staying out of local politics and your local problems entirely.” “To be 
here during Holy Week, Palm Sunday to Easter Sunday,” Graham declared, “is one of the 
greatest privileges of my life.” 
By this point, two-thirds of the time allotted for the press conference had passed – 
twenty-seven minutes out of forty-one total. Graham finally opened the floor to questions 
from reporters. 
“Mr. Graham,” the first reporter said immediately, “I wonder if you would 
comment on the TIME article that your campaign was financed in part by the Central 
Intelligence Agency.” The reporter, Robert Friedman, referenced an article in the  
March 3, 1967 issue of TIME magazine – “Pandora’s Cashbox” – alleging that the CIA 
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provided funding for the “Billy Graham Spanish-American crusade.” This article 
followed by one week TIME’s previous cover story – “The Silent Service” – that reported 
on the breaking news about the Ramparts controversy, which disclosed that the CIA used 
false front organizations and conduits to channel funds to anti-communist initiatives.6 
Graham replied, “I think they limited it to the South American crusades some 
years ago and I don’t know anything except what I read there. I was quite amazed. And, 
uh, I don’t know anything about it. I, uh, the CIA never gave any money to, uh, any of 
our crusades anywhere in the world. I was not aware of it.” 
What followed was a long pause. No reporters offered follow-up questions. The 
only sound heard on the recording of the event is background kitchen noise. 
After an uncomfortably long silence, Graham resumed his explanation. “And, uh, 
I intend to ask some of my friends in Washington to check on that to find out. In fact, I 
meant to do it last week and – didn’t get to it. But, uh, apparently they have given money 
secretly and privately to many different groups who didn’t know anything about it. And 
we certainly never knew anything about it.”  
At this point, there was an even longer pause. None of the reporters spoke. They 
waited patiently for Graham to answer fully the CIA question. 
Graham’s voice increasingly evidenced tension. To change the tone and perhaps 
the line of questioning, the evangelist seemed to decide that the best tactic was to laugh it 
off. 
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Graham spoke with a chuckle, “What we needed – was Dr. Lester . . .” referring 
to Carlos Lester, the chair of the crusade Finance Committee and former Secretary of 
State of Puerto Rico, “to, uh, if he gets his finances . . .” Graham snickered nervously.  
“I assure you,” Lester interjected from the audience, “that I have no [sic] received 
one single cent from the CIA.” Graham and Lester laughed together, but the mood of the 
audience did not seem to shift.  
Another long pause followed, with Graham hoping, perhaps, that some other 
reporter would ask a different question or someone from his team would rescue him. 
Finally, Graham broke the agonizing silence with his easy-going southern 
manner, “Thank you for asking that, ‘cause that is the first time I have been asked that 
and I’m glad to be able to say that, because, uh, uh, we know nothing about it.” 
When it was obvious that Graham would not address the CIA question further, 
three questions finally came from other reporters; Graham answered directly and briefly. 
First, there was a question about the “divisions in religion in the United States;” second, a 
question about the “civil rights movement in the United States,” as well as Martin Luther 
King, Jr.; and third, a question came regarding the number of people that might come 
forward and make a “decision” at the crusade. Graham stated that an internal BGEA 
study revealed that 1% to 10% of the people “come forward” for a variety of reasons. 
The forty-one minute press conference provided only four answers to journalists’ 
questions – one very long one on the CIA and three brief ones. Without hesitation, 





The press conference ended. However, the question about the CIA, with its 
confusing, stumbling answer, remained. 
The Elusive Story 
The headline of the San Juan Star story created an image of innocence for 
Graham – “Graham Denies CIA Ties.”7 The article appeared in the Star on March 24, a 
week after the March 16 press conference. From the text of the story, it is clear that 
reporter Robert Friedman wrote his 550-word copy the day after the press conference, but 
for unknown reasons the story was held a week before being published. The story begins 
with brief comments about the CIA story: 
Evangelist Billy Graham said here yesterday he has no knowledge that the Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA) has helped finance his religious crusades. 
“I would never accept funds from any government agency – especially the CIA,” 
Graham said. He was commenting on [sic] Time magazine article which reported 
that the CIA had partially backed his recent crusade in Latin America. 
Graham said: “I strongly believe in separation between church and state . . . I’m 
not running a political campaign, nor am I engaging in ideological conflicts. I stay 
out of politics.” 
The news story shifts to Graham’s comments about the Vietnam War, as well as his 
reasons for coming to Puerto Rico to hold a crusade. The article returns briefly to the 
issue of CIA support for Graham’s Latin American crusades: 
Returning to the Time magazine report of CIA-financing of his crusade to Latin 
America, Graham said that when he returned to the mainland next week, he would 
“try to find out” if and how the agency funded the trip without his knowledge. 
                                                 




“The story in Time magazine was the first I’d ever heard about the CIA financing 
the crusade,” Graham said. “We have never received any funding that we know 
about. The money might have come through some other organization.” 
“I stay out of politics. Many clergymen criticize me for this, but I don’t care. I 
believe God called me to proclaim a spiritual, not a political message.” 
The story subsequently shares additional quotes from Graham about Vietnam: “I think it 
would be wrong for the Protestant church to say we should not be in the war in Vietnam.” 
Finally, the news piece ends with Graham speaking favorably about the Catholic Church 
and critically of Protestants, especially those who say, “God is dead.” 8 
The Associated Press (AP) picked up the Graham-CIA story from the San Juan 
Star and published it across the newswire under the headline “Graham Not Aware of CIA 
Assistance.” The brief AP piece featured one important quote from Graham: “I would 
never accept funds from any government agency – especially the CIA.” The AP story 
also referenced the TIME magazine article and Graham’s promise to look into the matter 
after he returned home. Newspapers across the US carried the AP story, with some giving 
it more prominence than others. Some newspapers generated a different headline for the 
story, but used the basic text from the AP. The Miami Herald wrote an eye-catching 
headline – “CIA Funds? News to Me Says Graham.” The Durham Herald used the terse 
heading, “CIA Aid.” However, in addition to the basic facts from the AP newswire piece, 
the Durham Herald added an editorial observation: “Prudently [Graham] does not deny 





the charge – only that he and his organization are not aware of any CIA funds coming 
into the treasury.”9 
The most important exposure of the Graham-CIA story was in the New York 
Times on March 25, 1967. The 125-word Times news piece appeared under the headline, 
“Graham Denies Knowledge of C.I.A. Funds for Trip.” Although attributed as a “Special 
to the New York Times,” the account contains only the basic news elements found in the 
AP story. A baffling and yet revealing aspect of the Times publication of the story is its 
location in the newspaper. The Graham story appeared in two inches at the very bottom 
of page eleven, squeezed between an advertisement for Scandinavian furniture and a 
story about “Girl, Once Abducted, Is Wed.” To say that The Times hid the story is an 
understatement. The Graham-CIA article was not included in the international news 
section, even though it reported on accusations of CIA malfeasance in Latin America. It 
did not appear with other religious news. Instead, the Graham write-up has a spot at the 
bottom of a page that featured news about the arts – “Piano Accompanist for Films 
Retiring;” “Tributes to Toscanini;” “Royal Ballet Set for a New Season.” Apparently, 
someone inside or outside the Times organization wanted the Billy Graham story 
“buried” in the classic sense. The editors of the Times, perhaps under pressure from 
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superiors at the Times or highly placed government sources, seemingly did not want its 
readers to notice the story about Graham working with the CIA.10 
The March 3, 1967 TIME magazine article – “Pandora’s Cashbox” – that 
prompted the reporter’s question about the CIA, surprisingly made only a brief mention 
of Billy Graham.11 The story was a follow-up to the February 24 TIME cover story, which 
described the Ramparts revelations about the National Student Association and the 
appointment of the Katzenbach Committee by President Johnson to investigate the CIA 
funding of US organizations, journalists and academics in the battle against 
communism.12 “Pandora’s Cashbox” began by referencing the previous week’s news: 
With the disclosure that the U.S. National Student Association had been secretly 
financed by the Central Intelligence Agency for 15 years (TIME, Feb. 24), a 
Pandora’s cashbox of CIA philanthropy sprang open to public view last week.13 
The TIME story proceeds to report on the troubling CIA covert funding scheme that 
Ramparts, the New York Times, Washington Post, and other publications broke over the 
previous four weeks. The TIME story cites as one of its first examples of groups that 
received CIA money the “Billy Graham Spanish-American crusade.” It provides no 
further specifics. The only Graham crusades in “Spanish-American” countries prior to 
1967 were the 1958 Caribbean Tour and the two-part 1962 South America Tour. Given 
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Graham’s own reference to the “South American crusades” as well as the timing of CIA 
activities and funding in Latin America, it is clear that the reference is to 1962: 
The convoluted pipelines of foundations used to distribute CIA dollars seemed to 
be almost as limitless as the curiosity of the newsmen willing to plow through 
public-record tax files. Recipients of CIA-suspect largesse made an encyclopedic 
grab bag of organizations ranging from the now defunct Institute of International 
Labor Research Inc. (headed by old Socialist Norman Thomas) to the Billy 
Graham Spanish-American crusade, from the North American Secretariat of Pax 
Romana and the John Hay Whitney Trust for Charitable Purposes to the 
International Food and Drink Workers Federation and the Friends of India 
Committee. 14  
This brief mention is the only statement in either of the two TIME articles about 
Billy Graham receiving funds from the CIA. Moreover, this is the only comment in all of 
the news coverage about the Ramparts controversy and the Katzenbach Committee 
investigation that alleges the BGEA received funds from the CIA. In all the lists of CIA 
front foundations and funding conduits produced by the government and media 
investigations during the Ramparts controversy, this TIME statement is the only public 
source alleging a funding link between Billy Graham and the CIA. Further, in all the 
biographies of Billy Graham’s life, publications about the work of the BGEA, and 
histories of Graham’s 60 years of evangelistic crusades, this assertion in the “Pandora’s 
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Cashbox” story is the primary and original source cited by other publications verifying 
Billy Graham’s collaboration with the CIA. 
Did TIME reporters do their own plowing of “public-record tax files” to uncover                         
this intriguing link? Did Billy Graham privately share this piece of information with his 
good friend Henry Luce, the founder and publisher of TIME, who passed it on to his 
reporters? Did Luce’s wife, Clare Boothe Luce, US Ambassador to Italy and close friend 
of Allen Dulles, possibly learn this tidbit of gossip during one of her trysts with the 
former DCI and then pass it on to her husband? Whatever the source, TIME had access to 
information that no one else did, and it caught the attention of reporters and the public 
during the two weeks before Graham’s Puerto Rico crusade.15 
The TIME allegation that the BGEA took money from a CIA-funded front 
foundation had a basis in fact, likely contributing to its believability. From the early days 
of its operations, the Graham organization solicited and received money from public and 
private foundations – and it continues to do so, even today. Two 1957 articles in the New 
York Times about the preparations for Graham’s historic Madison Square Garden crusade 
set the cost of the New York city event at “more than $900,000,” the most expensive 
crusade ever mounted by the evangelist.16 Both news articles noted that two-thirds of the 
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Boothe] Luce was surely more than platonic but less intense than the affairs of his younger days”  
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budget was raised in advance of the event from “contributions by individuals, 
foundations, organizations, partnerships and corporations.”17 Given the heavy costs 
incurred by the BGEA in staging crusades, it is plausible that the BGEA received monies 
from a CIA-funded front foundation in the early 1960s, knowingly or unknowingly. 
Another mystery emerges from Graham’s comments at the San Juan press 
conference. He repeatedly said he knew nothing about receiving CIA funds, but his 
comments about the TIME article demonstrated familiarity with its allegations. For 
example, the reporter’s question never mentioned South America; that fact came from the 
TIME article, which Graham, by his answer, clearly had read: 
I think they limited it to the South American crusades some years ago and I don’t 
know anything except what I read there. I was quite amazed. And, uh, I don’t 
know anything about it. I, uh, the CIA never gave any money to, uh, any of our 
crusades anywhere in the world. I was not aware of it.18 
Subsequently, at the press conference, Graham promised that when he returned home he 
would check into the story, even contacting some of his friends in Washington, DC, to 
find out if the allegations were true. It would be reasonable to expect that Graham would 
have made follow-up comments once he was back in his office and had investigated the 
matter, perhaps a press release or maybe a formal report.19 
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Instead, nothing. The story died. It was buried, just like the New York Times 
account hidden away at the bottom of page eleven. Graham never publicly mentioned it 
again. Nothing about the CIA question appears in the official files and accounts of the 
Puerto Rico crusade. Nothing shows up in BGEA publications in the days and months 
following the end of the Puerto Rico meetings. Graham said nothing about the CIA 
question on The Hour of Decision, his weekly radio broadcast. Nothing appeared in 
Decision magazine, the primary BGEA news publication sent to supporters around the 
world every month. Christianity Today, the premier evangelical newsmagazine founded 
by Billy Graham in 1956, wrote nothing about the CIA story. It was as if Robert 
Friedman never asked his question. It was as if the TIME article was never printed.20 
The deafening silence and lack of answers raises questions. Did the BGEA take 
money from the CIA to help fund Graham’s Latin American crusades in 1962? Did the 
Graham organization knowingly collaborate with the CIA in an effort to stop the spread 
of communism in Latin America? Did Billy Graham personally know about the 
relationship with the CIA? Were CIA funds channeled directly to the BGEA office or 
were they funneled to individual Latin American crusade organizations, perhaps as 
untraceable cash donations? Why would the BGEA partner with the CIA in South 
America? What was the evangelistic organization’s motivation? Did the BGEA cooperate 
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with the CIA on any other ventures? These questions swirl around one of the most 
compelling mysteries in the Cold War religion and covert operations story.  
In recent research, meager yet valuable evidence has surfaced that seems to 
corroborate the allegation that BGEA received CIA funds. Professor of religious studies 
at Stonehill College, Fr. Richard Gribble, CSC, revealed in an article on the life of Fr. 
Patrick Peyton, CSC that two documents exist in the Archives of the Holy Cross 
Generalate (AHCG) in Rome that verify the assertion about Graham and the CIA. 
Gribble writes about the anti-communist efforts of Catholics in South America in 
partnership with the CIA. In particular, Gribble provides the history of the Family Rosary 
Crusade led by Fr. Patrick Peyton of the Congregation of the Holy Cross (CSC). In 
researching the linkage between Peyton and the CIA, Gribble came across a memo of a 
meeting in Rome between “Fathers Lalande, Mullahy, and Peyton” on October 24, 1964. 
In the memo, “Peyton told Lalande that Billy Graham’s Latin American revivals as well 
as the work of the Maryknoll religious community was also financed through the C.I.A.” 
Moreover, in a letter written by Lalande about the meeting, the Superior General also 
recounts the allegation about Graham and the CIA.21  
Cold War historian, Hugh Wilford, professor of history at California State 
University, Long Beach, writes about the same evidence in his book on the CIA’s covert 
operations during the early Cold War, The Mighty Wurlitzer: How the CIA Played 
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Germain Lalande, CSC, “Meeting with Peyton and Mullahy, 24 October 1964, 428 (Family Rosary) 




America. The title for Wilford’s book came from an analogy crafted by Frank Wisner, the 
CIA’s first chief of covert political warfare. Wisner compared the CIA’s network of front 
organizations, exposed during the Ramparts controversy, to a “Mighty Wurlitzer” organ 
capable of playing “any tune” the CIA decided to compose. Wilford’s book provides a 
comprehensive and extensively researched account of the front organizations created by 
Wisner, which operated with impunity for twenty years from the founding of the CIA in 
1947 until the Ramparts revelations in 1967.22 
In a chapter on Catholics and covert activities – “Saving the World” – Wilford 
examines the role that Tom Dooley and Edward Lansdale played in Vietnam. As well, he 
looks at the conservative Family Rosary Crusade under Fr. Patrick Peyton, CSC, who 
became involved with the CIA through funding from one of the CIA’s most active 
funding conduits, the W.R. Grace Corporation under the leadership of family scion, J. 
Peter Grace.23 According to Wilford, who reviewed the same archival documents seen by 
Gribble, at the meeting in Rome on October 24, 1964, Peyton told the Superior General 
of the CSC, Germain-Marie Lalande, that Billy Graham received secret payments from 
the CIA, along with Fr. Roger Vekemans and Maryknoll priests, for operations in South 
America. How did Peyton learn this information? The archival documents do not make it 
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clear. One can surmise that Peyton learned about it in one of his many private meetings 
with Peter Grace. Perhaps, Grace was involved in funding the other three South 
American CIA operations and said something to Peyton as they were discussing funds for 
the Family Rosary Crusade. In the meeting with Lalande, Peyton likely mentioned the 
names of Graham, Vekemans, and Maryknoll in an attempt to strengthen his defense in 
the face of questions by his Superior General.24  
In an interview with the author, Wilford stated that the Graham-CIA connection 
was one of the most intriguing yet unresolved mysteries that he had run across 
concerning the CIA’s covert operations for the twenty-year period covered by his 
research. Unfortunately, Wilford admitted, he lacked adequate time to pursue the 
Graham-CIA relationship further during his writing of The Mighty Wurlitzer. The focus 
of this chapter is to unpack, to the degree possible, this mystery.25 
Other than the two brief mentions – the TIME story and the Peyton memo – no 
substantive investigation into the allegation that the CIA funded Graham’s 1962 Latin 
American crusades has occurred. No research has explored “why” the BGEA might have 
collaborated with the CIA during this time. No files, declassified or otherwise, are 
available from the CIA (CREST), State Department (FRUS), or the National Security 
Archives that shed any light on this mystery. However, the Billy Graham Center 
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Archives at Wheaton College contains detailed files on the 1962 South America crusades, 
the events leading up to them, and the personal activities of Billy Graham during this 
time. Like a large puzzle, enough pieces can be assembled to gain a reasonably accurate 
picture of what occurred and why. 
Sadly, two months before the writing of this chapter, Billy Graham died at the age 
of ninety-nine. It was national news. Millions worldwide mourned his passing. He 
became the first religious leader and only the fourth private citizen in history to lie in 
honor at the U.S. Capitol in Washington, DC. With Graham’s death, there has been a 
revival of interest in his life and accomplishments with hundreds of news stories, opinion 
pieces and scholarly articles published about the acclaimed evangelist in the last few 
months.26 
In this sentimental context, a number of conservative Christians challenged the 
author’s decision to write about this episode in Graham’s life at this time. Does not this 
story besmirch the reputation and legacy of a great man of God? Why bring it up? Why 
not leave it alone, leave it in the past? Some supporters of Billy Graham do not want to 
hear anything about possible collusion between Graham and the CIA – not now, not ever. 
Regretfully, as with other devout believers, they do not want to hear about the shadow 
                                                 
26 Laurie Goodstein, “Billy Graham, 99, Dies; Pastor Filled Stadiums and Counseled Presidents,” 
NYT, Feb 21, 2018, A1. Kate Shellnutt, “Mr. Graham Goes to Washington: First Pastor Honored in 
US Capitol,” Christianity Today, posted online February 22, 2018, accessed May 28, 2018, 
https://www.christianitytoday.com/news/2018/february/billy-graham-funeral-plans-washington-
capitol-honor.html. The full April 2018 issue of Christianity Today magazine, founded by Billy 
Graham, was a memorial issue devoted to the life, ministry and accomplishments of Graham. The four 
private citizens who have laid in honor in the US Capitol Rotunda are Billy Graham (Feb. 28 – March 
1, 2018), Rosa Parks (Oct. 30-31, 2005), and Officer Jacob J. Chestnut and Detective John M. Gibson 




side of the person, life or ministry of their religious leaders. Indeed, Billy Graham 
achieved many things unmatched by any Christian leader. Nevertheless, with genuine 
humility, Graham admitted that he made mistakes and that if he could have done some 
things over – like his involvement with partisan politics – he would have done it 
differently.27 
The best answer to the question, “Why this story and why now?” is found in the 
Bible that Graham preached with passion and conviction. It is a verse he exhorted his 
audiences with many times. It is the verse that Allen Dulles had inscribed on the entrance 
wall of the old CIA headquarters building – “And you shall know the truth and the truth 
shall make you free” (John 8:32). 
Cold War Billy 
Billy Graham burst onto the American scene at the same time that the threat of 
international communism and the Cold War began to engulf the American psyche. In the 
fall of 1949, the thirty-year old Christian evangelist and Christian college president, 
William Franklin “Billy” Graham, Jr., began holding “revival services” at the corner of 
Washington and Hill Streets in downtown Los Angeles in a rented Ringling Brothers 
circus tent, dubbed the “Canvas Cathedral.”28 The meetings began on September 25, 
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1949, scheduled to run for three weeks. However, because of overwhelming turnout, the 
public conversion of several high profile Hollywood stars and an underworld gangster, 
and the surprise intervention by one of America’s most powerful media moguls – 
William Randolph Hearst – the Christ for Greater Los Angeles Crusade ran for eight 
weeks until November 20, 1949.29 Those eight weeks and what followed in Graham’s 
ministry, transformed the face of American religion, the relationship between religion 
and politics in the United States, the views of Americans on communism and the Cold 
War and, surprisingly, specific covert operations conducted by the CIA in South America 
and the Middle East.30 
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During the 1949 Los Angeles Crusade, Graham earned the moniker, “warrior 
against communism.” Indeed, his anti-communist message was one thing that drew 
people to his meetings. According to Graham biographer, Grant Wacker, the Gilbert T. 
Rowe Professor Emeritus of Christian History at Duke Divinity School, “Graham’s 
hatred and fear of communism was palpable, profound, and pervasive.”31  
Consider the times. On February 22, 1946, George F. Kennan sent his “Long 
Telegram” from Moscow to Washington influencing how the American government 
viewed communism. On March 5, 1946, Winston Churchill gave his “Iron Curtain 
Speech” in Fulton, Missouri. On March 12, 1947, before a joint session of Congress, 
President Truman announced the Truman Doctrine intended to stop Soviet expansion, 
particularly in Greece and Turkey. A week later, on March 21, the President signed 
Executive Order 9835 initiating an “Employee Loyalty Program,” intended to uncover 
subversives in the US government, but more crucially paving the way for Joseph 
McCarthy and the “Red Scare.” In July 1947, George F. Kennan’s X Article, “The 
Sources of Soviet Conduct,” appeared in Foreign Affairs calling for containment of the 
Soviet Union. On September 18, 1947, President Truman signed the National Security 
Act of 1947 creating the Department of Defense, the National Security Council, and the 
CIA. And on April 4, 1949, the NATO alliance was formed to deter Soviet aggression. 
Then suddenly, on August 29, 1949, only a month before the start of the Graham 
crusade in Los Angeles, the Soviet Union surprised the world by exploding its first 
                                                 




atomic bomb, thus creating, for the first time in history, the possibility of a devastating 
nuclear war between two great powers. Finally, on October 1, 1949, six days after the 
start of the Los Angeles Crusade, Chairman Mao Zedong officially proclaimed the 
establishment of the People’s Republic of China. Fear of communism and the possibility 
of a World War III were ubiquitous and overwhelming. 
During the eight weeks of the Los Angeles crusade, Graham preached every day 
and twice every Sunday – sixty-five sermons in total to an aggregate audience of 350-
400,000 people. Foreboding and apocalyptic admonitions permeated his messages. The 
sermon titles from the crusade reveal Graham’s disposition: “Final Judgement,” “The 
Second Coming of Christ,” “Weighed in God’s Balances and Found Wanting,” “When 
Casey Struck Out – God’s Judgement,” and “God’s Warning.”32 References to 
communism appeared in his first sermon on September 25 and frequently thereafter, 
though not in every sermon. On October 23, Graham was explicit about the threat that 
aggressive, atheistic communism posed to American Christians in a sermon entitled, 
“Why God Allows Communism to Flourish and Why God Allows Christians to Suffer.” 
Two years later, he characterized the threat more succinctly in a sermon simply entitled, 
“Christianity vs. Communism.”33 According to Wacker, “Graham hammered the 
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communist threat constantly. Next to the gospel message, by his own recollection, he 
preached about [communism] more than anything else.” The evangelist often challenged 
his listeners to be willing to lay down their lives for Jesus Christ the same way that the 
Soviets were willing to die for Lenin or Stalin. Graham claimed, “Stalin’s fixed purpose 
is to holster the whole world for communism” and “Communism is a fanatical religion 
that has declared war upon the Christian God.”34 
During the Los Angeles crusade, Hollywood’s brightest stars were anxious to rub 
shoulders with Graham and have some of his “moral stardust” brush off on them. He met 
with Cecil B. DeMille, Spencer Tracy, and Katherine Hepburn. Other stars attended the 
meetings, including Jane Russell, Gene Autry, Colleen Townsend, John Holland and 
Harvey Fritts. As the end of the third week approached, Graham and his team decided to 
pray and ask God for a “sign” as to whether they should continue the meetings. A day 
later, Stuart Hamblen, legendary cowboy, poet, musician, LA celebrity and host of one of 
the City of Angels’ most popular morning radio shows, announced on his show, “Tonight 
at the end of Billy’s invitation, I’m going to hit the sawdust trail.” Hamblen’s public 
conversion was widely publicized in the local and national media. Graham had his sign. 
The meetings continued. 35 
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On November 5, notorious crime figure Jim Vaus was listening to Hamblen’s 
radio show as he told the story of his conversion at the Graham crusade. Vaus was the 
electronics and wire-tapping wizard for Mickey Cohen, the Mafia boss of Los Angeles. 
Vaus attended one of Graham’s meetings and made a public commitment. The news 
wires across the country blared the headline: “Wiretapper Vaus Hits the Sawdust Trail.” 
With an introduction by Vaus, Graham went to meet privately with Mafia boss Mickey 
Cohen in an unsuccessful attempt to convert him too. The newspapers carried the story 
with the headline, “Evangelist Attempts to Convert Cohen, Mickey in Denial.”36 
Another celebrity conversion was Louis Zamperini, a 1936 Olympic track star and 
WWII war hero who was tortured as a Japanese prisoner of war.37 He returned from 
captivity after the war “to a blaze of publicity;” however, his life fell apart and he became 
“penniless, destitute, drinking heavily.” His wife dragged him to the LA crusade after 
first going alone. Zamperini attended several times before making a commitment to turn 
his life around, which became big news “on sports pages all over the country.” 
Capitalizing on the publicity value of celebrity conversions, Graham encouraged 
Hamblen, Vaus, and Zamperini to give their “testimonies” several times during the eight 
weeks of crusade meetings. The testimonies were widely covered in the newspapers 
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generating even larger crowds. Media-savvy Graham understood that “people want to 
come and hear a person who is famous.”38 
Again, Graham and his team asked God for a “sign” as to whether they should 
continue. Hamblen’s conversion had been their first “sign,” but a week later, they felt 
they needed something more. On the night that Graham had set as the deadline for a 
decision, he arrived at the big tent early and saw a swarm of reporters – notebooks out, 
questions flying, flashbulbs popping. When Graham asked what was going on, one 
reporter replied, “You’ve just been kissed by William Randolph Hearst.” Although 
historians agree on the basic story of Hearst’s endorsement of Graham, several variations 
exist concerning the details. Nancy Gibbs and Michael Duffy capture the most widely 
accepted version of the story in their critically acclaimed book, The Preacher and the 
Presidents: Billy Graham in the White House. 
Graham had never met the newspaper baron; he was later told that Hearst and 
Marion Davies [Hearst’s mistress] had attended the crusade in disguise, after 
learning about it from a housekeeper named Hedla who used to listen to Graham 
on the radio. It is just as likely that Hearst came around because he was acutely 
interested in anything that a great many people were interested in. As the legend 
goes, he returned to his office and sent a two-word telegram to all his papers: 
“Puff Graham.” The Hearst papers began running stories about the crusade all 
across the country, and it was not long before other news organizations noticed.39 
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The next day the Los Angeles Examiner and the Los Angeles Herald Express, 
Hearst publications, carried banner headlines about the crusade. On November 4, several 
Hearst papers carried an Editorial – “New Tide of Faith” – datelined Los Angeles and 
praising “the Christ for Greater Los Angeles revival meetings [which] have aroused a 
religious fervor rare in the annals of this city.” Soon thereafter, the Associated Press and 
United Press International (UPI) started covering the LA meetings, printing regular 
stories about the crusade and doing personal stories about Graham. According to 
Dartmouth professor of American Religious History, Randall Balmer, Hearst’s 
instructions to “Puff Graham” are “two of the most famous words in all of American 
religious history.”40 
History is murky about what motivated Hearst’s interest in Graham. Hearst never 
publicly spoke about it. Moreover, the sickly, frequently bed-ridden tycoon died less than 
two years after Graham held his LA crusade. Like Graham, though, the newspaper baron 
was “fiercely pro-American.” Like Graham, Hearst believed in having a well-ordered 
society. Like Graham, the media mogul believed in capitalism and free markets. 
Historians affirm, though, that it was most likely Graham’s “trumpet-lunged” preaching 
against the evils and dangers of communism that attracted William Randolph Hearst, an 
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ardent anti-communist. On the other hand, “It just as easily could have been a cold 
calculus to sell papers.”41 
Hearst’s sudden promotion of Billy Graham and the Los Angeles Crusade, as well 
as the coverage by the AP and UPI caught the attention of Hearst’s main competitor and 
“the nation’s most powerful publisher,” Henry R. Luce. The founder of Time, Inc., Luce 
owned two of America’s most influential news magazines, TIME and Life. On November 
14, 1949, during the final week of the LA crusade, TIME ran a one-page story, “Sickle 
Ready for Harvest,” introducing Graham to TIME’S international audience. Highlighting 
the mood of the nation in the fall of 1949, the article closes with a quote from Graham: 
“Very rarely do I find an atheist . . . People aren’t so smart-alecky any more. They’re 
scared.” The following week, TIME’S publication cousin, Life, with 25 million readers, 
published a brief story – “A New Evangelist Arises” – with six dramatic photographs, 
two of Graham gesticulating dramatically while preaching, two of the crowds in the 
circus tent, and one each of celebrities Stuart Hamblen and Louis Zamperini.42 
Although Luce’s introductory coverage of Graham was modest, the evangelist 
clearly appealed to the publisher’s beliefs about God and country. Luce was the son of 
Presbyterian missionaries to China, as was Billy Graham’s wife, Ruth Bell Graham. 
American missionaries did not find it easy to walk away from China after the 
Communists took over. Luce was a devout believer and active member of National 
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Presbyterian Church in Washington, DC. It was Luce’s faith that led him to “espouse a 
particularly virulent strain of anticommunism;” and it was his faith that undergirded his 
belief that it was America’s Judeo-Christian duty to “fend off the godless communist 
menace.” Luce intuitively understood how much further Graham’s evangelistic and anti-
communist message could travel with the support and publicity that Luce’s media empire 
could generate. “Luce quickly took up the role of Graham’s premier publicist,” 
personally schooling the evangelist on the importance of marketing, publicity and news 
coverage. Although, Hearst’s “Puff Graham” set off media fireworks around Graham, in 
the long run it was Luce’s media coverage and eventual friendship that made the 
difference for the thirty-one year old evangelist.43 
Grant Wacker succinctly explains the convergence that took place for Graham at 
the Los Angeles Crusade with Hearst, Luce and the media: 
A cluster of elements came into play. First, of course, was Graham himself, who 
possessed an exceptional aptitude for working with the press. Second, a message 
that proved timely, accessible, and exportable. Third, new media technology that 
spread Graham’s message, with speed, breadth, and depth that would have been 
unimaginable much before the 1950s. Fourth, a mass audience receptive to a mass 
message: one that sounded and functioned very much the same wherever he went. 
Fifth, a journalistic empire possessed of the financial means and power to project 
it. And sixth, the attention of Hearst, Luce, and savvy figures like them who saw 
that the other five elements were in place. They had the moxie and determination 
to make it all happen.44 
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With powerful men like Luce and Hearst paying attention, Graham felt God was 
“opening a door for him” to greater ministry. Fortunately, the benefits flowed two ways. 
“Graham gained vast publicity from the press, and the press gained a steady source of 
revenue from stories about the affable, photogenic, and loquacious evangelist.” A few 
months after the Los Angeles crusade, Graham and Luce struck up a close, personal 
friendship that lasted until Luce’s death in 1967. The friendship drew Graham into Luce’s 
social, financial, media and political world. Ultimately, the relationship with Luce figures 
into the 1967 TIME story about Billy Graham and the CIA.45 
After a brief stopover at home, Graham’s next crusade was in Boston, likely 
because it was the home of Dr. Harold John Ockenga, senior minister of the historic Park 
Street Church, who helped found Fuller Seminary, Gordon-Conwell Seminary and the 
National Association of Evangelicals. As well, it was the home of long-time BGEA 
treasurer and board member, Allan Emery, president of the National Wool Trade 
Association. The Boston meetings happened in two parts, January and April 1950. In the 
winter, Graham packed the old Boston Garden with 16,000 people (5,000 were turned 
away) and in the spring Graham closed his crusade with a service on Boston Common 
that drew 50,000.46 While speaking in Boston, Graham continued to mix his evangelistic 
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and political messages. He hammered away at communism: “Either communism must 
die, or Christianity must die, because it is actually a battle between Christ and the 
Antichrist.”47 
In the three years following the Los Angeles and Boston crusades, Graham rode a 
wave of publicity producing overflow crowds at meetings all around the United States. In 
1954, he travelled to England where for three months massive crowds attended his 
nightly meetings at Harringay Arena in London, considered by some British scholars “the 
most momentous religious event in 20th-century Britain.” During his 1954 crusade in 
London, Graham met personally with Prime Minister Churchill. Graham returned to 
preach for a week at Wembley stadium in 1955. During that time, he met with Queen 
Elizabeth II and preached for a service in her private chapel. After London in 1954, the 
evangelist held a string of shorter meetings in Scotland, Finland, Sweden, Netherlands, 
France and Germany. In total, the evangelist spent four months in the spring and summer 
of 1954 preaching in Europe. By the time he returned home, he was an international 
celebrity and a world Christian leader, commanding the global media spotlight and 
pursued by not only religious leaders, but also by government and political leaders.48 
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During his time in London and Europe, Graham significantly toned down, 
although not entirely, his political rhetoric and anti-communist comments.49 As the Cold 
War wore on, Graham’s attitude towards communism became less acerbic and more open 
to engagement. Graham visited the Soviet Union in 1959 as a tourist and “said a quiet 
prayer at Lenin Stadium that God would allow him to return to preach in the Soviet 
Union.” He held his first religious services in the USSR for a week in May 1982. 
Graham’s first preaching visit to a communist country was to Hungary in 1977, where he 
held a week of meetings in September. Graham and his wife, Ruth, visited China for the 
first time as private citizens in April 1988. During their two weeks in the land where Ruth 
was born and lived until high school, Graham had a one-hour meeting with Prime 
Minister Li Peng at the party compound at Zhongnanhai. He also visited the Chinese 
Academy of Social Sciences, spoke to students at Peking University, and preached at the 
Beijing Christian Church. In 1992, Graham returned to Russia for ten days of meetings 
and visited North Korea for two days, where he met with President Kim Il-sung, whom 
Graham perplexingly called “a gentle and logical thinker.” The evangelist baffled even 
some of his most loyal supporters by speaking of Kim Il-sung fawningly: “There are 
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statues of him all over the place. The people there really do love him.” While in 
Pyongyang, Graham also spoke to students at Kim Il-sung University and preached in the 
Changchung Church.50 
A generation of Americans knew Billy Graham as “The Pastor to Presidents,” an 
image actively cultivated and promoted by the Graham organization. In the early days, 
Graham did not just happen to meet and build relationships with US Presidents. He 
lobbied for introductions and meetings, often through powerful friends in Congress. In 
the later 1950s and 1960s, aspiring presidential candidates approached Graham hoping 
for, if not a formal endorsement, at least an informal association with the famous 
preacher, which could generate support from Graham’s millions of followers. Charles 
Colson recalled how in 1972 in an effort to build a twenty-million person database for 
Nixon’s re-election campaign, the President asked his good friend Graham for his 
mailing list, which was considered “pure gold.” “Nope,” came the reply, “Mr. Graham 
says he does not want to do that.” Obviously, Nixon tried many “tricks” to assure his re-
election in 1972. Graham personally invited US Presidents to attend his crusades 
believing that their presence and words would validate his ministry, encourage the faith 
of Americans, and promote attendance.51  
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Graham built genuine friendships with a number of US Presidents. He met with 
every US President from Harry Truman in 1950 to Barack Obama in 2010. He met 
Donald Trump on November 7, 2013 at his 95th birthday celebration in Ashville, North 
Carolina, before Trump publicly announced his run for the presidency.52 Graham’s first 
meeting with a President – Truman – was the most disastrous. After coming out of the 
Oval Office meeting, reporters swarmed the evangelist. In response to a flurry of shouted 
questions, Graham told reporters what Truman said in their private conversation. Then 
Graham and three of his associates famously knelt on the lawn of the White House 
“reenacting” the prayer Graham prayed privately with Truman. On hearing what 
happened on White House grounds, Truman was furious. He declared the evangelist a 
“counterfeit” and said that all Graham was interested in was “getting his name in the 
paper.” Years later, while visiting Truman at his home in Independence, Missouri, 
Graham admitted he made a grievous error in judgement and behavior and “apologized 
profusely” to the former President.53 
Graham had better fortune with Eisenhower. In 1952, through an introduction by 
Texas billionaire oilman Sid Richardson, Graham went to Europe to meet the General 
and convince him to run for office. After Eisenhower’s election, Graham became his 
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confidant and spiritual advisor. The President “invited the evangelist to the White House 
on just about every occasion that he visited Washington.” Graham convinced Eisenhower 
to become a member and regular attendee of the National Presbyterian Church where, 
twelve days after taking office, Eisenhower became the only president baptized while in 
office. When Eisenhower ran for re-election in 1956, Graham could not endorse him 
publicly, but promised the President, “I shall do all in my power during the coming 
campaign to gain friends and supporters for your cause.” In public, Graham continually 
claimed to be apolitical and neutral; however, according to Graham biographer William 
Martin, “in private he continued to act like a Republican strategist.”54 
Nancy Gibbs, who co-authored The Preacher and the Presidents with Michael 
Duffy, shared her insights on Graham’s relationships with Presidents in an interview with 
Christianity Today for the Graham memorial issue. In the interview, Gibbs shared her 
observations, drawn from interviews with Graham, about all the Presidents from Truman 
through George W. Bush: 
Graham’s relationships with different presidents varied widely. He skinny-dipped 
in the White House pool with Lyndon Johnson, played golf with John F. 
Kennedy, and counseled the Clintons after the Monica Lewinsky scandal. 
But Graham acknowledged that his relationship with Richard Nixon, tainted by 
partisan politics, was the one most harmful to the evangelist’s gospel mission. . . . 
He was personally probably closest to George Herbert Walker Bush, politically 
closest to Nixon, and theologically closest or pastorally closest to Johnson. 
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Johnson would invite him to the White House, to the ranch, all the time. He would 
want him to sit by his bed, read Scripture with him, pray together. Lucy Johnson 
would talk about how when Billy Graham came to the White House, it was like 
the entire temperature came down a few degrees. Everyone breathed more easily. 
With Nixon, it was a much more political transaction. This was where Graham 
got to indulge his hidden fascination with political strategy and was a very shrewd 
reader of the electorate and political tactics. There was a political closeness that 
was very damaging to his reputation and his ministry. With the Bush family, there 
is just a true, deep personal friendship between the Grahams and the Bushes. The 
two men just had an enormous appreciation of each other. There was more 
distance between Graham and Jimmy Carter. 
Gibbs and Duffy questioned Graham about the “now-famous” tape recording of his 1972 
White House meeting with Richard Nixon in which the evangelist joined the President in 
making “disparaging comments about the Jews” (for which Graham apologized in 2002): 
When those tapes came out, it was so shocking to him that he had trouble 
believing that was his voice. It was so not what he believed. He was horrified to 
hear himself and felt so badly about it. He said, “I think it was like locker room 
talk. I was just trying to go along and ingratiate myself.” 
What was so damaging was a fear that he was too willing to ingratiate himself, 
that he cared too much about remaining in the good graces of whatever president 
and would go along with whatever was being said. This was a very painful thing 
for him to hear.55 
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Graham’s connection to John F. Kennedy is one of the most intriguing of all of 
his presidential relationships. In the election of 1960, Graham’s support tilted towards his 
long-time friend, Vice-President Richard Nixon. On August 10, 1960, Graham wrote a 
personal letter to Kennedy promising not to cause trouble in the election, but explaining 
that he would “probably vote for Nixon.” There were serious concerns in the 1960 
campaign about electing a Catholic as President. Protestants warned about the danger of 
having a “papist” in the Oval Office. In August 1960, Graham, Norman Vincent Peale, 
Carl F. H. Henry, Harold John Ockenga and twenty other Protestant leaders held a “war 
council” in Montreux, Switzerland, ostensibly to discuss issues related to “world 
evangelization,” but in fact to strategize how they could marshal religious groups in 
America to support Nixon. Peale took the lead in vocally supporting Nixon and opposing 
Kennedy’s Catholicism; Graham worked behind the scenes, giving progress reports to 
Nixon in letters. Although Graham did not publicly endorse Nixon, “he left no doubt 
where he stood.”56 
During the election campaign, Kennedy made a shrewd move in an effort to reach 
out to Graham and Protestant America, a move overlooked by almost all historians of the 
Kennedy-Graham relationship. Kennedy enlisted the help of Brooks Hays (D-AR), a 
former eight-term Congressman and well-regarded former President of the Southern 
Baptist Convention (SBC) from 1957-58, to advise Kennedy on Protestant-Catholic 
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relations. The Kennedy campaign team was “naturally concerned” that religion would 
become an issue during the election contest. Hays’ historical papers and oral history 
reside in the John F. Kennedy Presidential Library; according to the oral history, the 
religion issue and Billy Graham’s relationship with Nixon created “anxiety” for the 
campaign team since Kennedy was only the second-ever Catholic presidential candidate. 
Kennedy advisers asked Hays for recommendations on “interpreting Mr. Kennedy’s 
religious ideas and religious position and background.”57 
Moreover, in an effort to neutralize Graham’s potential support for Vice-President 
Nixon as well as the anti-Catholic sentiment expressed by many of Graham’s Protestant 
supporters, the Kennedy team asked Hays to contact Graham and seek assurances that the 
evangelist would remain neutral during the election campaign. According to Hays, he 
contacted Graham, and they had a friendly and frank conversation about the “political 
situation.” Hays then observed, “I think he was convinced as a result of that conversation 
. . . that he should not endorse the Republican Ticket – or any ticket for that matter.” The 
Hays’ intervention and his personal relationship with Graham achieved the result the 
Kennedy team was hoping for in a very tight race.58 
In late 1961, Kennedy asked Hays to serve as Special Assistant to the President in 
the White House. The Arkansas Democrat became Kennedy’s point person for the 
administration’s relations with a broad spectrum of American religious communities and 
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leaders, including Christian, Jewish, Muslim, and Bahá’í. As Hays’ personal papers 
reveal, the Executive Office of the President routed most communications dealing with 
religious matters to Hays: disputes with religious groups; issues not satisfactorily dealt 
with by the State Department; religious leaders looking for employment in the Kennedy 
administration; and missionary executives looking for help with problems in specific 
countries. As well, Hays wrote regular memoranda to the President keeping him abreast 
of religious issues and developments.59   
Hays and Graham’s relationship dated back to the Arkansas Congressman’s 
tenure as President of the SBC. Hays served in Congress at the same time that he was the 
lay president of Southern Baptists. At the same time, Graham was officially a member of 
a Southern Baptist church, First Baptist Dallas. Graham would send messages to 
President Kennedy through Hays; and the Special Assistant would channel messages 
from the President to Graham. Moreover, Hays was the conduit for arranging private 
meetings between the President and Graham, for example, the two key private meetings 
dealing with Latin America on December 12, 1961 and September 10, 1962.60  
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After the 1960 election, it was Papa Joe Kennedy through Senator George 
Smathers (D-FL), a friend of the evangelist, who reached out to Graham to mend fences. 
Papa Joe realized that his son would need the support of Graham’s Protestant 
constituency if he was going to unify the nation after the bitter and bruising election 
campaign – a winning margin of a mere 113,000 votes out of 69 million. The Kennedys 
also figured that Graham still wanted access to the halls of power in Washington, DC, 
which he had enjoyed during the Eisenhower years. The President-elect invited Graham 
to visit the Kennedy estate in Palm Beach, Florida on January 16, 1961, only four days 
before the inauguration. The two men played a round of golf together at the Seminole 
Golf Club; talked about the Second Coming of Jesus; and took a ride in an open-top 
white Lincoln convertible. Graham admitted later that the President-elect won over the 
evangelist with his famous Kennedy charm. At the end of their time together, the 
President-elect drove Graham back to the Washington Hotel where 300 reporters and 
photographers waited to interview the two celebrities –a strategic photo op conceived by 
Papa Joe. The next day, newspapers across America carried pictures of the two tall, 
tanned, handsome men riding comfortably together in a white Lincoln convertible with 
the top down and then shaking hands together in front of the hotel. Graham later 
admitted, “It didn’t occur to me at the time, but it did later, that I was being used. But I 
wanted to be used.” Papa Joe and the President-elect had obtained their “pure 14-carat 




that the election wounds were healing. John F. Kennedy could now bring the nation 
together with his inaugural address.61 
When the evangelist arrived at the Kennedy Palm Beach estate right before the 
inauguration, Graham ended up having a conversation with Papa Joe poolside while 
waiting on the President-elect. The savvy old ambassador told Graham a flattering story 
of travelling in Europe with the president of the University of Notre Dame and visiting 
one of Graham’s crusades in Germany. Joe Kennedy and his travelling companion were 
both impressed with what they heard and saw. Then Papa Joe said, “When Jack got 
elected, I told him he must make you one of his friends.” However, President Kennedy 
and Graham did not become “close” to the same degree that the evangelist did with other 
presidents. Kennedy never invited Graham to stay overnight in the White House or to 
attend a state dinner. Graham biographers describe the relationship between the two as 
“friendly but not warm” and “cordial but distant.” Long after Kennedy’ assassination, 
Graham said in an interview, “I really did not get to know John Kennedy.”62 
However, Kennedy and Graham did communicate and collaborate significantly on 
one issue – Latin America. The President was concerned about the advance of 
communism after the Cuban Revolution and the failed Bay of Pigs operation. In 1961, 
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Kennedy launched his Alliance for Progress while Graham was preparing for an 
extensive series of crusades in nine South American countries in 1962. The President 
wanted and needed the help of Billy Graham, and it is possible that in a meeting in 
December 1961 or later in September 1962, the plan involving Graham and the CIA 
emerged. 
A Call for Help from Latin America 
In 1958, the spiritual and social needs of Latin America increasingly concerned 
Billy Graham. From mid-January to mid-February 1958, the evangelist held meetings in 
eight Caribbean and Central American countries – the Caribbean Tour. Soon thereafter, 
Graham’s good friend Vice-President Nixon visited eight countries in South America on 
a “goodwill tour” to build relations with “our neighbors” and “our best friends,” 
according to Nixon.63 As news of Graham’s Caribbean meetings and Nixon’s trip spread, 
Christian groups in South America began to organize and make appeals for the famous 
preacher to come to their countries. They wanted to experience the dramatic results that 
Graham saw in Los Angeles, London and New York City. Religious groups in Buenos 
Aires were some of the first to write an appeal directly to Graham: 
It has always been said that Africa is the “Black Continent”, but I think South 
America with its Roman Catholicism, full of superstitions and superficial beliefs, 
besides their great cities, prosperous and full of immorality and corruption, can be 
considered almost as the “Black Continent No. 1”. The Gospel of Salvation and 
Redemption has not been brought to these people on the same level as their 
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material progress, and we feel that now the doors are opening, and the hour is 
very favorable to preach the gospel to individuals as well as to the masses.”64 
Graham and his team expressed interest in the South American entreaties. Letters from 
June 1958 discuss the possibly of the Graham team coming to South America in 1960, 
allowing plenty of time for advance publicity and preparations. However, Graham did not 
hold crusades in South America until early 1962, with those almost postponed. Between 
1958 and 1962, the political and social climate in Latin America changed dramatically. 
What began in 1958 as an appeal for a purely spiritual mission for the Graham team took 
on political overtones involving the White House and President Kennedy, who by 1961 
increasingly focused on issues south of the border.65 
What changed in South America between 1958 and 1962? First, there was a new 
President in the White House, John F. Kennedy, who had a remote relationship with 
Graham. Second, the revolution in Cuba – roiling in 1958 when Graham held his 
Caribbean tour and bypassed Cuba – established Fidel Castro’s communist rule on 
January 1, 1959 with the help of fellow revolutionary, Che Guevara. According to the 
Church Committee assassination report, “Almost from the day Castro took power in 
Cuba, the United States became the center of attempts to depose him.” Among the efforts 
to get rid of Castro were multiple CIA assassination plots, “another method of achieving 
change in the Cuban government.”66  
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Third, on March 13, 1961, President Kennedy gave a speech at the White House 
to two hundred ambassadors and government officials from across Latin America, 
members of Congress, the diplomatic corps, , and invited guests, announcing the Alliance 
for Progress. Richard Goodwin, Kennedy senior advisor and speechwriter, named the 
Latin American program, wrote the speech, and gave leadership to the ensuing Latin 
American initiatives during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. Kennedy 
announced the ten-year plan to achieve “maximum progress” through “maximum effort” 
in Latin America. The Alliance for Progress promised economic development, social 
reform, and political freedom consistent with the “spiritual and cultural values” of 
“American civilization” and the “free governments” of Latin America, rather than the 
communist revolution espoused by Castro and Che Guevara.67 
Fourth, on April 17, 1961, a month after announcing the Alliance for Progress, the 
CIA launched its failed paramilitary invasion of Cuba at the Bay of Pigs. Subsequently, 
in August 1961, when Kennedy went to Punta del Este, Uruguay to sign the official 
agreement for the Alliance for Progress, Richard Goodwin held a secret meeting with 
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Che Guevara. In relating the story to a 2007 audience at the John F. Kennedy Library in 
Boston, Goodwin said that Che opened their meeting by saying, “Mr. Goodwin, I’d like 
to thank you for the Bay of Pigs.”68 Fifth, in November 1961, with “the greatest secrecy, 
John and Bobby Kennedy created a new planning cell for covert action, the Special 
Group (Augmented).” According to historical records, the Special Group (Augmented) 
(SGA) was clearly Bobby Kennedy’s “outfit and it had one mission: eliminating Castro.” 
President Kennedy selected as the SGA’s Chief of Operations, Brigadier General Edward 
Lansdale, who developed a six-phase plan to overthrow Castro, designed to occur 
between March and October 1962. Lansdale’s plan included a number of religious 
dimensions. Sixth, in the summer of 1962, Moscow began moving missiles into Cuba to 
assure the security of Castro’s regime against future invasion attempts, leading to the 
Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962.69 
From 1958 to 1962, the tone and subject matter of BGEA letters regarding South 
America changed significantly. The first two years, 1958 and 1959, the discussion 
involved the spiritual needs of the continent and the strong desire of the South American 
clergy, missionaries, churches and religious organizations in South America to have the 
Graham team come and hold meetings. The BGEA staff and Graham received repeated, 
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urgent pleas to come first in 1960, then 1961, then 1962, then whenever, but “please 
come.” One letter to Graham from a South America BGEA associate pled with the 
evangelist to come before holding another crusade in Europe. He asserted that the delay 
was affecting the feelings of Christians in South America about Graham: 
As you read world news you will understand that Latin Americans feel that they 
are too often given the last place of consideration by our government, our 
business men and by our missionary emphasis. Anything we can do to alleviate 
this situation will be to the advantage of the Gospel. Otherwise we are running the 
danger of accentuating the situation.70 
The response from the Graham team to this letter and others was tepid. Coming to South 
America was a matter of “consideration” and a “matter of prayer,” but no commitments. 
In an October 1959 letter, Jerry Bevan, BGEA Director of Crusade Planning and 
Organization, stated definitively “it was not possible for us to see our way clear to 
confirm dates for crusades in South America in the year 1961.” First, they had 
commitments for lengthy crusade tours in Australia, Europe and Africa.71  
One of the issues that begins to surface in the 1958-59 correspondence is the need 
for money, for the South American religious groups and for the BGEA itself. A Jerry 
Bevan letter succinctly states three reasons for postponing any trip to South America: (1) 
“We have actually taken on too much for our organization to adequately handle;” (2) 
“Billy’s health which is going to make it necessary for us to operate at a greatly reduced 
schedule;” (3) “There is the further problem of financial support from home. We must 
stay near the home base for a certain portion of the time to make certain that the support 
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is there for us to take on these additional ventures which are almost purely missionary in 
nature.” Over the next two years, conversations about money and expenses pepper letters 
and telegrams between the BGEA staff and South American personnel. Discussions of 
money often characterized the issue in dire terms: “expense would be prohibitive;” 
“expenses were indeed ‘shocking’;” “many of these men do not have funds to draw 
upon;” “no money has arrived yet . . . we are actually paralyzed from a financial 
standpoint;” “we are not prepared financially.” Clearly, money was a concern for these 
religious non-profits, which depended upon the largess of others to sustain operations.72 
In early July 1960, Billy Graham spoke in Rio de Janeiro at the Baptist World 
Alliance before 200,000 people. During Graham’s short trip to Rio, a two-hour side 
meeting took place with religious representatives from nine South American countries 
making a personal appeal to Graham for crusades in 1962. The group was well organized 
and presented two optional plans to Graham in a five-page memo, signed by each 
representative, spelling out their appeal. The second major section of the memo addressed 
“The Political and Social Situation” in South America. For the first time in the BGEA-
South America correspondence, the South American religious leaders raised the issue of 
advancing communism and political unrest as a reason for Graham to come: “We cannot 
overlook the devastating inroads which foreign political ideologies are making in our 
national life.” The leaders expressed that “our governments” would be open to Graham 
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and his message, and that a religious revival brought by Graham “may cause our nations 
to enjoy a new day spiritually, morally and socially.”73 
In 1961, BGEA and Graham correspondence increasingly expressed concerns 
about the growing anti-American attitude in South America. In a post-script to a February 
14, 1961 letter, Jerry Bevan related that he recently had conversations with “Billy” in 
which “I sensed a growing apprehension on his part as to the wisdom of attempting South 
American meetings in the immediate future. He has evidently become concerned over the 
growing ‘anti-American’ feeling in certain corners.” In a response a week later, Charles 
Ward, the BGEA coordinator in Quito, Ecuador, provided a detailed two-page analysis of 
the political situation for Graham: 
You asked me for some comment on the “anti-americanism” recently evidenced 
in some countries. May I say that I don’t think there is anything to fear. This has 
seemed to focus in three countries, but the difficulties have been brought under 
control and the causes for the disturbances eradicated. Agitators of the Castro 
regime from Cuba have infiltrated many of the South American countries to stir 
up minority groups in demonstration against the U.S. At least two of the three 
have taken decisive action against the trouble makers and U.S. prestige is looking 
up.74  
Ward goes on to explain that “Uruguay recently kicked out the Castro agitators and asked 
the Russian Embassy at the same time to trim down its so-called staff to normal size.” 
The extra Russian staff, according to Ward, were involved in promoting “Communistic 
affairs.” Second, the crisis in “Ecuador was solved by forcing the resignation of the 
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Minister of Government, a definite Castro sympathizer and Communist. Since that time 
there has been a decided reaction against Castro and favorable support for the U.S.” 
According to Ward, the third country, Venezuela, was still suffering communist-
influenced unrest that might become more “favorable . . . within six months.” 
Interestingly, when Graham held his South America tour in 1962, he visited all three of 
these countries.75 
On March 11, 1961, the Graham team held a critical planning meeting to make 
the final decision on whether to move forward with crusades in South America in 1962. 
In a letter dated March 14, Jerry Bevan excitedly announced that a decision had been 
made and that a two-part tour would take place as recommended to Graham by the Rio 
group – from mid-January to mid-February in Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and 
Chile, and then in the “latter part of the year” in Uruguay, Paraguay, Brazil and 
Argentina. Although the BGEA made a firm commitment and preparations were given a 
green light, repeated caveats in multiple letters stated that meetings might be postponed 
or cancelled if circumstances changed.76  
Correspondence throughout the spring, summer and fall of 1961, reflected 
concerns about the political situation in South America centered on the threat of 
communism. A letter to Billy Graham from Jim Savage stated: 
                                                 
75 Letter from Charles Ward to Jerry Bevan, February 21, 1961, BGCA-CA, Box 2, Folder 1. 
76 Letter from Jerry Bevan to Jim Savage and Chuck Ward, March 14, 1961, BGCA-CA, Box 2, 




Thank you so much for your recent word concerning the situation in Latin 
America resulting from the Cuban crises. All of us are keenly aware of disturbing 
factors not only in Latin America but around the world. . . . 
Would it not be the wise procedure to continue on . . . with the final provision that 
if political conditions become of such a nature that it would be impossible or 
impractical for the crusades to continue that, of necessity they would have to be 
postponed. 77 
Warnings and encouragement about postponement also came from Washington, DC. In 
two different letters in June 1961, Jerry Bevan related a personal conversation “with 
Billy.” Graham told Bevan about recent meetings in Washington “with some experts in 
Latin American affairs” from the State Department and the National Association of 
Evangelicals. According to Bevan, Graham “received several strong words of caution 
concerning certain of the countries in South America with definite recommendations 
against visiting one or two of those which are under active consideration at this time.” 
Bevan said that the meetings that Graham had in Washington “loom very large in his 
thinking.” “Billy rather surprised me,” Bevan admitted, “when he told me his very crucial 
concern in this regard the other day.”78 
In the fall of 1961, the State Department gave additional warnings to the BGEA 
against having meetings in South America. A letter sent directly to Graham on November 
21 states, “the U.S. State Department has officially requested that you not hold 
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campaigns in Colombia on your Latin American tour in 1962.” The author of the letter 
was Hoke Smith, the Executive Secretary of the Billy Graham Team in Colombia. Smith 
gave Graham the background to the State Department warning. It seems that the U.S. 
Consul in Cali, Colombia, Mr. John Ohmans, “consulted with regard to the campaign not 
with officials of the Colombian government, but with the Roman Catholic Bishop of the 
Diocese of Cali!” The Bishop discouraged granting Graham permission to come to Cali 
and this formed the basis of the Consul’s report. Smith further stated that after hearing 
about this, he and the pastor of First Baptist Church Cali visited with the “Governor of 
the State, His Excellency Carlos H. Morales, who is Catholic.” The Governor not only 
supported Graham coming and holding a crusade in Cali, but also committed to attend 
and help the crusade team secure the use of the Olympic stadium for the meetings. Smith 
ended his letter by denouncing the knowledge and objectivity of the U.S. Consul who 
“has lived in Colombia only about one year.” Whereas, missionaries who have served in 
Colombia “more than twenty-five years” and were “quite aware of the political, social, 
moral and spiritual conditions which now prevail in Colombia” did not have a problem 
with Graham’s plans.79 
Still the situation in Columbia was a concern to the Graham team. In a letter 
written on December 12, 1961, only a month before Graham traveled to South America, 
Walter Smyth, Director of Crusade Planning and Organization for the BGEA, 
                                                 




commented about Colombia: “We have promised [the State Department] that if the 
situation worsens, the meetings may have to be cancelled at the last minute.”  
Three notable points are in Smyth’s letter. First, he raised the point that President 
Kennedy would be visiting Colombia “this month.” In fact, the important weekend trip to 
South America by President and Mrs. Kennedy – December 15-17 – started a few days 
after Smyth wrote his letter. Kennedy visited and spoke in San Juan, Puerto Rico, 
Caracas, Venezuela, and Bogota, Colombia. According to the New York Times, which 
covered the trip extensively, “In each country President Kennedy will take part in the 
dedication of projects linked to the Alliance for Progress.” As well, Kennedy had private 
meetings with the presidents of each country. Secondly, the Smyth letter mentioned that a 
BGEA Board meeting was taking place in Washington, DC on the same weekend that 
Kennedy was travelling to South America. The BGEA Board, according to Smyth, would 
be making some key decisions about South America, including whether a “second tour” 
later in the year would even take place.80 Third and most importantly, Smyth wrote his 
letter on the same day – December 12 – that Graham held a private meeting in the Oval 
Office with Kennedy. The President and Graham discussed Latin American concerns. It 
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is likely that at this meeting the subject of CIA operations and funding for Graham’s 
South America tour arises.81 
Private Meetings with the President 
On December 12, 1961 and September 10, 1962, Billy Graham met with 
President John F. Kennedy in the Oval Office in the White House. The subject of both 
conversations was Latin America. It is apparent from accounts of the two meetings that 
the President wanted to discuss matters related to Latin American with Graham and the 
evangelist needed Kennedy’s help with specific problems faced by the Graham team in 
South America. From all the available evidence, it is likely that the subject of the CIA 
came up in the first and, possibly, the second of these two meetings.82 
The evidence is circumstantial and pieced together from multiple sources, 
primarily from the John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and the Billy Graham Center 
Archives. Files available through the CIA declassification program provided only limited 
insight.83 In addition, Kennedy Oval Office conversations were not tape-recorded, except 
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right before and during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. However, Kennedy did have a 
mechanism for recording phone conversations.84 In a fluke of history, at the September 
10, 1962 meeting, Kennedy had started a phone conversation before Graham entered the 
room. The President abruptly ended his call, leaving the phone off the hook and the 
automatic recording system inadvertently picked up portions of the conversation. These 
portions are transcribed and available in the Kennedy Library. Further, the military 
attaché to President Kennedy at the time, William Brown, was in the room during the 
Graham meeting on September 10; he recalled some details of the meeting and 
conversation in an oral history interview recorded by the Kennedy Library in 2005. For 
the December 12, 1961 meeting, two people who were in the room that day have 
provided first-person accounts of what took place: Billy Graham in his autobiography and 
Brooks Hays in his oral history interview.85 
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Besides these two private meetings with Kennedy in the Oval Office, there were 
at least three other occasions where Graham met with the President – the three annual 
Presidential Prayer Breakfasts during Kennedy’s time in office:  
 February 9, 1961 – twenty days after Kennedy took office; 
 March 1, 1962 – eleven days after Graham returned from his first month-long 
tour of South America; 
 February 7, 1963 – Graham and Kennedy’s last face-to-face meeting. 
Kennedy spoke at each of the Prayer Breakfasts, as did Graham. The events took place at 
the Mayflower Hotel, attended by about 1,000 people. In an acknowledgement of the 
times, Kennedy spoke in 1961 and 1962 on the subject of religion and the Cold War. At 
the first breakfast, Kennedy said, “religion should not be viewed as a weapon in the ‘cold 
war’ but as a ‘great reservoir of spiritual resources’ for meeting the challenges facing the 
nation.” At the 1962 Prayer Breakfast, Kennedy reemphasized his point from the 
previous year stating that “religion [is] not a ‘cold war’ instrument but [is] the basis of the 
difference that separates East from West.”86 
The 1963 Prayer Breakfast, according to Graham, was “the last time I was with 
Kennedy.” After the event, “we walked out of the hotel to his car together, as was always 
our custom.” Upon reaching the car, the President made a request of Graham, “Billy, 
could you ride back to the White House with me? I’d like to see you for a minute.” In a 
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decision that Graham said, “haunt[s] me still” the evangelist declined because he had the 
flu and a fever. He said to the President, “I don’t want to give you this thing. Couldn’t we 
wait and talk some other time?” Sadly, another time never came. According to Graham, 
“It was an irrecoverable moment.” Graham wondered for years afterwards, “What was on 
his mind? Should I have gone with him?” In a little more than two years – from the Palm 
Beach meeting to the third Prayer Breakfast – the two men’s relationship had changed. 
Although they were not “close,” they had a warming relationship. Graham learned years 
after the President’s assassination, “Mr. Kennedy had reportedly said I was the only 
Protestant clergyman with whom he felt comfortable.” Other members of the Kennedy 
clan, including Rose Kennedy and Ted Kennedy, shared warm feelings for the evangelist. 
At President Kennedy’s funeral Mass at the Cathedral of St. Matthew the Apostle in 
Washington, DC, the Kennedy family invited Graham to sit with the friends of the 
family.87 
In spite of what the President said at the 1961 and 1962 Prayer Breakfasts, neither 
John Kennedy nor his brother, Bobby, were opposed to using religion in covert 
operations, particularly if it helped eliminate Castro and his growing influence in Latin 
America. After the failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion and in spite of rising concerns over 
the erection of the Berlin Wall, starting in August 1961, the Kennedy brothers had no 
higher concern than the overthrow of Castro. In a meeting of the Special Group 
(Augmented) on January 19, 1962, Bobby Kennedy outlined for the group “how it all 
                                                 




started.” Beginning with the Bay of Pigs failure, Bobby described the evolution of the 
President’s thinking up to the decision to create the SGA on November 30, 1961. It was 
the President’s decision to make Brigadier General Edward Lansdale the “Chief of 
Operations” of the SGA. Bobby stated to the group that finding a solution “to the Cuban 
problem” is “the top priority in the United States Government – all else is secondary – no 
time, money, effort, or manpower is to be spared.” The agency heads, particularly State, 
Defense, Justice (FBI), CIA, and USIA (U.S. Information Agency), “have full backing on 
what you need.” Bobby told the group that the day before (January 18) the President 
personally said to him, “The final chapter on Cuba has not been written yet.”88 The SGA 
gave Lansdale the job of developing a covert plan to get rid of Castro, codenamed 
Operation MONGOOSE. As demonstrated during his time running covert operations in 
Vietnam and Southeast Asia, as well as engineering Operation EXODUS, Lansdale was 
not averse to using religion in his covert operations.89  
A memo dated December 7, 1961 from Lansdale to members of the SGA outlined 
“bold new actions” that the CIA would undertake as a part of MONGOOSE. The first 
action Lansdale listed involved using religion and women: 
 Enlisting the cooperation of the Church to bring the women of Cuba into 
actions which will undermine the Communist control system, harass the 
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regime’s economic program, and encourage a wave of non-cooperation in all 
segments of the population. 
The second action on Lansdale’s list involved utilizing American links with the Mafia in 
Cuba: 
 Exploiting the potential of the underworld in Cuban cities to harass and bleed 
the Communist control apparatus. This effort may, on a very sensitive basis, 
enlist the assistance of American links to the Cuban underworld. While this 
would be a CIA project, close cooperation of the FBI is imperative.90 
Another memo dated January 27, 1962 from Lansdale to Bobby Kennedy 
appealed for the Attorney General’s strong support and “direct access to the President” to 
assure that the covert plan did not become bogged down in the layers of government 
bureaucracy. In the memo to Bobby, Lansdale spoke in terms of not limiting the covert 
actions of MONGOOSE to Cuba, but using them across Latin America with labor unions, 
youth movements and the Church: “It could be with the families through the Church, 
with families resisting the disciplined destruction of social justice by the Communists.”91 
Senator Frank Church questioned Lansdale about this memo – the use of labor unions, 
youth movements and the Church, as well as applying the actions to Latin America more 
broadly – when Lansdale appeared before the Church Committee on July 8, 1975: 
The Chairman: Now, did all of that refer to the methods by which the touchdown 
play [a revolution to overthrow Castro] might be activated? 
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General Lansdale: Yes. Yes, sir.92 
Lansdale made multiple references to using religion in covert operations in Cuba 
and Latin America when considering the memos and the operational plan of “The Cuba 
Project” together.93 Clearly, Lansdale intended to mobilize the leaders and people of “the 
Church.” He directly conveyed these intentions to the SGA, to Bobby Kennedy, and to 
the President. None of the extant communications regarding Lansdale’s plan reveal 
objections voiced to using churches or religion to defeat communism in Latin America, in 
spite of President Kennedy’s statements to the contrary at the Prayer Breakfasts. 
The second week of December 1961, Billy Graham was in Washington, DC. He 
had several meetings planned, including, on the weekend of December 15-17, the official 
Board of the Billy Graham Evangelistic Association. In the weeks leading up to the 
Board meeting, concerns continued to be expressed in BGEA communications about 
political unrest in several countries included in the first part of the South America tour, 
particularly Columbia, Ecuador, and Venezuela. In a letter written that week by BGEA 
head of crusade operations, Walter Smyth, there was still talk of possibly postponing or 
cancelling visits to countries on the first tour because of political turmoil. In addition, 
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BGEA communications in the weeks leading up to Graham’s visit to Washington 
continued to express concerns about finances.94 
On Tuesday, December 12, Graham had a meeting at the White House with 
President Kennedy at 12:55 p.m. Immediately prior to the meeting, Kennedy held a 
swearing-in ceremony for Chester Bowles as Special Representative and Adviser on 
African, Asian and Latin-American Affairs and Ambassador-at-Large. According to the 
President’s Daily Appointment Diary for that day, over 53 people attended Bowles’ 
swearing-in including Special Assistant Brooks Hays. The swearing-in ceremony was 
from 12:45-12:55 p.m.95 According to Hays’ account of the story Graham had been 
Hays’ guest at lunch that day in the “White House Mess.” While walking back to Hays’ 
office, “Pierre Salinger suddenly opened the door” from the Oval Office. The President 
and Salinger “had seen us walking by,” Hays recalled, and Salinger said, “Brooks, the 
President wants to say hello to Dr. Graham.” According to Graham’s recollection of the 
event, he was at the White House that day with Grady Wilson and “the President invited 
Grady Wilson and me into his office.” Graham’s account never mentions Brooks Hays 
nor them having lunch together. From the two accounts, it is not clear if the appointment 
with the President on December 12 was scheduled or spontaneous. According to the 
President’s Daily Appointment Diary, Graham is the only person listed as meeting with 
the President; the Diary does not list Hays, Salinger or Wilson. According to Hays’ 
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account, he was in the private meeting with Graham and the President, however he does 
not mention Wilson. It seems odd in Hays’ account that he and Graham were coming 
from lunch when intercepted by Salinger, because the official Diary lists Hays as 
attending the swearing-in of Chester Bowles immediately beforehand. Was the meeting 
between Graham and the President a planned appointment for a specific purpose? It 
seems as though it might have been, since the meeting immediately followed the 
swearing-in of Chester Bowles as Kennedy’s Special Representative for Latin America. 
Yet, Hays’ account of a more spontaneous meeting is not completely at odds with 
Graham’s record of the event in his autobiography.96 
Latin America was on the President’s mind. It was the topic of discussion with 
Graham. Whether a consequence of the prior swearing-in of Chester Bowles as Special 
Representative for Latin America, the forthcoming three-day, three-country trip for the 
President and Mrs. Kennedy to promote the Alliance for Progress, or the issues 
emanating from the Special Group (Augmented) meetings, Kennedy was obviously 
preoccupied with Latin America. Graham shared with the President some problems that 
his team was encountering with their upcoming trip: “We told him we were having 
problems getting into Colombia, where some leaders warned of riots if we held large 
meetings.” According to Graham, “The President turned to an adviser and told him 
simply, ‘Take care of that.’” “What happened behind the scenes,” Graham said, “I will 
never know, but we got into Colombia without further problems.” On the upcoming 
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Sunday, December 17, Kennedy would was travel to Colombia and have a personal 
meeting with President Lieras Camargo. According to press accounts, Pierre Salinger 
accompanied the President on the Latin American trip. Therefore, whether the President 
gave the order to Salinger to “take care of it” or perhaps Hays; either way, Graham’s 
problems with Colombia disappeared.97  
Graham and Kennedy discussed other aspects of the evangelist’s “upcoming five-
week Crusade in Latin America.” They also discussed the President’s three-day trip 
upcoming in a few days. At one point, the President turned to Graham and said, “I’m 
going down to South America” ahead of you, “I’ll be your John the Baptist.” This was a 
clear allusion to the biblical account of John the Baptist, the forerunner of Jesus Christ. 
What is striking about Kennedy’s statement is that it intimated that the President was in a 
secondary position to the evangelist. John the Baptist famously said of Jesus, “He must 
increase, but I must decrease.” From a religious point of view, the statement is 
acceptable; however, from a political perspective, the statement is remarkable. Further, 
Graham and Hays both recount the statement being jocular in tone, which affects the 
context and interpretation.98 
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According to Brooks Hays, the “I’ll be your John the Baptist” statement was first 
made public by Billy Graham himself “in a radio talk or in a meeting.” Graham viewed 
the statement as an important endorsement of himself and his Latin American meetings. 
Graham biographer William Martin recalls an interview with the evangelist in 1987 when 
“Graham recounted with obvious pleasure” the statement. It is not surprising then that 
Graham first made the statement public in 1962, not the White House. Graham and the 
BGEA “circulated” it, not the President’s communications staff. Moreover, the BGEA 
used the statement on promotional literature for the South America crusades. Several 
pictures and posters were made showing Graham and President Kennedy shaking hands 
in the Oval Office with the following caption under the picture: 
Dr. Billy Graham and President Kennedy in the White House, December 12, 
1961, after having discussed their respective forthcoming visits to South America.  
When they were parting, President Kennedy said to Billy Graham: “When I go to 
South America, I will be your ‘John the Baptist.’”99 
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Graham ran the risk, by publicly sharing the private Oval Office statement, that he might 
offend Kennedy even as he angered President Truman in 1950. However, there was no 
blowback from the President this time. The statement connected Graham and Kennedy 
more than just religiously; it connected them politically because the purpose of 
Kennedy’s three-day trip was political, not religious. In addition, Kennedy’s broader 
efforts in Latin America were not only economic and political, they were covert and 
military with the goal to push back communism. 
Eleven days after Graham returned from his five-country South America tour, he 
attended the tenth anniversary Presidential Prayer Breakfast at the Mayflower Hotel in 
Washington, DC, on March 1, 1962. The date for the breakfast was pushed back three 
weeks from its normal early-February date to accommodate Graham, the co-founder of 
the event. As usual, President Kennedy attended, sat beside Graham, spoke first to the 
official men’s gathering, then went across the hall and addressed the separate “wives” 
gathering. Undoubtedly, the President had a few private moments with Graham to confer 
about the results of their trips to South America. However, there is no historical record of 
this conversation.100 
In the following months, the President displayed a continued interest in discussing 
Latin America with Graham. On August 17, the President instructed Brooks Hays to 
write to Graham inviting him to another Oval Office meeting. In the letter, Hays told his 
friend, “The President indicated that he wanted to see you.” Graham wrote a response 
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four days later to Evelyn Lincoln, personal secretary to the President, stating that he was 
free the first two weeks of September, until September 14, when he would depart on his 
second tour of South America to Uruguay, Paraguay, Argentina and Brazil. The 
evangelist wrote to Mrs. Lincoln, “I would consider it a great honor to see the President.” 
The meeting took place on Monday, September 10, 1962 at 12:35 p.m.101 
According to the President’s official Diary, the meeting with Graham was “Off 
the Record.” Further, Kennedy met with Graham while the evangelist’s old friend, 
President Eisenhower, was in the Oval Office for a longer meeting and lunch with 
Kennedy. One of the two accounts of the meeting came from William Brown, President 
Kennedy’s military attaché at the time. He described how the three men stood on the 
porch outside the Oval Office to admire the newly constructed Rose Garden designed by 
Jackie Kennedy’s friend, Bunny Mellon, and commissioned by President Kennedy 
himself. While standing on the portico, the President said, “Billy, I hear great things 
about what you did in Latin America.” Graham’s response, according to Brown, was a 
smile of gratitude and pride.102  
The second account of the meeting comes from an accidental tape recording of 
portions of the conversation made when the President’s phone was off its hook. The 
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phone recording system was voice-activated. With the three men standing a distance from 
phone, much of the conversation is unintelligible or not even recorded. On the tape, the 
voice of Kennedy is clearly identifiable and noted on the recording transcript as JKF. The 
transcript designates the other speakers as Voice 1, Voice 2 and so on. A careful 
examination of the transcript reveals that “Voice 1” is most likely Graham and former 
President Eisenhower is “Voice 2.” A segment of the conversation confirms that the 
primary topic of the conversation with Graham was Latin America and the threat of 
communist guerrillas: 
Voice 1:  . . . have these guerrillas up in the mountains of Colombia. I was there. 
They killed thirty-two in the town I was in, the night I was there. And they flew 
down. They killed over three hundred thousand in the last fourteen years. And 
they claim now that Castro’s got control of these guerrillas. 
Voice 2:  [Words missing] in Colombia? 
Voice 1:  In Colombia. And he says that the way to the United States is through 
the Colombian Andes.  
Voice 2:  [I doubt that?] 
Voice 1:  Well these people are [words missing?] get organized. [Words missing?] 
and so is Cuba. Infiltration is tremendous. And the anti-communist [word missing?] are 
getting furious because they feel that we’re not [word missing?] them like we ought to 
right along. And I’m much afraid that is a problem. 
Voice 2:  [Words missing?] twenty-five thousand, but ah, it [inaudible]. The present 
regime, the [word missing?], that is, the, uh, shooting them down, and therefore that 
America is wrong. America ought to give to [word missing?], not to [word missing?]. 
Voice 1: And how to get it to them. 
[A large unintelligible section followed by a few intelligible fragments.]103 
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Granted, records of the conversations of the December 12, 1961 and September 
10, 1962 meetings are incomplete. Granted, none of the records mentions the CIA. 
Granted, it is implausible that President Kennedy would have discussed classified covert 
operations in Latin America with Graham. Nevertheless, circumstantial factors 
surrounding these two meetings seems to indicate that something happened, something 
was said, that supports the allegations that Graham worked with the CIA during his South 
America tours and received monies from a CIA front organization. 
An in-depth study of the records of the BGEA from 1958 through 1962 – the 
inclusive time period for the planning and execution of the two South America tours – 
reveals that right up to December 12, 1961, the BGEA collectively and Graham 
personally were anxious about holding meetings in South America. There were serious 
concerns about the danger and threat of violence from communist agitators and guerrillas. 
Latin American experts from the State Department, other US government agencies, and 
the National Association of Evangelicals repeatedly warned Graham against travelling to 
South America. Several times, Graham seriously considered calling off the tours. 
However, after the December 12 meeting with Kennedy in the Oval Office something 
suddenly changed. No more hesitations or reservations about South America appear in 
any communications. The change in attitude is particularly noticeable regarding countries 
listed on the State Department’s list of “Countries with Subversive Insurgency Problems” 
– Venezuela, Colombia, and Ecuador. After December 12, the only talk of changes to the 
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South America crusade plans were positive and came during the first tour. Graham’s 
January-February meetings were so successful that “Billy has decided to spend a lot more 
time in South America in the fall.”104  
A second striking factor emerges from the study of the historical records. From 
the earliest days of discussion about possible South America meetings, there were 
emotional, repeated, desperate discussions about money – from BGEA staff in South 
America, from the local crusade organizations, and from the US-based BGEA.105 
However, after the December 12 meeting in the Oval Office, money worries seemed to 
vanish. Concern over finances does not appear again in archival communications during 
1962. One wonders, if in the same way that Kennedy told an aide in the December 12 
meeting to “take care of it” in relationship to helping Graham get into Colombia, were 
other orders given to “take care of it” in relationship to financial concerns? Furthermore, 
if Kennedy gave such an order, was the chosen avenue for funds a covert CIA front 
organization or perhaps Agency-managed Alliance for Progress funds? Whatever 
happened, the sudden and unexplained evaporation of ever-present money worries from 
BGEA communications regarding the South America tours gives credence to the 
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suspicion that covert monies were channeled to the Graham organization for its South 
American meetings. 
A Plausible Scenario? 
The evidence that Billy Graham collaborated with the CIA during his 1962 South 
America crusades is compelling, but is it convincing? Considered as a whole, would it 
persuade a jury of scholars, clerics or average citizens? Moreover, would it convince an 
evangelical Christian or a Graham supporter?106  
Considered in its totality, what are the questions at the heart of the case? What are 
the answers to those questions? Do they prove the case and resolve the initial inquiry 
from reporter Robert Friedman on March 16, 1967? Billy Graham promised Friedman 
and the other reporters present that day that he would “try to find out” what was behind 
the allegation, but according to the records, he never did. 
What evidence exists that Billy Graham collaborated with and received funds from 
the CIA for his 1962 South America crusades? 
At present, there are three primary sources for the Graham-CIA connection. All 
credible histories mentioning this linkage trace back in some way to these sources. A few 
sensationalized publications allege other CIA connections for Graham, but they are based 
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on hearsay, legends, or spurious sources. Interestingly, none of the authoritative books on 
Graham’s life, including his own autobiography, mentions the CIA in any respect.107 
The TIME magazine statement in the article “Pandora’s Cashbox” is an important 
primary source given the specificity of the statement about CIA funds for Graham, the 
integrity of the publication and the close relationship between publisher Henry Luce and 
Billy Graham. Likewise, Father Patrick Peyton’s statement to his Superior General in 
Rome in 1964 provides critical validation given the context, timing and relationship that 
Peyton had with the CIA. Furthermore, Graham’s denial at the press conference in San 
Juan, Puerto Rico provides its own corroboration of the allegation. 
The TIME article presents only a brief allegation without naming sources. What 
gives it credibility as a statement of fact? 
TIME magazine was a leading American newsmagazine of the 1950s and 1960s. 
Founded in 1923 by Henry R. Luce with Yale classmate Briton Hadden – the first editor 
of the magazine and an editorial “genius” who created the unique “Timestyle” – the 
magazine was a success from the start. It relied on a blend of the “epic,” the “titillating,” 
and “hard facts” to give a new style to the weekly news. The final 1923 prospectus 
presented to investors by Luce and Hadden stated, “TIME will be free from cheap 
sensationalism.”108 
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In “A Letter From the Staff” in the March 10, 1967 memorial issue of TIME after 
Luce’s death, the staff collectively said of Luce, “H.R.L. was no press lord in the 
tradition of Britain's Lord Beaverbrook or America's William Randolph Hearst. Power 
was not his passion – what burned in him was the search for truth and the desire to 
communicate it.” In Luce’s obituary published by TIME, it said of the magazine founder, 
“Few journalists in his time labored harder to examine all three or 30 sides of an 
argument, or strove more conscientiously to see that the facts were presented fairly.”109 
What gives the Graham-CIA allegation credibility? TIME’S publishing reputation 
and editorial rigor – from Henry Luce and Briton Haden to the editor for most of the 
1960s, Otto Fuerbringer.110 Furthermore, if the allegation against Graham was patently 
false, TIME would have faced legal liability issues. Most importantly, though, in the 1967 
press conference, Graham never questioned the reputation of TIME magazine or the 
veracity of the statement in the “Pandora’s Cashbox” story. Graham simply said, “We 
know nothing about it.” 
Does the relationship between Henry Luce and Billy Graham bolster the assertion in 
the TIME story? 
Billy Graham and Henry Luce were close friends. They both cared deeply about 
religion and its impact on the fabric of American society. Luce and Graham’s wife, Ruth, 
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were both children of Presbyterian missionaries to China. Graham and Luce shared 
conservative, Republican political convictions, strongly supporting Eisenhower and 
Nixon for the Presidency. They talked by phone and wrote regularly. They shared advice 
and opinions with one another.111 Biographer Grant Wacker recalls interviewing Graham 
at his home in Montreat when the evangelist was almost ninety. Wacker recounts the 
conversation with Graham, “He chatted about good friends, now gone.” The first of the 
“good friends” Graham mentioned to Wacker was Henry Luce, along with David Frost 
and Walter Cronkite.112 
Furthermore, it was important to Luce and Graham to stay in close touch. Before 
the start the South America crusades, Graham wrote Luce explaining what he would be 
doing. Luce then requested a “copy of [Graham’s] full schedule” while he was in South 
America, so that the publisher could stay in contact with the evangelist if anything came 
up. Graham’s special assistant sent Luce, at his Biltmore Estates home in Phoenix, 
Graham’s “complete schedule” on December 27, 1961.113 
Because of the relationship between the two men, one could argue that if Graham 
had a problem with the “Pandora’s Cashbox” allegation about the CIA connection, 
Graham could have picked up the phone and called Luce directly. However, Luce died 
three days before the publication of the Graham-CIA statement. Luce had been active, 
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alert and lucid up to his final hours. It is possible that Luce knew the statement about 
Graham would appear in the upcoming issue. Perhaps not.  
Either way, when Luce died, surely Graham heard the news and was in immediate 
contact with either Luce’s wife, Clare, or other close associates of the publisher. The men 
were too close and Graham was too compassionate and pastoral to imagine otherwise. 
Thus, in the days surrounding the March 3 publication of the “Pandora’s Cashbox” story, 
it is highly likely that Graham spoke with members of the Luce family or senior staff at 
TIME. The March 10 Luce memorial issue of TIME included a nine-page story about 
Luce’s religious faith and life. The story spoke of his relationship with Graham. 
Therefore, it does not ring true when Graham said only days later on March 16 at 
the press conference in San Juan, Puerto Rico that he was aware of the TIME story with its 
CIA allegation and that he meant to check on it “last week,” but “didn’t get to it.” The 
excuse seems shaky given the context of what was happening with Luce and TIME in the 
days immediately before the press conference. 
Does Fr. Patrick Peyton’s testimony in Rome in 1964 constitute direct evidence? 
Father Patrick Peyton, CSC, in a meeting with his Superior General, Germain 
Lalande, in Rome on October 24, 1964 – two years after Graham’s South America 
crusades – alleged the CIA gave funds not only to the Family Rosary Crusade, which he 
founded, but also to the Billy Graham and Maryknoll organizations.114 The conversation 
                                                 




occurs in two documents in the Archives of the Holy Cross Generalate, one written by 
Peyton and one by Lalande. 
Peyton’s testimony constitutes credible evidence. He is a priest testifying to his 
Superior General to whom he swore his allegiance; for Peyton to lie to Lalande would 
result in serious temporal as well as spiritual consequences. Further, the testimony came 
during a private conversation where Peyton would feel safe to tell the truth, no matter 
how difficult. The topic of the conversation between Peyton and Lalande was the Family 
Rosary Crusade to whom the CIA provided funds. The statement about Graham’s “Latin 
American revivals” along with the Maryknoll community was an aside, a supportive 
element to the larger conversation. If Peyton was lying about Graham, then he was 
certainly lying about all three groups, risking discovery by his Superior General. If 
Peyton was lying, then it is unlikely that he would have been nominated in 2001 for 
sainthood by then Bishop Sean P. O’Malley, head of the Fall River Diocese, now 
Cardinal Sean Patrick O’Malley, Archbishop of Boston.115 
Does Graham’s denial at the San Juan press conference refute the allegation of 
collusion between Graham and the CIA? 
Graham’s statements that he knew nothing about the CIA allegation constitutes a 
“non-denial denial.” The phrase “non-denial denial” originated with Bob Woodward and 
Carl Bernstein during their investigation of Watergate. It refers to a calculated attempt to 
obfuscate the truth and thereby disguise guilt. Woodward and Bernstein first applied this 
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idiom to Attorney General John Mitchell: “Mitchell helped draft many of the non-denial 
denials which were being used in response to their stories.” 116 Although originating with 
Woodward and Bernstein, in the movie version of All the President’s Men, the phrase 
“non-denial denial” is ascribed to Ben Bradlee, executive editor of the Washington Post. 
As the tape of the March 16 press conference reveals, Graham admitted that he 
read the February 24 and March 3 articles about the CIA funding of private 
organizations.117 Graham said, “I don’t know anything except what I read there.” He also 
said, “I think they limited it to the South American crusades some years ago.” The March 
3 “Pandora’s Cashbox” story is the only one that mentions Graham and South America. 
Further, Graham stated at the press conference, “Apparently they [CIA] have given 
money secretly and privately to many different groups who didn’t know anything about 
it.” This statement refers to information reported in the February 24 “Silent Service” 
story. In spite of reading both of these TIME articles, Graham claimed, “I was not aware 
of it” and “We never knew anything about it.” 
It is hard to believe that when the CIA accusation appeared on March 3 that 
Graham did nothing to follow-up before the March 16 press conference. He did not ask 
any of his staff, including his large communications staff, to check on the story. He did 
not have any of his legal team contact TIME and ask them to either verify the story or 
print a retraction with an apology. Graham did not contact any of his well-connected 
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board members and ask them to use their influence in New York and Washington, DC to 
repudiate the story. Nothing. 
What is more, the Graham organization, from its earliest days, has been obsessed 
with protecting its public reputation collectively and individually. In 1948, before 
Graham became a national figure, he realized the dangers that might assail his 
organization and destroy its reputation. In a motel room in Modesto, California in 
November 1948, the evangelist called his small team together and asked each of them to 
commit to the “Modesto Manifesto.” It addressed four issues – money, sex, inflated 
publicity and criticism. Most famous of the four commitments was the second one that 
gained notoriety as the “Billy Graham Rule” – never be alone with another woman other 
than your wife. This rule was imitated by a generation of evangelical clergymen and 
laymen including, most famously, Vice-President Mike Pence.118 It is implausible that 
Graham would let the CIA allegation stand unchallenged considering the damage it could 
do to the BGEA’s reputation. 
Moreover, Graham said at the press conference that when he got home, “I intend 
to ask some of my friends in Washington to check on that to find out.” Graham had high-
level contacts in Washington, DC, most notably President Johnson. Because of Graham’s 
close, personal relationship with the President, it would have been easy for Graham to 
pick up the phone, call the White House and request answers about the CIA allegation. 
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Graham could have done this as soon as the March 3 “Pandora’s Cashbox” story came 
out. Why did he not do this? Graham had many other contacts in Washington to whom he 
could have reached out. Why did he not contact them after March 3? It is interesting that 
Graham said he would contact “some of my friends in Washington” and never said 
anything about contacting his friends in New York City. Why did he not reach out to his 
friends at TIME-Life? 
Years later, in a personal letter from Graham to his good friend Vice-President 
George H.W. Bush, the evangelist reflected on his own tendency to provide opaque 
answers to the press. The 1983 letter contains Graham’s candid confession: 
At the moment I am trying to stay a bit quiet and out of the news because the 
events I am asked to comment on are so uncertain. When I met with the editors of 
the Miami Herald this past week I gave them such weak and ambiguous answers 
that they have not even printed it yet. I think that anything I might say about 
Central America (on which I am well versed), or the Middle East, or even 
abortion, prayer in schools, the nuclear freeze, etc. would confuse some of these 
issues even more in the minds of the constituency I represent.119 
Graham was intentionally ambiguous in his answers to the press. His reason was to 
protect his reputation “in the minds of the constituency I represent.” This mirrors the 
situation at the San Juan press conference and the question about the CIA. 
In sum, Graham’s denial at the 1967 press conference – considering what he said 
and the stumbling way he said it – appears by all measures to be a “non-denial denial.” 
The only possible exception might be if Graham knew about the BGEA-CIA 
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collaboration, but promised the President or someone in the CIA that he would keep the 
CIA operation a secret.  
Do the BGEA financial records provide any answers to the allegation? 
There is no clear avenue or mechanism to “follow the money” in understanding 
the TIME allegation that the CIA gave funds to the BGEA for the 1962 South America 
crusades. The Graham organization, for many years, was highly secretive about its 
financial information. In October 1977, the BGEA released for the first time in its history 
a public financial statement. The BGEA has long been exempt from making public an 
IRS Form 990 nonprofit filing because early on it obtained “an Internal Revenue Service 
ruling designating it a church so that it has no legal obligation to report.” On June 25, 
1977, The Charlotte Observer reported that the BGEA had a secret fund – the World 
Evangelism and Christian Education Fund of Dallas, Texas – that had “amassed almost 
$23 million over the past seven years in land, stocks, bonds and cash holdings in a fund 
that had been shielded from public view.” The secret fund “had never been mentioned in 
previous interviews with Mr. Graham” and it was not “included in a list of organizations 
compiled by the Observer . . . that a Graham associate told the newspaper was complete.” 
A month later, Graham issued a six-page statement in defense of the fund stating, “We 
are accountable to God” for all the money received by the BGEA.120 By December 1, 
1979, Graham “became a zealous advocate of full disclosure” and “played a key role in 
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the founding of the Evangelical Council of Financial Accountability (ECFA).” The 
BGEA was a charter member. As such, the BGEA was required to make public every 
year an audited financial statement prepared by an independent certified public 
accountant. Since 1979, the BGEA has publicly made available this audited financial 
statement. However, because the IRS classifies the BGEA as a church, it does not have to 
file a detailed IRS Form 990.121 However, there is no access to BGEA financial records 
prior to 1979, excepting 1976. All financial records reside at the Charlotte, NC offices; 
none is located in the Billy Graham Center Archives. 
In trying to find the CIA money trail at the BGCA, there were some breadcrumbs 
on the path that provided clues as to how a Graham-CIA money transaction might have 
transpired. In scrutinizing the archival records of the 1962 South America crusades, 
several documents detail the receiving and spending of monies. Letters and memos 
between BGEA staff members discuss financial matters and provide some limited 
financial statements for the South America crusades. From examining these documents, 
several points are evident.  
First, the organization had a high degree of internal accountability regarding 
money matters. Letters and memos between BGEA staff members regularly discuss 
                                                 
121 William Martin, A Prophet with Honor, 472-480. For information on BGEA membership in the 
ECFA, see BGEA membership paged, accessed June 18, 2018, 
http://www.ecfa.org/MemberProfile.aspx?ID=4764. At the end of 2017, the BGEA audited financial 
statement reported an annual income of $108 million with total assets of $423 million, accessed June 
18, 2018, https://billygraham.org/about/financial-info/. The IRS Form 990 is the “Return of 
Organization Exempt from Income Tax” which all US nonprofits (religious or non-religious) are 
required to file and made available to the public. Churches are exempt from filing an IRS 990. The 




money. Second, BGEA staff sent or copied many of the financial letters and memos to 
Allan Emery of Weymouth, MA, the volunteer treasurer of the BGEA and a member of 
the board. He was ultimately responsible for the finances of the BGEA. Members of the 
Graham senior leadership team, Cliff Barrows for example, would write Emery for 
clarification about expenditures even for small items like flowers and transportation. If 
anyone knew about or handled funds from the CIA, it would likely have been Allan 
Emery. However, he died in 2010. Third, the staff team regularly sought Graham’s 
approval for large financial matters – the receiving of a large gift or the distribution of a 
large check. Many times, financial matters needing Graham’s authorization were on the 
agenda for senior staff meetings. Given the pattern of communication about money 
matters between Graham and his staff, it is highly unlikely in 1962 that the BGEA 
received a large donation from the CIA without Graham’s knowledge or approval – 
whether it came directly from the CIA or through a front organization.122 
How did the CIA funnel money to the BGEA? 
As the Ramparts episode revealed, in the 1950s and 1960s the CIA had a vast 
network of legitimate and illegitimate front organizations, foundations and businesses 
through which it channeled funds for covert operations. The BGEA office could have 
received funds from one or more of these entities for their South America crusades. Such 
a contribution likely went into the BGEA books, if at all, as a general donation from a 
foundation or business with no reference to the Agency. 
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In addition, the CIA funds may not have come through the US-based Graham 
organization. The money could have gone directly to local BGEA staff or to individual 
crusade organizations in the various countries that Graham visited. Each crusade had its 
own local board, its own local treasurer, and its own local bank accounts. If funneled to 
the local organization, the money likely would have been a cash payment, thereby 
avoiding problems with international banking and exchange rates. More importantly, cash 
was untraceable to the CIA. The Agency, even in recent years, has sent agents into 
trouble spots, like Afghanistan, carrying suitcases full of cash to fund covert operations. 
Whatever form the CIA payments took and whomever received them, there likely was no 
paper trail. When former DCI Richard Helms interviewed with the CIA Oral History 
project in 1988, they questioned him about one of the Family Jewels operations – mail 
openings. When asked how the operational instructions and agreement were handled with 
the Postmaster General, Helms answered, “Orally, obviously, you don’t write pieces of 
paper about something like that.” 123 
What activities did the CIA conduct in conjunction with the 1962 South America 
crusades? 
As the United States pushed back against communist expansion in Latin America, 
the State Department deemed a number of countries to have serious “Subversive 
Insurgency Problems.” In an official June 1, 1962 document, the State Department listed 
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Colombia, Venezuela and Ecuador – all countries on Graham’s South America itinerary – 
as countries of particular concern. Philip Agee, a CIA agent operating in South America, 
recounted in his memoir, Inside the Company: CIA Diary, how Castro and Che Guevara 
were active in South America – shipping arms into Colombia and Ecuador, and setting up 
guerilla training bases. In May 1961, Castro sent his Sub-Secretary of Foreign Relations, 
Carlos Olivares, his “most important trouble-shooter,” on a “goodwill tour” of South 
America “to bolster Cuban relations with South American countries, capitalizing, of 
course, on the Bay of Pigs invasion.”124 
Given these challenges, the Graham crusades provided the CIA with a valuable 
opportunity to strengthen its South American operations. Graham was an international 
celebrity. His meetings attracted tens of thousands of people into a single location – 
10,000 per night in Barranquilla and Cali, Colombia; 50,000 in Buenos Aires, Argentina; 
60,000 in Sao Paulo, Brazil.125 Many of the people who came were religious people, pro-
American, anti-communist, and conservative. These were just the kind of people that 
might be willing to work for the CIA in its South American operations. 
What might the CIA have done at the crusades? In the streets and areas leading up 
to the stadiums, they could hand out propaganda flyers, leaflets, and newspapers 
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supporting America-friendly governments and denouncing Castro’s communist 
insurgents. Communists used these same techniques – leaflets, newspapers, posters – to 
promote their revolutionary message. Why not the CIA at the Graham crusades in South 
America? 
The crusades also provided the opportunity to identify and recruit people – from 
among the crusade volunteers as well as the crowds – to become ongoing CIA assets. The 
crusades attracted priests, pastors, and missionaries who were involved in urban and rural 
areas, as well as with jungle tribes that were often the target of Che Guevara’s recruiters. 
These religious leaders had access to valuable information that could be helpful to the 
CIA. From among the crowds, the CIA also might have sought people to join in political 
or paramilitary operations, helping to keep America-friendly politicians in power and 
deposing leaders that drifted too far towards Castro and Che. Moreover, Kennedy’s 
Alliance for Progress projects were just getting started and needed trustworthy people. 
Since the Graham organization depended heavily on publicity and news coverage 
to draw large crowds, the crusades offered the CIA the opportunity to recruit local media 
people to be CIA assets. Every day and night, dozens of local, conservative and religious 
media personnel covered the crusades. Some of these individuals could be valuable to the 
CIA in distributing disinformation and propaganda in the future. What better place to find 
and recruit potentially friendly TV reporters, journalists and communications assets for 
the CIA?  
The CIA may have initiated its own efforts to connect quietly with Graham and 




Cameron Townsend of the Summer Institute of Linguistics and Wycliffe Bible 
Translators. Graham was a board member of SIL/WBT. In 1961, during the lead up to 
Graham’s South America tour, Townsend sought to involve Graham in SIL/WBT 
activities in Ecuador. Townsend contacted Graham through intermediaries and asked the 
evangelist to meet with Ecuadorian President Velasco Ibarra during Graham’s visit to the 
country in early 1962. Townsend also asked Graham to visit some of SIL’s jungle bases, 
like Shell Mera, the forward base out of which the five missionaries operated, killed by 
Auca Indians in 1956.126 In addition, a curious incident shows up in BGEA letters in 
1960. Jerry Bevan, BGEA Director of Crusades and Operations, wrote to Jim Savage 
about an incident that happened in Philadelphia. Charlie Riggs was at a breakfast for 
ministers, when he was “approached by a young man who is connected with the Wycliffe 
Translators. This young man told [Riggs] that he had been asked, by [Savage], to take 
over the responsibility for training counselors in the South American meetings.” Bevan 
and Riggs were shocked and alarmed by this unnamed young man’s actions, because 
Riggs was the one responsible for all the training of counselors “both in this country and 
overseas.” Was this an effort by a CIA operative working with SIL/WBT to inject 
himself into this critical leadership position for the South America crusades? Or was this 
simply a naïve, ambitious young man? Given the strength of Bevan and Rigg’s reaction 
in the letter, it was something that certainly caused them alarm.127 
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Why was the CIA interested in collaborating with the Graham organization during 
their 1962 South America crusades? It was about people. It was about propaganda. It was 
about supporting the Alliance for Progress. It was about long-term CIA operations in 
South America. It was about stopping communist revolution from spreading to the rest of 
the continent. 
Why would Graham collaborate with the CIA in South America? 
Like many of the American missionaries who worked with the CIA in South 
America, Graham’s overarching reason for collaborating with the CIA was likely 
patriotism.128 He loved his country. He proudly ‘waved the flag’ of America when he 
denounced communism in his sermons. Post-war America was highly patriotic as was 
Graham. Moreover, Graham had close relationships with leaders in Washington, DC. He 
was an adviser and trusted friend for successive Presidents. He had knowledge of some of 
the matters troubling Presidents in the 1950s and 1960s. He concurred with presidential 
concerns over advancing communism, particularly in South America after the Cuban 
Revolution. Graham cared deeply about America, not only spiritually, but also as a 
patriot. If the evangelist could serve America and the President by helping the CIA, then, 
like many American missionaries, Graham would have done it. 
Another reason Graham might have collaborated with the CIA was money. 
Although the assets of the Graham organization currently total almost a half a billion 
dollars, in the 1950s and early 1960s as the BGEA expanded its organization and 
                                                 




international reach, many times it operated on a shoestring.129 As the letters and memos 
of the South America crusades in the BGCA testify, money was tight; budget funds fell 
short; people had to wait for payments; the lack of funds delayed or cancelled trips. On 
December 12, 1961, the day Graham met with Kennedy in the Oval Office, one of the 
BGEA staffers wrote a letter pleading for money.130 Then, suddenly, the money problems 
disappeared. As with some of the American missionaries who admitted to taking money 
from the CIA to help fund their compassionate ministries, the Graham organization may 
have used similar reasoning to rationalize their cooperation with the CIA. 
Additionally, in the December 12 meeting with Kennedy, Graham asked for help 
gaining access to Colombia. The President provided it with one simple command to one 
of his assistants, “Take care of it.” Graham also may have mentioned the financial 
struggles the BGEA was having. In return, if President Kennedy asked Graham for a 
favor – to cooperate quietly with the CIA on some of their activities in South America – 
it would have been hard for Graham to say no. Thus, Graham’s collaboration with the 
CIA could have been a quid pro quo between Graham and the President. 
Are there any other possible explanations for the Graham-CIA connection? 
It is possible that Graham truly did not know about what the CIA did during his 
South America tours. The CIA could have piggybacked their operations on Graham’s 
mass events without telling anyone in the BGEA. But if this was the case, how did Luce 
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know about it? Why did TIME print the allegation in the “Pandora’s Cashbox” article 
stating that the BGEA received CIA funds? 
Is it possible that the initiative with the CIA came through one of the well-
connected businessmen on the BGEA board? Did a board action shelter Graham to give 
him deniability? The BGEA board met in Washington, DC a few days after Graham’s 
December 12 meeting in the Oval Office. If the arrangement with the CIA came from a 
board member, then the individual could have reassured the board not to worry about 
South America and not to worry about money – he or she took care of it. If this was the 
case, then it is highly likely that Allan Emery, as treasurer of the board, knew about the 
secret arrangement and the funding. 
Conclusion 
Consider all the elements of this story, the direct evidence and the circumstantial 
evidence. Consider the noticeable change in tone about the South America crusades that 
happened immediately after Graham’s December 12 meeting with Kennedy. Consider 
how quickly the money problems for the South America tour vanished. It is highly 
plausible that Billy Graham collaborated with the CIA on some type of covert activities 
during his 1962 evangelistic crusades in South America and received funds in return. 
Is this conclusion reasonable, given the evidence? Yes. Can we be certain? No.  
The definitive proof has more than likely been locked away or destroyed by the 
CIA and the BGEA.  
And conclusive answers to these questions are now buried for eternity with the 





CIA COVERT OPERATIONS AND RELIGION 
On a yellow legal pad with a No. 2 pencil, Richard Helms handwrote notes for a 
retired CIA officer and the ghostwriter of his memoirs, Bill Hood. After penning three 
spy novels in retirement, Hood agreed to use his skills as a wordsmith to help his former 
boss at the CIA tell his story. Once published, the critically acclaimed autobiography – A 
Look Over My Shoulder: A Life in the Central Intelligence Agency – credited Hood as co-
author and reflected his “astute, perceptive, and dead on the money” prose describing 
Helms’ life in the Agency.1 
Helms’ handwritten notes provide an unimpeded look into the mind and emotions 
of one of the most noteworthy and influential Directors of Central Intelligence. Helms, 
along with Allen Dulles, William Colby and William Casey, were the most important 
DCIs of the Cold War. All four started out in the OSS. All four carried out crucial 
clandestine operations during WWII. All four, once in leadership in the CIA, 
demonstrated a predisposition for covert operations. 
While Helms’ memoir was still taking shape, the former DCI wrote lengthy notes 
to Hood about “Covert Action,” questioning how to address the subject in the book – in a 
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single chapter or woven in-and-out of the narrative.2 Helms said, “Covert Action (CA) is 
the heading for a grab-bag of activities which must be conducted in secrecy. And therein 
lies the Achilles Heel. Americans dislike secrecy, except of course when it is their secret 
or their privacy. And they tend to howl with disapproval when any element of their 
government is caught acting behind their backs.” According to Helms, the “grab-bag” 
included “political action, psychological warfare which includes ‘black propaganda,’ 
economic manipulation, certain types of deception, even support for paramilitary 
operations.” During Helms’ days as DCI, “governmental approval was necessary on each 
and every operation. There was never any thought of giving the CIA a free hand.” Helms 
spoke about two of the core tenets for covert operations: “The device to protect secrecy 
needed two duties: (1) approve the operation from a policy standpoint (2) protect the 
President from political embarrassment if things went wrong.” 3  
In another missive to Hood about covert operations, Helms complained with 
unbridled emotion about how “the press and Congress nit-pick every move of every 
agency or department,” and “Cabinet officers pee on each other through leaks and other 
devices, making things look worse than they really are.” Helms closed his outburst, “But 
enough! Democracy is a messy business!!!”4  
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Not only is democracy messy, but the establishment of the CIA was messy. 
During WWII, under the leadership of William “Wild Bill” Donovan, the OSS developed 
and exercised impressive intelligence and covert capabilities, including clandestine 
collection, propaganda, subversion, sabotage, and paramilitary operations. The success of 
the OSS in WWII and the highly skilled team of intelligence analysts and operators 
assembled by Donovan led the spymaster to propose to President Truman in November 
1944 the creation of a “peacetime successor agency responsible to the president.” At 
war’s end, though, Truman promptly disbanded the OSS effective October 1, 1945. He 
parceled out its units to the State Department and War Department because of his fear of 
creating an American “Gestapo.”5 
However, three months later Truman reversed his position. The need for 
centralized intelligence collection, analysis and oversight became obvious. Truman 
ordered the formation of the Central Intelligence Group (CIG) headed by a Director of 
Central Intelligence (DCI). The new department, with little authority or autonomy, was 
pushed and pulled between competing forces within the government until the passage of 
the National Security Act of 1947 restructured the national security apparatus. The Act 
created the National Security Council, the Department of Defense with three service 
branches (army, navy and air force), a Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and 
a new Central Intelligence Agency under the leadership of the DCI. In the Act, “the 
CIA’s mission was only loosely defined.” From 1946 through 1952, the Agency 
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struggled to develop its identity and establish its authority. Its strength and influence in 
the cutthroat federal bureaucracy was largely contingent upon the stature and competency 
of the DCI of the moment.6 
The creation of the CIA’s covert operational capabilities was equally messy. A 
stump of the disbanded OSS – seven field stations still intact in North Africa and the 
Near East – became the Special Services Unit (SSU) within the War Department. With 
the creation of the Central Intelligence Group, the SSU moved to the CIG from the War 
Department, became the Office of Special Operations (OSO), and assumed responsibility 
for the CIG’s espionage and counter-espionage operations. By 1947, fully one-third of 
the CIA’s personnel were alumni of the OSS. This provided a group of individuals “who 
could quickly develop and implement programs.” As well, it provided the Agency with a 
ready-made overseas network of agents and informants to facilitate the quick 
implementation of clandestine missions.7  
However, intense internal and external debates ensued between Congress, the 
Executive Branch, and the CIA over the nature and scope of covert activities. In 
December 1947, the Office of Special Operations acquired control of “psychological 
operations”– mainly media operations including unattributed publications, forgeries, 
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subsidized publications, radio broadcasts and blackmail – through a new office called the 
Special Procedures Group. Initial efforts of this group against Soviet expansionism in 
Central and Eastern Europe were “limited and amateur.”8  
By May 1948, George F. Kennan, Director of the State Department’s Policy 
Planning Staff (PPS), “advocated the development of a covert political action capability,” 
including overt and covert political warfare operations directed against the Soviet Union. 
The National Security Council (NSC) embraced Kennan’s vision for political warfare in 
NSC-10/2, though not his proposed structure. NSC-10/2 created the CIA’s Office of 
Special Projects (OSP), soon renamed the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC) to help 
disguise its purpose. NSC-10/2, adopted June 18, 1948, begins: 
The National Security Council, taking cognizance of the vicious covert activities 
of the USSR, its satellite countries and Communist groups to discredit and defeat 
the aims and activities of the United States and other Western Powers, has 
determined that, in the interests of world peace and US national security, the overt 
foreign activities of the US government must be supplemented by covert 
operations.9 
The initial purpose of the CIA’s covert actions was to push back and contain 
communism, whether originating with the USSR, Soviet satellites, or Communist China. 
According to NSC-10/2, the OSP would operate with a unique degree of autonomy: “For 
purposes of security and of flexibility of operations, and to the maximum degree 
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consistent with efficiency, the Office of Special Projects shall operate independently of 
other components of Central Intelligence Agency.”10  
The new covert operations office had its own chief, nominated by the Secretary of 
State according to NSC-10/2, but accountable directly to the DCI. In a NSC meeting on 
August 20, 1948, Frank G. Wisner became the new chief of the Office of Special 
Projects. In the same meeting, George F. Kennan was designated as Secretary of State 
George C. Marshall’s “representative for NSC 10/2 affairs” and Colonel Ivan D. Yeaton 
was designated the representative for both the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff.11 
Even after the implementation of NSC-10/2 and the mobilization of the CIA’s 
renamed Office of Policy Coordination, in 1951 the State Department’s Policy Planning 
Staff under Paul Nitze was still involved in strategizing about the development of 
“coordinated political warfare” capabilities. During the Korean War, from 1950-1953, 
covert operations rapidly expanded and the OPC grew. By the end of the war, concerns 
increased about this expansion, as well as the independence of the OPC to act 
unilaterally. In 1951, the NSC created the Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) as a sub-
committee to oversee covert operations. By 1953, the PSB had morphed into the 
Operations Coordinating Board (OCB) to oversee not only psychological operations, but 
also political warfare and paramilitary covert operations. In 1955, the NSC issued NSC-
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5412/2 revising and replacing all previous policy directives on covert operations. The 
new directive established a formal NSC structure to oversee and approve all covert 
operations. The White House covert operations oversight group was given the name the 
“5412 Committee” (in reference to NSC 5412/2) or simply the “Special Group.”12 
In the midst of the messy maturation of the CIA and its covert capabilities, the 
NSC adopted “one of the seminal manifestos” of the Cold War – NSC-68 – which 
“articulated the strategic framework and ideological foundations for American Cold War 
policy.” The directive’s existence and content was a highly guarded secret for over a 
quarter of a century. Another policy document – NSC-162/2: Basic National Security 
Policy – adopted in 1953, made a consequential contribution to covert operations during 
the Cold War: It opened the door and provided the legal foundation, some argued, to use 
religious ideas, institutions and people as tools in covert operations.13 
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Policies that Operationalized Religion 14 
Religion has a long history in spying and covert operations, including with the 
OSS during WWII. However, there was no grand plan within the US government to 
operationalize religion during the Cold War. It emerged haphazardly. It was a result of 
circumstances and opportunity. It came from Presidents and CIA field operatives. It arose 
from people of great faith and no faith. It imitated efforts by the Soviets and created new 
approaches that were uniquely American. To understand the developmental process, one 
has to understand the policies and people behind the evolution of religion as a tool of 
foreign policy and covert operations in the Cold War. 
On March 5, 1946, President Harry Truman invited former Prime Minister 
Winston Churchill to give a speech in his home state at a Presbyterian all-boys school – 
Westminster College in Fulton, Missouri. In his speech, the British wartime leader 
famously warned that an “iron curtain has descended across the Continent,” thus marking 
the popular date for the start of the Cold War.15 The next day, President Truman gave a 
speech in Columbus, Ohio to the Federal Council of Churches where he warned that “if 
the civilized world as we know it is to survive,” Americans must have a “spiritual 
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strength of greater magnitude” than the “gigantic power” of “atomic energy.” Truman 
appealed for a “moral and spiritual awakening,” a “renewal of religious faith” and a 
“revival,” without which “we are lost.” Furthermore, Truman asserted, “The Protestant 
Church, the Catholic Church, and the Jewish Synagogue – bound together in the 
American unity of brotherhood – must provide the shock forces to accomplish this moral 
and spiritual awakening.”16 Thus, religion and the Cold War intertwined from its earliest 
days, sometimes obviously, other times subtly.  
Less than two weeks prior to his speech, President Truman received George F. 
Kennan’s “Long Telegram,” which, in 8,000 words, provided Kennan’s frank analysis of 
“Soviet attitudes toward the outside world and Stalin’s foreign policy objectives.”17 In his 
memoirs, Kennan reflected on the request from the State Department for his opinion: 
Now, suddenly, my opinion was being asked. . . . It would not do to give them 
just a fragment of the truth. Here was a case where nothing but the whole truth 
would do. They had asked for it. Now, by God, they would have it.18 
Further, in his memoirs, Kennan stated that he composed his five-part telegram, “all 
neatly divided, like an eighteenth-century Protestant sermon.”19 Kennan understood and 
was familiar with 18th century sermons. He grew up in a strict Presbyterian home and he 
revered his great-great-grandfather, Thomas Kennan, a rural Presbyterian minister in 
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Vermont and upstate New York in the eighteenth century. As described by Kennan in a 
family history he wrote in later life, Thomas Kennan was a deeply spiritual man who had 
an “active religious commitment” more than all the “other male Kennans, both before his 
time and after it.”20 Moreover, Kennan’s “sermon” remark was not solely an historical 
reflection. It evidenced an avocation that the diplomat would later practice, that of lay 
preacher.21 
In section four of the Long Telegram, Kennan described the “agencies” that the 
Soviet Union would use to promulgate its policies and advance the communist cause. 
These included “religious societies” and the “Russian Orthodox Church with its foreign 
branches, and through it the Eastern Orthodox Church in general.” A year later, in his 
pseudonymous “X” article in Foreign Affairs, Kennan again made religious allusions. He 
argued that in fighting the ideological battle with communism, the United States must 
possess “a spiritual vitality capable of holding its own among the major ideological 
currents of the time.”22 
On January 31, 1950, President Truman wrote a directive to the Secretaries of 
State and Defense, asking them “to undertake a reexamination of our objectives in peace 
and war and of the effect of these objectives on our strategic plans.” The motivation for 
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this reexamination was the “probable fission bomb capability and possible thermonuclear 
bomb capability of the Soviet Union.” In his directive, Truman not surprisingly 
requested, “The moral, psychological, and political questions involved in this problem 
would need to be taken into account and be given due weight.” The resulting document – 
NSC-68 – written by the State Department’s Policy Planning Staff under Paul Nitze, 
became one of the seminal policy statements of the Cold War. According to Jonathan 
Herzog, it “forever altered the way American security experts conceptualized and fought 
the Cold War.”23 
Since its declassification in 1975, historians have dissected and debated NSC-68 
from numerous angles. More recently, the religious overtones of the text have drawn 
scrutiny. Nitze’s grandson and author, Nicholas Thompson, observed in The Hawk and 
the Dove, “Though Nitze had no theological background, the document sounded biblical 
at times.”24 It does so in numerous spots. In describing the “present world crisis,” NSC-
68 states that one of two factors affecting the global distribution of power was that “the 
Soviet Union, unlike previous aspirants to hegemony, is animated by a new fanatical 
faith, antithetical to our own, and seeks to impose its absolute authority over the rest of 
the world.” Later the idea of a Soviet “faith” recurs: The Kremlin is “the source of a new 
universal faith.” Repeatedly, the document uses theological terminology like “morality,” 
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“evil,” “covetousness,” “faith,” and “infallibility.” According to NSC-68, American 
institutions were the target of Soviet efforts to “bring the free world under its dominion,” 
and especially those institutions that exerted a moral influence on society: “Every 
institution of our society is an instrument which it is [sic] sought to stultify and turn 
against our purposes. Those that touch most closely our material and moral strength are 
obviously the prime targets, labor unions, civic enterprises, schools, churches, and all 
media for influencing opinion.” In describing the darkly characterized “Kremlin design” 
for the world, NSC-68 curiously invokes the imagery of the divine: “The system becomes 
God, and submission to the will of God becomes submission to the will of the system.” In 
contrast, when describing the more positively characterized “purpose of the United 
States,” the document summons the hallowed closing words of America’s sacred 
Declaration of Independence: “With a firm reliance on the protection of Divine 
Providence, we mutually pledge to each other our lives, our Fortunes and our sacred 
Honor.” If Nitze and his Policy Planning Staff sought to express a moral tone in NSC-68 
to please the President or by their own decision, they certainly did so with the language, 
imagery and metaphors they chose.25 
The next stage of operationalizing religion in US foreign policy – and some 
would argue the most significant in the early Cold War – came on October 30, 1953, 
when the National Security Council under the leadership of President Eisenhower 
adopted NSC-162/2: Basic National Security Policy. This NSC policy guided all national 
                                                 




security planning of government departments until January 7, 1955, when NSC-5501, a 
revised Basic National Security Policy, superseded it. NSC-162/2 provided the legal 
foundation, by some interpretations, to use religious ideas, institutions and people as tools 
in covert operations. Paragraph 30 of NSC-162/2 contains a sentence that became the 
basis for some in the NSC’s Operations Coordinating Board – overseeing and 
coordinating US policy overseas, as well as covert activities – to argue that religion was a 
valid and valuable tool for use in covert operations. The sentence contained in Paragraph 
30 stated, “Accordingly, the American people must be informed . . . of the need for 
mobilizing the spiritual and material resources necessary to meet the Soviet threat.” The 
inclusion of the statement was not coincidental; it had the approval of the full NSC 
including, and most importantly, President Eisenhower.26 
The NSC reviewed the original draft of NSC-162 on October 7, 1953. As was his 
pattern in NSC meetings, Eisenhower encouraged vigorous discussion and debate of the 
policy document. Before a meeting, draft documents circulated for review, and follow-up 
memos passed among NSC members highlighting specific points and suggesting revised 
wording for the text. At the full Council meeting, Eisenhower went through each 
document line-by-line debating specific concepts, words, and even the placement of 
commas and semi-colons. A final NSC document only included wording vetted by the 
full group. When the first draft of NSC-162 came before the NSC on October 7, the 
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statement in Paragraph 30 (then labeled 29) about “the need for mobilizing the spiritual 
and material resources necessary to meet the Soviet threat” was not included. However, 
by October 29, when NSC-162/1 received its final review and revision, the sentence is 
present. During the Council debate of the final draft of the document, no memos 
challenged the inclusion of the sentence and no debate of the statement appears in the 
minutes of the meeting preserved in the Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS). 
A meeting of the NSC occurred on October 19 to formulate revisions of NSC-162 into 
NSC-162/1, but FRUS states that there are no extant records of that meeting. Therefore, 
the NSC rationale for the inclusion of the “mobilizing the spiritual and material 
resources” sentence remains unknown.27 However, the application of the statement to 
religion and covert operations is clear in memos and documents of the Psychological 
Strategy Board and the Operations Coordinating Board throughout the mid-1950s. 
Edward P. Lilly was a Truman appointee to the Psychological Strategy Board 
who remained after Eisenhower became President and the PSB morphed into the OCB. 
Lilly was also a Catholic and a professor of history first at Loyola University in Chicago 
and then at Catholic University of America.28 In March 1954, he wrote a memo to Elmer 
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Staats, a colleague within the OCB and a Methodist. The subject of the memo was “The 
Religion Factor and OCB.” In the memo, Lilly argues that the statement in Paragraph 30 
of NSC-162/2 regarding “mobilizing the spiritual and moral resources necessary to meet 
the Soviet threat,” while “not assigned to the OCB” should not “be considered beyond 
OCB’s legitimate jurisdiction.” Lilly further bases his argument for “use of the religious 
factor in Government activity implementing national security policies” upon the 
statements of President Eisenhower in his first Inaugural Address and that of Secretary of 
State John Foster Dulles in a speech he gave on December 11, 1952. Lilly argued that 
three government agencies “are undertaking, or have undertaken” actions in this area: the 
CIA, State Department, and the US Information Agency (USIA). He states, “CIA’s 
approaches can not be reported,” but he spoke of them as if the CIA was actively making 
use of the “religious factor.” Lilly closed with a statement for why the OCB should be 
involved in developing and implementing actions in this area: 
Since the United States has not done enough with the religious factor and since 
the present Administration publicly supports the religious approach to America’s 
world position, OCB should undertake an analysis of the possibilities and 
difficulties in developing greater American use of the religious factor. OCB has a 
legitimate concern in this field of implementation of national policy, particularly 
in as much as the religious factor necessarily can not be the concern of any one 
agency of the Government.29 
The OCB circulated the Lilly memo to a number of people. One of them, Colonel 
Byron Enyart of the US Air Force, wrote a response to Elmer Staats a few days later. 
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Commenting on the “mobilizing the spiritual and material resources” statement in 
Paragraph 30 of NSC-162/2, Col. Enyart affirmed,  
NSC 162/2 now furnishes the peg upon which we can hang our hat. The 
Departments almost universally used the absence of such a document as an excuse 
for not doing anything in this field. . . . If we are not able to accomplish 
something with a climate of opinion as generated by the present administration, 
and as further evidenced by the efforts of that climate in the NSC document 
referred to above, then we are not deserving of the many great things that the 
Good Lord has given us.30 
Enyart referenced his previous experience in the Truman Administration when he “sat 
upon the State Department’s religious group,” which was disbanded after accomplishing 
“nothing.” Enyart blamed this failure on “the personality of the Chairman” of the group. 
Enyart admitted that the “religious factor” was a “sensitive subject; nevertheless, it has a 
tremendous potential, and any failure to appreciate this fact is certainly a loss to our 
global effort.”31 
Not everyone was as enthusiastic about Lilly’s memo. Charles Taquey sent a 
memo to Staats regarding a March 16, 1954 meeting held to discuss Lilly’s proposal. 
Taquey was cautious and concerned about the “sensitive nature” of the religious factor in 
foreign policy operations. In particular, Taquey felt that Lilly’s proposed special 
“working group on the ‘religious factor’” was unreasonable: 
If we establish a group for the “religious factor”, why not one for the “military 
factor”, and one for the “diplomatic factor”? Functional divisions can proliferate 
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ad infinitum; they do not add necessarily to the technical proficiency of 
governmental action.32 
Yet, whatever reservations Taquey and others may have felt, actions in support of the 
“religious factor” went forward within the OCB. 
In August 1956, the OCB circulated a ten-page draft paper entitled “Proposals 
Regarding U.S. Relations with Therawada Buddhist Countries.” A special committee 
made up of members from the State Department, USIA and the CIA drafted the report. 
Countries considered by the report included Ceylon (now Sri Lanka), Burma (now 
Myanmar), Thailand, Laos, and Cambodia. The paper argued, “Inadequate consideration 
has been given to the role of religion and religious organizations in international 
relations.” The report discussed how Buddhist organizations could promote “U.S. policy 
objectives,” in particular anti-communism. Buddhist clergy and lay leaders were primary 
targets of US government efforts, and US officials involved in the activities would need 
“to remain as inconspicuous as possible” using nondescript titles to disguise their true 
purposes. Money for the OCB projects would come through the Ford Foundation and the 
Asia Foundation, CIA conduits long before the Ramparts controversy exposed them. 33 
By January 1957, the ten-page OCB report swelled to a forty-three page report 
entitled “Outline Plan Regarding Buddhist Organizations in Ceylon, Burma, Thailand, 
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Laos, Cambodia.” The report specifically notes that its recommendations are in response 
to directives in “NSC-5612/1: Statement of Policy on U.S. Policy in Mainland Southeast 
Asia.” The OCB report was in direct response to the “communist exploitation of 
Buddhism” in Southeast Asia and, in particular, the efforts of “Chinese Communists” to 
extend “their influence in the Buddhist countries of Southeast Asia.” The report outlined 
specific “courses of action to promote U.S. policy,” providing a brief summary of each 
action, the department it was assigned to, and a target date for completion. Responsibility 
for most of the actions went to the State Department or USIA, with some going to the 
Defense Department. However, a few actions remained classified and blacked out; one 
might reasonably assume that these actions were assigned to the CIA. This report, like the 
earlier one, spelled out funding for specific actions, some coming through the Ford 
Foundation and others through the Asia Foundation. This report provided a lengthy, 
detailed Annex on each country. Noteworthy is that for each country the OCB report had 
a section entitled “Buddhist Organs as Vehicles for Subversion” and another entitled 
“Anti-Communist Educational Efforts By or Through Buddhist Groups.”34 
Concerns over communist penetration into the Middle East both predated and 
followed Lilly’s “religious factor” memo. In February 1953, the Psychological Strategy 
Board prepared a sixty-seven page report marked Top Secret entitled “Psychological 
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Strategy Program for the Middle East.” The report outlined six objectives for 
psychological actions in the Middle East, with the primary one being, “To promote a 
realistic awareness of the threat to the aspirations and self-interests of the peoples of the 
Middle East that is posed by Communism, Soviet imperialism and Soviet-inspired 
revolution.” Like the Buddhist reports, this report went into detail about Islam as a 
religion, its structures, leadership, ideologies, and social conditions.35  
The OCB produced a follow-up report in May 1957 entitled “Inventory of U.S. 
Government and Private Organization Activity Regarding Islamic Organizations as an 
Aspect of Overseas Operations.” This report argued, “Islam is important to the United 
States” and bemoaned that, “Soviet and Chinese Communists have far surpassed the 
West, including the U.S., in making direct appeals to the Muslims as Muslims.” The 
report’s twenty-three pages provided succinct, cogent analysis of Islam as a religion, of 
Islamic organizations, and of Islam’s function in countries in the Middle East and Asia. 
Like the Buddhist reports, this report’s goals were clearly anti-communist; for example, 
one of the actions the report listed was “stressing the incompatibility of Islam and 
Communism.” The CIA’s influence is visible in the report. The working group that 
prepared the document lists a representative from the CIA, with the name blacked out. 
“No CIA activity will be reported in the inventory part of the paper,” the document states; 
and CIA information used in the report was intentionally mixed with that of other 
agencies in order to disguise its CIA origins, the report explained. An examination of the 
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report and its cover memo yields evidence that, at the time of publication, the CIA had 
current operations in the Middle East and with Islamic groups that it wanted to protect 
and keep secret.36 
Some might argue that the statement in Paragraph 30 of NSC162/2 – “the need for 
mobilizing the spiritual and material resources necessary to meet the Soviet threat” – was 
more generic in nature, and represented broad matters of the spirit or nebulous moral 
feelings rather than specific religions. Yet a generalized reading of the text was not how 
Truman or Eisenhower seemed to intend the words, given their Presidential speeches and 
public statements. It was not how the NSC, PSB, and OCB interpreted the words, given 
their strategies and global actions targeting specific religious communities and leaders. It 
was not how agencies like the CIA, Defense, State and USIA interpreted “spiritual,” 
given their covert operations. These groups interpreted Paragraph 30 as Col. Enyart did in 
his memo to the Elmer Staats: “NSC 162/2 now furnishes the peg upon which we can 
hang our hat” for religious operations. Government bureaucrats seemed to prefer 
generalized terminology like “spiritual” because of the “sensitive nature” of discussions 
about religion.37 
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Subsequent revisions of NSC-162/2 reflected the NSC’s comfort with the 
statement as it appears in follow-up versions of the Basic National Security Policy:  
4. NSC 5440 (December 13, 1954) – Paragraph 52.a, “Continuing efforts should 
be made to inform the American people of the demands on their spiritual and 
material resources necessary to ensure U.S. security . . .” 38 
5. NSC 5501 (January 7, 1955) – Paragraph 54.a, “Continuing efforts should be 
made to inform the American people of the demands on their spiritual and 
material resources necessary to ensure U.S. security . . .” 39 
People Who Operationalized Religion 40 
The operationalization of religion in foreign policy during the Cold War came 
from government leaders who reflected the dominant religious culture of the time. Never 
before in US history had religious fervor been as high as it was in the late 1940s and 
1950s. Polls at the time revealed that 99 percent of Americans said they believed in God. 
Gallup reported that 49 percent of the US population was in church on a weekly basis 
during much of the 1950s, the highest level of church attendance in US history. “Church 
membership nationwide grew at a faster rate than the national population, from 57 
percent of the U.S. population in 1950 to 63.3 percent in 1959.” All denominations grew 
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at historic rates, but Roman Catholics showed the most dramatic growth, with all their 
numbers up 25 percent between 1950 and 1955.41  
There was a strong correlation between the extraordinary growth in religion and 
demographics. After the war, the US experienced a “marriage explosion” and a “baby 
boom” unlike anything in its history. Soldiers came home, found jobs, got married, and 
started families. “The U.S. population grew from 150 million in 1950 to 180 million in 
1960, the largest increase in a single decade in history.” As Robert Ellwood points out in 
his book, The Fifties Spiritual Marketplace, there is a verifiable correlation between 
church attendance and the birth rate: 
The fortunes of religion often rise and fall with the birthrate. More specifically, it 
is rightly claimed that people tend to go to church during their prime child-
bearing years, and that religiosity (as measured by church attendance) is a 
function of family size. Religion assists parents in socializing their children, 
provides a site for family activities (togetherness!), and is generally deemed a safe 
environment for raising children.  
One of the reasons noted by some scholars for the decline in mainline American 
Protestantism is that women in liberal churches “tend to have fewer children than do 
women in conservative churches.”42  
In the late 1940s and 1950s, American politicians correctly discerned the times 
and recognized that promoting religion, whether domestically or in foreign policy, was a 
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political winner. The pervasive religious environment of the era clearly contributed to the 
growth of religion in American foreign affairs and in American intelligence operations. 
Josef Stalin understood the importance of religion in American life. He urged Andrei 
Gromyko, the Soviet Ambassador to the United States, to attend church every Sunday 
and to listen to sermons preached by American ministers in order to gain insight into the 
American mind and values system.43  
President Harry Truman, a skilled politician, understood this. He was a dedicated 
Baptist who attended church regularly. He believed that God had ordained his becoming 
President, so that he could face down the Soviets. According to Cold War historian 
William Inboden, Truman saw the Cold War conflict with communism as “nothing less 
than a religious war.” In an April 3, 1951 address to the New York Avenue Presbyterian 
Church in Washington, DC, Truman articulated his viewpoint:  
For the danger that threatens us in the world today is utterly and totally opposed 
to all these things. The international Communist movement is based on a fierce 
and terrible fanaticism. It denies the existence of God and, wherever it can, 
stamps out the worship of God. 
Our religious faith gives us the answer to the false beliefs of communism. Our 
faith shows us the way to create a society where man can find his greatest 
happiness under God. Surely, we can follow that faith with the same devotion and 
determination the Communists give to their godless creed.  
That is what we must do. Our religion must live in our hearts, not as a set of dull 
rules learned by rote, but as a burning faith. Only such a faith--only a living 
                                                 




allegiance to such a faith--can carry this country through the trials which are 
ahead of it.44 
President Eisenhower came to embrace the power of religion in his politics. He 
grew up in a strict religious home – his parents were Anabaptist River Brethren and 
eventually converted to Jehovah’s Witnesses – but during his adult life, he was not 
religiously observant until he began to consider a run for the White House and needed to 
build up his “spiritual bona fides.” During the summer of 1952, Eisenhower famously 
met with Billy Graham, who strongly encouraged the supreme commander of NATO to 
run for President and pledged his support.45 During the 1952 election campaign, 
candidate Eisenhower was explicit in his characterization of the Cold War as a moral and 
spiritual struggle: “What is our battle against communism if it is not a fight between anti-
God and a belief in the Almighty? Communists know this. They have to eliminate God 
from their system. When God comes in, communism has to go.”46 At Eisenhower’s 
inauguration, he underscored his religious convictions by spontaneously beginning his 
Inaugural Address with a personal prayer. It is the only time a President has led a prayer 
at his own inauguration. Later, “God’s Float” led the Inaugural Parade down 
Pennsylvania Avenue, pulled by a military Jeep and decorated with twelve paintings of 
varied religious groups in front of diverse houses of worship. The float boldly featured, 
on its front and rear, the words that would soon become the U.S. national motto, “In God 
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We Trust.”47 Once in office and at the encouragement of his friend, Billy Graham, 
Eisenhower and his wife, Mamie, became members and regular attendees of the National 
Presbyterian Church, where on February 1, 1953, Eisenhower became the only President 
baptized while in office, only twelve days after taking the oath of office.48 Whether 
Eisenhower’s spiritual practices and actions were genuine or politically motivated has 
been debated – one journalist cynically called the Eisenhower era a time of “piety on the 
Potomac.” However, there is no question that the Eisenhower years saw an explosion of 
religious fervor and American civil religion, which influenced the government’s 
approach to the Cold War.49  
The Eisenhower administration took concrete steps to operationalize religion in its 
foreign policy. In the Middle East, Eisenhower “made a deliberate effort to reach out to 
the Islamic world,” based on Christianity and Islam’s mutual belief in one God. He 
appealed to Muslim leaders to join America in fighting a “holy war” against communism. 
The CIA’s Allen Dulles created a plan to provide “arms, funding, and other means of 
support to the leaders of Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Lebanon and Iraq” to oppose the Soviet 
Union. In a “multi-country operation” the CIA, Defense Department, and State 
Department launched the still largely classified “U.S. Program for Support of the 
Orthodox Church” in a covert effort to aid anti-communist leaders within the Orthodox 
Church and to undermine Soviet efforts to manipulate the Church. In Southeast Asia, the 
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NSC and OCB cultivated relationships with Buddhist and Islamic leaders to counter the 
initiatives of the Chinese Communists.50 From its earliest days, the Eisenhower 
administration aggressively pursued overt and covert initiatives where religion was, at 
times, an operational component. 
One of the ways President Eisenhower’s religious beliefs influenced foreign 
policy was through senior members of the Executive Branch who shared his beliefs. 
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles was a devout Presbyterian and passionate 
Republican. His father was a prominent Presbyterian minister in Watertown, New York 
and his grandparents were career missionaries to India. He formed opinions about people 
based on two criteria: their attitude towards business and their attitude toward religion. 
Dulles once said, “For us there are two kinds of people in the world. There are those who 
are Christians and support free enterprise, and there are the others.”51 Dulles expressed 
his passions by working as an international trade lawyer in New York City and by 
serving as a lay leader in the Federal Council of Churches (FCC), where he founded and 
chaired the Commission on a Just and Durable Peace. The Commission gave Dulles a 
platform to express his views about the importance Christianity in international affairs, 
and to participate in the 1945 San Francisco Conference that drafted the United Nations 
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Charter. The Commission proposed nine amendments to the UN Charter, four of which 
made it into the final document.52 
Religion and diplomacy intertwined in John Foster Dulles’ world. Besides the 
ministers and missionaries in his family, his maternal grandfather, John W. Foster, was 
Secretary of State for Benjamin Harrison and his uncle, Robert Lansing, was Secretary of 
State for Woodrow Wilson. Dulles literally grew up with discussions of religion and 
foreign affairs taking place at the family dinner table. Some historians believe that Dulles 
spearheaded American foreign policy during the Eisenhower years: “Dulles, not 
Eisenhower, was the prime mover of American foreign policy. It was he who generated 
it. It was he who persuaded the President. It was he who carried it forward. That made 
Dulles the effective commander of American power for the six years of his Secretaryship. 
And the world recognized him as such.” Other historians counter, “While Dulles enjoyed 
considerable authority as Secretary of State, his influence extended only so far as his 
President permitted.”53  
Dulles believed that America was at risk of losing the ideological battle with the 
Communists because “our generation is not drawing dynamic power out of its Christian 
beliefs.” He believed that a “religious revival” in America could win the Cold War. To 
that end, he sought to engage American missionaries in the clash with communism and 
encouraged American clergymen, when they “travelled overseas or met with foreign 
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dignitaries,” to serve “as both ambassadors of American values and intelligence agents, 
reporting what they learned back to Dulles.” Chief among these was Billy Graham, who 
befriended Dulles, communicated with him regularly, and sought the Secretary of State’s 
advice before embarking on overseas crusades in the 1950s. In return, Dulles invited 
Graham to come to the State Department to give personal, hour-long briefings after 
returning from some of his overseas tours, like India in 1956 where he met with Prime 
Minister Nehru with Dulles’ help. Although Dulles aspired to perform his job “in the 
light of Christian principles,” in a letter to Methodist Bishop G. Bromley Oxnam, Dulles 
admitted that applying religious principles to foreign policy was “much more difficult 
and far messier” than he anticipated.54 
John Foster Dulles’ brother, Allen, was Director of Central Intelligence at the 
same time Foster was at the State Department. It was an unusual arrangement, but Allen’s 
celebrated background in the OSS in WWII and his experience as CIA Deputy Director 
under DCI Walter Bedell Smith, made him a perfect choice. “Never before had siblings 
directed the overt and covert sides of American foreign policy. . . . With a glance, a nod, 
and a few words, without consulting anyone other than the president, the brothers could 
mobilize the full power of the United States anywhere in the world.”55 
Allen received the same strict Presbyterian upbringing as his brother. When 
Foster chose not to follow in his father’s footsteps and enter the Christian ministry – a 
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common expectation of first sons in some conservative Christian homes of the era – the 
anticipation passed on to Allen. However, Allen deeply disappointed his father when, as a 
student at Princeton, he announced his plans to go into diplomacy. “The Diplomatic 
Service is no career,” his father replied with contempt; but Allen’s study for the Foreign 
Service exam had already begun. After leaving home, Allen was not religiously observant 
like his pious brother. A philanderer and serial adulterer, he was less influenced by the 
religious and ethical imperatives of his youth. Nevertheless, Allen did like to cite the 
Bible’s use of spies to justify, and perhaps sanctify, the work of the CIA. Dulles also had 
the words of Jesus inscribed on the wall of the CIA headquarters building, which Dulles 
defended by saying that intelligence work “was the search for the truth.” Evan Thomas 
observes in The Very Best Men, “Foster Dulles was regarded as a grim and pompous 
moralist. Allen Dulles, by contrast, had a twinkle in his eye (a roving eye, to be sure) and 
a jolly, avuncular manner. But he was actually a hard man.” One legal colleague 
remarked about Dulles, “Allen was shrewd – but cold as ice.”56 During the Dulles 
brothers’ years leading the American foreign policy establishment, religious influence on 
foreign policy came almost entirely through Foster Dulles, rather than Allen. However, 
the DCI did not oppose using religion or religious people in CIA covert operations, a 
likely holdover from his years in the OSS. 
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George F. Kennan – author of the Long Telegram, father of “containment,” and a 
principal figure in shaping US covert operations policies – grew up at the turn of the 20th 
century in a devout Presbyterian home in Milwaukee. The Kennan family was a part of 
Immanuel Presbyterian Church where the children regularly attended Sunday School and 
occasionally church services. The Kennans were a “straight-laced family” that allowed 
“no movies or card-playing on Sundays,” no swearing and no discussions of sex. Kennan 
left home to attend Princeton where its mandatory religious services had little impact on 
the lonely, socially outcast young man. After joining the Foreign Service, Kennan was 
not particularly religious and “drifted away from the church.” Kennan succumbed to the 
typical enticements for young professionals living abroad, which seduced him and many 
of his compatriots in the Foreign Service. Still sensitive to his religious upbringing, 
though, George reassured his sister, Jeannette, in a letter: “Prolonged and intimate 
association with the devil does not lie in the Kennan character.”57 
It was during his early, not-very-Presbyterian years in Moscow that Kennan 
developed a deep passion for the Russian Orthodox Church through reading 
Dostoyevsky, for whom “I had no great respect . . . as a novelist, and even less as a 
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person,” but who “taught me something about the Russian church [sic], and with it about 
religion generally.” Although never a convert to Orthodoxy, Kennan developed an 
abiding affection for the church and its worship – the liturgy, the incense, the emotion-
filled music, the passion, the magnum mysterium – which offered an enticing alternative 
to the oft times dry, sterile worship of the Presbyterian Church. He occasionally attended 
Russian Orthodox Church services during his postings in Russia. In reflecting on those 
times, Kennan later remarked: “If I ask myself who were at that time, and actually 
through all the remaining years of my service in Russia, my most effective teachers in the 
field of religion? I can only say that they were, ironically, none other than the Soviet 
communists themselves.” For it was the efforts of the Communists to subvert and 
supplant the genuine Orthodox religion with a shallow imitation that “brought home to 
me how deep was my own need for, and dependence upon, the majesty and mystery of 
the Christian Church in giving meaning and solemnity to such occasions.”58 
According to Kennan’s daughters, while the family was in Washington, DC, they 
only attended church services once – on an Easter Sunday. Neither George nor his wife, 
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Annalise, discussed religion much with their children, until later years, when the Kennans 
moved to Princeton and George became active in the Episcopal Church.59  
Historians frequently comment on Kennan’s decision to invite his “good friend” 
Reinhold Niebuhr to join the deliberations of the Policy Planning Staff in 1949. At 
Niebuhr’s memorial tribute in 1971 at the American Academy of Arts and Letters, 
Kennan said of Niebuhr, “I regarded him during his lifetime, and continue to do so, as the 
greatest of my own teachers – as the man whose thought and example have exerted the 
greatest influence on my own view of life.” In a thank-you letter to Kennan, Niebuhr’s 
widow, Ursula, said that Reinhold repeatedly said of Kennan, “There is no one I feel 
more compatible with.” However, Kennan’s recollection later in life about Niebuhr’s 
involvement with the PPS in June 1949 is that Niebuhr had “no discernible impact on the 
proceedings.” Niebuhr confirmed this assessment in a 1969 interview, when he confessed 
of his time with the PPS that he “didn’t play any significant part.” Some scholars 
mischaracterize Kennan’s inclusion of Niebuhr on the PPS as an effort to inject religion 
into the strategic planning of the State Department. The evidence says no.60 
Perhaps more influential on the work of the PPS from a religious perspective was 
Kennan’s invitation to Dorothy Fosdick, daughter of famed New York City pastor Harry 
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Emerson Fosdick, to join the elite State Department strategy group. Fosdick was a 
“woman of indisputable talent and experience” and the first female member of the PPS. 
Fosdick became a personal confidant of Kennan to whom he would “pour out his heart” 
when depressed. Dorothy remained on the PPS under Paul Nitze and participated in the 
drafting of NSC-68 as well as other important Cold War documents. Dorothy was an 
ardent devotee of Reinhold Niebuhr and adopted a “Christian realism” approach to 
foreign policy.61 
Kennan, from his position as Director of Policy Planning, exerted significant 
influence on the early development of covert operations policy and capabilities. Sarah-
Jane Corke, in her insightful article, “George Kennan and the Inauguration of Political 
Warfare,” traces the development of Kennan’s influence during the formative years of 
clandestine operations and institutions. In June 1946, before going to the State 
Department, DCI Hoyt Vandenberg appointed Kennan “Special Consultant for 
Intelligence” for the nascent Central Intelligence Group. When the NSC adopted  
NSC-4-A at its fourth meeting, detailing the enacting of “black” operations, only three 
copies were printed: one for the President, one for the DCI, and one for Kennan. Kennan 
was involved in the creation of NSC-10/2: Office of Special Projects, as well as writing 
an NSC document, “The Inauguration of Political Warfare,” which outlined principles for 
covert actions, as well as four specific operations for approval.62 
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Although Kennan was enthusiastic about covert operations during his years in 
Washington, DC and earlier when he was coordinating “American intelligence activities” 
in Portugal as Counselor of the Legation, by his later years, Kennan came to regret his 
involvement with clandestine activities: 63 
I also confessed . . . my regret that I in earlier years had had a part, although a 
very small one, in setting up within our government facilities for the conduct of 
secret operations. I expressed as the more mature judgment of later years, the 
view that all forms of foreign policy that involved secrecy and concealment were 
neither in keeping with the American tradition nor did they fit naturally with the 
established modalities for the conduct of American foreign policy. 
. . . I would go even further and add that the involvement of our government in the 
acquisition of secret intelligence, by espionage and other avowed processes, while 
perhaps occasionally unavoidable, has had ascribed to it a degree of importance 
far greater than it deserves. This judgement has rested on my longstanding belief 
that well over nine-tenths of all that our government needs to know about life 
beyond our borders, even in military matters, can be better and more safely 
obtained by the scholarly scrutiny of information already available to us in 
legitimate ways than by the most elaborate efforts of espionage, secrecy, and 
concealment. I make these points in order to emphasize that I am concerned to 
distance myself from all aspects of American policy that cannot be openly and 
honestly avowed.64 
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A group of influential American clergymen supported the use of religion in 
foreign policy and covert activities. Bishop Fulton J. Sheen, the Auxiliary Bishop of the 
Archdiocese of New York, was a radio and television star, whose influence rivaled Billy 
Graham. In the 1930s, Sheen started a weekly NBC Sunday Night radio broadcast, The 
Catholic Hour, which ran for over twenty years and reached a weekly audience of over 
four million. In 1951, Sheen switched to television with a show, Life is Worth Living, 
whose audiences challenged those of Milton Berle and Frank Sinatra, eventually reaching 
20 million viewers weekly. Sheen received three Emmy Award nominations for the 
show; he won “Most Outstanding Personality” on television in 1953, defeating Edwin R. 
Murrow, Lucille Ball, Jimmy Durante, Arthur Godfrey and Adlai Stevenson. Sheen 
became famous on radio and television as an anti-communist crusader, a cause about 
which he was passionate and unrelenting. Sheen had a knack for taking complex 
philosophical concepts about communism and making them easy for average, working-
class Catholics to grasp.65   
We oppose communism not only because it is against religion, but because it is 
opposed to American institutions. 
The good Catholic . . . [is] one who [gives] his unstinting support to the efforts of 
both the Church and the nation to the destruction of the Communist peril.66 
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In his autobiography, Treasure in Clay, Sheen describes how the Communist Division of 
the FBI helped root out Soviet spies and sympathizers who attempted to infiltrate his 
inner circle, which travelled with him around the country as he gave speeches and 
lectures against communism.67 
Bishop Sheen’s superior in the Archdiocese of New York and, in some ways, his 
rival, was Francis Cardinal Spellman. As Archbishop of New York, Spellman was the 
senior and most influential prelate in the United States during the early Cold War. And as 
a member of the College of Cardinals, Spellman had powerful connections inside the 
Vatican. Spellman resided in a chancery nicknamed “the Powerhouse,” which was “at the 
nexus of politics and religion.” Spellman was a fierce advocate for spiritual revival in 
America “in the name of national security.”68 
In 1954, the CIA launched Operation PBSUCCESS in Guatemala to overthrow 
the democratically elected President Jacobo Arbenz, who dared to initiate land reforms 
after his election in 1950. The American United Fruit Company and the plantation 
owners called the land reforms “communist” and “Marxist.” As a part of their plan, the 
CIA needed the support of the Catholic Church in Guatemala, but it had no channel to 
Guatemalan Archbishop Mariano Rossell y Arellano. Allen Dulles, sent CIA agent 
Howard Hunt, who later became famous for Watergate, to meet with Francis Cardinal 
Spellman in New York City and solicit his help in convincing Archbishop Arellano to 
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lend his support and that of the Guatemalan Catholic Church to the coup plot. Spellman 
agreed to help Dulles and the CIA, as did Arellano. Soon, CIA agents were involved in 
writing “scripts and leaflets” for the Guatemalan priests and for Catholic radio 
broadcasts. The most important document the CIA drafted was a pastoral letter read in 
every Catholic Church in Guatemala on April 9, 1954, warning that “the worst atheistic 
doctrine of all time – anti-Christian Communism – is continuing its brazen advance in our 
country” and that Catholics should “rise up like a single man against this enemy of God 
and the nation.” According to a scholar of the Guatemalan coup, Stephen Kinzer, the 
pastoral letter was a “masterpiece of propaganda, steeped in the vocabulary of faith, fear, 
and patriotism. It was “reprinted the following morning in Guatemalan newspapers, [and] 
had a profound impact.” Buoyed by the success of its efforts, the CIA directed its agents 
in Guatemala to use religiously based propaganda “on a continuous and rapidly 
increasing scale.” The support of the Catholic Church was crucial to the triumph of 
PBSUCCESS.69 
In addition to Cardinal Spellman, Billy Graham, Bishop Sheen and Reinhold 
Niebuhr, perhaps the most influential clergyman during the early Cold War years was Dr. 
Edward Elson, senior minister of the National Presbyterian Church in Washington, DC. 
National Presbyterian boasted the membership of President and Mrs. Eisenhower, of 
former presidents Andrew Jackson and Woodrow Wilson, as well as Cold Warriors 
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Henry Luce, J. Edgar Hoover, and Attorney General Tom C. Clark. A week before 
Eisenhower’s inauguration, Elson sent a letter to the President-elect suggesting that when 
he took office he should begin every Cabinet meeting with prayer, because of the 
“spiritual battle against Communism and moral indifference.” Only three weeks later, 
Eisenhower informed his Cabinet that all meetings would begin with a few moments of 
silent prayer.70 
Elson’s influence reached far beyond his minister-parishioner relationship with 
Eisenhower. Elson took the lead on numerous national religious and political initiatives 
in an effort to support the objectives of the White House. One of these was the 
Foundation for Religious Action in the Social and Civil Order (FRASCO) whose 
announced purpose was “to unite all believers in God in the struggle between the free 
world and atheistic communism.”71 In his capacity as Chair of the American Friends of 
the Middle East, Elson spoke out on Arab-Israeli relations, the plight of Christian 
missionaries in the Middle East, and U.S. actions during the Suez crisis. In 1956, Elson 
made a six-week trip to the Middle East as an emissary for and bearing a letter of 
greeting from President Eisenhower. The “pastor-turned-ambassador” met with King 
Saud of Saudi Arabia, young King Hussein of Jordan, Egyptian President Nasser, Israeli 
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President Ben-Gurion, and other senior officials in Lebanon, Syria, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan 
and Yemen. 72  On his return, Elson gave a full report to Eisenhower about his trip, 
proudly declaring that the President was “exceedingly popular, particularly for his 
spiritual qualities and for his statesmanship.” Moreover, Elson did not hesitate to share 
his anti-Israel sentiments with Eisenhower. Elson argued – as did many Christian 
missionaries in the Middle East at the time – that the US government should make greater 
efforts to enlist the support of the Islamic states in the fight against the Soviet Union, and 
that the expansionist ambitions of Israel should be “contained.”73 
A lesser-known religious figure in the Cold War struggle against communism was 
the fundamentalist preacher, broadcaster, and political activist, Carl McIntire. For seventy 
years, McIntire was the godfather of fundamentalist Christian political activism and the 
architect of what became the Christian Right – predating and paving the way for Billy 
Graham, Pat Robertson, Jerry Falwell, Ralph Reed, James Dobson, and Gary Bauer.74 
McIntire’s chief cause was anti-communism, believing that Satan was the true “author of 
Communism.” In the fight against communism McIntire held numerous national petition 
drives, lobbied Congress and the White House, provoked congressional investigations, 
led regular mass marches on Washington, DC, spearheaded the religious takeover of the 
Republican Party and engaged in cultural warfare on “issues of abortion, gay rights, sex 
education, secular humanism, and alleged judicial tyranny.” McIntire’s closest associate, 
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friend, and chief adviser was a former Air Force intelligence officer, Edgar Bundy, who 
was an ordained Southern Baptist minister and a homosexual. Bundy was a rabid anti-
communist who wrote numerous books promoting wild conspiracy theories about how 
communism had infiltrated the US government and the churches. He joined McIntire in 
lobbying the House Un-American Activities Committee to investigate and expose “Reds 
in the churches” and “Communist infiltration in religious circles.” Bundy used his 
intelligence background and military intelligence contacts to support US government 
efforts to push back communism, including the Vietnam War. McIntire and Bundy’s 
view on how religious groups should aggressively fight communism is best characterized 
by a sign carried at a McIntire-sponsored, pro-Vietnam War rally in Washington, DC – 
“Kill a Commie for Christ’s Sake.”75 
In the early years of the Cold War, influenced by the religiosity of US 
government leaders and American society-at-large, the CIA carried out a number of 
covert operations where religion was a key component in the plan. However, many of the 
CIA agents and operatives who executed these plans were not very religious, if at all. For 
these agents, religion was just another tool in their clandestine toolbox to use as needed. 
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Using the Catholic Church to Buy an Election 
By the time that the National Security Council held its first meeting on September 
26, 1947, only a week after the National Security Act of 1947 took effect, crises were 
multiplying in post-war Italy, threatening its viability as a democracy. Communist 
insurgents were spreading propaganda and radicalizing labor unions. Communist agents 
incited strikes and armed uprisings around the country, which the Italian police and 
military did not have the arms to suppress. A lack of wheat led to bread and pasta 
shortages, staples of the Italian diet, stirring discontent in the populace. The government 
was financially bankrupt and, without immediate assistance, the country risked falling 
into general chaos, making it susceptible to subjugation by the Communists. Since the 
end of WWII, the Soviet Union had been on the march installing communist regimes in 
Poland, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria, with Czechoslovakia on the brink of collapse. 
In NSC-1/2, the National Security Council expressed grave concerns that “Italy, Greece, 
Turkey, or Iran” would be next. Commenting specifically on Italy, NSC-1/2 states, “The 
Government is now under strong and persistent Communist attack aimed ultimately at the 
creation of a Communist dictatorship subservient to Moscow.”76 
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The situation became increasingly urgent with the approaching Italian general 
election on April 18, 1948, which would elect the first full Parliament since the war – an 
election that the Communists had targeted to seize power. In NSC-1/1 (November 14, 
1947), the National Security Council authorized eight specific actions that the US 
government would take to “assist in preventing Italy from falling under the domination of 
the USSR.” Actions included sending money, arms, equipment, shipments of “wheat and 
other essential commodities,” garnering international diplomatic support for Italy, and 
“relaxation of unduly onerous terms in the Italian Peace Treaty.” Action number five in 
the list authorized covert actions: “Actively combat Communist propaganda in Italy by an 
effective US information program and by all other means practicable [remainder of the 
sentence classified and sanitized].” Therefore, the NSC authorized, in its first-ever 
directive, the CIA’s first-ever covert operation, and it significantly involved religion – the 
Roman Catholic Church.77 
James Jesus Angleton was CIA Rome Station Chief during the lead up to the 
Italian elections. Angleton spent much of his boyhood and youth in Milan where his 
father owned the Italian subsidiary of the American NCR Corporation. After attending 
Yale and Harvard Law, Angleton joined the OSS, which placed him in charge of OSS 
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counter-intelligence operations (X-2) for Italy. After the war, Angleton stayed on in 
Rome, working first for the new Central Intelligence Group and then as one of the 
founding officers of the CIA. Angleton developed “great sources in the Vatican,” 
particularly with Monsignor Giovanni Battista Montini, the Vatican’s undersecretary of 
state for Italian affairs.” As well, Angleton claimed, “he had penetrated the Italian secret 
service so deeply that he practically ran it.” Moreover, Angleton forged powerful and 
beneficial relationships with Israel’s fledgling intelligence services at a time when few 
officials in the Washington foreign policy establishment were friendly towards Israel. 
Angleton regularly shared information with Jerusalem and they returned the favor, much 
to Angleton’s benefit. Among his best sources of information were Israeli intelligence 
agents in Italy involved with smuggling Jews into Palestine at the end of WWII. So deep 
was Angleton’s relationship with Israel that eight months after he died in 1987, Israel 
planted a tree and dedicated a “memorial forest” in his name ten miles west of Jerusalem. 
All seven current and former heads of Mossad and Shin Bet, as well as three former 
heads of Israeli military intelligence, attended the “clandestine conclave” in Angleton’s 
honor.78 
Through the years, much speculation has surrounded Angleton’s middle name – 
Jesus. In fact, newspapers and other public accounts of the legendary CIA 
                                                 
78 Helms and Hood, 152-53. Jefferson Morley, The Ghost: The Secret Life of CIA Spymaster James 
Jesus Angleton (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2017), 33. Tim Weiner, Legacy of Ashes: The History 
of the CIA (New York: Anchor Books, 2007), 30-31. Dan Raviv and Yossi Melman, Every Spy a 
Prince: The Complete History of Israel’s Intelligence Community (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 
1990), 78. Andy Court, “Spy Chiefs Honour a CIA Friend,” The Jerusalem Post, December 5, 1987. 




counterintelligence chief rarely print his name without including his full middle name, 
never simply the initial or just his first and last names. Some people wrongly conclude 
that his middle name was an indication of his religiosity and that his religious beliefs 
informed his intelligence craft. Nothing could be further from the truth. 
In the personal notes that Richard Helms wrote to his ghostwriter, Bill Hood, the 
former DCI, who knew and worked closely with Angleton for over twenty years, 
provides an insightful explanation of Angleton’s name not included in the final 
manuscript of his autobiography:  
Even after his death, James Angleton has remained the most controversial of any 
of our Agency contempories [sic]. His name alone raises a response. At the time I 
left the Agency, I doubt that there were a half a dozen of Jim’s colleagues who 
knew his middle name was Jesus. He never used the name, or the initial. Although 
Jim’s mother was Mexican, and Catholic, Jim was Presbyterian. The assumption 
of some journalists that Jim’s middle name was a clue to this complex man is as 
far fetched as it is false. As an American at an English public school before WWII 
when Americans living abroad were a still a [sic] rather rare species, Jim was 
surely to have been subjected to even more hazing than others in his class. To 
avoid the additional ragging that he would have faced had he been known as Jesus 
– or even Hay-Suss – Jim accepted the suggestion of the head master, and never 
again used his middle name. He signed Agency memoranda simply JA.  
As a matter of common practice, newspapers in the country refer to public 
figures, and others who attract press attention, by the names by which they choose 
to be known. In the years that J. Edgar Hover directed the FBI, I doubt that the 
New York Times ever referred to him as John E. Hoover. Yet The Times makes 
an exception for Angleton, and continues to archly refer to him as James Jesus 
Angleton, a name he never used.79  
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On a separate page of handwritten notes about Angleton, Helms scribbled in the top 
margin, “Doubtless this was related to the fact that although baptized a Roman Catholic, 
he was raised as an Episcopalian.”80 To add further to the speculation about Angleton’s 
religious beliefs, biographer Tom Mangold quotes the conclusion of Angleton’s last will 
and testament written in January 1949: 
You who believe or half believe, I can say this now, that I do believe in the spirit 
of Christ and the life everlasting, and in this turbulent social system which 
struggles sometimes blindly to preserve the right to freedom and expression of the 
spirit. In the name of Jesus Christ I leave you.81 
As Helms said, Angleton was a “complex man” – baptized Catholic as a baby; 
raised Episcopalian; considered a Presbyterian as an adult; and one who confessed his 
belief “in the spirit of Christ and life everlasting.”82 It is safe to say that Angleton 
identified as a Christian, although there is little evidence of the degree to which he was 
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observant. His religious background may have made him more comfortable in building 
relationships with the Catholic Church; however, religion does not figure significantly in 
Angleton’s CIA story. His middle name may have been Jesus, but it meant nothing 
special to him and he never used it beyond his teenage years. 
The covert plan to use the Catholic Church to assure the defeat of the surging 
Communist Party in the 1948 Italian elections combined the efforts of the CIA Special 
Procedures Group, the Vatican, Francis Cardinal Spellman, private citizen Allen Dulles, 
and Secretary of Defense James Forrestal. In 1947, the Communists were the best-
organized and funded political party in Italy. Their strength grew with each passing 
month and in order to defeat them at the polls in 1948, the non-communist political 
parties needed money and lots of it. Pope Pius XII – Eugenio Pacelli – “provided 100 
million lire from his personal bank” in a battle for the survival of “Christian 
Civilization.” Pacelli’s donation was “apparently raised from the sale of surplus U.S. war 
matériel and earmarked for the Vatican to spend on anti-communist activities.” In the 
United States, Spellman raised private funds from wealthy Catholics, particularly in the 
Italian-American community. Forrestal approached his rich Catholic friends and Dulles 
approached his prosperous Protestant friends. Forrestal and Dulles both aggressively 
solicited donations from their well-heeled friends on Wall Street, where each man had 
made his personal fortune. Even with all the fundraising on both sides of the Atlantic, it 
was not going to be enough to buy an election.83  
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Spellman, through his connections with Myron Taylor, the President’s personal 
envoy to the Vatican, lobbied the US government not only to contribute funds for the 
reconstruction of Italy, but also for “political purposes.” Forrestall lobbied his old friend, 
John Snyder, one of Truman’s closest allies and the current Secretary of the Treasury, “to 
tap into the Exchange Stabilization Fund set up in the Depression to shore up the value of 
the dollar overseas,” but which became during World War II “a depository for captured 
Axis loot. The fund held $200 million earmarked for the reconstruction of Europe.” 
Government money by the millions went “into the bank accounts of wealthy American 
citizens, many of them Italian Americans, who then sent the money to newly formed 
political fronts created by the CIA.” To legalize and shield their transactions, “donors” 
were “instructed to place a special code on their income tax forms alongside their 
‘charitable donations.’”84 
Angleton’s “best guess” was that the CIA funneled $10 million into the 1948 
election operation. Money went to anti-communist trade unions, anti-communist and 
moderate political parties, religious societies, parishes, Catholic Action – the lay-led 
political arm of the Vatican, and directly to bishops and priests.85 The money blanketed 
Italy with posters, leaflets, books, newspaper placements, and radio advertisements, all 
warning about the dangers of communism. Select non-communist candidates and 
political leaders received funds for campaign rallies and “personal expenses.” The four-
                                                 
84 John Cornwell, Hitler’s Pope: The Secret History of Pius XII (New York: Penguin Books, rev. ed., 
2008), 329. Weiner, 29-30. Grose, 284-85. 
85 Weiner, 30. Kinzer, The Brothers, 89. Prados, Safe for Democracy, 39-40. $10 million US dollars in 




star Hotel Hassler at the top of the Spanish Steps in Rome became grand central for the 
distribution of bags and suitcases full of cash. “We would have liked to have done this in 
a more sophisticated manner,” said CIA agent and courier, F. Mark Wyatt recalled. 
“Passing black bags to affect a political election is not really a terribly attractive thing.”86 
The Catholic Church, exercising its considerable spiritual influence, buttressed 
the CIA propaganda operation. The Pope authorized the vice-dean of the College of 
Cardinals, Cardinal Tisserant, to speak on behalf of the Holy See: “Communists and 
Socialists [can] not receive the sacraments.” In fact, “they [can] not even receive 
Christian burial.” On the eve of the vote, Archbishop Giuseppe Siri of Geona, told the 
people of his diocese that not voting was a “mortal sin” and “voting Communist was not 
reconcilable with being a Catholic.” The Christian Democratic Party slogan drew from 
Ignatius of Loyola’s Spiritual Exercises – “Either for Christ or against Christ.” CIA 
propaganda experts arranged for copies of Greta Garbo’s 1939 satire of harsh Soviet life 
in Stalinist Russia, Ninotchka, to play in theaters across Italy. Moreover, the Agency 
propaganda machine enlisted American movie stars Frank Sinatra, Bing Crosby, and 
Gary Cooper to make special broadcasts to the Italian People reminding them that the 
outcome of the election was “the difference between freedom and slavery.”87 
The money and effort paid off. With a 90 percent turnout, the Christian 
Democrats received 48.5 percent of the vote, securing strong majorities in the Chamber 
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of Deputies and the Senate. Italy was safe from the communist threat. The Christian 
Democrats dominated Italian politics for thirty-five years. The CIA had proved the value 
of its new tools of political warfare and covert operations in stemming the spread of 
communism. CIA officers gained confidence and “a sense of omnipotence” because of 
their Italian success. They had taken on communism in a country with a dominant 
religious culture and won. Italy was the CIA’s first covert foray into the world of 
religion, but it would not be their last.88  
The Search for a Moslem Billy Graham 89 
After World War II, Egypt was in turmoil. The British struggled to maintain 
control of the Suez Canal and to exert their influence based on the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty 
of 1936. The government of King Farouk was corrupt, ineffective, and increasingly 
unpopular. Young army officers were restive and humiliated at the loss of the 1948 Arab-
Israeli War. Nationalists and socialists were openly promoting revolution and 
independence for the Egyptian state. 
In this context, two events catalyzed the CIA to become involved in Egyptian 
affairs with an operation that mixed Islam, American Christianity, covert activity, and a 
coup d’état – “the search for a Moslem Billy Graham.” First, Winston Churchill’s 
Conservative party returned to power in Britain in October 1951and decided to “punish” 
Egypt for dissolving two treaties that promised the British control of the Suez Canal Zone 
                                                 
88 Grose 284-85. Cornwell, 330-31. Weiner, 30-31. Holzman, 86-87. 
89 See Appendix 3: Excursus on Miles Copeland’s Reliability as a Source for important background 




through 1956. Second, in response to British military suppression of an uprising in the 
town of Ismailia, rioting broke out in Cairo on “Black Saturday,” January 26, 1952, 
resulting in the looting and burning of over 475 buildings in the city – all symbols of 
British imperialism – fashionable restaurants, every movie house, every liquor store, and 
every foreign establishment the mob came upon.90  
In early February 1952, Kermit “Kim” Roosevelt travelled to Cairo, at the behest 
of Secretary of State Dean Acheson and Deputy DCI Allen Dulles, to persuade King 
Farouk to initiate reforms that would defuse the revolutionary stirrings in the Egyptian 
populace and stabilize the government. Kim Roosevelt was the grandson of Theodore 
Roosevelt, a former OSS officer, and the head of the CIA Office of Policy Coordination’s 
Near East/Africa (NEA) division under Frank Wisner. Miles Copeland worked under 
Roosevelt and went to Cairo to assist with the CIA operation surrounding Farouk. 
Copeland relates in his memoir, The Game Player, the story of Roosevelt’s effort to 
persuade Farouk to accept American-proposed reforms and facilitate peaceful change in 
Egypt. Agents in the NEA gave Roosevelt’s reform project the label “Project FF,” 
according to Copeland, abbreviating the epithet used internally for Farouk – “Fat 
Fucker.” 91 When Roosevelt returned to Washington, DC, he believed that he had been 
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“successful” in convincing Farouk to make necessary reforms. However, Roosevelt’s 
confidence quickly faded. Farouk proved again in the weeks following the CIA spy 
chief’s visit to be a “mental lightweight,” an incompetent leader, and a sexual deviant 
known for his orgies. Roosevelt decided to “cast around for other leadership elements 
capable of bringing stability to the country” – preferably a strong, handsome, eloquent, 
charismatic leader. The OPC developed several scenarios for how to achieve this goal, 
“all of them unconventional,” according to Copeland in The Game of Nations. Roosevelt 
was determined to “save Egypt from itself” and, “grasping at straws,” Copeland wrote, 
“he dusted off my idea of a Moslem Billy Graham, and decided to send me to Egypt for a 
bit of reconnaissance.”.92 
Miles Axe Copeland, Jr. was a flamboyant, Alabama-born, jazz playing, former 
OSS agent with an inventive facility and intuitive capacity for the subtleties of covert 
operations.93 He prided himself in being a covert “political operative” so much that he 
inflated his prestige in the title of his entertaining autobiography – The Game Player: 
Confessions of the CIA’s original political operative. Copeland was not the CIA’s only 
political operative in its nascent years; but surely, he was one of the most colorful – at 
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least in his own telling.94 He was “a great bear of a man, six foot two or three, blond, 
genial, loose-limbed, casually dressed, with a good-ole-boy Alabama drawl that fluency 
in Arabic and a half-dozen other languages, and nearly fifty years of living in London had 
done nothing to erase.”95 Miles Copeland was not one of the patrician, East coast, Ivy-
league elites that saturated the ranks of the OSS and newly formed CIA – “gentleman 
spies” with impressive family pedigrees and social connections.96 Instead, he grew up in 
Birmingham, Alabama, the son of a doctor. He attended the University of Alabama in 
Tuscaloosa until he dropped out to play jazz trumpet in the Harry James and Glen Miller 
bands.97 After joining the National Guard in 1940, Copeland transferred to the Army’s 
Corps of Intelligence Police; later, after securing a personal meeting with “Wild Bill” 
Donovan of the OSS, Copeland entered the Counter-Intelligence Corps (CIC). He was 
sent to England to help with the preparations for Operation Overlord and after D-Day was 
dropped into France along with other notable CIC agents, Henry Kissinger, J.D. Salinger, 
and William Saroyan.  
In Europe, he gained first-hand experience with covert operations and learned that 
although some of the operations were morally questionable, in reality they were, 
                                                 
94 For more on Copeland’s truthfulness and reliability as an historical source, see Appendix 3: 
Excursus on Miles Copeland’s Reliability as a Source. 
95 Priscilla L. Buckley, "Miles Copeland R I P (Obituary)," National Review 43, no. 2 (February 11, 
1991), 18-19. Wilbur Crane Eveland, Ropes of Sand: America's Failure in the Middle East (New 
York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1980), 96. 
96 Karl E. Meyer and Shareen Blair Brysac, Kingmakers: The invention of the modern Middle East 
(New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2008), 324, 352. 




according to Copeland, just a “game” in the “amoral world” of power politics.98 In his 
1969 book, The Game of Nations, Copeland describes the “Games Center” in the State 
Department where in the early Cold War “a carefully selected assortment of superexperts 
under contract to the United States Government ‘gamed out’ international trends and 
crises to predict their outcome.” The three simple “rules of the game” reveal how the 
senior foreign policy operatives in the US government viewed international power 
politics: 
First, moral judgements are relevant only when they are in accord with the 
recognized moral standards of the various countries in the Game. Our own moral 
standards applied only when we were predicting what our own Government’s 
actions and counteractions would be. 
Second, we assume, unless it is proved otherwise, that a national leader’s first 
objective is to stay in power or, if he cannot, to retire from power with a minimum 
of personal loss (however he views “loss”) to himself. 
Third, we assume, unless it is proved otherwise, that a national leader acts in his 
country’s best interest as he sees them, and that he sincerely thinks he has a good 
case as he explains his actions to the world. . . . We had no Good Guys and Bad 
Guys in our Game, only a lot of players each of whom was trying to win and to 
win according to what constituted “winning” by his own lights [sic].99 
Copeland’s background was pivotal in shaping his thinking about “the search for 
a Moslem Billy Graham.” Copeland was not a religious man. However, he grew up in 
one of the most intensely religious sub-cultures in America – the evangelical Deep South, 
the Bible belt – that idolized Billy Graham. “It was not for nothing that I had thought of a 
Moslem Billy Graham,” wrote Copeland in his autobiography. “As an Alabaman who 
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had known holy rollers, shouting Baptists and snake-handlers, it occurred to me that 
maybe, just maybe, there was something about these characters to be taken seriously.”100   
Copeland understood that charismatic leaders, religious or political, with 
compelling oratorical gifts, had the power to sway the masses and to persuade them to act 
in a prescribed manner. Such a leader, positioned correctly and promoted vigorously – as 
Billy Graham had been by Hearst and Luce – could lead a revolution and alter the 
direction of a nation. Copeland believed that in Egypt the most powerful and persuasive 
person to have the respect of the impoverished, uneducated masses would be an Islamic 
religious leader, a holy man, a “Moslem Billy Graham,” clandestinely promoted by and 
taking directions from the CIA.101 
The first time Copeland asserts the CIA used the “Moslem Billy Graham” 
scenario was in 1951 prior to the collapse of the situation in Egypt. Copeland claims the 
idea evolved from the “conceptualizing” of many ideas and the game playing that took 
place in the State Department Games Center. “Someone advanced the idea of promoting 
a ‘Moslem Billy Graham’ to mobilize religious fervor in a great move against 
Communism and actually got as far as selecting a wild-eyed Iraqi holy man to send on a 
tour of Arab countries.”102 In his account twenty years later in The Game Player, 
Copeland expands on the same story: 
An all-post memorandum to the field prompted the station chief in Baghdad to 
recruit a local “holy man” and send him on a speaking tour which got him 
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arrested, tried and hanged by the Iraqi government of Nuri es-Said. Nuri objected 
to that sort of thing “on principle,” as he later said in a letter of apology which he 
wrote to Kim Roosevelt when he learned that the man really was a CIA agent as 
he had claimed, and was not merely boasting to his interrogators.103 
Later in 1952, when faced with limited options in Egypt, Roosevelt told Copeland 
to dust off the idea of a “Moslem Billy Graham” and go to Cairo “for a bit of 
reconnaissance” to see what he could develop.104 According to Copeland’s telling of the 
story, in Cairo he teamed up with an old friend from his CIA days in Syria, Nasr-ed-din 
Nashashibi (Nasri), a thirty-first generation descendent of the guardian of the Jerusalem 
and Hebron mosques under the Mamluks. “Nasri agreed that a charismatic leader might 
be just what was needed to divert the growing stream of anti-American hostility. . .  A 
religious spellbinder would be ideal.” Copeland and Nasri began their search by visiting a 
“religious speakeasy in the old City” – Milo’s Den – which overlooked the strikingly 
beautiful Sultan Hassan mosque. That night, a group of Whirling Dervishes was the 
entertainment. They reminded Copeland of the “holy rollers” he had known back in 
Alabama. “I knew from what was happening back in America that a religious movement 
didn’t have to make sense in order to attract adherents.” Billy Graham was appealing not 
only to “fools and mental defectives” but also to “lawyers, doctors and even college 
professors who wanted to be ‘born again.’” Copeland figured he could surely find some 
“thinking dervishes.”105 
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The following night, Nasri took Copeland to hear Hassan Hodeibi, the newly 
appointed head of the Muslim Brotherhood. According to Copeland, he was “one hell of 
a speaker” who held the crowd in the large auditorium in the palm of his hand. 
Subsequently, Copeland found out that King Farouk had given money to Hasan Hodeibi 
to bring about a “return to God” movement of Egypt’s fundamentalist Muslims, which 
would help Farouk to hold onto power. However, Hodeibi double-crossed Farouk by 
using the king’s bribery money to entice elements of the Egyptian Army to join with the 
Muslim Brotherhood to execute a coup of their own. There was even some evidence that 
Hodeibi might be on the CIA payroll, but Copeland could not substantiate it.106 In the 
midst of the religious double-cross, deceit, and betrayal, Copeland came to the conclusion 
that a “combination” of the Army and the Muslim Brotherhood was needed in order to 
have the power to execute a coup d’état and receive the broadest base of popular support 
in order to hold onto power once it was achieved.107  
According to Copeland, one of Roosevelt’s agents code-named “Rupert” initiated 
super-secret meetings with representatives of the Free Officers movement.108 Copeland 
offered the assistance of the American government to help the Officers halt “the further 
deterioration” of the country. Among those that Copeland encountered in Nasser’s inner 
                                                 
106  Ibid., 149-51. 
107  Ibid., 150-51. 
108 Wilford in America’s Great Game states that “Rupert” seems to fit the description of “Richard Paul 
Mitchell, a young Syrian American graduate student who had come to Cairo in 1951 on a Fulbright 




circle were members of the Muslim Brotherhood.109 Multiple sources validate that the 
Muslim Brotherhood initially supported the coup. However, efforts to build a strong 
alliance between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Free Officers, even using Sayyid Qutb 
as a liaison, broke down over political and ideological differences.110 The veracity of 
Copeland’s outreach to the Free Officers movement is challenged, according to Wilford, 
by the later testimony of “both Kim Roosevelt himself and several of the Free Officers.” 
Moreover, Gamal Abdel Nasser, one of the leaders of the Free Officers Movement and 
later President of Egypt, wrote an article explaining the “revolution” in Foreign Affairs in 
1955. In his apologia, Nasser insisted that the coup was “purely national with no 
international intervention,” a to-be-expected assertion from an Arab leader not wanting to 
be seen as colluding with the American government, particularly the CIA. Owen Sirrs, in 
his authoritative history of the Egyptian intelligence services, ascribes no active role to 
the CIA in the coup d’état. He states that the Free Officers moved to oust Farouk when 
they heard that the King was planning to arrest them, having been tipped off to their 
plans. Whether the CIA participated in a support role in the coup d’état is a point that 
continues to be debated by historians. 111 
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In the end, Copeland’s “search for a Moslem Billy Graham” did not secure a 
“religious spellbinder” to lead the poverty-stricken masses of Egypt in revolt. Instead, 
savvy military officers took advantage of the unstable situation – with or without the 
clandestine help of the CIA – to overthrow Farouk on July 23, 1952 and install a 
parliamentary government based on secular political principles.112 Nasser believed 
religion should have its place in civil society, but it should not control the government. 
Tensions between the secular and sacred in Egypt endure to the present day, with the 
Muslim Brotherhood commanding huge popular support and the military using strong-
arm tactics to maintain power and control. 
Copeland’s story of “a search for a Moslem Billy Graham” is captivating and 
entertaining. However, is it true? This is a key question given that several histories of the 
Middle East recount the story of Copeland’s “search for a Moslem Billy Graham,” and in 
the retelling cite one source – Copeland. They report it as an historical fact, without 
questioning its veracity.113 Wilford, commendably, relates elements of the story that are 
verifiable, but does not use the phrase “a Moslem Billy Graham.” Based on his research, 
Wilford makes a qualified affirmation of the Egyptian activities of Copeland and 
Roosevelt regarding Farouk: “Some circumstantial evidence seems to corroborate Miles’s 
claims.”114 
                                                 
112 Mohamed Naquib, another senior leader of the Free Officers Movement, was the first President 
Egypt, until Nasser assumed full control in 1954. 
113 Matthew F. Holland, America and Egypt: From Roosevelt to Eisenhower (Westport, CT: Praeger, 
1996), 26-27. Michael B. Oren, Power, Faith, and Fantasy: America in the Middle East 1776 to the 
Present (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2007), 508. 




Copeland’s title of his operation – “a Moslem Billy Graham” – is catchy. It 
provokes the imagination, coupling Islam with Christianity, associating a yet-to-be-
discovered Muslim religious leader with a famous American religious firebrand. Did the 
CIA envision recruiting such a Muslim leader and plan to put him on the CIA payroll, as 
it did with the Iraqi holy man? If so, what motivated the CIA to operationalize religion in 
this way? Did the religious beliefs of individuals inside the Agency drive the operation; 
or was it a religiously neutral, transactional operation? Does it provide any clues about 
the CIA’s relationship with Billy Graham? 
Donald N. Wilber was a CIA agent in the Middle East and one of the principal 
architects of the 1953 CIA-led coup d’état that overthrew Iranian Prime Minister 
Mohammed Mossadegh. Wilber wrote the official classified CIA history of Operation 
TPAJAX in March 1954. James Risen of the New York Times first reported the existence 
of the secret document on April 16, 2000 and The Times subsequently posted it on its 
website. Wilber also wrote one of the most important cultural and political histories of 
Iran – Iran, Past and Present: From Monarchy to Islamic Republic – which has gone 
through nine editions from 1948 to 1981.115 
Another of Wilber’s many books, Adventures in the Middle East, provides the 
history of numerous OSS and CIA operations in the Middle East to which he was 
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connected. In telling the story of “Operation Ajax,” Wilber reminisces about working 
with Kim Roosevelt and Miles Copeland. Then, in a discussion of “psychological warfare 
and political action” operations, he brings up the story of the “Moslem Billy Graham.” 
Except, he does not credit Copeland with coming up with the idea. Wilber says that he 
came up with the idea during the time that he and Copeland were in Washington, DC at 
the Games Center: 
One day at home I happened to have the television on when Billy Graham 
appeared. He was holding a Bible, and from time to time he thrust it toward his 
viewers, saying, “The Bible says,” with increasing emphasis. This incident led me 
to consult sociologists about the relationship between what a speaker says and his 
manner of delivery. I found agreement that delivery makes up about 80 percent of 
a speaker’s attraction to an audience, his actual words only the remaining 20 
percent. Another member of the group and I considered the use of hypnotism in 
relation to delivery, and applied for training in this field. . . .  
 I also did a great deal of reading, much of it exploring the experiences of 
Christian and Muslim mystics, and I produced an essay expressing my conviction 
that the trances these mystics experienced were caused by self-hypnosis – they 
were not subject to direction by another person, an “operator” in the terminology 
of the subject. (The above conclusion I later modified somewhat in an article I 
wrote, “Sufis: Mystics of Islam,” Fate, December 1979.) . . . 
<< A sanitized page dealt with an assignment in Egypt.>>116 
Unfortunately, CIA censors sanitized a portion of Wilber’s Egypt story. However, much 
of what Wilber describes in this account concurs with what Copeland relates, particularly 
where he wrote that during their Games Center strategizing, “Someone advanced the idea 
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of promoting a ‘Moslem Billy Graham’ to mobilize religious fervor in a great move 
against Communism [italic added].”117  
Wilber’s account, as a second source, validates that the idea of a “Moslem Billy 
Graham” was real. It was not one of Copeland’s fictionalized stories to enliven his 
narrative. Did Wilber dream up the idea first after watching Billy Graham on television? 
Or was it Copeland? Or perhaps both? It is plausible that the “Moslem Billy Graham” 
was an idea that Wilber came up with from watching Billy Graham on television and then 
brought to the State Department Games Center as an “unconventional” yet potential idea. 
It is also plausible that the idea was one that Copeland came up at the Games Center 
when they were “conceptualizing” scenarios for the Middle East. This would explain 
Copeland’s nebulous statement in his 1969 book, “Someone advanced the idea of 
promoting a ‘Moslem Billy Graham’.” Then later, when sent to Egypt to assist Roosevelt 
with Farouk, Copeland recalled the idea from the Games Center exercises, applied it to 
his current situation, added a bit of his own flair, and embarked on “a search for a 
Moslem Billy Graham.” This possibility makes the statement in Copeland’s 1989 book 
also true: “But it was not for nothing that I had thought of a Moslem Billy Graham 
[italics added].” Whichever option one considers more plausible, it is clear that these 
early CIA operatives conceived and carried out operations in the Middle East using Billy 
Graham as an exemplar of the kind of “religious spellbinder” they hoped to employ to 
                                                 




sway the Muslim masses. Moreover, this was not the only time the CIA considered using 
Billy Graham as an archetype for a covert operation.118 
In late 1959 and 1960, the Western Hemisphere division of the CIA’s clandestine 
service (Directorate of Plans) strategized about ways to overthrow Castro. It sought to 
mobilize various forms of propaganda against Castro, including using the Catholic 
Church. A CIA declassified document – Evolution of CIA’s Anti-Castro Policies, 1959–
January 1961 – describes some of the ideas discussed in various meetings about how to 
undermine Castro. In a meeting on April 1, 1960 at the Miami residence of the former US 
Ambassador to Peru and Brazil, William D. Pawley, a group of senior CIA leaders, 
including DCI Allen Dulles and some private citizens, met to strategize against Castro. 
During the meeting, participants voiced disappointment with “the present pathetic effort 
on the part of the Catholic Church to face up to the Communist plot in Cuba.” 
Subsequently, in a separate meeting of the CIA Western Hemisphere division, covert 
agents discussed ways to mobilize the Catholic Church to oppose the visit of Nikita 
Khrushchev to Cuba in the summer of 1960. One propaganda strategy floated was to 
anger members of the church against Khrushchev by distributing leaflets across Cuba 
“depicting the crucifix upside down, to signify the Soviet treatment of religion.” 
Although considered, the official CIA history notes, “There is no indication that this 
particular leaflet was ever devised.” In another meeting, CIA agents E. Howard Hunt, of 
Watergate fame, and Dave Phillips,  
                                                 




assessed the possibility of sending a white painted “flight of truth” airplane on a 
trip to several of the Latin American countries, bringing – in a “Billy Graham 
type operation” – the message of Castro’s betrayal of the Cuban revolution. But 
this esoteric plan, too, never got beyond the planning stage.119 
Here in an officially sanctioned CIA history written by a CIA staff historian, 
clandestine agents unrelated to Miles Copeland and Donald Wilber propose carrying out 
a “Billy Graham type operation” in a different part of the world – Latin America. The 
date of this proposal is the summer of 1960, likely August. The timing of this proposal is 
well before Billy Graham’s South American crusades of 1962, when cooperation between 
the CIA and the Billy Graham Evangelistic Association likely took place. However, 
Hunt’s suggestion comes after Graham’s 1958 Caribbean Tour to Puerto Rico, Jamaica, 
Trinidad, Barbados, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Panama, and Mexico. Perhaps Hunt and 
Phillips were familiar with Graham’s Caribbean crusades through their work in the 
Western Hemisphere division. They saw what Graham did as an archetype for their own 
propaganda challenge, even though theirs did not directly involve religion.120 
Whatever Hunt and Phillips’ reasons for suggesting the example of Billy Graham, 
it is obvious that CIA agents during the Cold War were well aware of Graham, his anti-
communist passions, and his power to influence the masses. The CIA valued Graham’s 
oratorical skills, his powers of persuasion, his charisma. They sought to duplicate it. 
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Furthermore, the CIA’s use of Graham as a model was not limited to religiously devout 
CIA agents or religiously contextualized situations. 
Occultism in High Places 
On a blustery, bitter January day in 1961, a young President John F. Kennedy 
declared, “Let the word go forth from this time and place, to friend and foe alike, that the 
torch has been passed to a new generation.” In the CIA, the process had already begun. 
Miles Copeland resigned the CIA in May 1957 frustrated, along with the Roosevelts, 
over the “Eisenhower administration’s handling of Middle East policy . . . their conflation 
of nationalism and communism, their tendency to overestimate the American ability to 
influence local developments, and their failure to heed the advice of area experts.” Kim 
Roosevelt followed in January 1958, leaving the CIA for a lucrative position with Gulf 
Oil Company and eventually setting up his own consultancy, Kermit Roosevelt & 
Associates. Allen Dulles remained as DCI until November 1961when Kennedy fired him 
for mishandling of the Bay of Pigs Invasion – part of a larger covert effort to depose 
Castro initiated in the Eisenhower administration and continued in the Kennedy 
administration.121 
Miles Copeland settled with his family in Beirut and started his own consultancy 
with CIA colleague Jim Eichelberger. Copeland, like other Agency alumni, kept his 
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fingers in the intelligence world and occasionally took on contract jobs. More 
significantly, though, Copeland started writing about his life in the CIA, telling 
captivating stories about covert operations seldom found in other sources. As Wilford 
affirms, Copeland writes “extraordinarily detailed accounts of CIA covert operations” 
that “constitute one of the most revelatory set of writings by a former US intelligence 
officer ever published.”122 In The Game Player, Copeland tells about another member of 
Roosevelt’s five-person political action staff, “a bright and inventive young PhD named 
Bob Mandelstam.”123 Mandelstam had a vivid imagination and had “some ideas he had 
been nursing since his university days” at Johns Hopkins. One of Mandelstam’s first 
ideas, according to Copeland, was “occultism in high places” (OHP), a theory of political 
activism “based on an impressively detailed study of ways in which leaders of the world 
based their judgements on one form or another of divine guidance.” According to 
Copeland, Mandelstam’s OHP made it into several CIA covert operations, most notably 
the coup d’état that ousted Kwame Nkrumah from Ghana in 1966.124 
Robert S. Mandelstam was born and raised in Sioux City, Iowa and later moved to 
Baltimore. He began his post-secondary education at Baltimore City College, transferring 
                                                 
122 Wilford, America’s Great Game, 67-68. 
123 There is no record that Robert S. Mandelstam ever earned a PhD degree. His student records from 
Johns Hopkins University show that he earned a BA degree in 1940. Copeland’s reference to a PhD 
degree must be an allusion to Mandelstam’s high intelligence. For more on Copeland’s fictionalization 
of elements of his narrative, see Appendix 3: Excursus on Miles Copeland’s Reliability as a Source. 
Kim Roosevelt’s “special group” included Kim’s cousin Archie Roosevelt, Copeland, Mandelstam, 
Donald Wilber, and one other unknown agent. See Copeland, Game Player, 175-76. Wilber, 
Adventures in the Middle East, 191-92. 
124 Wilford, America’s Great Game, 227-28. Copeland, Game Player, 175-76. “R.S. Mandelstam, 68, 




to Johns Hopkins University in his junior year. He graduated with a BA in 1940. Like 
Copeland, Mandelstam was not a northeastern elitist, perhaps one of the factors that 
endeared him to Copeland. Also like Copeland, Mandelstam had a facility with 
languages, studying French and Latin in university and learning Japanese, German, Greek 
and Spanish during his professional career. During WWII, Mandelstam joined the Navy 
and became an intelligence officer. After the war, he stayed on with the Office of Naval 
Intelligence for a couple of years as a civilian before moving over to the CIA. During 
1963, he worked on International Security Affairs, particularly Cuba, at the Pentagon in 
the Office of the Secretary of Defense. In 1969, he resigned from the CIA and went to 
work for his old boss at Kermit Roosevelt & Associates.125 
Mandelstam was an average looking man – medium-height, medium-build, 
medium-smile, not someone who stood out in a crowd – perfect for a spy. His teachers 
described him on his student evaluation forms as intelligent, polite, having good character 
and “well-bred.” He and his wife, Rosemary, never had children. His only surviving 
relative is a niece, Marjorie Mandelstam Balzer, a research professor at Georgetown 
University, an anthropologist specializing in Russian, Eurasian, and Eastern European 
studies, as well as shamanism and indigenous Russian religions. According to Balzer, her 
uncle was a “rule keeper” who did not stray outside the lines of strict secrecy surrounding 
his work. As such, he did not leave behind a cache of secret documents, which would 
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illuminate his ideas and work. Nor did Mandelstam write a memoir of his life in the 
intelligence services, even though family members “begged” him to do so in his later 
years. Therefore, the only record of Bob Mandelstam’s life in the CIA and intelligence 
services is what Miles Copeland provided in The Game Player and briefly in a 
surreptitiously recorded interview with novelist Larry Collins in November 1986.126 
Mandelstam’s “occultism in high places” explored and syncretized a variety of 
religious, quasi-religious, shamanistic, mystical, and astrologic practices. According to 
Copeland, the Kabul CIA station chief reported how “Afghani politicians habitually 
settled deadlocks in their parliament with cockfights.” Mandelstam sought the advice of 
“a Mexican chicken-trainer” to see if there was a way that the CIA could fix the outcome 
of cockfights to influence the decisions of the Afghani parliament. Kim Roosevelt “halted 
the project” of manipulating Asian and African superstitious practices because he deemed 
it too “racist.” However, Roosevelt enthusiastically supported the idea of “planting 
astrologists on certain world leaders,” because Washington’s premier social hosts, Perle 
Mesta and Gwyn Cafritz, whose parties Roosevelt frequented, checked their elite party 
guest lists with astrologers before extending invitations. As well, certain members of 
Congress consulted astrologers and practitioners of voodoo. The CIA, according to 
Copeland, used “astrological computations [to induce] President Sukarno of Indonesia to 
make various moves which suited our purposes.”  Moreover, Mandelstam made OHP 
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arrangements with the highly controversial Moral Rearmament movement of Frank 
Buchman, as well as L. Ron Hubbard’s Church of Scientology.127 
Copeland’s claims about OHP are plausible given independent reports from CIA 
sources regarding the Agency’s efforts in the area of the paranormal and mind control. 
Donald Wilber, another member of Roosevelt’s “special group,” talked in his memoir 
about his efforts to use Sufi mysticism and hypnotism in CIA operations in the Middle 
East. In 1968, Edward Lansdale wrote a report to US Ambassador to South Vietnam 
Ellsworth Bunker encouraging the employment of “Vietnamese Soothsayers” who 
advised elite South Vietnamese political and military leaders by means of divination, 
wizardry, and astrology. In 1964, the Special Operations Research Office at American 
University produced a report for US military intelligence agencies and the CIA entitled 
“Witchcraft, Sorcery, Magic and Other Psychological Phenomena and Their Implications 
on Military and Paramilitary Operations in the Congo.”128 
Moreover, American intelligence agencies’ interest in “psychic warfare” during 
the Cold War was not a random exercise carried out by rogue agents. It was a planned 
operation, spearheaded by the CIA and the Defense Department in the 1960s, 70s, and 
80s, to catch up with the Soviets, who had been conducting scientific experiments in the 
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paranormal from the late 1930s. Three declassified Defense Intelligence Agency reports, 
as well as articles in the Armed Forces Communications Journal, Signal, and the Army’s 
Military Review, detail efforts of the Soviets to weaponize various dimensions of psychic, 
paranormal, and spiritual activity. These included hypnotically programing sleeper agents 
for future attacks, remotely controlling US intelligence assets to act against their 
country’s interests, and launching “photonic barrier modulators,” which like voodoo 
witch doctors can “induce death or illness from miles away.”129 In addition, the Soviets 
worked to develop the capability to do remote viewing of secret military sites, locating 
submarines, remotely disabling military equipment, and launching “hyperspatial 
howitzers” to transmit nuclear explosions telepathically. The Soviets also took the lead in 
developing psychotropic drugs for its military and intelligence agencies, including an 
effort to monopolize the world’s supply of LSD. The CIA authorized Project MKULTRA 
in direct response to the Soviet efforts, which experimented on human subjects with LSD 
and other drugs – with deadly effect – in an effort to develop the perfect “truth drug” and 
other mind control agents.130 
                                                 
129 “Photonic barrier modulators” was a term coined by DIA psychic warriors to describe the mental-
psychic manipulation of energy particles which carry radiant energy, like light or x-rays. In some 
respects, terminology like this is psychic warfare mumbo-jumbo to make the experiments seem more 
scientific. 
130 Defense Intelligence Agency, “Controlled Offensive Behavior – USSR,” July 1972, in Larry 
Collins Papers, Box 14, Folder 68, Maze Research Files: Volume 3, Booth Family Center for Special 
Collections, Lauinger Library, Georgetown University, Washington, DC (hereinafter LCP). Defense 
Intelligence Agency, “Soviet and Czechoslovakian Parapsychology Research,” September 1975, Box 
14, Folder 68, Maze Research Files: Volume 3, LCP. Defense Intelligence Agency, “Parapsychics 
R&D – Warsaw Pact,” March 30, 1978, Box 14, Folder 67, Maze Research Files: Volume 3, LCP. 
U.S. Congress, Senate, Joint Hearing before the Select Committee on Intelligence and the 
Subcommittee on Health and Scientific Research of the Committee on Human Resources, Project 
MKULTRA, The CIA’s Program of Research in Behavioral Modification, 95 Cong., 1st sess., August 




In January 1981, columnist Jack Anderson broke the story of the Pentagon’s top-
secret “psychic task force” working to close the “ESP gap” with the Soviets – some 
skeptics called it the “voodoo gap.” The Pentagon allocated $6 million for the task 
force’s work, but members of the House Select Committee on Intelligence pushed for 
increasing the amount. The National Security Agency employed psychics, astrologers, 
and even palm readers to crack the codes on the Kremlin’s computers.131 TIME magazine 
reported that in the fall and winter of 1980, on the third Thursday of every month a 
strange meeting took place as a part of the task force’s research: 
A Navy officer in a plain civilian suit carried a briefcase handcuffed to his wrist 
into the parlor of “Madame Zodiac,” psychic and palm reader. By looking at top-
secret photographs and charts, the clairvoyant attempted to predict the movements 
of Soviet submarines off the East Coast. Madame Zodiac’s payment: $400 
cash.132 
The CIA conducted another set of experiments using “two respected academics: Harold 
Puthoff, formerly with the National Security Agency, and Russell Targ, formerly with 
Stanford Research Institute in Menlo Park, [California].” The experiments were code-
named “Grill Flame.” The first test involved giving a psychic the latitude and longitude 
of a remote location and asking him to describe the scene. The site was a super-secret 
Soviet nuclear testing area in Kazakhstan, which the psychic correctly described in detail 
as verified by photographs from US spy satellites. The second test asked a psychic to 
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locate a TU95 “Backfire” bomber that had crashed somewhere in Africa. The psychic 
“gave the CIA the location within several miles.” Grill Flame was a success. North 
Carolina Congressman Charlie Rose summed up the feeling of many who learned of the 
“psychic warfare” of the US government: “Some people think this is the work of the 
devil. Others think it may be the holy spirit [sic]. If the Soviets, as is evident, feel it is 
worthwhile, I am willing to spend a few bucks.”133 
In The Game Player, Miles Copeland claims that the CIA employed 
Mandelstam’s OHP strategy of using astrologers as a part of the coup d’état that 
overthrew Kwame Nkrumah on February 24, 1966. Nkrumah was the first Prime Minister 
and founding President of Ghana after its colonial independence from Great Britain in 
1957. In his usual loquacious style, Copeland describes the employment of Mandelstam’s 
OHP for the covert operation: 
The astrology training scheme dragged along slowly, and didn’t show results until 
some years later when a seer we planted on President Nkrumah of Ghana 
persuaded him to accept an invitation to visit Communist China so that he would 
be out of the country when our boy, General ‘Uncle Arthur’ Ankrah, staged his 
coup d’état.134 
This is the only reference anywhere to the CIA using Mandelstam’s OHP in the Nkrumah 
coup plot. There are small elements of Copeland’s account that are flawed, but the basic 
assertion is historically valid. 135 Did the CIA actually plant a “seer” in Nkrumah’s inner 
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circle to expedite the coup d’état? Did Mandelstam’s “occultism in high places” play a 
role in the ouster of Kwame Nkrumah? Do historical records provide any indication as to 
whether this part of Copeland’s claim about Mandelstam and the CIA is true? 
Kwame Nkrumah was a complex person – personally, politically, and religiously. 
He was born in 1909 in a small village in southwestern Ghana to parents who baptized 
him into the Catholic Church. After his basic education, he went to the Government 
Training College in Accra, the capital city, and earned a certificate as a teacher. He taught 
for several years in Catholic schools around Ghana, then known by its colonial name, the 
Gold Coast. Dissatisfied with his situation in life and wanting a western university 
education, Nkrumah applied to Lincoln College (now University) in Chester County, 
Pennsylvania, a small Presbyterian school of 300 students and the United States’ oldest 
degree-granting historically black college. In three years, he earned a Bachelor of Arts in 
sociology and economics. He stayed on as a lecturer at Lincoln while earning an 
additional Bachelors of Theology at Lincoln Seminary. At the same time, he earned a 
Master of Science in education and a Master of Arts in philosophy from the nearby 
University of Pennsylvania.136  
During his college years, Nkrumah was constantly short of funds to pay his tuition 
fees and living expenses. Help came from the Presbyterian denomination, which licensed 
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him to preach. He earned money preaching at various black churches in the greater 
Philadelphia and New York City areas. During this time, Nkrumah consumed the 
writings of black activist W.E.B. DuBois, whom he later invited to live in Ghana, after 
becoming President, and where DuBois died. Nkrumah also came under the influence of 
“Father Devine” and his religious, socialist Black Pride movement. As a part of Father 
Devine’s group, Nkrumah was eligible for various forms of members-only financial 
assistance. Devine claimed to be Jesus Christ returned to earth and his followers 
considered him to be God. Increasingly during these years of black activism, Nkrumah 
declared his belief in “African Socialism” and embraced traditional forms of African 
spirituality, spurning organized American religion.137  
In 1945, after ten years in the United States, Nkrumah moved to London 
ostensibly to earn a law degree. However, he quickly changed plans and became involved 
in leftist, anti-colonial politics. He absorbed the writings of Marx and Lenin, feeling that 
“their teaching held the secret of banishing British imperialism from West Africa.” Some 
sources say that he even joined the British Communist Party while in London. He made 
friends with other leaders from West African countries in London and formed a 
“vanguard group” of the West African National Congress dedicated to working secretly, 
each in their own country, towards forming a “Union of African Socialist Republics.” 
Nkrumah became eager to see his own Gold Coast emancipated. Back home a new 
political party formed, the United Gold Coast Convention (UGCC); the founders sent to 
                                                 




London to invite Nkrumah to return and become the leader of the new nationalist 
movement. The six senior leaders of the UGCC, including Nkrumah, quickly ended up in 
jail amidst a British crackdown. Impatient for action and results, and unwilling to 
compromise, Nkrumah broke with the UGCC leadership and formed his own party, the 
Convention People’s Party (CPP), which campaigned with the motto, “Self-government 
now.” The CPP quickly rose to power winning British-sponsored local, parliamentary, 
and national elections in 1951, 1952, 1954 and 1956, on the way to independence on 
March 6, 1957. Kwame Nkrumah was a “national hero” as the new nation of Ghana was 
born.138  
By design, Nkrumah cast his national leadership in overt religious terms, mixing 
nationalism, European Christianity, Islam, and traditional African tribal religions in a 
way that cemented his supreme authority in Ghanaians’ minds. His followers referred to 
him with honorific titles filled with religious meaning – “Savior,” “Redeemer,” 
“Messiah,” “Prince of Peace,” and “Africahene (King of Africa),” a title given to a tribal 
chief that signified his political and spiritual authority. Nkrumah had a twenty-foot statue 
of himself erected in front of Parliament House in Accra with a scriptural paraphrase of 
Matthew 6:33 inscribed underneath: “Seek ye first the political kingdom and all other 
things shall be added to you.” The original biblical passage reads, “Seek ye first the 
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Kingdom of God and his righteousness; and all things shall be added unto you.”139 The 
CPP adapted the Lord’s Prayer to denounce the British and praise Nkrumah. As well, the 
party changed all the words of the Apostles Creed to honor the CPP and Nkrumah; it 
began,  
I believe in the Convention People’s Party. 
The opportune Savior of Ghana, 
And in Kwame Nkrumah its founder and leader, 
Who is endowed with the Ghana Spirit 
Born a true Ghanaian for Ghana, . . . 140 
During one of Nkrumah’s early imprisonments in 1950, the CPP newspaper, Accra 
Evening News, published a paraphrase of the Beatitudes (Matthew 5:1-12) in support of 
their leader. Some historians believe that Nkrumah penned the words: 
Blessed are they who are imprisoned for self-government’s sake,  
   for theirs is the freedom of the Land.  
Blessed are ye, when men shall vilify you and persecute you,  
and say all kinds of evil against you, 
   for the Convention People’s Party sake.  
Blessed are they who hunger and thirst because of self-government,  
   for they shall be satisfied.  
Blessed are they who reject the Coussey Report,  
   for they shall know freedom. . . . 141 
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Nkrumah, like many politicians, knew how to embrace religion when it was to his 
political advantage. In January 1960, during his Africa Crusades, Billy Graham visited 
Ghana for three days, holding evangelistic meetings in Accra and Kumasi. He also met 
privately with Nkrumah of whom Graham said, “It was, I believe, my first experience 
with a political leader who held such a tight rein on the hearts and minds of his 
people.”142 Nkrumah’s use of religion and “God-language” to legitimize his leadership 
with the poor, uneducated masses was widely criticized by European Christian leaders in 
Ghana, but the people accepted it as confirmation of Nkrumah’s “Ghana spirit.” 
Ghanaian scholar Ebenezer Obiri Addo states, “God-language was indeed part and parcel 
of the C.P.P. political mechanism, and in most statements, both official and unofficial 
resonances to biblical language can be heard.”143 
At the heart of Nkrumah’s support from the rural and tribal population of Ghana 
was his embrace of traditional African animistic practices. From his youth, Nkrumah 
“yearned for the supernatural.” His mother told stories of her son’s “occult precocity” and 
his supernatural acts. Moreover, Nkrumah’s tribe, the Nzema, were famous for their 
witchcraft: “In the mind of the average Gold Coaster, Nzema witchcraft, [was] perhaps 
the most powerful witchcraft anywhere.” Therefore, since Nkrumah was from the Nzema 
tribe, “he was a witch.” Stories of Nkrumah’s “psychic powers were numerous.” To the 
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average Ghanaian, it explained his “invincibility” and his survival of two assassination 
attempts. Many of the metaphysical stories about Nkrumah cast him as being a witch or 
sorcerer – good or bad depending on the African or European Christian orientation of the 
teller – while others characterized Nkrumah as practicing tribal magic. Whatever 
viewpoint one chooses, his supernatural powers were “an important source of charismatic 
authority in Nkrumah’s political life.” For him to be an “African epic hero” in the eyes of 
his people, he had to have “supernatural abilities.”144 
From his student days onward, Nkrumah embraced elements of Marxism and 
socialism in a rejection of British colonialism. Some saw his leftist leanings as an 
expression of European social democracy, while others saw it as an endorsement of 
Soviet-style Communism. The evidence cited was his leadership style, considered by 
some to be “dictatorial to the extreme,” the state-controlled economy, and the multiplicity 
of state-owned, state-run businesses. In a five-page January 1964 classified report to the 
State Department, US Ambassador to Ghana William Mahoney wrote that Ghana’s 
economy was its “prime area of vulnerability,” warning that the “financial situation [is] 
critical” and not “far from insolvency.” Mahoney declared that Nkrumah “hasn’t the 
vaguest notion of the impending disaster.” By contrast, in a 2012 interview, Nkrumah’s 
oldest son, Francis, defended his father’s economic transformation of Ghana out of the 
exploitation of the colonial era: “The living standard of Ghanaians was among the highest 
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in Africa at the time of the coup! Sadly, the 1966 coup brought about the sudden 
truncation of Ghana’s carefully planned economic development and social 
transformation.”145 
In spite of his problems at home, Nkrumah aspired to be a leader on the 
international stage in the mold of Nasser, Nehru or Zhou Enlai. Nkrumah, a proponent of 
Pan-Africanism, inserted himself into the colonial independence struggle of the Congo, 
signing a secret agreement with Patrice Lumumba nine days after Congo’s independence, 
committing both countries to work towards a “Union of African States.” Six months later, 
Congolese military forces assassinated Lumumba in a plot developed by the CIA and 
authorized by Allen Dulles. When Nkrumah talked of becoming involved in the 
Rhodesian conflict, Ghanaian military leaders resisted fearing severe losses against the 
British. Ghana’s military believed that Rhodesian independence was a matter for 
diplomacy, not combat.146 
The military tired of Nkrumah’s authoritarian, “power-drunk” leadership, his 
destruction of the economy, and his dismantling of democratic institutions. General 
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Ocran, one of the coup leaders, described Nkrumah’s seizure of power as absolute: 
“Apart from him there existed no centre, no source of power.” Nkrumah provoked the 
military by a maneuver that became central to the coup d’état. In 1960, Nkrumah selected 
a company of Army soldiers to serve as a ceremonial detail. “Nkrumah liked ceremonies 
and would go all out to turn almost every occasion, no matter how insignificant, into an 
elaborate show of colour and pomp.” Soon, though, the small company of soldiers grew 
to brigade strength and ceremonial duties morphed into the “President’s Own Guard 
Regiment.” In addition, the regiment was no longer accountable to the Chief of Defence 
Staff, but directly to Nkrumah. Then in 1963, Nkrumah ordered the formation of the 
“President’s Own Field Regiment,” another brigade operating outside the military chain 
of command and answerable only to Nkrumah. The Defence Staff’s anxiety with the 
president over these military moves became a chasm of distrust when the military 
leadership learned that the Soviets had secretly shipped a load of arms to equip the 
president’s two regiments and provided Soviet military advisors to give them specialized 
training. A showdown became increasingly inevitable.147 
Rumors of a military coup d’état and talk of regime change multiplied by early 
1964. Multiple communications from US Ambassador Mahoney to Secretary of State 
Dean Rusk discussed the possibility. In February 1964, two years in advance, 
Ambassador Mahoney correctly assessed that a “coup could be attempted with high 
probability of success,” and that the military would coalesce around General Ankrah – 
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who became president after the coup – with Police Commissioner Harlley’s full support. 
According to one of Mahoney’s reports, Nkrumah blamed the United States for the 
rumors and unrest, calling the US the world’s “foremost neocolonialist power” and 
accusing the CIA of masterminding the rumored plot. Despite Nkrumah’s accusatory 
rhetoric, he continued to meet one-on-one with the US ambassador to discuss bilateral 
affairs and two matters in particular. First, Nkrumah wanted an official invitation to the 
United States to meet with President Johnson about financial aid for Ghana and US 
support for the Volta River Hydroelectric Dam. Second, Nkrumah wanted to talk with 
Johnson about the African leader’s plan for peace talks to end the Vietnam War. 
Nkrumah brazenly promoted himself with the Americans, Vietnamese, Soviets, and 
Chinese, as the best person to negotiate an end to the war in Southeast Asia. Throughout 
the summer of 1965, Ambassador Mahoney and Nkrumah met privately to exchange 
ideas and draft points of a peace plan. Mahoney sent reports of these meetings to the 
White House and the State Department.148 
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A group of senior and mid-level military and police officers actively plotted “to 
oust Nkrumah in the very near future” from February 1965 onwards. The timing of the 
actual coup d’état on February 23 & 24, 1966 was driven by several events. First, the 
news of the arming and training of the presidential regiments by the Soviets alarmed the 
coup plotters. Second, a “rash of army coups in western Africa has sparked new plotting 
against Nkrumah,” according to a CIA report. Third, the coup plotters saw as fortuitous 
Nkrumah’s invitation to travel to Hanoi to discuss peace proposals with Ho Chi Minh at 
the same time that the Ghana Chief of Defence Staff, Major General Aferi, was going to 
be in Addis Ababa on business with the Organization of African Unity. “The absence of 
the military’s top officers was an important consideration in the timing of the coup 
because it weakened the command structure of the army so that loyalist countervailing 
forces lacked obvious focal points around which to rally and retaliate, making the regime 
more vulnerable to attack.”149 The military and police launched the coup d’état at 0400 
Wednesday February 23, 1966. The operation took the code-name “Cold Chop”: 
 “Chop” is West African pidgin English for “food”, and “cold chop” is a meal that 
can be served instantly, without heating or cooking. “Cold Chop” has thus 
become a slang expression for anything that can be got easily or without much 
effort.150 
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The officers leading the coup saw it as a “last resort” to get rid of Nkrumah. They had 
“no doubts” about the “justness of our cause.” According to Colonel Afrifa, one of the 
leaders, “This conviction gave us the additional courage to carry the exercise through at 
all costs and if the worse came to the worst to fight a civil war and stand our ground until 
the Nkrumah government was overthrown.”151 
When the military action started, the officers – many of whom were classmates in 
Britain at Sandhurst – told the troops that the President’s Own Guard Regiment was 
carrying out a “mutiny” and it was the Army’s duty to stop it and arrest the president’s 
soldiers. Officers spread out across the capital and key locations around the country to 
seize strategic buildings – Flagstaff House, Parliament Buildings, Broadcasting House, 
the Osu Castle, all the offices of the Convention People’s Party, and the homes of senior 
military officers who remained loyal to Nkrumah. Colonel Afrifa commandeered 
Broadcasting House with no shots fired and at 0600 he announced on radio the military 
takeover of the government of Ghana: 
Fellow citizens of Ghana, I have come to inform you that the military, in 
cooperation with the Ghana Police, have taken over the government of Ghana 
today. The myth surrounding Nkrumah has been broken. Parliament is dissolved 
and Kwame Nkrumah is dismissed from office. All ministers are also dismissed. 
The Convention People’s Party is disbanded with effect from now. It will be 
illegal for any person to belong to it. We appeal to you to be calm and 
cooperative. All persons in detention will be released in due course. Please stay 
by your radios and await further details.152 
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The Ghana Police carried out countrywide arrests for all members of Parliament, 
Regional Commissioners, Party Propaganda Secretaries, District Commissioners and 
Party activists. The coup was largely non-violent with minimal resistance from those 
arrested, excepting the Vice Chief of Defence Staff, Brigadier Barwah, who was killed 
resisting arrest. The coup was nearly bloodless with armed combat occurring only at 
Flagstaff House, the presidential palace, between the regular Army troops and Nkrumah’s 
loyal regiments. Sporadic fighting at the triple-walled presidential fortress lasted an 
additional day, ending the coup on February 24, 1966.153  
Nkrumah was on his way to Hanoi when the coup occurred. Reports are 
conflicted about whether he was on the ground in Rangoon or in the air between Rangoon 
and Peking when the news reached him. At the Peking airport where Zhou Enlai greeted 
Nkrumah, he was fully aware of the military action. He declared to the assembled press 
that he was still the “constitutional head of the Republic of Ghana and supreme 
commander of the armed forces.” He vowed to return to Ghana and seize back control. 
According to a CIA report, Zhou Enlai met with Nkrumah for four hours immediately 
following a state dinner given in the former president’s honor. During the meeting, the 
Chinese Premier promised to restore Nkrumah to power in Ghana by sending arms and 
training a guerrilla force in nearby Guinea, where the Chinese had influence. However, 
Nkrumah never returned to Ghana. He lived his final years in exile in Guinea and later 
                                                 




travelled to Romania for prostate cancer treatment, where he died in 1972 at the age of 
62.154 
Did the CIA play a role in the coup d’état? The popular story in the press and in 
memoirs of retired CIA agents is that the Agency “masterminded” or “engineered” the 
Nkrumah coup. Given the CIA’s more visible involvement in coups in other countries 
during this time – Iran, Guatemala, Congo – it is easy to believe. However, US 
government documents declassified and published in 1999 tell a different story. Multiple 
State Department telegrams and reports dating back to 1963 and made available through 
FRUS and the LBJ Presidential Library, verify that the State Department and US 
intelligence services were clearly aware of the coup rumors, the coup planning by the 
military, and the possible coup timing. US Embassy officials in Accra – likely including 
members of the five-man CIA staff – were certainly in direct communication with 
military coup plotters. Perhaps US officials offered advice and help, perhaps not; the 
available records are not definitive on this point.155 Moreover, a memo from White House 
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, Robert Komer, written to President 
Johnson two weeks after the coup expresses surprise at Nkrumah’s ouster: 
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The coup in Ghana is another example of a fortuitous windfall. Nkrumah was 
doing more to undermine our interests than any other black African. In reaction to 
his strongly pro-Communist leanings, the new military regime is almost 
pathetically pro-Western [italics added].156 
Komer’s surprise at the “fortuitous windfall” gives the impression that he did not 
know the coup was going to happen when it did. Given that he was Johnson’s National 
Security Advisor and a member of the 303 Committee (formerly the Special Group), 
which approved all CIA covert operations, it is unlikely that help from the CIA in Accra 
was anything more than informal and unofficial. Furthermore, few of the books written 
by Ghana military officers after the coup – for example, Major General Ocran and 
Brigade Major Afrifa – or by Ghanaian historians, even mentions possible CIA 
involvement. In some respects, this is not surprising since the military would want to be 
seen as successfully executing the coup d’état on their own. Yet, with the numerous 
scholarly histories written about Nkrumah and the coup d’état, it is surprising that there is 
so little discussion of the CIA in these works if the Agency had been involved to any 
significant degree. On the other side of the argument, after the coup, the US government 
quickly recognized the new military government in Ghana. General Ankrah and President 
Johnson exchanged letters within weeks pledging a “close and warm friendship.” And 
General Ankrah made a gift to the US government of significant pieces of USSR military 
equipment supplied to Nkrumah’s personal guard regiments – equipment deemed “of 
great interest” by the US military and intelligence services. In particular, the State 
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Department manifest of the military equipment highlights “three Twin 23mm Light 
Antiaircraft Guns (ZU-23),” which “can be expected to appear in North Viet-Nam” and 
pose a “distinct threat to helicopters and low-flying ground support aircraft.” The gift of 
the three antiaircraft guns “will contribute materially to the capability of U.S. forces to 
cope with the threat posed by this weapon.” Was the US military’s desire to get their 
hands on these Soviet weapons a reason for the CIA assisting the Ghanaian military with 
the coup? Was Ankrah’s gift a quid pro quo or a goodwill gesture? It is uncertain.157  
What about Mandelstam’s “occultism in high places?” Did the CIA use a “seer” 
to influence Nkrumah to leave the country in order to facilitate the coup d’état as 
Copeland claimed? There is no documentary evidence to support this claim. However, 
Nkrumah’s complex history of religious involvement, particularly with traditional 
African occultism, makes the claim at least somewhat plausible. CIA officials in Ghana 
were undoubtedly aware of Nkrumah’s history with astrology and wizardry. CIA officials 
may have been aware from the coup plotters of the need to get Nkrumah out of the 
country at the same time that the Chief of Defence Staff was going to be in Addis Ababa. 
CIA officials could have easily paid a respected “seer” in Nkrumah’s inner circle to 
provide the president with predictions of good fortune for a trip to Hanoi. CIA officials 
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could have used a “seer” to sooth Nkrumah’s fears about an imminent military coup, 
something that had troubled the president for at least two years. Copeland’s story of using 
Mandelstam’s OHP to help oust Nkrumah fits the historical and circumstantial context of 
the coup d’état. But is it true? Like the question of CIA involvement, this too is uncertain. 
Conclusion 
These stories of CIA activities in Italy, Egypt and Ghana give a glimpse of a 
larger picture of the US government’s use of religion in covert operations in the Cold 
War. Time and space limit a deeper examination of the CIA’s mobilization of Islamic 
leaders in Operation TPAJAX in Iran in 1953. Documents recently discovered at the 
National Security Archives at George Washington University reveal that “senior Iranian 
clerics received ‘large sums of money’ from U.S. officials in the days leading up to the 
August 19, 1953, overthrow of Prime Minister Mohammed Mosaddeq.”158 Similarly, in 
1954, the CIA engineered the overthrow of democratically elected President Jacobo 
Árbenz in Operation PBSUCCESS with the help of Guatemalan Archbishop Mariano 
Rossell y Arellano and his network of Catholic bishops, priests, and parishes.159 As well, 
the US military targeted Seventh Day Adventist conscientious objectors during the 
Vietnam War as human guinea pigs for biological weapons research at Fort Detrick’s US 
Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases, in an operation known as 
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Operation WHITECOAT.160 And there was the collection of “psychic warfare” research 
projects spearheaded by the DIA and CIA under the collective moniker Project 
STARGATE.161 The convergence of various forms of religion with the work of the US 
intelligence agencies during the Cold War is complex and real. 
Government documents and scholarly histories firmly establish that the CIA used 
religion as a secularized transactional tool during the Cold War. Early NSC policies made 
space for operationalizing religion, influenced by the religious convictions of senior 
government leaders and the social-spiritual environment of the US in the 1940s and 50s. 
The CIA did not view religion through a doctrinal or dogmatic lens. They saw it as a 
contextual reality in countries where operations occurred. They saw it as an influential 
dimension in the lives of targeted foreign leaders. They saw it as a neutral, logical, 
convenient mechanism to weaponize in the struggle to defeat godless, atheistic 
communism. CIA officials and agents who operationalized religion were dominantly 
non-religious themselves. They understood religion’s power, but sometimes failed to 
calculate adequately the consequences of manipulating the metaphysical. Sometimes 
results were positive, as in Italy in 1948, other times the negative consequences still have 
an impact, as with Iran in 1953 versus 1979. 
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In the early Cold War, Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles spoke at two 
cornerstone-laying ceremonies three years apart. At Georgetown Presbyterian Church in 
1956 Dulles asserted, “Communism has more to fear from the inherent power of religious 
faith” than it realizes. He said it was “the role of the church . . . to develop and make 
living this religious faith” to stand against “atheistic Communism.” At the second 
ceremony at the CIA Headquarters Building in Langley, Virginia in 1959, the DCI’s 
words were less overtly religious, yet he maintained that morality and faith were a part of 
the Cold War struggle: “In this work of intelligence we must not forget that human 
beings are largely the creatures of their beliefs. . . . If they be sound and enduring, based 
on the deep moral strivings of man and the conception of our national interests, let us 
cling to them.” Both speeches ended with Dulles quoting his favorite verse of scripture 
from John 8:32: “Ye shall know the truth, and the truth will set you free.”1  
Dulles was a son of Presbyterian missionaries to China. He was the longest 
serving DCI in history and a chief architect of American clandestine operations in the 
OSS and CIA. Dulles exemplifies the operationalization of religion during the Cold War. 
However, as the preceding pages illustrate, he was not alone. He was one of several in the 
                                                 
1 Allen W. Dulles, “Address Hon. Allen Welsh Dulles Cornerstone Laying Georgetown Presbyterian 
Church Washington, D.C., July 1, 1956,” accessed October 16, 2017. CIA-RDP70-
00058R000100250062-5, CREST, NARA II. Allen W. Dulles, “Remarks by Allen W. Dulles Director 
of Central Intelligence at the Cornerstone Ceremony Central Intelligence Agency Headquarters 
Building, 11:30 A.M., November 3, 1959,” accessed October 17, 2017. CIA-




US intelligence services, carried by the tide of world events, the religiosity of American 
society and the evolution of the CIA, who exploited religious beliefs, religious leaders, 
religious institutions and religious cultures during the Cold War to serve the purposes of 
US foreign policy. 
The story told in this dissertation does not lead to a simple, singular conclusion. It 
is much too complex a narrative with numerous, multi-faceted, inter-connected variables. 
Furthermore, during the course of the Cold War these variables shifted and morphed with 
the changing of the times and principal actors. Therefore, to come to a credible 
conclusion, one must first consider the overarching factors that shaped the Cold War 
religion and covert operations story. These macro factors are comparable to consolidated 
independent variables whose calculus reveals the value of the dependent variable – the 
conclusion. 
The objective of this historical inquiry has been to find an answer to the question 
at the heart of the research for this project: “How and, more importantly, why did the US 
government instrumentalize and operationalize religion in the Cold War as a part of its 
covert intelligence operations?” With the discovery of the answer to this question, 
perhaps the mystery of the title – Blowback of the Gods – will be uncovered. Did the US 
intelligence agencies’ use of religion during the Cold War result in ‘blowback’? If so, 
what was it? What impact did it have during the Cold War? And is there a residual 





The historical context for the religion and covert operations story is central to its 
very existence. Religion in covert operations did not emerge ex nihilo. It sprang forth 
from roots anchored for millennia in the affairs of religious institutions and international 
relations. More particularly, for the United States, it emerged from World War II when 
the United States used every means available to win the life-and-death battle for freedom 
and liberal democracy. The OSS used clergy and missionaries, ancient religious societies 
like the Knights of Malta, the Vatican and its global networks, as well as Christian church 
groups in Europe and Muslim communities in the Middle East. The OSS used religious 
groups as both conduits for operations and cover for its clandestine agents. The WWII 
experience of the OSS was foundational not only to the formation of the CIA, but also to 
the use of religion. During the Cold War struggle to preserve freedom and democracy a 
second time, it was easy for former OSS operatives to fall back on their WWII 
operational ideas and experiences in their new positions within the CIA. 
Another unique circumstance shaping the use of religion in covert operations was 
the religious environment in the United States after WWII. The late 1940s and 1950s was 
one of the most highly religious times in American history. Soldiers came home from 
war, got married, started families, and went to church as a means of family and child 
socialization. American leaders, particularly Presidents Truman and Eisenhower, 
promoted and modeled religious participation. The American media publicized and 
popularized religious activities on the radio, television, and through widely read 




The US government actively promoted the inclusion of religion in the Cold War 
battle against communism. US politicians and government officials actively framed the 
basic Cold War narrative as good versus evil, god-fearing Americans against godless, 
atheistic Communists. To support this point, in 1954, a joint resolution of Congress 
approved the addition of the words “one Nation under God” to the official Pledge of 
Allegiance, after a recommendation and political support from President Eisenhower. In 
1956, Congress adopted and President Eisenhower approved the statement “In God We 
Trust” as the official motto of the United States, replacing the long-used unofficial motto 
of E pluribus unum. In addition, Congress mandated that all US currency contain the new 
motto. Seemingly, every direction Americans turned in the late 1940s and 1950s they 
faced a reminder that being patriotic meant being religious; the one reinforced the other. 
The United States was not the only place in the world where religion flourished. 
The Middle East, Africa, South America, and Southeast Asia were all highly religious 
regions of the world where the US carried out Cold War covert operations. Whether 
dealing with Christianity, Islam, Buddhism or indigenous religions, CIA agents had to 
contend with the religious dimensions of the cultures in which they operated. Like the 
OSS before them, CIA agents used indigenous religious elements to support and expedite 
their operations. Moreover, in the post-WWII era of decolonization, religion often was a 
social force in the struggle for independence. And in some cases, Israel and India-
Pakistan, it was the foundational basis for the formation of the new countries. 
This time in American history also saw the labor, delivery, and birth of the CIA. 




were created; operations were developed; change was constant and, at times, 
confounding. CIA staff with backgrounds in the OSS defaulted to their previous 
experience to shape the new agency. New staffers, with no connection to the OSS, came 
into the CIA determined to create a new, peacetime intelligence agency. In addition, with 
the exception of Allen Dulles, Richard Helms, William Colby and William Casey, there 
was a parade of short-term Directors of Central Intelligence who cycled through, each 
making his own contribution and some creating their own chaos. Some consider the early 
years of the CIA, even up to the Church Committee hearings, as its “golden years.” 
Others view this period as the “Wild West” for the CIA and especially for clandestine 
activities. The majority of the religion and covert operations activities detailed in these 
pages occurred during these early years. 
The use of religion in covert operations in the Cold War – like with the OSS in 
WWII – happened during a time of war and conflict. The Cold War had many hot spots – 
Korea, Vietnam, Cuba, Berlin, Egypt, Iran, Africa, and the world-ending threat of nuclear 
war with the Soviet Union. It was a time of real danger and active threats. For those on 
the front lines of America’s national security, there was a conviction that it was fair and 
necessary to use whatever means available to win the war – even operationalizing 
religion. 
In sum, all these elements are critical to the context in which religion and covert 
operations emerged. Another time, another set of circumstances, the absence of WWII, 
and the outcome might likely have been different. Religion and covert operations in the 





The types of people involved in religion and clandestine activities during the Cold 
War provide a deeper understanding of the story. Some people were religious; some were 
not. Some worked for religious institutions; some for government and intelligence 
organizations. Some understood religion from a theological and doctrinal perspective; 
some were neophytes. Some understood the methods, motivations and amorality of 
intelligence agencies; some involved themselves through patriotism and idealism. There 
was no typical religious spy or covert clergyperson. 
Why would the CIA target religious actors and religiously inclined leaders in 
foreign countries where they planned to carry out operations? Religion is a core 
component of many national cultures, customs and practices. If CIA operatives wanted to 
blend in and operate undetected, they needed to understand and function comfortably 
within the local religion. Religious leaders in some countries also functioned in dual roles 
as political and governmental leaders. If reached religiously, then perhaps these leaders 
would engage politically. Foreign religious leaders, in most cases, had the best interests 
of their people in their hearts. Clergy knew the issues and concerns of the average person. 
If the CIA wanted to thwart communism or change a government, it needed the support 
of the people on the street. Who better to help CIA agents reach them than religious 
leaders? As well, religious organizations have structure, values, and tenets that can be co-
opted. Religious people believe in something. All the CIA needed to do was to 




networks. Rather than creating new covert structures from scratch, all the CIA needed to 
do was to employ the religious structures already in place. 
American clergy and missionaries became involved with covert operations by 
various means. National religious leaders like Billy Graham or Cardinal Spellman 
engaged with the CIA because they were, by virtue of their religious leadership positions, 
a part of the American political establishment. Sometimes, the CIA approached American 
religious leaders for help, as with Cardinal Spellman regarding Guatemala. Other times, 
the religious leaders asked for help with their own initiatives, as with Billy Graham in 
Columbia. Local level American clergy and missionaries usually became involved with 
the CIA when approached by an Agency field operative seeking information or 
assistance. Many times, the CIA pumped missionaries for information when they 
returned home on furlough. American clergy became involved with the CIA in covert 
operations out of concern for the homeland and other times out of concern for the people 
and countries where they had given their lives in ministry. They did not want to see the 
people of their parishes suffer at the hands of a communist government. The testimony 
and experiences of clergy and missionaries related in the preceding pages reveals that the 
usual catalyst for their involvement with the CIA was a mix of the spiritual and temporal. 
It is striking that most of the named CIA agents involved in religious covert 
operations were themselves largely non-religious – Miles Copeland, Kim Roosevelt, 
Edward Lansdale. It seems their primary concern was the success of their operations and 
the achievement of foreign policy goals, not religion or dogma. Their interest was 




out to convert anyone. Perhaps, the religious convictions of some CIA agents influenced 
their choice of operational methods; for example, a Catholic agent many have felt more 
comfortable approaching a Catholic bishop than a Protestant missionary. This was a 
tactical choice not a strategic one. For most CIA agents in the Cold War, religion was one 
tool among many in their clandestine toolbox.  
Some political leaders, including Presidents Truman and Eisenhower and to a 
lesser degree Johnson, were motivated by their religious convictions. Some NSC and CIA 
officials let their personal beliefs shape their interpretation of national security directives 
and, as a result, authorize the instrumental use of religion. However, the historical record 
shows that the NSC and CIA almost never used religion in covert operations for sectarian 
purposes, even though some religious leaders might have hoped they would. 
How did the CIA use religious personnel – foreign and domestic – in covert 
operations during the Cold War? The historical record shows that religious personnel 
were active in every phase of clandestine operations: collecting grassroots intelligence; 
disseminating propaganda; thwarting Soviet influence operations; serving as translators 
of local languages and cultures; running covert operations; supporting counter-
intelligence operations; assisting with coup d’états; being a conduit for funds; supplying 
and supporting CIA agents in the field; and providing cover for CIA clandestine agents. 
Sometimes the religious workers assisted the CIA with a full understanding of what they 
were doing; other times religious personnel provided help without knowing or asking 




risked their lives and careers to assist the work of the CIA and other intelligence 
agencies. Why? What drove them to take such risks? 
Motivation 
The motivations for using religion in covert operations were both idealistic and 
pragmatic. Some religious leaders and organizations involved themselves in the fight 
against communism because of their theological beliefs. Communism was atheistic (in 
theory, if not always in practice), and therefore it was considered to be opposed to the 
god in whom they believed and preached. In this scenario, Communists – the antichrist, 
the great Satan – were the enemy of faithful believers. Believers who viewed the Cold 
War through this dogmatic lens felt obligated to work for the defeat of communism. They 
gladly and willingly worked with the CIA. Their motivation was primarily religious and 
theological. 
For other religious leaders, particularly missionaries, the people and region where 
they carried out their ministries was the focus of their motivation. The reason they gave 
their lives to religious ministry was the needs and welfare of their parishioners. In some 
cases, these missionaries opposed communism because of their fear that anti-religious 
rulers would target, persecute, and perhaps kill their followers if Communists came to 
power. These missionaries’ motivation was to serve and protect, to lay down their lives 
for their brothers and sisters in the faith, even if it meant compromising their opposition 
to working with the CIA. These religious leaders placed their people first and rationalized 
this as the greater good. In other cases, particularly in some of the post-colonial 




called communism by Americans, because the missionaries felt this form of government 
was better for the nation states emerging out of colonial oppression. In this case, US 
government officials sometimes called the missionaries traitors because “if you are not 
with us, you are against us.” 
Three other motivations drove American religious personnel to involve 
themselves with the CIA. One was sheer patriotism. Clergy and missionaries helped US 
government officials in the Cold War struggle because their country asked for their help. 
They were Americans. When their country called, they answered. They saw themselves 
as American Christians or Jews, not Jewish or Christian Americans. For them it was 
country first, right or wrong. This motivation was foundational for some of the 
missionaries to South America described in this story. It was also likely a primary 
motivation for Billy Graham. In this scenario, these religious leaders seemingly placed 
the sacredness of America ahead of the sanctity of their own religious doctrines.  
Second, for some American religious personnel, the motivation was money. They 
needed money to support their own personal needs, particularly if they were “faith” 
missionaries. They also wanted money to support the needs of people in the foreign 
countries where they served – countries and people that were poverty-stricken. This may 
appear as though the missionaries compromised their beliefs to gain money; but with 
tangled theological reasoning, these missionaries likely saw this as “God’s provision” and 
an answer to their prayers. Third, a few religious personnel likely did it for the thrills. 




doing the same kind of ministry, they were eager to do something new. When the CIA 
came calling, they saw it as an adventure.  
Why did CIA officials use religion and religious personnel in covert operations? 
As described above, their motivations were primarily pragmatic, not idealistic or 
theological. Religion provided people, institutions, networks and on-the-ground 
experience required by CIA agents to accomplish their missions. Furthermore, in the 
1940s and 1950s, many regions of Africa, South America and Southeast Asia were 
extremely remote, with little access and less information about daily life. For some of 
these regions, the only Americans that had any knowledge about them were missionaries, 
journalists and academics. It is logical that the CIA would target and employ individuals 
from these three groups, up until the Church Committee hearings and DCI George H.W. 
Bush’s memo halting the practice. Of these three groups, the only ones living long-term 
in remote areas and working daily with the people were missionaries and religious 
personnel. And, in particular, if CIA agents were seeking to work in remote jungle areas 
recruiting para-military forces or chasing fleeing communist rebels, what Americans 
could they seek out who knew the regional dialects, the geography and the local customs? 
Missionaries. 
In addition, religion provided the CIA with powerful, global ideologies to use in 
countering communist propaganda. People in countries all over the world knew and 
trusted these ideologies. Religions were believed by average people, whether Islam in 




CIA agents to weaponize something known than to convince people to believe in 
something they did not understand, like American democracy. 
Morality & Ethics 
A troublesome dilemma for clergy and missionaries who worked with the CIA 
during the Cold War was the morality and ethics of their actions. Whatever their religious 
tradition, working in covert operations required them to engage in assorted behaviors 
deemed immoral by their sacred doctrines – for example, lying, stealing, deceiving, 
hurting others. Religious leaders used three ethical rationales to justify their behavior in 
an effort to maintain their integrity.  
First is the ethics of the lesser of two evils. Clergy and missionaries may have 
believed that working with the CIA in covert operations was bad, but allowing 
communism to flourish and possibly be victorious was worse. The ethical dilemma of the 
lesser of two evils argument is that whichever choice one makes, one is still choosing to 
do evil.  
Second is the ends justifies the means. Unrighteous means are justified if a 
righteous end is the result. Deception is allowable if the preferred religious or political 
cause is triumphant. In this case, though, who determines the standard of righteousness? 
The church? The state? What if the two standards clash? 
Third is the difficulty that war poses to theology. No matter how fervently a 
religious leader believes and adheres to his or her sacred teachings, war creates a 
theological and ethical quandary. Either religious persons choose to be total pacifists or 




embrace war. No matter how religions have endeavored to justify war over the millennia, 
few ethical answers have proven fully pure or satisfactory. 
For agents of the CIA, some may have regretted things they had to do in order to 
accomplish their missions. However, they generally did not wrestle with the ethics of 
their operations. Their standard is the Constitution and the law, not a moral code. The 
First Amendment to the US Constitution erected, according to Jefferson, a “wall of 
separation” between church and state. It was the announcement of the Supreme Court 
decision in Everson v. Board of Education (1947) that enshrined Jefferson’s “wall of 
separation” in law. Justice Hugo Black’s majority opinion contains a statement, though, 
that is problematic to the CIA’s use of religion in covert operations. Black states, 
“Neither a state nor the Federal Government can, openly or secretly, participate in the 
affairs of any religious organizations or groups and vice versa.”2 The point of challenge 
for the CIA, as it relates to using religion in covert operations, are the words “secretly” 
and “participate.” These words create a potential argument that any engagement with 
religion in covert operations violates the Supreme Court’s decision in Everson. However, 
there is a converse side to this argument that is specifically applicable to the CIA. It is 
that Everson and the First Amendment applies to domestic affairs, not foreign affairs. 
Since by statute the CIA is restricted to working internationally, some make the argument 
that the First Amendment does not apply to the use of religion in CIA covert operations. 
                                                 




Yet, this approach breaks down when the CIA seeks to work with American citizens or 
organizations that come under the US Constitution. 
Thomas Braden, a former OSS officer and assistant to Allen Dulles in the 1950s, 
presents another argument supporting the CIA’s actions. Braden co-authored a book in 
1946 with Stewart Alsop on the activities of the OSS in WWII – Sub Rosa: The OSS and 
American Espionage. In 1967, Braden wrote an article for The Saturday Evening Post 
entitled, “I’m glad the CIA is ‘immoral’.” Citing specific examples of CIA operations 
possibly considered unscrupulous by American citizens, Braden argues that such actions 
and behaviors by the CIA are “essential.” He summarizes his argument this way: 
Was it “immoral,” “wrong,” “disgraceful”? Only in the sense that war itself is 
immoral, wrong and disgraceful. For the cold war was and is a war fought with 
ideas instead of bombs. And our country has had a clear-cut choice: Either we win 
the war or lose it. This war is still going on, and I do not mean to imply that we 
have won it. But we have not lost it either.3 
For the CIA, the Cold War was war. Wartime ethics and rules applied. As with religious 
leaders, war creates a cacophony of moral conflicts not easily disaggregated. 
Blowback 
What is the blowback from the CIA’s use of religion in covert operations during 
the Cold War? For religious groups and personnel, it was the suspicion that every 
American clergyperson and missionary was a covert agent of the CIA. This suspicion 
became more real for foreign officials with the revelations of the Ramparts controversy 
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and the Church Committee hearings. Moreover, this blowback reverberates to the present 
day. Within the past year, an East Asian country kicked out the senior missionary leader 
for a large Protestant denomination for being a “CIA spy.” The individual vehemently 
denied the accusation. However, the suspicion persisted with the country’s officials, at 
least partially due to the history of the CIA’s use of missionaries during the Cold War.4 
Another form of blowback for American religious leaders during the Cold War 
was that it became increasingly hard for Americans to build relationships of trust with 
local coreligionists in the countries where they went to serve. The story of American 
clergy and missionaries being “spies” for the CIA was widely circulated in newspapers 
and media around the world – perhaps even more than in the United States, certainly with 
more élan and exaggeration in the telling. 
For the CIA, the blowback has been at least twofold. First, during the latter part of 
the Cold War and more so following the fall of the Soviet Union, there was a backlash in 
the CIA and other US government agencies towards any talk of religion in foreign affairs. 
Foreign policy was enlightened and secularized. Religion was deemed passé. That is until 
9/11, as former Secretary of State Madeline Albright acknowledged in her 2006 book, 
The Mighty and the Almighty: 
We were living, after all, in modern times. The wars between Catholics and 
Protestants that had claimed the lives of one-third the population of Christian 
Europe had been brought to a close in 1648 by the Peace of Westphalia. Large-
scale fighting between Christians and Muslims had ceased when, in 1683, the 
advance of the Ottoman Turks was halted at the gates of Vienna. I found it 
incredible, as the twenty-first century approached, that Catholics and Protestants 
were still quarreling in Northern Ireland and that Hindus and Muslims were still 
                                                 




squaring off against each other in south Asia; surely, I thought, these rivalries 
were the echoes of earlier, less enlightened times, not a sign of battles still to 
come. 
Since the terror attacks of 9/11, I have come to realize that it may have been I who 
was stuck in an earlier time. Like many foreign policy professionals, I have had to 
adjust the lens through which I view the world, comprehending something that 
seemed to be a new reality but that had actually been evident for some time. The 
1990s had been a decade of globalization and spectacular technological gains; the 
information revolution altered our lifestyle, transformed the workplace and 
fostered the development of a whole new vocabulary. There was, however, 
another force at work. Almost everywhere, religious movements are thriving.5 
The blowback for the CIA for how they manipulated and exploited religion during the 
Cold War was that they were not prepared to address religion in the 9/11 era.  
A second element of blowback for the CIA has been the struggle to find the 
proper place for religion within the Agency. This challenge manifested itself in the CIA’s 
inability to understand or interpret political Islam and its impact on our world through 
any lens other than terrorism. An effort to change this shortcoming developed in 2003 
through the efforts of CIA analyst Emile Nakhleh who introduced the “Political Islam 
Strategic Analysis Project.” He described this project in his 2009 book, A Necessary 
Engagement. The goal of the project was to address in a rational, intellectually informed 
way, “the rise of Islamic activism as the first post-Cold War challenge to the international 
order.” 6 The project grew and evolved; Nakhleh retired. But the CIA Intelligence 
Directorate continues its analysis work on a range of religious movements worldwide, not 
just Islam. Religion is making its home in the Intelligence Directorate rather than simply 
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with the Clandestine Services, although no outsiders know for sure what the Clandestine 
Service is doing with religion. 
My Conclusion 
My conclusions are these. 
I believe that the US government’s covert use of religion during the Cold War 
was largely a product of the unique circumstances and factors surrounding the Cold War 
– the influence of WWII; the post-war religious milieu in America; the decision by 
American leaders to cast the Cold War narrative in starkly religious terms; the influence 
of religious leaders in American society at that time; and the “Wild West” culture and 
mindset in the CIA in its early days. Further, in the 1940s and 1950s, some of America’s 
most senior leaders believed that America had the right to intervene wherever it wanted, 
however it wanted, and with whomever it wanted, in the name of democracy and 
freedom. This attitude began to disappear with the news stories and Congressional 
hearings of the 1960s and 1970s. For these reasons and more, I do not believe that we 
will see a recurrence of religion and covert operations in US government operations like 
we did during the Cold War. 
However, I think we also need to be on guard. The CIA has and will continue to 
work with religion, religious personnel, and religious organizations in accomplishing its 
mission. Religion is too powerful and too prevalent to ignore. CIA agents will continue to 
seek out foreign religious leaders and groups to assist with their missions. There is 




Likewise, as long as CIA policy allows for “voluntary” cooperation of US 
religious personnel, some clergy and missionaries will choose to assist the CIA. Perhaps 
not to the degree seen during the Cold War. Perhaps not on the payroll as CIA 
employees. But the pull of American patriotism and a desire for adventure is too strong 
for some American religious personnel to ignore. 
Neither reality is wholly good, nor is it wholly bad. 
However, my criticism rests more with religious organizations and personnel who 
chose to involve themselves in spying and espionage, and thereby make a mockery of 
their religious vows and public pronouncements of serving God, not man. My harshest 
condemnation is for those religious leaders who do it for money and are guilty of simony. 
Blowback will inevitably result. However, I believe that the blowback will be 
greater for religious groups and leaders. It should be, considering the high standards to 
which religious communities aspire and profess. 
In conclusion, I believe that the story I have told in this dissertation is unique to 
the Cold War era. Yet, in other ways, maybe not. 






APPENDIX 1  
EXCURSUS ON THE  
PROVENANCE OF BLOWBACK 
‘Blowback’ is a word and concept increasingly heard in contemporary discourse, 
particularly in reference to political, military and social events.1 Speakers use the word to 
convey the repercussions of ‘unintended consequences.’ Often ‘blowback’ and 
‘unintended consequences’ are used as synonyms with little awareness of the provenance 
of the word or the nuances of its meaning. 
Chalmers Johnson in his best-selling book, Blowback: The Costs and 
Consequences of American Empire, claims that the word blowback is “a term the CIA 
invented to describe the likelihood that our covert operations in other people’s countries 
would result in retaliations against Americans, civilian and military, at home and 
abroad.” Johnson’s book, first published in the spring of 2000, was “largely ignored in 
the United States” for eighteen months. Then September 11, 2001 happened. The book 
was “reprinted eight times in less than two months and became an underground bestseller 
among Americans suddenly sensitized to, or at least desperate to know about, some of the 
realities of the world in which they lived.” After 9/11, Johnson states, “The term 
‘blowback’ went from being an esoteric term of CIA tradecraft to virtually a household 
                                                 
1 See Peter Bergen and Alec Reynolds, “Blowback Revisited,” Foreign Affairs 84, no. 6 
(November/December 2005): 2-6. Mary Anne Weaver uses the term in an article that predates 
Chalmers Johnson’s publications on the subject: “Therein lies the greatest paradox of the 
bombing in Riyadh: it and the explosions in Peshawar and Islamabad could well prove to be 
part of the negative fallout -- or ‘blowback,’ in intelligence parlance -- of the U.S.- and 





word, cropping up in discussions of multiple disasters that were beginning to assail the 
United States.” Johnson explains that the actions that generate blowback “are normally 
kept totally secret from the American public and from most of their representatives in 
Congress.” “In its most rigorous definition,” Johnson continues, “blowback does not 
mean mere reactions to historical events but rather to clandestine operations carried out 
by the U.S. government.” 2 As Johnson presciently warned in the original 2000 edition of 
his book, “World politics in the twenty-first century will in all likelihood be driven 
primarily by blowback from the second half of the twentieth century – that is, from the 
unintended consequences of the Cold War and the crucial American decision to maintain 
a Cold War posture in a post-Cold War world.” 3 
In both his book and a well-timed September 27, 2001 article in The Nation, 
Johnson declares that the word blowback is found originally in a previously classified 
CIA after-action report examining the 1953 coup d’état that overthrew Iranian Prime 
Minister Mossadeq.4 Indeed, the full declassified report – “Clandestine Service History: 
Overthrow of Premier Mossadeq of Iran, November 1952-August 1953” – was first 
publicly disclosed by James Risen of The New York Times on April 16, 2000 and posted 
on its website. Subsequently, this original report along with extensive supporting 
documentation, including from the British Foreign Office and the highly-anticipated 
                                                 
2 Chalmers Johnson, Blowback: The Costs and Consequences of American Empire, 2nd ed. (New 
York: Henry Holt, 2004), ix-xi. 
3 Chalmers Johnson, Blowback: The Costs and Consequences of American Empire (New York: Henry 
Holt, 2000), 229. 
4 Johnson (2004), xii. Chalmers Johnson, “Blowback,” The Nation, September 27, 2001, accessed 




updated official history from the US State Department (June 15, 2017), have been made 
available online by the National Security Archives.5 
The official CIA after-action report was written by long-time Middle East CIA 
operative and one of the architects of the 1953 coup d’état, Dr. Donald N. Wilber. The 
report is two hundred pages with ten main sections and five appendices. The final 
appendix is “Appendix E: Military Critique – Lessons Learned from TPAJAX re Military 
Planning Aspects of Coup d’Etat.” It is in this appendix that the word blowback is used 
twice, the only times it is found in the report.  
First, in sub-section III.O of the appendix, the word blowback appears as one of 
the lessons learned: “Possibilities of blowback against the United States should always be 
in the back of the minds of all CIA officers involved in this type of operation. Few, if 
any, operations are as explosive as this type. This fact makes it imperative that the best 
trained and experienced officers who can be found be assigned” [italics added]. 6 Second, 
                                                 
5 James Risen, “Secrets of History: The CIA in Iran,” NYT, April 16, 2000, accessed September 12, 
2017, http://www.nytimes.com/library/world/mideast/041600iran-cia-index.html. Malcolm Byrne, ed., 
“Briefing Book 28,” National Security Archive Online, accessed September 12, 2017, 
http://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB28/. Malcolm Byrne, ed., “Briefing Book 598,” 
National Security Archive Online, accessed September 12, 2017, 
http://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB598-State-Department-releases-documents-on-US-
backed-1953-coup-in-Iran/. Malcolm Byrne and Mark Gasiorowski, eds., “Briefing Book 601,” 
National Security Archive Online, accessed September 12, 2017, http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-
book/iran/2017-08-08/1953-iran-coup-new-us-documents-confirm-british-approached-us-late. See 
also, Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1952-1954, Iran, 1951-1954, Volume X, eds. 
Carl N. Raether and Charles S. Simpson (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1989), 
accessed September 12, 2017, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v10. FRUS, 
1952-1954, Iran, 1951-1954, ed. James C. Van Hook (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 
2017), accessed September 12, 2017, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1951-54Iran. 
6 Donald N. Wilber, “Clandestine Service History: Overthrow of Premier Mossadeq of Iran, 





in sub-section III.Y, the report warns, “Deep cover personnel should be used in order to 
prevent severe blowback whenever it is possible to do so” [italics added]. 7 
It is important to note that the use of the word blowback in the Wilber report is 
neither extensive nor substantive. The word occurs only twice in two hundred pages and 
then in the final pages of the report. In both instances where the word occurs, it is in 
reference to personnel lessons learned. When the word appears, there is no definition. 
There is no explanation to clarify and contextualize the “invented” word. There is an 
assumption that the reader is familiar with the word and easily understands its intended 
meaning. Perhaps the word was a commonly used in CIA tradecraft, but given this 
nascent period of the CIA’s existence, this conclusion is tenuous. One phrase in the first 
appearance of blowback in Appendix E suggests a different origin. Wilber states, “Few, if 
any, operations are as explosive as this type,” referring to the coup d’état operation. The 
word “explosive” holds the clue. 
The Oxford English Dictionary (OED) defines blowback as “the act or process of 
blowing back” as with a firearm, a boiler, or internal-combustion engine. Merriam-
Webster explains that blowing back comes from the “escape backward of imperfectly 
burned gunpowder after a shot.”8 This particularly references 19th century muzzle-loaded 
arms that used loose gunpowder for firing. In explaining the provenance of the word, the 
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OED traces the appearance of blowback in English literature to 1883 in Britain, while 
noting that in the United States the word first occurred in 1968.9 
How is it possible that the US Central Intelligence Agency “invented” a word in 
use in the English language for over seventy years? How did the CIA invent a word, use 
it in tradecraft and normalize it within the Agency vernacular a mere six years from the 
founding of the CIA in 1947? Are Chalmers Johnson’s repeated claims about the origins 
of the word blowback accurate? 
It is more plausible that Wilber, in writing his report, borrowed the word 
blowback from the British and, in particular, British Intelligence. The British originally 
introduced and promoted the idea of a coup d’état to overthrow Mossadeq. For over two 
years, British Intelligence repeatedly lobbied the CIA to take the lead in the operation. It 
is reasonable to expect that British planners used the word blowback in their initial 
planning documents and operational estimates of the possible negative outcomes of a 
failed coup.10 
                                                 
9 Several online dictionaries and encyclopedias parrot Chalmers Johnson’s claim that the CIA coined 
the word blowback in the TPAJAX after-action report. The contemporary online Urban Dictionary 
(www.urbandictionary.com) provides the most unique and creative definition of the word. It states 
that youth prefer this definition of blowback: “To hold a marijuana joint in one’s mouth between the 
lips with the hot end in the mouth while blowing smoke out of the hole at the other end into someone 
else's mouth, so as to get a big 'hit'.”   
10 Malcolm Byrne and Mark Gasiorowski, eds., “1953 Iran Coup: New U.S. Documents Confirm 
British Approached U.S. in Late 1952,” Briefing Book #601, National Security Archive, accessed 
September 12, 2017, http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/iran/2017-08-08/1953-iran-coup-new-us-
documents-confirm-british-approached-us-late. FRUS, 1952-1954, Iran, 1951-1954, ed. James C. Van 





Donald Wilber was a Middle Eastern and Iranian expert from his student days at 
Princeton, participating in a number of archaeological expeditions over several years. 
Eventually, he earned a PhD in Islamic Architecture from Princeton in 1949 based on his 
extensive time, work, and study in Egypt, Iran and other parts of the Middle East. During 
World War II, he served in the OSS as a Middle Eastern operative and Persian expert. 
The newly formed CIA recruited Wilber to work as an Islamic and Persian expert, a 
consultant, and eventually a covert operative. As described in his memoir, Adventures in 
the Middle East, Wilber was well versed in the activities of the British and American 
intelligence services in the Middle East, particularly Iran.11 
Wilber was recruited by Kermit “Kim” Roosevelt, Jr., head of the CIA’s Middle 
Eastern division, to be the “principal planner for Operation AJAX and … to prepare an 
operational plan.”12 On January 30, 1954, Wilber received a personal commendation 
from CIA director Allen Dulles for his “outstanding contributions to Operation AJAX.” 
Dulles states, “Your contribution, however, was one of the primary elements of its 
success. Your expert knowledge of the country and your personal knowledge of many of 
the leading actors in the operation were invaluable assets during all phases of the 
operation. Your competence and tact in dealing with [British] in the preparation of the 
joint plan and your ingenuity, resourcefulness, and untiring efforts in the planning and 
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preparation of the psychological warfare aspects of the operation cannot be too highly 
praised. . . . AJAX constitutes a major victory in the Cold War.”13 
Given this historical and linguistic context, it is logical and probable that the word 
blowback came from the British Intelligence Service and that Donald N. Wilber picked it 
up in his planning of TPAJAX, either from British planning documents or from 
conversations with British intelligence operatives. Blowback was an effective, descriptive 
metaphor for the negative and unintended consequences of a covert operation gone 
wrong. Wilber appreciated the explosive symbolism of the metaphor and employed it in 
his report. From there it passed into the CIA vernacular. This is the most likely 
provenance of the word blowback as we have come to use it today – thanks to the British, 
their 19th century muskets and their Industrial Revolution machinery.  
Chalmers Johnson eloquently captures the essence of the British metaphor in his 
use of blowback throughout his book. Johnson goes one step further. He applies it more 
widely to the history of “American Imperialism” for over a century, particularly in the 
Middle East, utilizing a biblical proverb and imagery. “In a broader sense,” Wilber 
writes, “blowback is another way of saying that a nation reaps what it sows.”14 He ends 
his post-9/11 introduction with this somber final warning: “The blowback from the 
second half of the twentieth century has only begun.”15 
                                                 
13 Ibid., 8. Dulles’ letter of commendation to Wilber, declassified in 1983, is included in Wilber’s 
memoir. 
14 Johnson (2004), xi. The biblical verses referenced are Proverbs 22:8, “Whoever sows injustice will 
reap calamity,” and Galatians 6:7, “God is not mocked, for you reap whatever you sow” (NRSV). 




APPENDIX 2  
LITERATURE REVIEW 
The study of religion in the Cold War is a new “subgenre” in Cold War Studies, 
particularly since 9/11.1 Starting with Diane Kirby’s groundbreaking edited volume, 
Religion and the Cold War, first published in 2002, the study of religion’s role in the 
Cold War era has “flourished.” 2 As Cambridge University Professor Andrew Preston 
observes, the academic study of religion in the Cold War is “a subject once confined to 
the periphery of the historical imagination when it was noticed at all. . . . Historians of the 
Cold War, and not just historians of religion in the Cold War, are acknowledging the 
importance of the topic more frequently and in greater numbers. ” Preston asserts, “Long 
mired in obscurity, the role of religion in the Cold War is now an important aspect of 
international history.” 3 
The study of religion and covert operations in the Cold War is therefore a sub-
section of research within this subgenre of Cold War Studies. As described in the Preface 
of this dissertation, the search for published materials on religion and covert operations in 
the Cold War yields meager results. This is not surprising for a new, emergent area of 
research. Conversations with respected Cold War and CIA scholars such as John Prados 
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ix.  
2 Philip E. Muehlenbeck, ed., Religion and the Cold War: A Global Perspective (Nashville: Vanderbilt 
University Press, 2012). vii. 
3 Andrew Preston, “The Religious Cold War,” in Religion and the Cold War, ed. Phillip E. 




(National Security Archives), Mark Kramer (Harvard University Cold War Studies 
Program), Burton Gerber (Georgetown University and CIA), Loch K. Johnson 
(University of Georgia), William Inboden (University of Texas at Austin), Diane Kirby 
(University of Ulster), Sarah-Jane Corke (Dalhousie University), Hugh Wilford 
(California State University, Long Beach), and Michael Warner (former CIA Historian), 
confirmed that a serious lacuna exists in the research and literature on religion and covert 
operations during the Cold War.4 
The significant challenge with a research project of this nature, which involves 
government secrets, classified documents and clandestine operations, is where does one 
locate the documentation and the data to validate or refute one’s hypotheses? This 
challenge has likely discouraged more than a few researchers from tackling this subject in 
depth.  
The sources regarding religion and covert operations in the Cold War initially pop 
up in numerous snippets of historical accounts and a few chapters in books across a range 
of Cold War literature. These published accounts lead to primary source documents 
residing in government archives, presidential libraries, private archives, as well as private 
libraries and memoirs. Ultimately, the historical archival material verifies the reality and 
scope of the covert operations.  
The material for this project is located in four groups of literature: (1) histories 
about religion and the Cold War, (2) critical analyses of the CIA and covert operations 
                                                 




during the Cold War, (3) personal memoirs and histories about covert operatives and 
religious actors during the Cold War, and (4) declassified, yet sanitized, US government 
documents. Many publications examine segments of the story of religion and covert 
operations in the Cold War, but no single publication fully addresses the convergence of 
these subject areas in an integrated, comprehensive manner. 
Religion and the Cold War 
The genre of books on religion and the Cold War begins with Diane Kirby’s 2002 
Religion and the Cold War.5 This book is a part of the Cold War History Series published 
by Palgrave Macmillan. The edited volume came out of an innovative conference of 
international scholars held in April 2000 that “brought together scholars from different 
countries and different disciplines who have different approaches to and different 
perspectives of religion and the Cold War. They address different subjects, in different 
eras, in different countries and in different ways.” 6 The book largely concentrates on the 
                                                 
5  Other books addressing religion, US foreign policy and the Cold War not in this Literature Review 
include Jason W. Stevens, God-Fearing and Free: A Spiritual History of America’s Cold War, 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010). David Foglesong, The American Mission and the 
“Evil” Empire (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007). Janicke Stramer, U.S. Foreign Policy 
and Religion During the Cold War and the War on Terror, with a foreword by Matthias M. Maass 
(Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 2012). Owen Chadwick, The Christian Church in the Cold War 
(New York: Penguin, 1993). John Koehler, Spies in the Vatican: The Soviet Union’s Cold War against 
the Catholic Church (New York: Pegasus, 2011). Lucian N. Leustean, ed., Eastern Christianity and 
the Cold War, 1945-91 (New York: Routledge, 2010). Odd Arne Westad, The Cold War: A World 
History (New York: Basic Books, 2017). Interestingly, renowned Yale University professor and Cold 
War historian John Lewis Gaddis consistently glosses over the topic of religion in his multiple, best-
selling histories of the Cold War. For another example of the neglect of religion in Cold War histories, 
see Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad, eds., the Cambridge History of the Cold War, 3 vols. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), which does not devote a separate chapter to religion 
in spite of its comprehensive coverage of all aspects of the Cold War, including cultural and 
ideological aspects. 




early Cold War years from 1945 to 1960. Although it addresses a number of important 
elements in the story of religion and the Cold War, it is by no means comprehensive. 
Some of the authors in the book briefly mention intelligence activities in their respective 
chapters, but only in a cursory manner. 
In 2012, Philip Muehlenbeck edited a follow-up volume – Religion and the Cold 
War: A Global Perspective – written by a different group of international scholars that 
built on “the foundation laid by Kirby . . . to expand the scholarship of religion in the 
Cold War geographically, chronologically, and spiritually.” 7 Although more expansive 
in scope and broader in content, this volume, like Kirby’s, is by no means comprehensive 
– a fact that Muehlenbeck acknowledges. It is somewhat puzzling that in the Preface to 
the book, Muehlenbeck goes out of his way to denounce a “handful of historians” whom 
he believes “have begun to overemphasize the importance of religion in global conflict” – 
a perspective, admittedly, with which some historians concur. Singling out William 
Inboden as a part of this group, Muehlenbeck sharply rebukes Inboden for statements 
from his book, Religion and American Foreign Policy, 1945-60, which point to religion 
as both a cause and instrument in the Cold War. Muehlenbeck rejects the causal nature of 
religion in shaping the Cold War and deems Inboden’s perspective an “exaggeration of 
the role of religion played in the creation of the Cold War consensus.” 8 According to 
                                                 





Muehlenbeck, his volume is more modest in its claims recognizing religion as “a factor 
in the Cold War, not the factor” [emphasis added].9 
William Inboden’s assiduously researched and persuasively argued book, 
Religion and American Foreign Policy 1945-1960: The Soul of Containment, examines 
the story of religion in the Cold War from the perspective of key personalities central to 
the story. Quoting President Harry Truman, Inboden advances the hypothesis that the 
Cold War was “nothing less than a religious war.” He also advances that religion 
“functioned in two distinct yet related ways,” as cause and as an instrument. Yet he does 
so with a more nuanced argument than Muehlenbeck ascribes. 10 The bulk of Inboden’s 
book centers on the White House and Congress during the Truman and Eisenhower 
administrations. Like Kirby, Inboden’s analysis of intelligence activities is limited. 
However, Inboden acknowledged in a personal conversation with the author that there is 
“more, much more” material on the subject of religion and covert operations which he 
discovered but lamentably did not have space to address within the framework of his 
book.11 
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(Summer 2013): 162-80. 




Similarly, Jonathan Herzog’s The Spiritual-Industrial Complex: America’s 
Religious Battle Against Communism in the Early Cold War adds to our understanding of 
this subgenre of Cold War literature in his examination of the institutional factors which 
influenced the government’s use of religion as a tool in fighting communism. 
Interestingly, the main actors in Herzog’s story are “secular, not religious, leaders and 
institutions.” 12 Jeremy Gunn’s book, Spiritual Weapons: The Cold War and the Forging 
of an American National Religion, makes the critical connection between Robert Bellah’s 
concept of “civil religion” in America and the activities of the US government during the 
Cold War. Civil religion was a driving force in shaping the ideas and ultimately the 
policies of American political leaders. Gunn extends his examination to intelligence 
activities, although the only covert operations he details are Guatemala and the early days 
of Vietnam.13 Finally, David Settje explores the same developments from the perspective 
of the Christian media and the debate, both pro and con, over the US government’s Cold 
War policies and, in particular, the execution of the Vietnam War.14 Taken together, these 
four books offer a compelling story of the strategic and tactical use of religion by the 
United States during the early Cold War. 
Michael Oren’s classic, Power, Faith and Fantasy: America in the Middle East 
1776 to the Present, is a broad-ranging and important history of the Middle East. It 
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contains a significant section dealing with the Cold War era and how religion and oil 
propelled the Middle East into Samuel Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations.15 Oren is not 
timid about confronting the interference and mis-steps of the CIA and British Intelligence 
in Middle Eastern affairs, as well as identifying the negative impact of the operations. 
Although richly constructed and compellingly told, Oren’s story reveals, at points, his 
pro-Israeli viewpoint. This should surprise no one in that Oren is a member of the 
Knesset and former Ambassador of Israel to the United States (2009-2013). 
CIA and Covert Operations 
Understanding CIA covert operations in the Cold War requires a firm grounding 
in the foundational history and documents surrounding the early establishment and 
evolution of the CIA. William Leary’s The Central Intelligence Agency: History and 
Documents is an expansion of the first published comprehensive history of the CIA. 
Church Committee staffer, Anne Karalekas, originally penned it. William Leary’s edition 
adds supporting documents to Karalekas’ history, an introduction, and a thorough 
bibliographic essay – a tour d ’horizon of the foundational literature of the history of the 
CIA. This bibliographic essay is more complete and useful than the official bibliography 
provided by the CIA in its own online library.16 
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From 1952 to 1953, Arthur B. Darling, the CIA’s first official historian, wrote an 
internal history of the founding and early years of the CIA, which remained classified 
until 1989. It encompasses the early Cold War years. After the Cold War was considered 
over, Darling’s account was declassified for release to the public. Prior to publication, the 
CIA History Staff added additional materials. The book’s value rests in (1) its close 
proximity to the early years that it narrates, (2) its previously classified designation – thus 
of high value to the CIA, and (3) its character and nature as the first, officially classified 
history of the CIA.17 Both of these books provide useful information on the origins and 
nascent development of the covert operations capabilities of the CIA.18 
The story of covert operations within the CIA inevitably brings up Tim Weiner’s 
award-winning bestseller, Legacy of Ashes: History of the CIA. As the title suggests, 
Wiener’s history is a “litany of failure” and “C.I.A. ineptitude” “from the C.I.A.’s early 
days . . . to more recent humiliations,” many of them involving covert activities.19 
Weiner’s exposé is widely praised, particularly by journalists and scholars, in reviews 
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across a broad spectrum of literature, both popular and academic. However, the CIA 
community holds a bitter opinion of Weiner’s work as evidenced by the lengthy, 
contemptuous, acerbic takedown posturing as a review, posted on the CIA’s website.20 
The review accuses Wiener’s account of not being “the definitive history . . . that it 
purports to be.” “Nor is it the well researched work that many reviewers say it is.” 
Instead, “the book is a 600-page op-ed piece masquerading as serious history; it is the 
advocacy of a particularly dark point of view under the guise of scholarship. Weiner has 
allowed his agenda to drive his research and writing, which is, of course, exactly 
backwards.” Moreover, “anyone who wants a balanced perspective of CIA [sic] and its 
history should steer well clear of Legacy of Ashes.” In conclusion, the CIA reviewer 
suggests, “that Weiner’s work will soon be replaced by that of a historian who seriously 
attempted to get at more of the ‘whole truth’ of intelligence, rather than carefully selected 
bits intended to highlight an interpretation.” 21 However, no suggestions of alternative, 
politically acceptable, institutionally praiseworthy histories are listed – even years later.   
John Prados is a distinguished historian and scholar of the CIA and covert 
operations. He is a Senior Fellow with the National Security Archives at George 
Washington University where he directs the CIA Documentation Program. His over 
twenty-five books on CIA history, covert operations, and military history are the sine qua 
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non of serious research into the history of CIA covert activities. Of particular note  are 
The Ghosts of Langley: Into the CIA’s Heart of Darkness, Safe Democracy: The Secret 
Wars of the CIA, Presidents’ Secret Wars: CIA and Pentagon Covert Operations from 
World War II Through the Persian Gulf War, Keepers of the Keys: A History of the 
National Security Council from Truman to Bush, and The Family Jewels: The CIA, 
Secrecy, and Presidential Power. 22 Prados’ works are comprehensive, impeccably 
researched, and accessible. Henry W. Brands, professor of history at the University of 
Texas at Austin praises, “John Prados, who knows more than anyone else about the 
CIA.” 23 Prados’ works touch on religious components of various covert operations, 
although it is not a major focus of his writing. 
An important addition to the literature on covert operations in the early Cold War 
is Sarah-Jane Corke’s US Covert Operations and Cold War Strategy: Truman, Secret 
Warfare, and the CIA, 1945-53. As the title reveals, Corke’s book focuses on the narrow 
timespan of the Truman Administration. Published in 2008, the same year as William 
Inboden’s book, Corke did not engage Inboden’s arguments or material, which also 
addresses the Truman Administration. A tete-a-tete between Corke and Inboden over 
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covert operations in the Truman Administration could have been informative. 
Additionally, Corke’s use of the CREST files at the National Archives was unfortunately 
limited to the documents available in 2000-2001.24 
William Blum provides a valuable tool with his 2004 book, Killing Hope: US 
Military and CIA Interventions Since World War II. It is an updated edition of his earlier 
book, which chronologically details CIA covert operations from 1946 through 1994. As 
well, Gregory Treverton offers a necessary warning about the limitations and 
camouflaged snares in covert operations in his mid-Cold War book, Covert Action: The 
Limits of Intervention in the Postwar World.25 
Numerous other books are crucial to developing a holistic and balanced 
understanding of CIA history and covert operations. Among them are Thomas Powers’ 
The Man Who Kept the Secrets: Richard Helms and the CIA, Burton Hersh’s The Old 
Boys: The American Elite and the Origins of the CIA, Harry Rositzke’s The CIA’s Secret 
Operations: Espionage, Counterespionage and Covert Action, William Daugherty’s 
Executive Secrets: Covert Action & The Presidency, and Loch Johnson’s Intelligence: 
The Secret World of Spies.26 
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Gerard Colby penetrates the heart of the story of religion and covert operations, 
albeit with a regionally specific focus, in his exhaustive tome, Thy Will Be Done – The 
Conquest of the Amazon: Nelson Rockefeller and Evangelism in the Age of Oil. Colby 
explores the religious convictions of the Rockefellers, their involvement with the CIA in 
Latin America, and a host of covert operations designed to secure American access to 
oil.27 In fact, the linkage between religion and covert operations in the Cold War and 
America’s post-war, industry-created, transportation-driven thirst for oil is a theme 
highlighted by others including Kermit Roosevelt and Rachel Bronson.28 
A stream of literature, which has emerged post-9/11, examines the relationship 
between the CIA and the roots of radical Islam. These books explore a range of CIA 
covert activities in Middle East, North Africa, Afghanistan and Europe as it relates to 
fundamentalist Islam. Primarily, investigative journalists penned these narratives, which 
center on historical events, including during the Cold War. Included in this collection of 
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books is Stephen Kinzer’s classic, All the Shah’s Men, which acknowledges religious 
elements in the 1953 CIA coup d’état in Iran. Ian Johnson, Pulitzer Prize-winning 
journalist, spent five years unearthing the intriguing story of A Mosque in Munich, which 
became the epicenter for the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood in Germany and the whole 
of Europe from WWII through the Cold War to the present day. Robert Dreyfuss in 
Devil’s Game reveals how the US government cultivated and supported political Islam 
and fundamentalism in the Middle East from before the Cold War, and how this 
miscalculation created blowback that continues to affect US foreign policy today.29  
An ancillary branch of literature that is essential to understanding the Cold War 
covert operations story is that of propaganda, culture and the arts, where religion is often 
situated. Walter L. Hixson first began the exploration of this dimension of the covert 
operations narrative in Parting the Curtain: Propaganda, Culture, and the Cold War, 
1945-1961. Frances Stonor Saunders quickly followed up with a more expansive 
examination in The Cultural Cold War: The CIA and the World of Arts and Letters. A 
decade later, Kenneth Osgood, focusing on the Eisenhower Administration, delved more 
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deeply into the religious dimensions of the cultural Cold War story in Total Cold War: 
Eisenhower’s Secret Propaganda Battle at Home and Abroad.30  
The story of the CIA and covert operations has generated an abundance of books, 
many worth serious scrutiny while others are little more than pulp noir. The research for 
this project focuses on credible academic examinations of covert operations, as well as 
authoritative first-person accounts. The challenge is effectively connecting the dots from 
the Cold War religion story to those in the covert operations story, a task that is not easy. 
Personal Memoirs and Histories 
The third category of essential literature for navigating the religion and covert 
operations story is that of personal memoirs and historical accounts of individuals 
involved in clandestine activities. These primary source materials are valuable in that 
they provide first-person accounts of covert operations, yielding prized details about 
motivations, structures, personnel and outcomes. It is in many of these memoirs that the 
larger story of religion and covert operations is found. However, these insider chronicles 
are not without their limitations and deficiencies.  
In some cases, the veracity and reliability of the author is in dispute. In other 
cases, the passage of time distorts recollections, yielding imperfect details. Inherent 
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biases – personal, political, institutional, or religious – sometimes skew the shape of the 
narrative. Other times, personal memoirs are used to vindicate one’s past actions or to 
rehabilitate one’s reputation. Hopefully, professional editors and publishers catch and 
correct these deficiencies. Nevertheless, sometimes the imperfect survives. Therefore, the 
use of memoirs and personal accounts requires that researchers be discriminating in their 
investigation and analysis, as well as utilize double or triple sources for verification. 
In addition, authors who are current or former CIA employees face the 
professional and legal obstacle of the CIA Publications Review Board (PRB), which 
reviews, edits and sanitizes all non-official print, broadcast and online materials made 
available to the public.31 Complaints about this process are frequent in the prefaces and 
footnotes of CIA employee memoirs. The PRB censorship process is often considered 
tiresome and unfair by authors, as many times, key elements of the narrative are deemed 
‘still classified’ by reviewers and removed over the vehement protests of authors and 
publishers. Because what the PRB frequently expunges are the intriguing and provocative 
portions of the story – the ‘money passages’ for booksellers.   
For example, Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks’ 1974 book, The CIA and the 
Cult of Intelligence, contained 399 passages that the PRB censored and demanded 
removal before publication. Marchetti and the publisher, Alfred A. Knopf, fought back all 
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the way to the US Supreme Court. In the end, only 168 passages were sanitized. To 
demonstrate their dissatisfaction with this process, the authors and publisher chose to 
include in the book blank spaces for all of the 168 sanitized sections and bold-faced type 
for the 231 sections that challenged by the PRB, yet allowed to stand.32 Courts have 
heard court challenges of the PRB process on multiple occasions, but the Supreme Court 
has consistently upheld the authority and validity of the process. Additionally, President 
Gerald Ford in Executive Order 11905 affirmed and clarified the process.33 
In examining personal accounts, it was possible in some cases to conduct first 
person interviews with family members and associates of key figures in the narrative. 
Unfortunately, because of the passage of time, almost all of the principals in the religion 
and covert operations story are either deceased or too infirm to conduct interviews.  
Additionally, authors who interviewed key figures in the religion, Cold War and covert 
operations stories proved helpful in providing insights from their own first-person 
interviews. As well, a few of the authors shared insights, clues, and tidbits from their own 
research that was helpful for this project. In several cases, the authors shared their interest 
in the covert operations stories involving religion that they ran across. However, they 
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confessed that they just did not have time to dig further given the restrictions of their own 
writing projects. 
The first group of memoirs and histories considered are those of politicians and 
government leaders who participated in the formation of the CIA and oversaw the 
expansion of its covert capabilities. Among these figures are Presidents Truman, 
Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson, along with John Foster Dulles, Allen Dulles, George 
C. Marshall, James Forrestal, George F. Kennan, Paul Nitze, Dean Acheson, Charles 
Bohlen, and others. Their personal stories are found in self-penned memoirs, edited 
personal diaries and histories composed by family members and close associates.34 
Rigorously researched group biographies are an increasingly valuable resource in this 
group, including Walter Isaacson and Evan Thomas’ The Wise Men: Six Friends and the 
World They Made, Evan Thomas’ The Very Best Men: The Daring Early Years of the 
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CIA, and Stephen Kinzer’s The Brothers: John Foster Dulles, Allen Dulles, and Their 
Secret World War.35  
George F. Kennan is a key figure in the creation of covert operations capabilities 
for the CIA. The Kennan corpus of literature offers an array of details, from his Pulitzer 
Prize-winning Memoirs to The Kennan Diaries to his official biography by Yale 
University historian John Lewis Gaddis. Of particular note is a journal article by 
Dalhousie University professor, Sarah-Jane Corke, which explores the role of George F. 
Kennan in the CIA’s development of political warfare capabilities.36 
Another group of recollections, which informs this segment of research, is that of 
CIA directors and principals who shaped not only institutional structures, but also 
clandestine strategies, plans and operations. Central to the story of religion and covert 
operations are Directors of Central Intelligence Walter Bedell Smith, Allen W. Dulles, 
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Richard M. Helms, William Colby, George H.W. Bush, and William Casey.37 CIA 
principal actors who are foundational to this segment of the CIA’s history include 
William O. Donovan, Frank Wisner, C.D. Jackson, Edward P. Lilly, Tracy Barnes, 
Desmond FitzGerald, and Frank Lindsay.38 
The most useful group of individuals to unearthing the religion and covert 
operations story is that of the CIA agents and operatives who tell stories, filled with 
mystery and élan, of actual covert operations that involve religion. In some cases, the 
agents provide operational specifics not found elsewhere, which whets one’s curiosity 
and propels one to dig deeper to authenticate the full story. 
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Chief among these operatives is a trio of the CIA’s most influential and colorful 
Middle Eastern agents in the 1940s and 1950s: Kermit “Kim” Roosevelt, grandson of 
President Theodore Roosevelt and the first head of the CIA’s Middle Eastern division; 
Archie Roosevelt, Kim’s cousin and chief of the Beirut station; and Miles Copeland, a 
loquacious, Alabama-born, swash-buckling, jazz-playing, former OSS agent with a gift 
for strategic gamesmanship and operational improvisation. Besides their prized individual 
memoirs, Hugh Wilford skillfully tells the story of this trio as a group for the first time in 
America’s Great Game: The CIA’s Secret Arabists and the Shaping of the Modern 
Middle East. 39 It is Miles Copeland who provides some of the most colorful stories of 
religion and covert operations in the early Cold War, for example, “The Search for a 
Moslem Billy Graham” and “Occultism in High Places.” Copeland is frequently cited by 
other authors because of his vivid and captivating yarns.40 Yet, some scholars and authors 
question the veracity of Copeland’s accounts and, thus, his reliability as a source.41 
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Another agent and partner with Miles Copeland and the Roosevelt brothers in 
Middle Eastern operations was Donald N. Wilber. He was one of the principal architects 
of Operation TPAJAX, the coup d’état that ousted Mossadeq in 1953. Wilber was a 
prolific author and wrote the CIA’s official history of TPAJAX.42 James Jesus Angleton, 
a former OSS agent in Italy, oversaw the CIA’s first official covert operation – rigging 
the Italian Election in 1948 with the help of the Vatican. Edward Lansdale was an Air 
Force General who worked for the CIA in Southeast Asia and Cuba. He recruited and 
handled American doctor Tom Dooley in moving Catholics in North Vietnam to South 
Vietnam to prop up the failing Diem regime. Bill Young was a US missionary in Burma 
and Thailand, who also worked as a CIA agent recruiting, training and leading covert 
operations. He was one of the local leaders of the CIA’s heroin trafficking operation in 
Southeast Asia.43 
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The final group of personal stories concerns religious leaders involved with CIA 
covert operations. The collaboration between the Vatican, Pope Pious XII and the White 
House began in the early days of World War II and continued into the Cold War with the 
Italian Election of 1948. The partnership between the two nation-states expanded as 
“godless Communism” unremittingly devoured one Christian country after another across 
Eastern Europe.44 In America, the charismatic Bishop Fulton J. Sheen and the powerful 
Cardinal Francis Spellman stoked anti-communist passions.45  
Protestant Christians were also involved in CIA activities during the Cold War. 
William Sloan Coffin, later Yale University Chaplain and senior minister of Riverside 
Church in New York City, worked for the CIA for several years before resigning, 
disillusioned by the CIA coup d’états in Iran and Guatemala.46 Edward Elson, senior 
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minister of National Presbyterian Church in Washington, DC, went on several diplomatic 
missions to the Middle East at the behest of President Eisenhower and with the support of 
John Foster Dulles – both members of National Presbyterian. Undoubtedly, these trips 
with foreign heads of state and government officials involved more than diplomatic 
niceties and discussions of religion.47 
One of the most intriguing stories of the CIA’s covert use of religion in the early 
Cold War is the Agency’s collaboration with evangelist Rev. Billy Graham. A few scant 
news reports in the 60s mention that Billy Graham’s South American crusades were paid 
for by the CIA and used to recruit local anti-communist operatives for projects with the 
CIA. This research project investigates and describes this story in detail for the first time. 
The final segment of the religion and covert operations story involves foreign clergy and 
US missionaries contracted by the CIA to work in regions with limited Western access. 
The CIA’s use of clergy and missionaries, along with journalists and academics, was first 
unveiled as a part of the Church Committee hearings in 1975.48 
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Archival Materials and Government Documents 
The fourth category of literature, critical to telling the religion and covert 
operations story, is that of archival materials and government documents. There are a 
number of important collections – published and unpublished, digital and hardcopy, 
online and in dusty archives – which one should investigate in order to properly and 
accurately uncover the religion and clandestine operations story. 
The challenge is to pinpoint the pieces of material relevant to the research project 
within larger, more extensive collections. Some archives and collections are well indexed 
and easily cross-referenced, while others, particularly for less well-known individuals, 
exist in a state of semi-disarray. Either way, the search process is often a needle-in-a-
haystack exercise unfolding over weeks and months of repeated searches with true “aha” 
moments being scarce.  
Furthermore, the search of archives and libraries is not always a linear, one-time-
at-each-location activity. Discoveries in one archival collection often leads to another 
archive that was not on the original research list. As well, later discoveries can lead the 
researcher to return to an already visited archive to re-examine a previously viewed 
collection for documents and clues that one was not aware existed the first time around. 
In some ways, the archival research process resembles a swirling vortex that one hopes 
will end successfully. 
The first stop in the search for official CIA documents is CREST (the CIA 
Records Search Tool) located at the National Archives II (NARA II) in College Park, 




searchable system. From 2000 to 2017, NARA II was the only place in the whole world 
that full-text CIA documents, declassified under the “25-Year Program Archive,” were 
available for viewing. The CREST system at NARA II consists of a massive, air-gapped, 
secure server connected to four desktop computers with accompanying printers in a 
specially designated room. All equipment is marked “Property of the CIA.” CIA 
employees in Langley monitor in real-time who is in the CREST view area and what files 
they are viewing. According to the CIA, “11 million pages have been released in 
electronic format and reside on the CREST database.”49 However, according to 
conversations with the NARA II archivists in charge of the CREST room, the CIA is 
several million pages behind in its declassification protocol to meet compliance 
requirements of the “25-Year Program.”50 The CIA recently announced that as of January 
2017 the entire CREST collection is made available online worldwide to anyone via the 
CIA FOIA Electronic Reading Room.51  
Another collection of particular value is the State Department’s Foreign Relations 
of the United States (FRUS) series, available in hardcopy in major libraries and, 
selectively, online. Initiated in 1861, the FRUS collection spans 450 published volumes 
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of material, with materials from the Truman Administration through the Reagan 
Administration made available digitally online. Of particular note for this research project 
are the National Security Affairs collections of Presidents Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy 
and Johnson, as well as special retrospective collections: Emergence of the Intelligence 
Establishment, 1945-1950; The Intelligence Community, 1950-1955; Iran, 1951-1954; 
Guatemala 1952-1954. The value of FRUS is that it “presents the official documentary 
historical record of major U.S. foreign policy decisions and significant diplomatic 
activity.” This includes a significant amount of declassified documents. 52 
A third collection of strategic value to the corroboration of the history of 
clandestine operations is the National Security Archive “founded in 1985 by journalists 
and scholars to check rising government security.”53 The offices and reading room of this 
archive are at George Washington University in Washington, DC. However, almost all of 
their documents are now available digitally online. The materials in this archive include 
declassified materials copied from government archives, private documents from private 
collections donated to the archive, and, most valuably, classified materials made available 
through Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests, often pursued through the courts 
in order to have the documents released. John Prados directs the CIA Documentation 
Program at the National Security Archives, having turned over many of the materials he 
discovered in his own research, once completing his book projects. 
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Increasingly, digital document collections are available from various publishers 
via online subscription. Many universities make these collections available to students 
and all of them are available on-site at the Library of Congress and the National Archives 
where much of the research for this project took place. The Digital National Security 
Archive by ProQuest provides extensive and valuable sub-collections by topic: Covert 
Operations I & II; Presidential Directives on National Security I – Truman to Clinton; 
U.S. Espionage and Intelligence, 1947-1966; U.S. Intelligence Community – 
Organization, Operations and Management, 1947-1989; The Soviet Estimate – U.S. 
Analysis of the USSR, 1947-1991; CIA Family Jewels.54 In addition, there is the U.S. 
Declassified Documents Online by Gale; the Gale Virtual Reference Library – Cold War 
Reference Library by Gale; Cold War Intelligence Online, 1945-1991 by Brill; U.S. 
Intelligence on the Middle East, 1945-2009 by Brill; and Praeger Security International 
Online – Cold War.55 Some of the materials in these various collections are duplications 
of historical documents available from CREST, FRUS, or NSA-D. Yet sometimes one 
discovers unique, documentary gems that enhances the research and makes the extra 
search worthwhile. 
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One of the invaluable secrets of researching declassified CIA documents is that 
materials often unavailable or sanitized beyond recognition in the CREST and FRUS 
databases are sometimes available in more detail in US Presidential Libraries. Many 
relevant documents for this research project were located in the Presidential Libraries of 
Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, and George H.W. Bush where the author spent 
substantial research time during this project. The Presidential Libraries generally follow a 
reference protocol established by the National Archives and Records Administration. 
Thus, most of the relevant materials can be located among the Presidential Papers, 
National Security Files, or in the Central File. In addition, most presidential libraries host 
additional donated papers of presidential staff members and associates, providing helpful 
supplementary materials. 
University, government and private libraries housing individual collections of 
papers proved a fruitful source of materials for this project. The Library of Congress 
houses the Archibald Roosevelt Papers and the Kermit Roosevelt Papers. Princeton’s 
Mudd Manuscript Library is home to the Allen W. Dulles Papers, John Foster Dulles 
Papers, James Forrestal Papers, George F. Kennan Papers, and William Colby Papers. 
The Georgetown University Archives holds the Richard Helms Papers and the William 
Hood Papers. The most unanticipated and exciting discovery of this project was in the 
Larry Collins Papers in the Georgetown Archives, which contains a previously 
overlooked recording of Miles Copeland discussing his writings and CIA covert 




Some religious archives hold valuable documents related to specific elements of 
this story, particularly missionary and clergy activities connected to the CIA. The Church 
Committee hearings in 1975 exposed this activity and relationship. A number of 
denominations and mission agencies responded to the revelations by making public 
statements denying collaboration with the CIA, by taking official board actions, and by 
contacting the CIA to request face-to-face meetings at headquarters in Langley. 
The most important religious archive accessed for this project is the Billy Graham 
Center Archive located on the campus of Wheaton College in Wheaton, IL. This archive 
is the official repository of the historical materials of Billy and Ruth Graham, the Billy 
Graham Evangelistic Association (BGEA), and of some of the associates of the BGEA. 
The materials in this archive are central to the discussion of Billy Graham’s early 
involvement with the CIA covered in Chapter Four of this document. The BGEA placed 
limitations on access to a number of materials, deemed sensitive, when Rev. Graham was 
alive. Indeed, for access to some folders in this collection, the General Counsel of the 
BGEA in Charlotte, NC had to approve a formal viewing request. 
Conclusion 
Many threads to the religion and covert operations story exist in an array of 
documents and literature. However, no monograph, to date, has attempted to weave 
together the threads into a full-spectrum tapestry revealing the variety of hues and 
textures to the story. No one work has significantly explored the political, theological, 




Although a number of authors have examined the available declassified 
documentary sources, much of the archival evidence remains un-scrutinized from a 
religious-political-intelligence perspective. Further, few authors have explored the 
essential question of whether or not some elements of religious belief and ideology were 
so deeply embedded in the US government’s Cold War policy apparatus – either by 
individuals or institutionally – that CIA covert operations were predisposed to 









MILES COPELAND’S RELIABILITY AS A SOURCE 
In researching the covert operations of the CIA in the early Cold War years, one 
frequently runs across the name of Miles Axe Copeland, Jr., a CIA political operative in 
the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region in the late 1940s and 50s. Authors 
often utilize his spirited stories and recollections to enliven their own historical 
narratives; yet, some authors and CIA colleagues challenge the validity of Copeland’s 
claims.  
Miles Copeland was not one of the patrician, East coast, Ivy-league elites that 
saturated the ranks of the newly formed CIA after the passage of the National Security 
Act of 1947. Instead, he was a flamboyant, Alabama-born, jazz playing, former OSS 
agent with an inventive facility and intuitive capacity for the subtleties of covert 
operations. He prided himself in being a “political operative” so much that he inflated his 
prestige in the title of his absorbing autobiography – The Game Player: Confessions of 
the CIA’s original political operative.1 Copeland was not the CIA’s only political 
operative in its infant years; but surely, he was one of the most colorful – at least in his 
own telling. 
Copeland was as loquacious as he was lively, with a talent for spinning 
captivating yarns about his adventures in the CIA. After retiring from The Agency, he put 
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his garrulousness to work writing books and articles about the CIA and the secret world 
of covert operations. 
In 1975, while the Church Committee was actively investigating the intelligence 
communities of the US government, Miles Copeland wrote a book, Beyond Cloak and 
Dagger: Inside the CIA. The Foreword to the book begins with a statement that some 
might regard as hubris or bombast: 
Annoyed by the inaccuracies and misrepresentations of those highly publicized 
books about the Central Intelligence Agency which have recently monopolized 
space in the bookstores, the Agency’s Chief of Operations remarked to a 
colleague that “At least Copeland’s book puts us in a proper perspective.” 
According to the colleague, the chief wasn’t exactly pleased with my book, 
Beyond Cloak and Dagger, but he did go on to say that it was “the first truly 
authoritative book on the CIA ever written.” 
What a blurb for a dust jacket! I called to ask his permission to use it, but he said, 
“No, but you can say this. It’s positively the last authoritative book that will ever 
be written on the CIA.”2 
In claiming that it was “the last authoritative book” written about the CIA, Copeland 
alludes to the anticipated changes and restrictions forecast resulting from the Church 
Committee hearings. Copeland believed that new rules would restrict individual 
operatives’ ability to tell the truth about their experiences and events during their time 
with the CIA. The “secrecy oath” for employees, Copeland claimed, was “pretty thin 
stuff” and left the US government “naked to our enemies.” Copeland, surprisingly, 
advocated a more rigorous publication review process – “we can no longer leave it to 
individual consciences to decide what should and what should not be revealed to the 
                                                 




general public.”3 This advocacy is curious in that Copeland repeatedly boasts, “I do not 
‘clear’ my drafts with the security authorities of any US or British Government agency. I 
do, however, impose my own security disciplines.” He details his own clearance process, 
which involves sending the manuscript “to two or three friends high in the American and 
British Governments.” If he receives negative feedback – an infrequent occurrence 
according to Copeland – he makes the necessary changes to the manuscript. If he hears 
nothing back, then his account stands. 4 
Other authors do not share Copeland’s confidence in his historical recollections or 
his storytelling. William Blum was a former State Department official who left in 1967 
because of opposition to the Vietnam War. He went on to co-found and be an editor for 
the Washington Free Press; in addition, he authored several books on US foreign policy, 
the CIA, and the Cold War.5 In his notable book, The CIA: A Forgotten History: US 
Global Interventions Since World War 2, Blum challenges the veracity of Copeland’s 
history. Blum states that Copeland’s account in The Game of Nations of the overthrow of 
King Farouk of Egypt in 1952 – including the story of the “Moslem Billy Graham” – is 
“pure crypto-mumbo-jumbo.” In referencing Copeland’s account of the coup in Syria in 
1949, Blum contends that the “tale . . . does not inspire credibility.” 6 Wilbur Crane 
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Eveland, a CIA spy and a Middle East colleague of Copeland, consistently questions 
Copeland’s believability in his memoir, Ropes of Sand. Eveland accuses Copeland of 
lying, “promising all kinds of things beyond his control,” “fawning praise,” and being 
“hard to believe” at times. “I’d already had evidence that Copeland tended to 
exaggerate,” Eveland asserted. Eveland’s reminisces about Copeland are peppered with 
skepticisms.7 
Is Miles Copeland a reliable source of history of the CIA’s covert operations in 
the early Cold War? Is he prone to hyperbole or fabrication? Why do some authors 
regularly cite and quote him when writing about CIA activities in the MENA region? Is it 
because of the credibility of his claims or the tantalizing trajectory of his stories?  
The most important and valuable history written about Miles Copeland is 
America’s Great Game: The CIA’s Secret Arabists and the Shaping of the Modern 
Middle East. Author Hugh Wilford skillfully weaves the story of the covert lives and 
operations of Copeland, Kermit “Kim” Roosevelt, and Archie Roosevelt, who together 
oversaw and conducted almost all of the CIA’s covert operations in the MENA region in 
the early Cold War. Wilford, a professor of history at California State University, Long 
Beach, confronts head-on the question of Miles Copeland’s reliability as an historical 
source: 
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Miles Copeland presents the historian with a problem. . . . In addition to 
disarmingly candid confessions about their author’s personality . . . these works 
also contain extraordinarily detailed accounts of CIA covert operations in, 
among other countries, Syria, Egypt, and Iran, making them an indispensable 
source about the secret history of America’s involvement in the Middle East.  
The trouble is that it is very difficult to know how far one can trust Copeland’s 
writings. Former colleagues, personal acquaintances, and even, tacitly, 
Copeland himself testified to his unreliability. When confronted about one wild 
claim, “he laughed, thought it was terribly funny,” recalled one friend. Indeed, 
the consensus on this score is so unanimous that the skeptical researcher begins 
to wonder if it might not be a bluff concocted by CIA insiders to distract 
attention from Copeland’s essential truthfulness. Then there are other 
possibilities to consider. Perhaps Copeland deliberately mixed fact and fiction 
in order to evade official censorship, a fate that would befall several other CIA 
memoirists. Was there a more mysterious, darker motive, as hinted by Jack 
Philby’s son, the British double agent Kim Philby, who described another of 
Copeland’s controversial books, The Game of Nations, as “itself a move in the 
CIA’s monstrous game”? Or was it simply that Miles Copeland enjoyed telling 
a tall tale, playing games with his readers? Whatever the explanation, this trait 
in Copeland obliges one to tread carefully, cross-checking his assertions when 
other records are available, and acknowledging when there is only his word to 
go on. “Miles Copeland,” the irreverent, rollicking, and thoroughly amoral 
Game Player of Copeland’s own writings, was a splendid literary creation – but 
was he real?8 
Wilford’s assessment of Copeland as an historical source is straightforward and 
incisive. It is one of the few balanced appraisals of Copeland’s reliability. Wilford does 
not say that a researcher should not trust or utilize Copeland as a source, for Wilford’s 
America’s Great Game is replete with citations from Copeland’s books. He does say that 
a researcher should substantiate historical data with corroborating sources, which Wilford 
abundantly provides from interviews with Copeland’s wife, Lorraine, and children, 
Lennie and Miles III. Wilford also interviewed members of the Roosevelt families, as 
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well as Copeland’s CIA colleagues and associates. Moreover, as a skilled historian, 
Wilford makes ample use of primary source documents to verify historical accounts. 9 
In Wilford’s evaluation of Copeland, he speculates about whether “Copeland 
deliberately mixed fact and fiction.”10 The research phase of this project provided an 
unequivocal answer to this question through a most surprising and valuable discovery. 
The Georgetown University Special Collections Research Library houses a highly 
organized, meticulously indexed collection of papers from best-selling author Larry 
Collins. A graduate of Yale, Collins served in the military in Europe in the early 1950s 
before transitioning to a journalistic career with United Press International and later 
Newsweek magazine. He left journalism to begin a long and lucrative career as a writer 
of best-sellers, mostly historical novels.11 
In the late 1980s, Collins wrote a Cold War spy novel – Maze – about the CIA’s 
use of psychic powers and mind control to manipulate its adversaries. As a part of his 
research for the Maze project, Collins arranged to interview Miles Copeland. At their 
meeting, Collins sought to confirm research he had received from other intelligence 
sources and glean additional information from Copeland on CIA psychic operations 
during the Cold War. 
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In the Larry Collins Papers at Georgetown, there is a file with an abridged 
transcript of the interview with Copeland, covering only a very small portion of the 
conversation.12 Fortunately, in an accompanying box, there is a micro-cassette recording 
of the entire meeting between Collins and Copeland.13 Seemingly, Collins wanted a 
record of the conversation to assist with his note taking. The surprising and intriguing 
discovery made while listening to the tape is that Collins made the tape surreptitiously, 
without Copeland’s knowledge or permission.  
At the beginning of the recording, one hears Collins hiding the microphone in his 
clothes; and throughout the recording, one hears the swish-swish of Collins’ clothing 
brushing against the microphone. At no time does Collins acknowledge he is recording 
conversation; and at one point, Copeland challenges Collins about his note taking, stating 
that he wants to see what Collins is writing down. Collins says he is taking very few 
notes and will gladly show them to Copeland. Collins does not mentions the recording. 
This first-ever meeting between the two men took place in November 1986 at the 
Four Seasons Hotel on Pennsylvania Avenue in Washington, DC. Collins and Copeland 
met for drinks in the hotel piano bar and then continued their conversation over a dinner 
of “steak – rare – with fresh asparagus and white wine.” Copeland was animated and 
entertaining throughout their meeting, with a quick, hearty laugh that frequently 
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punctuated the repartee. Copeland’s inquisitive mind and fearless questioning sought out 
as much information from Collins as he gave in return. At points, Copeland exhibited 
caution and restraint with his answers, but he never seems to mistrust Collins.14 
In the course of the conversation, the two men swap stories about their 
experiences as authors and, particularly, how they deal with historical details that elude 
their memories. Copeland, in a moment of transparency and honesty, admits to Collins: 
“There are some of these things that I don’t remember and I’m filling in fictionally.” He 
goes on to claim that when this is the case, “I’m making this clear in the early part of the 
book.” With these words, Miles Copeland incontrovertibly affirms that some details in 
his books are fiction. However, he alleges that when this is the case, he makes it clear to 
his readers – a debatable assertion.15 In the Preface to some of Copeland’s books, he does 
admit to modifying some operational details and occasionally changing names to protect 
classified information and to comply with the publication security requirements of the US 
and British Governments.16 
Miles Copeland was “a thoroughly amoral” man with few religious beliefs or 
practices. Therefore, it is strange that a number of the covert operations that he conducted 
in the MENA region in the early Cold War involved religious themes, elements or actors 
– most famously “The Search for a Moslem Billy Graham,” “Occultism in High Places,” 
and the overthrow of Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana. Perhaps it was his Deep Southern 
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upbringing: “As an Alabaman [sic] who had known holy rollers, shouting Baptists and 
snake-handlers, it occurred to me that maybe, just maybe, there was something about 
these characters to be taken seriously.”17 
It became clear during the research for this project that one could not ignore Miles 
Copeland. As Hugh Wilford correctly affirms, Copeland writes “extraordinarily detailed 
accounts of CIA covert operations” that “constitute one of the most revelatory set of 
writings by a former US intelligence officer ever published.” Copeland’s accounts are 
“an indispensable source about the secret history of America’s involvement in the Middle 
East,” and any serious research project concerned with religion and covert operations 
during the early Cold War must consider them.18 
Therefore, in this research project, the author is careful to cross-reference and 
corroborate sources and information presented by Copeland. All sole source citations of 
Copeland are carefully noted. If other sources confirm Copeland’s accounts or provide 
additional material, the narrative provides an explanation with supporting documentation. 
Copeland’s contributions to the historical record are valuable. One should use them, 
while maintaining fidelity to an historical research methodology.  
In closing, the words of Scottish historian Ted Cowan ring true – “If things are 
not controversial in history, they’re not worth talking about.”19 
                                                 
17 Copeland, Game Player, 3, 148-49. 
18 Wilford, America’s Great Game, 67-68. 
19 After Braveheart, part 1, directed by Maurice Sweeney, written by David Ryan, narrated by Brian 
Cox (Dublin, Ireland: Tile Films & Caledonia TV Production, 15 January 2015). Professor Ted 
Cowan is Emeritus Professor of Scottish History, University of Glasgow. This quote occurs at 1:37:35 





CIA FUNDING OPERATIONS 
On February 26, 1967, the Washington Post printed one of the most effective 
graphics for explaining the CIA pass-through funding operation used to disguise CIA 
money targeted for clandestine operations. This is not an exhaustive list of CIA conduits.1 
Primary Conduits 
The Post graphic lists forty-two foundations, trusts and charitable funds used by 
the CIA as conduits to distribute funds. The Patman Eight funds are noted. 
1. Andrew Hamilton Fund [Patman Eight] 
2. Beacon Fund [Patman Eight] 
3. Benjamin Rosenthal Foundation 
4. Benjamin Rosenthal Fund 
5. Borden Trust [Patman Eight] 
6. Broad-High Foundation 
7. Catherwood Foundation 
8. Chesapeake Foundation 
9. D.J. & W. Baird Foundation 
10. Dodge Foundation 
11. Edsel Fund [Patman Eight] 
12. Florence Foundation 
13. Foundation for Youth and Student Affairs 
14. Gotham Fund [Patman Eight] 
15. Granary Fund 
16. Heights Fund 
17. Hobby Foundation 
18. Hoblitzelle Foundation 
19. Independence Foundation 
20. J. Frederick Brown Foundation 
                                                 
1 Richard Harwood, “O What a Tangled Web the CIA Wove: Cost Likely to Rise High Into Millions,” 
WP, February 26, 1967, E1, E3. For a more detailed explanation, see Chapter 2. Newsweek published 
another graphic illustrating the CIA foundation money trail in Michael Holcomb, “The Pass-Through: 




21. J.M. Kaplan Foundation 
22. Jones-O’Donnell Foundation 
23. Kentfield Fund [Patman Eight] 
24. Littauer Foundation 
25. McGregor Fund 
26. Marshall Foundation 
27. M.D. Anderson Foundation 
28. Michigan Fund [Patman Eight] 
29. Monroe Fund 
30. Norman Fund 
31. Pappas Charitable Trust 
32. Price Fund [Patman Eight] 
33. Rabb Charitable Foundation 
34. Rabb Charitable Trust 
35. Robert E Smith Fund 
36. Rubicon Foundation 
37. San Jacinto Fund 
38. San Miguel Fund 
39. Tower Fund 
40. Vernon Fund (CIA) 
41. Warden Trust 
42. Williford-Telford Fund 
Secondary Conduits 
Fifteen organizations and foundations served, according to the Post graphic, as 
the secondary conduits to further disguise and direct the CIA funds: 
1. African American Institute 
2. American Council for the International Commission of Jurists 
3. American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees 
4. American Friends of the Middle East 
5. American Newspaper Guild 
6. American Society of African Culture 
7. Committee of Correspondence 
8. Farfield / Littauer / Florence 
9. Fund for International Social and Economic Education 
10. Hobby Foundation 
11. Institute for International Labor Research 
12. International Development Foundation 




14. National Student Association 
15. Operations and Policy Research 
Below is the complete graphic from the Washington Post article. On the following pages 










































































CIA POLICY ON CLERGY AND MISSIONARIES  
DECEMBER 14, 1988 
Below is a reproduction of the CIA policy as of December 14, 1988 on “Relations 
with Clergy and Missionaries.” DCI William Webster referenced this policy in a meeting 
with Keith Parks, President of the Foreign Mission Board of the Southern Baptist 
Convention, at a meeting in Webster’s office on November 9, 1988. A letter sent to Parks 
from CIA General Counsel Russell Bruemmer on November 14, 1988 also mentioned the 
policy. Bruemmer stated to Parks in the November 14 letter that the “policy is 
unclassified,” and therefore Parks requested a copy “for our files.” In a letter to Parks on 
December 14, 1988, Bruemmer attached the policy statement reproduced here. 1 
   
(e) Relations with Clergy and Missionaries (U) 
(1) No relationship will be established with any U.S. clergy or missionary, whether or 
not ordained, who is sent out by a mission or church organization to preach, teach, 
heal, or proselytize, except as otherwise provided in this regulation. Any CIA use 
of a U.S. clergy or missionary who is not made aware of CIA sponsorship of the 
activity, or any use of a person’s status as a member of the clergy or a missionary 
to provide cover for any CIA activity or assignment, is prohibited. (U) 
(2) Open relationships with clergy (for example, contracts to perform translating 
services or to lecture at training courses) are permitted. Open relationships are 
characterized by a willingness on both sides to acknowledge the fact and nature of 
the relationship to senior management officials of the organizations involved. (U) 
                                                 
1 “Attachment to letter from Russell Bruemmer to Keith Parks,” December 14, 1988, Southern Baptist 
Convention Foreign Mission Board Archives, Richmond, VA. See also, “Letter from Russell 
Bruemmer to Keith Parks” and “Letter from Keith Parks to Judge William Webster,” both November 




(3) Unpaid relationships with clergy who voluntarily and wittingly maintain contact 
for the purpose of providing information on matters of foreign intelligence or 
foreign counterintelligence interest to the U.S. Government will continue to be 
permitted. If, in the determination of the DDO, such individuals might possess 
important foreign intelligence information or be in a position to assist the Agency, 
contact may be initiated to afford an opportunity for channeling this information 
to the U.S. Government. (U) 
(4) American church groups will not be funded or used as funding cutouts for 
intelligence purposes. (U) 
   
The four points of this statement reveal, though not in chronological sequence, the 
progression of CIA policy during the Cold War regarding relations with clergy and 
missionaries. Point ONE reflects commitments made in the February 11, 1976 Bush 
memo and the subsequent May 14, 1976 expanded CIA policy statement. Point TWO 
reflects the 1977 accommodation made by DCI Turner with the CIA’s Joint Publications 
Research Service and the lawsuits threatened by the missionaries employed by the JPRS. 
Point THREE reiterates the ongoing policy exception made during DCIs Bush, Turner, 
Casey, and Webster tenures (1976 through 1991 and following) allowing for the 
voluntary collaboration of clergy and missionaries with the CIA. Point FOUR reflects the 
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